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Santiago de Chile 
November 1953 
Sir, 
In 1951, at its fourth session, held in Mexico City, the Economic Commission 
for Latin America adopted resolution 20 (IV), requesting the Executive Secretary 
to make a continuing study of inter-Latin-American trade as a whole, in its 
diverse regional aspects and with a view to its expansion. It was further recom-
mended that special attention be given to the relationship between inter-Latin-
American trade and complementary development of national economies for 
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Janeiro in April 1953. This report analyses the trade between seven countries 
of the southern zone of Latin America, representing more than 80 per cent of 
all the trade between the Latin-American countries. 
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trade which will cover the whole of Latin America. 
Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration. 
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Economic Commission for Latin America 
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Chapter II 
SUMMARY OF THE CONCLUSIONS 
1. Introduction 
The Economic Commission for Latin America has 
been concerned with the development of inter-Latin-
American trade since its first session, held in Santiago 
in June 1948. Attention was initially concentrated on 
the financial aspects of developing this trade, in an 
effort to find the means for establishing a multilateral 
payments system between Latin-American countries.1 
At the third session, held in Montevideo in June 1950, 
the attention of the Commission turned to the main 
factors affecting inter-Latin-American trade. The 
Commission considered that the limited capacity of 
individual domestic markets to absorb higher manu-
facturing output constituted a serious obstacle to any 
such increase and recommended that Latin-American 
governments, in adopting measures to raise manufac-
turing output should "take into account the possibili-
ties of expanding demand through reciprocal trade, 
in order to achieve a better integration of their econo-
mies and higher levels of productivity and real in-
come" (E/1762, resolution E/CN.12/194). 
During the fourth session, held at Mexico City in 
June 1951, there was considerable discussion of the 
relationship between economic development and inter-
Latin-American trade, and two resolutions were 
adopted in this connexion. The first, relating to the 
economic development of Central America, was pre-
pared and presented by the delegations of Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
(resolution 9 (IV), E/2021).2 By the second (resolution 
20 (IV), E/2021), the Executive Secretary was re-
quested "continuously to study inter-Latin-American 
trade as a whole, and in its diverse regional aspects, 
with a view to its expansion" and "to continue giving 
special attention to the study of the relation of inter-
Latin-American trade to the co-ordination of national 
economic units within over-all plans for joint and 
harmonious development". 
In view of the very wide scope and complexity of the 
subject, this resolution made it advisable that the 
work completed to date should be presented at the 
1 During the first session a resolution (E/CN.12/72) was passed, 
requesting the International Monetary Fund to undertake a 
study of the possibilities for instituting a multilateral clearing 
system in Latin America. This study was presented to the second 
session, in May-June 1949, it included, inter alia, that "multi-
lateral clearing by itself is likely to contribute to an expansion of 
trade only as part of a regional payments scheme in which mem-
bers are prepared to extend special credits to each other, or can 
call on an outside source of foreign exchange if it is needed to 
help countries that are net creditors within the group to convert 
their surpluses for use elsewhere". At the same session, the 
Uruguayan delegation suggested the establishment of an inter-
American clearing agency, but this proposal was not approved 
by the Commission. 
2 See Progress Report on Economic Integration and Reciprocity 
in Central America (E/CN.12/296), which describes the work 
being carried out there by the Commission. 
fifth session in Rio de Janeiro, as the first stage of a 
study embracing the whole of Latin America. 
During this initial stage, the study was confined to 
trade between the seven southern countries, namely, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay.3 These countries are situated in a geographi-
cal area of dissimilar, yet complementary, natural 
characteristics, which has resulted in the development 
of a mutual trade representing more than four-fifths 
of the value of all commerce between the Latin-
American republics. Nevertheless, for the future of 
this study and until the entire region has been covered, 
one factor must be underlined. Despite the high pro-
portion of all inter-Latin-American trade carried out 
in the southern zone, this area has commercial ties 
and outstanding possibilities for greater trade with 
other Latin-American countries outside the zone. 
Examples of these ties may be found in the trade which 
has developed between Chile and two other countries, 
Cuba and Ecuador, due, among other factors, to 
differences of climate and produce, as well as direct 
shipping lines. Although Chile and Ecuador are 
situated in different geographic areas, for many years 
there has been a relationship, hitherto uncommon in 
Latin America, passing beyond the limits of trade 
alone to actual financial co-operation. This has per-
mitted an increase in Ecuador's tropical fruit produc-
tion for Chilean consumption, and upon this a stable 
mutual trade between these two countries has been 
based. Two examples of the latent possibilities be-
tween different geographic areas include the Vene-
zuelan petroleum supplies available to some of the 
southern republics, and certain Mexican non-ferrous 
metals which are suitable for industrial requirements 
in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Notwithstanding, due 
solely to the time factor and methods, this study has 
been limited to the southern zone of Latin America, 
where inter-Latin-American trade is mainly concen-
trated. 
In preparing this analysis, an examination was made 
of official documents and other trade in the southern 
zone, such as treaties, payments agreements, statistics, 
exchange systems, etc. To provide a correct interpre-
tation of these data, which would allow for certain 
conclusions of value in directing isolated trade policies 
towards concerted action, further research was under-
taken. Direct inquiries were thus addressed to govern-
ment officials, government and private banks, cham-
bers of commerce, exporters and importers, as well as 
producers and manufacturers. 
Part I of this report summarizes the results of this 
research and examines the structure of intra-zonal 
trade. It discusses certain general barriers which must 
be removed if trade is to prove a satisfactory basis for 
3 Referred to elsewhere in this document as the "southern 
zone". 
3 
bringing the economies closer together. After present-
ing a brief outline of the basic trade characteristics, 
the report analyses the policies of the southern repub-
lics in respect to their reciprocal trade and examines 
the structure of payments, underlining some of the 
problems of monetary parities, price differentials, ad-
justment of balances and other factors. Finally, this 
part of the study discusses the effects which transport 
by ships registered in Latin America has both upon 
trade within the zone and upon the ability of locally 
produced goods to compete within the area, when 
carried by sea. 
Part II of the study is concentrated upon specific 
foodstuffs and industrial raw materials which are, or 
could be, traded between the countries of the southern 
zone. Production and consumption prospects and 
practical problems delaying the disposal of surpluses 
are examined. Finally a description is given of how 
trade relations and economic reciprocity would be 
assisted if the structural elements referred to in part I 
(those basically determining the conditions for the 
movement of goods and services) were the object of 
practical agreements aimed at stimulating the eco-
nomic development of Latin America. 
2. Principal features of inter-Latin-American 
. trade in the southern zone 
As may be observed from this study, the traditional 
structure of trade between the seven southern repub-
lics is defined by the different policies adopted by the 
individual participants. Argentina, Brazil and Peru 
appear in the zonal market, with varying degrees of 
importance, as suppliers of foodstuffs. The other four 
countries, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, 
resort to the market to obtain essential foodstuffs, for 
which domestic production is inadequate or entirely 
lacking. 
The trade in foodstuffs has a tendency which is 
frankly unfavourable to diversification. This trade, 
since the pre-war period, has tended to be limited to 
basic items such as wheat, sugar, meat, stimulants 
and fats, apart from the large fruit trade between 
Argentina and Brazil. Certain items, such as vege-
tables, cereals, rice, potatoes, pastes and preserves, 
etc., formed a valuable part of the trade only a few 
years ago, but now they no longer comprise an appre-
ciable share. This is due to the expansion of both 
secondary crops and food industries in the various 
countries of the group. Trade in foodstuffs, represent-
ing 70 per cent of the total zonal trade in 1934-38, fell 
to approximately S3 per cent in 1946-51. This, how-
ever, was in part due to the fact that the food-deficit 
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received from Argentina, in other parts of the world, 
because of Argentine price policies in 1946-48 and the 
lack of exportable surpluses in 1952. 
Apart from these temporary events and the un-
favourable trend towards diversification of food ex-
ports, foodstuffs dominate the trade pattern. In coun-
tries having a food deficit, the population growth, 
urban expansion, improvements of real income and to 
some extent the efforts for a better utilization of 
increased incomes, all influence the problem of under-
consumption. They raise domestic food requirements 
at a greater rate than that of the plans to attain self-
sufficiency. Between the pre-war period and 1953, 
increasing domestic demand in countries supplying 
foodstuffs has risen more rapidly than their production 
of wheat, sugar and meat. Since agricultural extension 
programmes have not significantly altered this trend, 
trade within the area, apart from fluctuations due to 
the varying success of development plans and climatic 
or world market conditions, depends upon the gap 
between production and consumption. To date, this 
resulted in a stronger bargaining position for the sup-
plier countries. 
Apart from exceptional cases, the trade balance in 
the zone shows an almost continuous deficit for food-
importing countries, since they are unable to supply 
a sufficient reciprocal amount of the products essential 
to the economies of their trading partners. In order 
to avoid larger adverse balances, therefore, the debtor 
countries must limit their purchases to essentials and, 
at times, must restrict the purchase of new products. 
Thus trade expansion within the zone is closely related 
to eliminating the basic causes of such disparities. 
On the whole, there have been signs of improvement 
in the differences shown in bilateral trade imbalances 
and in the degree of importance or the necessity for 
traded products. Since the pre-war period, the com-
position of trade shows an increase in exports of indus-
trial raw materials from the food-purchasing countries. 
This trade, which was only 10 per cent of the total value 
of all zonal trade in 1934-38, has risen to more than 
20 per cent at present, the improvement being mainly 
due to a greater demand for cotton and lumber and 
to a lesser degree for copper, nitrates and, more re-
cently, iron. Lumber is practically the only commodity 
showing a real increase in production, rather than a 
mere shift in the usual export destination.4 In the case 
of lumber, the present favourable trend in the southern 
zone also indicates that exports depend almost entirely 
upon Argentine purchases, which are under continuous 
pressure from European softwood supplies. 
Although Latin America is one of the largest world 
exporters of copper, some countries in the area en-
counter considerable difficulty in obtaining sufficient 
quantities, due mainly to deficiencies in payments 
mechanisms. Some progress, however, has been 
achieved. The principal exporter, Chile, has changed 
the system formerly used by foreign producer com-
panies to distribute copper, and now arranges the 
sales directly, thereby permitting their incorporation 
into the negotiation of trade treaties. Brazil, which 
imported less than its industrial requirements of copper 
in 1951 and 1952, is seriously considering the substi-
tution of aluminium from domestic bauxite in its 
electric installations. However, the extent of this re-
placement will depend upon the amount and regu-
larity of future copper imports. 
Among the raw materials, Chilean nitrate has al-
most trebled its importance since the pre-war period, 
especially because of the rapidly increasing Brazilian 
demand for fertilizers. In 1952, the clearing account 
balance between the two countries showed an accumu-
lated surplus resulting from fertilizer sales, which 
exceeded the exchange required for Chilean imports 
from Brazil. It will thus be necessary either to increase 
Brazilian exports to Chile or to find a multilateral 
method of liquidating the balance, if the latter is not 
to remain dormant. Increasing nitrogen requirements 
have also led to projects for synthetic nitrate produc-
tion in Brazil, although this is currently prohibited 
under the terms of an agreement between the two 
countries, for some time to come at least. 
4 Over the medium-term, similar results might also be caused 
by an increase in the trade in certain iron and steel items. 
4 
Apart from the five items mentioned—cotton, lum-
ber, copper, nitrates and iron—-the other raw materials 
show a decline compared with 1934-38. If the value 
of exports of these five commodities is subtracted 
from the total value of raw material exports to the 
zone, the remaining raw materials accounted for 
approximately 4.7 per cent of total exports in 1934-38, 
and only 2.7 per cent in 1946-51. Among the raw 
materials which are losing ground, or showing only 
slight progress, the position of sulphur is paradoxical 
and illustrates how price problems can impede zonal 
trade. In 1934-38, the combined annual sulphur con-
sumption of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay was a 
little over 25,000 tons, while present requirements are 
closer to 120,000. A reliable estimate places Brazilian 
consumption in 1955 at approximately 150,000 tons. 
Despite this remarkable expansion and the vast 
deposits in the southern zone of Latin America which 
have been worked for many years, regional trade in 
sulphur is declining, since these three countries prefer 
to import from other parts of the world. Brazil is also 
testing the use of pyrite deposits and the processing of 
pyritous residue from coal-washing. The Argentine 
search for self-sufficiency involves the working of 
volcanic deposits at high altitudes. The high price of 
the Chilean and Bolivian product, in comparison with 
the world market, has prevented sulphur from pro-
viding a valuable contribution to the trade of the 
southern zone. Within the same group of raw mate-
rials, the slight increase in the trade of non-ferrous 
metals, excluding copper, is due to the fact that the 
tin and, to a lesser extent, the zinc produced in the 
zone are not of the grades mainly required by domestic 
consumer industries. 
It is of interest to examine the trade composition of 
important raw materials and their progress since the 
pre-war period. Generally speaking, this indicates that 
the influence upon zonal trade exercised by the greater 
demand for industrial raw materials—an essential 
corollary to manufacturing expansion—has not yet 
caused any stimulus to raise production, with the 
exception of lumber. In the case of the remaining items 
where trade has increased, such as cotton, copper and 
nitrates, the market offered within the zone is only a 
substitute for other traditional export markets. For 
various reasons, including the price and the type of 
material available, the greater demand created by 
economic development has had little effect upon the 
trade in other raw materials. 
The zonal trade in finished goods shows a well-
defined tendency. Since the immediate post-war years, 
the lists of goods marketed in various bilateral chan-
nels generally show a marked reduction, especially in 
the number of items and also, in many cases, in their 
value. Although import restrictions are usually im-
posed because of balance-of-payments difficulties, and 
this is always the nominal reason, the basic cause of 
the decline appears to be the diversification of each 
country's domestic industry and the rapid measures 
for tariff protection which typically follow the estab-
lishment of new industries. In the principal countries 
of the southern zone, therefore, it is a general practice 
to reserve the domestic market, often indiscriminately, 
to local products of many different kinds. Many of 
these small industries are necessarily uneconomical, 
since their scale of operations is limited by the small 
available market. Typical examples are hypodermic 
syringes and needles, precision scales, certain radio 
components and sports equipment, which are manu-
factured from imported raw materials in several coun-
tries. Other industries in which there has been similar 
investment, such as the manufacture of cellulose fibres, 
plastics and rubber articles, frequently have machinery 
lying idle because their productive capacity far exceeds 
local demand. 
During the past five years measures restricting im-
ported manufactured goods, or which nominally limit 
their entry, have frequently been lifted to allow the 
import of items similar to domestic products, or those 
for which exchange facilities at the official rate are not 
normally granted. In all cases, however, such goods 
were acquired with exchange derived from exports 
which are difficult to place in world markets. Two 
examples are provided by Brazil and Chile, where such 
linked operations have provided an appreciable source 
of supply for manufactured goods during recent years. 
Since such imports depend upon exporting goods that 
are difficult to sell, and which generally find a market 
in Europe or the United States but not in the region, 
Latin-American countries have remained outside the 
trade in such manufactured goods. Furthermore, in 
compensatory trade agreements with European coun-
tries, part of the merchandise exchanged for Latin-
American exports must necessarily consist of manu-
factured goods, including items the import of which 
is normally prohibited. For these and other reasons, 
countries of the southern zone now participate less in 
supplying other Latin-American countries with high-
grade woven goods, household textiles, clothing, toilet 
articles, glassware and ceramics, household and medi-
cal electrical apparatus, school articles, sports goods, 
and even certain pastes and food preserves. Such items, 
inasmuch as their entry is permitted, are usually im-
ported from outside the region. Although certain trade 
agreements between countries within the zone have 
included manufactured goods, difficulties in regard to 
prices, and, on occasions, methods of payment, often 
hampered their fulfilment. 
To summarize, an examination of the structure and 
composition of inter-Latin-American trade in the 
southern zone establishes that, during the last fifteen 
years, such trade has tended to be limited by geo-
graphic causes, thus eliminating or postponing possible 
development due to economic factors—including ad-
vantages of comparative costs. Since the declining 
influence of economic factors directly concerns com-
mercial policy and payments mechanisms, this study 
examines the relative influence of both in the present 
situation. 
3. Problems of trade policy and payments 
The trade policy of countries which are funda-
mentally exporters of foodstuffs and raw materials, 
as are most of the Latin-American countries, must 
primarily aim to ensure stability and favourable con-
ditions for the sale of their products in world markets. 
By means of tariff agreements, formerly the controlling 
factor in overseas trade, it was ensured that products 
exported to world markets were not subject to heavier 
duties than similar items from other sources. Recipro-
cal treatment was thus accorded to imports from 
Europe and North America as consumers of Latin-
American commodities. In addition to these main 
agreements, there were others covering inter-Latin-
American trade, giving certain tariff advantages based 
upon proximity or climatic differences. Products not 
classified in the preferential tariff list were in the 
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majority, especially manufactured goods. These re-
ceived the same treatment as similar items from other 
parts of the world, according to the most-favoured-
nation clause. 
Since the 1930 crisis, trade policy has been moving 
away from tariff agreements and now relies more upon 
State intervention in the form of payment agreements, 
differential exchange rates, allotment of quotas, pro-
hibitions and so on. In the southern zone of Latin 
America, trade policy has made increasing use of these 
methods during the last ten years to foster commercial 
agreements based upon exchanging specific quantities 
of equally important goods, to meet careful long-term 
forecasts or at times because of temporary shortages. 
These same methods sometimes permitted a regional 
preference, even benefiting trade in goods that were 
covered by the most-favoured-nation clause. However, 
the obstacles caused by inequalities in exchange rates, 
non-observance of parities, non-competitive prices, 
transport costs and other factors, prevented these 
efforts from yielding any concerted benefits, and indeed 
often invalidated them. Furthermore, certain trade 
barriers have restricted commerce within the southern 
zone to a greater extent than the larger flow of trade 
between Latin America and other parts of the world. 
Extra-regional trade, because of its size, was more 
elastic in adapting itself to rapid changes in exchange 
regulations, quotas, prohibitions, approval or refusal 
of permits, and so forth. Inter-Latin-American trade 
has a weaker structure and, without any wide-spread 
organization to maintain continuity between supply 
and demand, it suffered severely from the frequent and 
short-lived changes in the regulations. This insecurity 
reacts adversely upon commercial operations. In addi-
tion, it tends to discourage investment in new indus-
tries, or the expansion of existing ones, whose export-
able surplus could increase trade. Such changes in 
regulations thus react to the detriment of industrial 
expansion and economic development. 
Since 1949, trade policies of the countries in the zone 
have moved in different directions as a result of an 
event of international importance. As may be seen in 
chapter III, some countries in the southern zone have 
concluded multilateral agreements under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), while others 
have not. This divergence places them in different situ-
ations for mutual preferential agreements (of the type 
to which trade policy has inclined in recent years) and 
for import restrictions, either to defend the balance of 
payments or for economic development. Since those 
joining the GATT enjoy specific tariff and other bene-
fits for their basic exports to the world market, they 
must obtain its approval for any proposed regional 
preference, or for restrictions which might prejudice 
the rights of other members. Those countries remain-
ing outside the GATT may grant any preference, or 
apply any restrictions, compatible with their existing 
bilateral agreements. 
Until the depression of 1930, the system of payments 
for intra-regional trade had all the characteristics of 
free-trade operations. Nonetheless, large accounts 
tended to accumulate because of unequal bilateral 
liquidation, serving to restrain the development of 
trade relations. Primary products and other goods 
traded on the basis of comparative costs nonetheless 
resulted in large net surpluses and deficits in all bi-
lateral channels. In 1928, for example, Peru exported 
goods for a value of over 31 million dollars to the six 
other countries in the zone, while imports from them 
barely totalled 3 millions. Conversely, Chile imported 
23 and exported less than 7 millions. Argentina and 
Brazil had very high balances in their bilateral trade, 
although their aggregate balances within the southern 
zone were relatively small. 
The collapse of the multilateral payments system, 
resulting from the world depression, and subsequent 
compensation agreements between European and 
Latin-American countries, restricted the flow of for-
eign exchange which countries of the region had 
previously used to cover adverse balances in their 
mutual trade. The resources, which would have 
been available in the future for this purpose, were 
confined to those obtained from areas trading in 
convertible currencies. Consequently, the restrictions 
suffered by inter-Latin-American trade could not 
be offset by the mechanism of compensatory pay-
ments to which the republics of the southern zone 
also submitted their mutual trade. The basic causes of 
the inequality apparent in the various bilateral trading 
channels remained unchanged. Thus, since it was nec-
essary to continue to settle non-compensatory balances 
with assets from other areas, which were decreasing 
substantially, bilateral compensation of inter-Latin-
American trade in no way counterbalanced the break-
down of the multilateral payments system. Trade 
within the zone, which in 1946-51 rose to an average 
f.o.b. figure of 396.5 million dollars annually, showed, 
in the same period, an average of 15.9 million dollars 
per year in unliquidated balances. Difficulties in set-
tling these balances had long deterred studies on the 
possibility of establishing a multilateral compensation 
agreement for Latin America. Recently, the detri-
mental effects resulting from difficulties in benefiting 
from blocked assets, as well as other defects in the 
payments structure, have revived regional interest in 
such studies. However, there has been a tendency to 
liquidate only the amounts resulting from trade in 
products of equal priority. In practice, this tendency 
results in the establishment of two accounts; one for 
basic, and the other for secondary or non-essential 
items. The creation of a clearing system in Latin 
America is therefore complicated, among other factors, 
by the problem of determining a common criterion as 
to the essential or secondary importance of traded 
foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactured goods. 
The experiences of government officials in treaty nego-
tiations show how widely individual national opinions 
may differ in this respect. 
The elimination of other payments defects would 
also remove barriers to the flow of trade. As may be 
seen from chapter IV of this study, there are many 
defects having wide repercussions on trade. These 
include: the non-observance of a monetary parity; the 
lack of prior definitions in ad hoc inter-governmental 
agreements, for example, as to whether the value of 
all goods covered by a specific trade agreement should 
be balanced in the corresponding compensation ac-
count, or whether some should be settled in hard cur-
rency; the system of surcharges, whereby a higher 
price may be fixed for goods paid through a compensa-
tion account (even if exchanged for goods of equivalent 
importance) than for the same items paid in United 
States dollars; the adjustment of balances in convert-
ible currencies, which at present applies equally to 
receipts from basic and secondary goods; the lack of 
credit incentives facilitating the entry of regional 
goods; and finally the absence of measures (such as 
re-export or multilateral operations) to maintain an 
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equilibrium when a balance accumulates in each 
bilateral compensation account. 
Research into these problems has led to the formu-
lation of some possible solutions for most of the south-
ern zone countries, as indicated in chapter IV. How-
ever, a more detailed study would be necessary to 
determine whether these would prove effective under 
present trade conditions. 
4. Ocean transport 
Ocean transport, closely related to trade and pay-
ments policies, is an important factor both in the 
movement of goods in the southern zone of Latin 
America and in the competitive capacity of these 
goods in the regional market. 
Approximately 80 per cent of the intra-zonal move-
ment of merchandise is effected by sea. Almost three-
quarters is transported in foreign vessels capable of an 
average speed of more than 15 knots. The remainder 
is carried by vessels of zonal register. For the latter, 
in lines which sail to the northern hemisphere from the 
River Plate, on the Atlantic coast, and from Val-
paraiso, on the Pacific, without passing through the 
Straits of Magellan, speed, cargo capacity and the 
utilization of freight space are similar to those of 
European and United States vessels. There is therefore 
little difference between the shipping rates. Local mer-
chant fleets, however, whose regular route is through 
the straits, have a smaller cargo capacity, a speed in 
most cases of only 10 or 11 knots and in general are 
working under less favourable conditions than the 
foreign vessels. There is no need to emphasize the effect 
this has upon the competitive capacity for their cargo. 
Goods sent from the southern Atlantic countries to 
those on the southern Pacific coast have a much 
higher value than the reverse traffic. In 1951, exports 
from Argentina and Brazil to Chile and Peru averaged 
196.4 dollars per ton, while those from Chile and Peru 
to Argentina and Brazil averaged only 97.1 dollars. 
For this reason the trade imbalance between the two 
groups, traditionally in favour of the Atlantic coun-
tries, had previously coincided with nearly the same 
volume of cargo carried in both directions. Since 1946, 
when declining Argentine exports improved the bal-
ances of Chile and Peru to a point where they finally 
showed a credit, the amount of cargo has varied in-
versely with the movement of the trade balance. 
Consequently, ships must now travel from the Atlantic 
to the Pacific with only a small cargo. Services are 
becoming less regular, while freight rates have in-
creased by 25 per cent. 
In addition, other influences affect freight rates. 
They include the presence of "outsiders" or "tramps" 
offering low rates for cash payment in dollars; the 
lack of agreements between countries in the zone, to 
avoid the disparity of exchange rates applied by each 
country to goods carried by national vessels; and the 
effect of certain bilateral agreements, whereby some 
of the countries divide their ocean freight as equally 
as possible. 
Because of the complexity of the subject and the 
lack of available information, the chapter covering 
the main effects of ocean transport upon inter-Latin-
American trade may be regarded as only a first 
approach to the subject. Nevertheless, it is sufficient 
to show how certain questions such as freight charges, 
exchange rates for freights and co-ordination of ship-
ping enter into the general problems of trade policy. 
5. Trade policy and the future of 
inter-Latin-American trade 
To conclude this introductory review of the principal 
features of trade within the southern zone of Latin 
America, it becomes clear that no problem is more 
important to the economic integration of this area 
than that of trade policy. To date, economic develop-
ment has only partially stimulated trade in raw mate-
rials, while, to a certain extent, it has even restricted 
that of manufactured goods. I t is obvious that, for 
the trade in raw materials, supplementary agreements 
covering specific items could encourage specialization 
and substantially increase the demand which is at 
present confined to the requirements of isolated 
domestic industries. Another result might be a reduc-
tion in the current non-competitive prices for the 
exportable surplus. It is easy to envisage the broad 
effects that specialization could have upon zonal 
trade. In addition to reducing the drain on foreign 
exchange caused by imports of certain basic products, 
it could assist in the development of many industries 
on a regional scale. These might include mechanical 
and chemical pulp, rayon, vinyl resins and plastic raw 
materials, dyes and pigments, pharmaceutical goods, 
crop protectives such as insecticides, fungicides and 
pesticides, ink for high-speed printing and many 
others. 
The weakness of the trade in manufactured goods 
also indicates the urgency for remedying the existing 
situation. At present, regional products may compete 
in their own market with similar goods produced in 
countries of higher productivity. But the imports often 
enjoy additional advantages, resulting from their ex-
change for items difficult to export. Complementary 
output in certain manufacturing lines, as in raw mate-
rials, would alleviate the financial and technical prob-
lems that are beyond domestic solution, and would, 
through multilateral agreements, allow for the devel-
opment of industries benefiting the regional economy. 
For certain commodities, which are becoming increas-
ingly more important in the foreign exchange budget, 
considerable financial resources could thus be applied 
to economic development and the encouragement of 
inter-Latin-American trade. In the case of antibiotics 
(to which might be added sealed units for refrigerators, 
domestic electrical appliances and many others) the 
amount involved for this medical item in Chile alone 
represents 4.9 million dollars in the foreign exchange 
budget for 1953, or the.equivalent of 81 US cents per 
capita. 
The future organization of inter-Latin-American 
trade can thus contribute substantially both to the 
economic development of individual Latin-American 
countries and to the region as a whole. It will largely 
depend upon the extent to which the traditional fea-
tures of trade policy can be adapted to future circum-
stances. It is also essential that solutions applied to 
unequal trade between various Latin-American coun-
tries should not be of the restrictive type predominant 
among countries using exchange controls as a means 
of reducing bilateral balances. On the contrary, there 
should be an incentive for trade expansion within 
some form of multilateral contact. Trade policy may 
either cause inter-Latin-American commerce to decay, 
as a result of economic growth, or may use it as a spur 
to such growth. It is indeed difficult to find a common 
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viewpoint for trade policy among the Latin-American 
countries. Commitments with other areas, the recon-
ciliation of internal regional trade interests with those 
of the large consumers of regional exports, and the 
impact which certain measures for expanding trade 
would have upon established domestic industries, must 
all be taken into account. Obstacles to the free play 
of economic factors in inter-Latin-American trade and 
the uncertainties affecting such trade, in a zone where 
more than four-fifths of it is concentrated, are of 
fundamental importance, meriting the united atten-
tion of the Latin-American republics. 
Chapter II 
CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADE BETWEEN COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTHERN ZONE 
OF LATIN AMERICA 
1. Introduction 
Statistics compiled by the Economic Commission 
for Latin America clearly indicate the importance of 
inter-Latin-American trade in each of the geographic 
zones of Latin America. Although the figures in table 1 
refer to 1948-49, when the total f.o.b. value of this 
trade reached an annual average of 522.1 million 
dollars and 387.5 millions for the southern zone of the 
region, they are nonetheless representative of the 
present position. This may be seen by comparing the 
figures with averages established for 1946-51. 
T A B L E 1 . P E R C E N T A G E IMPORTANCE O F I N T E R - L A T I N -
A M E R I C A N T R A D E B Y GEOGRAPHIC ZONES 













Mexico, Central America and 
Caribbean 52.7 25.6 21.7 100.0 
Colombia, Venezuela, Ecua-
dor 9.1 9.8 81.1 100.0 
Southern zone 5.0 6.6 88.4 100.0 
TOTAL, LATIN AMERICA 9.6 8.5 81.9 100.0 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
Table 1 shows that four-fifths of inter-Latin-
American trade is localized in the countries of the 
southern zone. It also demonstrates that this zone 
purchases approximately 80 per cent of the exports 
to Latin America from Colombia, Venezuela and 
Ecuador on the one hand, and 20 per cent of those 
from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean on 
the other. From another viewpoint, this table indicates 
that, of total exports to Latin America from the 
southern zone, approximately 90 per cent goes to its 
own constituent countries, which, in addition, provide 
markets for over 80 per cent of inter-Latin-American 
exports. 
During 1946-51, when the average f.o.b. value of 
inter-Latin-American trade (southern zone), 396.5 mil-
lion dollars, reached a figure closely approaching that 
for 1948-49, the percentage value of trade between the 
seven southern countries, in relation to the rest of their 
trade and pre-war levels is shown in table 2. 
Like table 1, this reveals the extraordinary impor-
tance of the southern zone in inter-Latin-American 
trade, although the relationship between intra-zonal 
trade and its trade with the rest of Latin-America shows 
some decline when compared with the pre-war period. 
T A B L E 2 . P E R C E N T A G E I M P O R T A N C E O F I N T R A - Z O N A L 
T R A D E 
(Annual average of f.o.b. values) 
For exports to For imports from 
Latin Latin 
America World America World 
1934-38 . . . . 96.0 8.2 90.4 12.2 
1946-51 . 89.9 12.0 86.2 14.5 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
This is mainly due to the drop in Peruvian petroleum 
exports to the zone and to the more or less corre-
sponding increase in petroleum imports from Vene-
zuela, outside the zone: 
In contrast with the great importance of intra-zonal 
trade itself, as compared with inter-Latin-American 
trade, table 2 shows that the former is rather small in 
relation to the trade of the zone with the whole world. 
During 1946-51 it only amounted to 12 per cent of 
the zone's total exports and 14.5 per cent of total 
imports. In the years since 1934-38 a small but de-
cided improvement may be noted in the zone's capa-
city to purchase the exportable products of its 
constituent countries. 
2. The structure of trade 
Reciprocal trade within the southern zone has 
always been dominated by the unequal distribution 
of food production in the respective countries. There 
is a continual and marked discrepancy in intra-zonal 
trade, between countries supplying foodstuffs and 
those obliged to import them in order to meet essential 
food requirements. This is evident in most of the 
bilateral trade and, despite some exceptions, generally 
results in an adverse trade balance for those countries 
lacking wheat, sugar, meat and fats. The traditional 
pattern of this commerce shows that the main reason 
for the disparity between the values of the goods ex-
changed in either direction is that countries with 
food shortages have found it impossible to provide 
their suppliers with a sufficient volume of equally 
essential goods. 
This is clearly shown by figures given in the follow-
ing tables.1 Table 3 illustrates the part played by the 
different republics of the zone in reciprocal foreign 
1 It was necessary for the purposes of this study to know how 
trade in the southern zone had developed until recently. Quantum 
statistics were not available for some countries of the group after 
1949, and since these are essential for determining the exact 
position of each product at constant prices, it was decided to use 
current prices. Although this method makes it impossible to 
gauge the influence of the particular price trend for each product, 
it does furnish data sufficiently representative of the prevail-
ing trends. 
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trade. Argentina and Brazil are such decisive factors 
that of the total intra-zonal exports—which as already 
stated rose to an annual average of 396.5 million 
dollars in 1946-51—these two republics together con-
tributed 72.5 per cent. Adding the 12 per cent supplied 
by Peru, the next most important exporter country, 
it is seen that three of the seven countries within the 
zone were responsible for 84.5 per cent of total exports, 
while the other four together contributed only 15.5 
per cent. Since exports from the three countries 
accounting for such a high percentage of the total are 
based upon a few products, the general level of intra-
zonal trade is very sensitive to any fluctuations among 
such commodities. They are wheat, stimulants, 
sugar and, of lesser importance, meat, fruit and fats. 
Although imports are more evenly distributed, Argen-
tina and Brazil also predominate in that field, pur-
chasing 60.1 per cent of the total within the zone. 
T A B L E 3. INTRA-ZONAL TRADE VALUES AND BALANCES 
(F.o.b. values in millions of dollars) 
Average 1934-38 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Peru Uruguay Totals 
Exports to the zone. . . . 45.5 1.1 21.3 4.4 2.3 11.1 9.2 94.9 
Imports from the zone. 28.1 3.9 35.4 8.7 3.7 4.6 10.8 94.9 
Net balances +17 .4 - 2 . 8 - 1 3 . 8 - 4 . 3 - 1 . 4 + 6 . 5 - 1 . 6 ± 2 3 . 9 
Average 1946--51 
Exports to the zone 162.3 2.6 125.1 36.5 11.5 47.7 10.8 396.5 
Imports from the zone. 133.8 19.1 104.4 65.2 12.6 20.9 40.5 396.5 
Net balances +28.5 - 1 6 . 5 +20.7 - 2 8 . 7 - 1 . 1 +26 .8 - 2 9 . 7 ± 7 6 . 0 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
(a) SUPPLIER COUNTRIES 
Argentina ranks first among those members of the 
zone acting as principal suppliers to the common 
market. Before the war, its export values to the zone 
amounted to 47.9 per cent of the total trade. By 
1946-51 these had fallen to 40.9 per cent, due to 
reductions in wheat sales. Imports, on the other hand, 
which before the war amounted to only 26.6 per cent, 
rose in 1946-51 to 33.7 per cent, thus showing a 
relative and absolute strengthening of Argentina's 
purchasing position.2 It necessarily entailed a certain 
decline in the level of its visible trade balances. Before 
the war, Argentina enjoyed favourable balances in 
all its bilateral trade channels, except with Uruguay, 
where they were generally adverse because of large-
scale imports of sand for building. This position was 
modified, as table 3 shows, during 1946-51. The high-
est proportion of Argentina's intra-zonal trade is with 
Brazil and this has shown a certain tendency towards 
equilibrium, possibly due to consecutive agreements 
regulating the volume of trade which the two countries 
conduct through an appropriate clearing system. 
In contrast to pre-war conditions, the average bal-
ance of this trade in 1946-51 generally favoured 
Brazil. On the other hand, the decline of sand imports, 
together with certain other factors, gave Argentina 
a favourable trade balance with Uruguay. In the 
remaining sectors, Argentina maintained its tradi-
tional position as a creditor country, but on a reduced 
scale. 
Brazil is second among the supplying countries. 
Unlike Argentina, however, its exports are increasing 
while the relative importance of imports from the 
2 If in 1946-51 the countries of the group had imported from 
Argentina the wheat they obtained from other parts of the world 
(because of Argentina's high prices and its lower exportable sur-
plus), and if Argentina had increased its imports from them in the 
same proportion (61.9 per cent of the wheat value), then Argen-
tine exports for 1946-51 would have risen to 44.9 per cent, and 
imports to 34.6 per cent. Even under these conditions, therefore, 
there would have been a definite improvement in Argentina's 
purchasing position. 
zone is decreasing. This is partly because, during 
1946-51, Brazil at times bought wheat from the 
United States, Canada and France that was formerly 
obtained from Argentina. Exports to the zone, which 
amounted to 22.5 per cent before the war, rose in 
1946-51 to 31.6 per cent. Due to the reversal of 
Brazil's trade balances with Argentina, however, 
imports dropped from the pre-war figure of 37 per 
cent to 26.3 per cent in 1946-51. Simultaneously 
Brazil became a creditor for the entire zone with the 
exception of Chile, where it became a debtor. The 
latter was due mainly to increased purchases of 
Chilean nitrate and to a reduction in Chile's imports 
of Brazilian raw cotton and textiles. 
Peru occupies third place among the supplying 
countries, its position having remained unchanged 
since before the war. Formerly, as at present, exports 
amounted to approximately 12 per cent of the value 
of intra-zonal trade, while the percentage for imports 
was 4.8 per cent before the war and 5.3 per cent in 
1946-51. The disequilibrium of these figures is evident 
from the credit balances with Bolivia, Chile and 
Uruguay, principally due to sugar sales, with cotton 
taking second place. These balances are, however, 
weakened by the trade deficit with Argentina, where 
Peru buys wheat, meat and other foodstuffs, and also 
by the decline in petroleum exports. 
The importance of the zonal market differs con-
siderably for each of the supplying countries. Before 
the war, this market absorbed 8.4 per cent of Argen-
tina's entire exports, rising to 12.6 per cent in 1946-51. 
For Brazil, these percentages were 7 and 10.1 per cent 
respectively, and 14 and 30 per cent for Peru. The 
zone has thus become of prime importance for Peru's 
foreign trade. 
(,B) IMPORTING COUNTRIES 
Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay are basically importers 
from the zone, chiefly in order to supply their domestic 
markets. To them must be added Peru, since it is an 
importing country as regards Argentina. 
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Of the first three, Chile's imports are the highest, 
their value amounting to 16.5 per cent of zonal 
imports in 1946-51, as against 9.2 per cent before the 
war. Its zonal exports, however, have increased at a 
faster rate than imports, having risen from the pre-
war figure of 4.6 per cent to 9.2 per cent in 1946-51. 
This is mainly due to greater sales of copper and 
nitrate and, since 1950, products of the new Chilean 
steel industry. Although Chile has favourable trade 
balances with Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, 
its dependence on Argentine meat and on Peruvian 
sugar and cotton cause the net total to be negative 
with the zone as a whole. 
Uruguay's imports show a slight downward trend 
while at the same time, exports are losing ground. 
For imports, there are marked fluctuations in the 
annual figures due to periodic purchases from Argen-
tina of wheat and cattle on the hoof, the latter for 
processing and re-export. Purchases of lumber, coffee 
and maté from Brazil have been relatively stable. 
The decline in exports is chiefly due to the fall in 
traditional sand exports to Argentina. In absolute 
values, Uruguay recorded the highest deficit in intra-
zonal trade, averaging nearly 30 million dollars a year 
between 1946 and 1951. With the exception of Bolivia, 
this balance is favourable to all the other members 
of the group and particularly to Argentina, Brazil 
and Peru. 
Bolivia's imports have remained fairly stable since 
pre-war years, whereas exports are declining. Invari-
ably, there are adverse trade balances with every 
other country in the zone, particularly with Argentina, 
the chief supplier of foodstuffs. Paraguay, an im-
porting rather than an exporting country, has shown 
little change since 1934. There is almost always a 
deficit, especially with Argentina and Brazil, but 
Uruguay is an exception, since Paraguay supplies 
lumber and cotton for sale there. Despite the small 
value of Paraguay's share in total intra-zonal trade, 
this commerce is more important for Paraguay than 
for any other within the zone. During 1946-51, the 
zone bought 41.6 per cent of Paraguay's exports and 
supplied 39.1 per cent of the imports. 
In brief, the opposing tendencies shown by the 
principal supplying countries, Argentina and Brazil, 
to increase and restrict their purchases within the 
zone, seem linked to the apparent temporary reduc-
tion in Argentine wheat exports. There is, however, a 
genuine though moderate improvement in Argentina's 
position as a consumer, chiefly due to its increased 
purchases of lumber from Brazil, Chile and Paraguay. 
Since the position of Peru, the other supplying coun-
try, remains stationary and there has been little vari-
ation in the tendencies of the importing countries, it 
may be assumed that the changes observed in 1946-51 
reveal small, though significant, advances along the 
line of development that would be achieved by intra-
zonal trade if the supplying countries would increase 
the relative importance of their imports without 
lowering their export levels. 
3. Breakdown of trade 
The basic features of the breakdown of intra-zonal 
trade are shown in table 4. 
T A B L E 4 . B R E A K D O W N OF INTRA-ZONAL T R A D E 











Foodstuffs 65.8 69.3 210.5 53.1 
Raw materials" 9.9 10.4 82.3 20.7 
Fuels' 7.2 7.6 13.4 3.4 
Manufactured goods 
and miscellaneous.. . 12.0 12.7 90.3 22.8 
TOTAL 94.9 100.0 396.5 100.0 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
• Annual average 1946-50. 
(A) F O O D S T U F F S 
The breakdown of the intra-zonal trade in foodstuffs 
shows the effects of domestic programmes for agri-
cultural diversification and the clear tendency to limit 
exports to the more essential foodstuffs. Although 
wheat is sometimes purchased from areas other than 
Argentina, the trade in foodstuffs remains at a high 
level, despite some decline compared with the pre-war 
period. While the value of all intra-zonal exports in 
1946-51 rose by 317.8 per cent over the pre-war figure, 
the value of exports of important foodstuffs rose by 
242.8 per cent during the same period. Table 5 sum-
marizes the general features of this trade. 
T A B L E 5 . INTRA-ZONAL T R A D E IN IMPORTANT FOODSTUFFS® 
Value of exports • 
Percentage of foodstuffs of foodstuffs to zone Percentage of exports 
in millions of dollars of foodstuffs within total exports 
(annual average) to zone to zone 
1934-38 1946-51 1934-38 1946-51 1934-38 1946-51 
Argentina 
Bolivia. . 
Brazil. . . 




























SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
* Sugar, oils and fats, cocoa, coffee, fruit, cattle, wheat and flour, and maté. 
Table 5 shows the predominance of foodstuffs in the 
zonal trade, indicating that three countries alone 
supply 96 per cent of the imports of essential food-
stuffs within the zone. The other four countries to-
gether account for only 4 per cent. 
Apart from the foodstuffs covered in table 5, com-
prising the principal items in which trade is steadiest, 
there is additional intra-zonal trade in other food 
products. The amounts involved are of secondary 
importance within the total and cover such items as 
rice, malted barley, preserved goods, pastes, sheep, 
pulses, potatoes and a few others. The average annual 
value of combined trade in these products during 
1946-51 amounted to 16.6 million dollars, as against 
9.7 million dollars in 1934-38. The relative importance 
of post-war trade in this group of foodstuffs has been 
practically halved, falling from 9.7 per cent of total 
trade before the war to 4.2 per cent in 1946-51. This 
was mainly due to the decline in rice exports from 
Brazil and Chile and of pulses from Chile, their 
markets in Argentina and Uruguay having been re-
stricted as a result of agricultural diversification in 
those countries. 
Total trade in foodstuffs in the southern zone, 
taking both groups together, represented 69.3 per 
cent of the value of aggregate trade in the pre-war 
years and 53.1 per cent in 1946-51, when it amounted 
to f.o.b. payments equivalent to 210.5 million dollars.3 
Expressed in current values, this amount would have 
had to average 274 million dollars a year during 1946-
51 for trade in foodstuffs to have remained at the 
same relative level as before the war. The influence of 
specific foodstuffs on the general trade structure re-
quires a brief explanation of certain features; such an 
explanation is also necessary to understand the prob-
lems described in subsequent chapters. 
Wheat is the most important commodity, not only 
for the intra-zonal trade in foodstuffs, but also in the 
pattern of reciprocal trade among the constituent 
countries. Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Peru, and 
sometimes Chile, do not produce sufficient wheat to 
meet their domestic requirements. As a result they 
purchase large quantities within the zone, particularly 
from Argentina and, to a lesser extent, from Uruguay. 
The wheat trade during 1946-51 represented more 
than a fifth of the entire value of intra-zonal trade. 
When the republics having wheat shortages can ob-
tain supplies from Argentina, their payments mecha-
nism with that country enables them to cover at least 
part of the value of their purchases with their own 
commodities. When they have to resort to a third 
party, however, they are obliged to pay dollars for the 
entire purchase. It is also difficult, if not impossible, 
for them to sell, on other markets, some of the goods 
delivered as part payment to Argentina. This is spe-
cifically the case with lumber exports from Brazil, 
Paraguay and, to a lesser extent, from Chile, to 
Argentina. Moreover, the transfer of wheat purchases 
to other parts of the world, as explained in the chapter 
on ocean freight, tends to decrease even further the 
freight moving from the South Atlantic to the South 
Pacific. The disparity between this and the return 
traffic is another factor disrupting the regularity of 
shipping services in this part of the continent. 
s The actual figures are undoubtedly somewhat higher, since, 
in addition to the foodstuffs included in the statistics forming the 
basis of this study, there are others of marginal importance or 
included in frontier traffic. The latter may be conservatively 
estimated at 2 per cent of the total trade in foodstuffs. 
Wheat consumption in the five countries showing a 
deficit reached an annual average in 1946-51 of 2.9 
million tons, of which their own production amounted 
to 1.4 million tons. They were thus obliged to import 
1.5 million tons, at an average value of 155 million 
dollars a year. Within this total, imports from the 
zone covered 830,000 tons a year, with a value equiva-
lent to 97.7 million dollars annually. In this same 
period, 1946-51, Argentine exports to the zone were 
14 per cent of the total volume of its wheat production 
and 32 per cent of the value of its exports to all parts 
of the world. 
In 1952 the decline in Argentina's exportable sur-
pluses obliged the five countries suffering from deficits 
to import their wheat from other markets. These 
purchases amounted to 1.8 million tons, at a cost of 
204.4 million dollars.4 The consequent heavy decline 
in foreign-exchange holdings, experienced by these 
countries, shows the extent to which their balance of 
payments would be undermined if wheat were regu-
larly included among the goods to be paid for entirely 
in dollars. Brazil's wheat imports from Canada and 
the United States represented almost half its pending 
commitments in the visible trade account with the 
dollar area during the year ending December 1952, 
or approximately 300 million dollars. While Brazil 
bought wheat in North America and was obliged by 
a decree in the middle of 1952 to halve its sawmill 
output of pinewood for export to Argentina, its com-
pensation account with Argentina was accumulating 
an inactive credit balance almost equivalent to 60 
million dollars. The corresponding value in cruzeiros 
had already been delivered to Brazilian exporters 
through credits extended by the Banco do Brasil. 
When Chile bought wheat from Canada and the 
United States, its exporters encountered difficulties 
on the Santiago free exchange market in converting 
the credits received from their exports to Argentina 
into Chilean pesos. Moreover, the deterioration in 
Chile's balance of payments caused by paying 28 
million dollars for North American wheat, plus other 
outlays arising from similar commitments of the pre-
vious year, led to a series of restrictive measures on 
imports during the second half of 1952. These included 
the suppression of the system whereby import permits 
were not required for goods classified within the so-
called "free area". In Paraguay, the purchase of North 
American wheat and the lack of timber sales to 
Argentina not only contributed to the exhaustion of 
monetary reserves, but also necessitated a loan of 
800,000 dollars from the United States in order to 
finance a part of the wheat purchases. 
Within the whole foodstuffs group, stimulants— 
comprising cocoa, coffee and maté—absorbed 8.5 per 
cent of the value of intra-zonal trade in 1946-51, and 
accounted for average annual payments of 33.6 million 
dollars. Of this proportion, cocoa represents one per 
cent, coffee 5.3 per cent and maté 2.2 per cent. The 
first two showed an improvement over the pre-war level 
and the third a decrease, mainly due to the steady 
decline in Argentine purchases from Brazil, from 
34,000 tons in 1937 to slightly over 16,000 in 1951. 
Although the Argentine maté plantations, cultivated 
in "Misiones since the beginning of the century, are 
sufficient to supply the entire domestic demand—-
which stood at 130,000 tons in 1951—production is 
restricted by a quota system. This, in effect, has 
4 Bolivia, 5.4 millions; Brazil, 140; Chile, 28; Paraguay, 7; 
Peru, 24. 
reserved part of the Argentine market for Brazil and 
Paraguay, in accordance with their requests as ex-
pressed in the respective trade agreements. Argentine 
imports from Paraguay, like those from Brazil, have 
also declined, from 5,600 tons in 1946 to only 1,400 
in 1951. 
In 1941, as a result of a trade agreement, Argentina 
and Brazil came to an understanding which protected 
Brazilian maté exports from the risk of eventual com-
petition by the Argentine product on the Chilean mar-
ket. When this agreement expired, Argentina began to 
export maté to Chile. During 1946-51, these exports 
covered 6.3 per cent of Chilean consumption, which 
averaged 8,300 tons a year during that period. During 
the first few months of 1952, there was a sudden rise 
in such Argentine shipments to Chile, amounting to 
3,100 tons for the year, resulting from the more favour-
able exchange rate granted by Argentina to its maté 
exporters. This led the authorities of the Instituto 
Nacional do Mate in Rio de Janeiro to reduce the 
12-cruzeiro-per-kilogramme tax on exports of this 
product by 50 per cent, to avoid losing the connexion 
with the Chilean market. Sales were renewed during 
the second half of the year, and Brazil's exports to 
Chile for that year amounted to 11,145 tons. 
Tea produced in Brazil was exported to Chile for 
the first time in 1952, in a sample consignment of 
81 tons. 
Sugar absorbed 7.5 per cent of intra-zonal trade 
during 1946-51, with average annual values of 29.5 
million dollars. Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay produce 
no sugar, and thus are consistent importers of this 
commodity. Sugar-cane is grown in Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Peru. Their total annual production 
approaches 2.6 million tons, which is equivalent to 
the entire southern zone consumption. 
During 1946-50, sugar imports by Bolivia, Chile 
and Uruguay averaged almost 209,000 tons a year. 
Peru was the principal exporter, followed by Brazil, 
these two countries supplying 76 per cent of the 
requirements of the three importers. The remainder 
came from Cuba, with small amounts from the Domin-
ican Republic and some countries outside the region. 
Chile, under a trade agreement signed with Cuba in 
1952, agreed to purchase 60,000 tons of sugar a year 
at world prices. Under this agreement, Chile was able 
to reduce the dollar outlay for sugar imports from its 
northern neighbour, since, unlike Cuba, Peru imports 
relatively little from Chile. 
Cattle and chilled and frozen meat are regularly 
exported by Argentina and Uruguay, while Paraguay, 
exports only canned meat. These items entailed pay-
ments of nearly 20 million dollars a year in intra-zonal 
trade during 1946-51. While such payments repre-
sented only about 10 per cent of the trade in foodstuffs, 
cattle were important in some bilateral sectors, par-
ticularly in Argentine-Chilean trade where they have 
long held a key position. 
Per capita consumption in the zone corresponds to 
the pattern of the meat trade among the countries 
involved. Argentina and Uruguay, the main suppliers, 
show high consumption figures of 76.2 and 73.5 kgs. 
per capita respectively. Paraguay, which is also an 
exporter, but not to the zone, consumed 50.6 kgs. per 
capita in 1951. This was a decrease of 5.1 kgs. in rela-
tion to pre-war statistics. The respective consumption 
totals in Brazil, Chile and Peru were 17.9, 20.0 and 
31.7 kgs. The problem of protein deficiencies in these 
three latter countries is evident from the low figures 
for beef supplies, which determine their need to import. 
In Chile, aggregate meat consumption, including 
beef, mutton, pork and goat meat, has declined con-
siderably during the last ten years, falling from 31.2 
kgs. per capita in 1940 to only 25.8 in 1950. The decline 
in supplies is partly due to the drop in sales of live 
sheep from Argentine Patagonia to the Chilean refrig-
erating plants in Magallanes. Until 1946, about half 
a million Argentine sheep were added annually to the 
slaughter of Chilean animals. During the past five 
years, the six refrigerating plants at Argentine ports 
south of latitude 42 have been obliged to extend their 
purchases to the foothills of the Cordillera, despite the 
long trail over which the animals must be driven. This 
has resulted in a decrease in exports of sheep from 
that region to Chile, the total in 1951 having fallen 
to a fifth of the 1946 figure. The export quota set by 
Argentina in 1953 is 300,000 head of sheep. 
Fresh and dried fruit constituted 4.4 per cent of the 
value of intra-zonal trade in 1946-51. Trade during 
that period reached an annual average value of 17.4 
million dollars, mainly covering exports of temperate-
zone fruit from Argentina, and Brazilian bananas, 
pineapples and oranges. Both countries, consolidating 
their long-standing trade in these products, signed a 
far-reaching fruit agreement in June 1950. Its chief 
clause consisted in eliminating the import permit re-
quirement previously needed for each fruit consign-
ment. Producers are thus no longer prone to uncertain-
ties and eventual losses because of the perishable 
nature of the fruit, which cannot be subjected to the 
delays involved in obtaining import permits. The 
higher exchange rate which Argentina gave its export-
ers has also helped to increase this trade. Nevertheless, 
some difficulties appear to have arisen owing to the 
short period for the agreement, which is limited to one 
year and is not automatically renewable. In 1949, 
Argentina supplied 34,000 tons of apples, pears and 
grapes to the large Brazilian market for temperate-
zone fruit, the total for the year from all sources being 
42,000 tons. In 1951, following the previous fruit agree-
ment, Argentina supplied nearly 67,000 of the 81,000 
tons of these particular items imported by Brazil. 
Chile's share of the intra-zonal fruit trade, in 
1946-51, amounted to nearly 2 million dollars a year, 
chiefly based on exports to Brazil, to Peru and to a 
lesser extent to Uruguay, particularly of prunes. 
Brazilian bananas were first exported to Chile in 1952 
in a trial consignment of 1,000 tons and have favour-
able prospects. 
Among important foodstuffs, edible oils and fats 
play a more modest role in intra-zonal trade, despite 
a dietary deficiency of fats in all the countries except 
Argentina and Uruguay. These two countries supply 
a part of the demand in the other five countries. Brazil 
has occasionally sent fairly large consignments to 
Chile. Total imports of edible oils and fats by the five 
countries with deficits averaged 21,000 tons annually 
in 1946-51, at an approximate value of 16 million 
dollars. Of this amount, 11,000 tons, representing 
nearly 6 million dollars, came from Argentina and 
Uruguay, and the remainder from Europe and the 
United States. 
(B) R A W MATERIALS 
Most of the basic industrial raw materials traded 
within the southern zone are exported by countries 
deficient in foodstuffs. Since the intrinsic weakness of 
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intra-zonal trade, as seen above, appears to lie in the 
differing ability of the various countries to satisfy 
their individual requirements through such trade, it 
is of value to note the composition and evolution of 
this trade since 1939 and in particular the trade 
designed to supply countries exporting foodstuffs. 
Table 4 shows that raw materials represented some 
40 per cent of the value of foodstuffs in intra-zonal 
trade during 1946-51. A considerable advance in the 
relative importance of raw materials may also be 
noted, since they rose from 10.4 per cent of total trade 
before the war to 20.7 per cent in 1946-51. In the 
latter period, raw materials comprised annual average 
payments of 82.3 million dollars. 
Table 6 summarizes the changing position of various 
raw materials and of two fuels in intra-zonal trade. 
Moreover, it indicates that the increased value of 
their trade, by contrast with the decline in foodstuffs, 
is mainly due to lumber, despite the higher relative 
expansion of copper and cotton. It also shows that 
there has been some slight progress in the diversifica-
tion of the export trade in raw materials, since zinc, 
iron and steel have now been added to the pre-war 
commodities. 
Within the raw materials group, the increasing de-
mand for cotton, due to expanding textile industries 
in the southern zone, has raised this product's impor-
tance in intra-zonal trade. Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay in 1946-51 imported an annual average of 
almost 21,000 tons from all sources. The cotton-
exporting countries in the zone, Brazil and Peru, con-
tributed 67 per cent of this total. 
Lumber is the most important raw material traded. 
It is also second in importance, after wheat, of all 
T A B L E 6. INTRA-ZONAL TRADE IN PRINCIPAL 
RAW MATERIALS AND FUELS A 
(Annual average of f.o.b. values in thousands of dollars) 
Exports to Per- Exports to Per-
the zone centage the zone centage 
in of the in of the 
1934-38 total 1946-51 total 
Raw materials 
Of agricultural origin: 
Non-edible oils and 
fatsb 57 0.1 953 0.2 
Cotton 395 0.4 9,697 2.4 
Wool, hides and 
bristle 751 0.8 4,265 1.0 
Lumber 2,716 2.9 41,509 10.5 
UC11U , 495 f\ c \J . yj 1,629 0.4 
Seeds 932 1.0 — — 
Of mineral origin: 
Sand and s t o n e s . . . . 1,652 1.7 1,110 0.3 
Sulphur 185 0.2 274 0.1 
Copper0 142 0.1 12,529 3.2 
V-CIXiCIlL o — 244 0.1 
Tin, lead and zinc. . . 339 0.4 2,612 0.6 
Iron and steel — .— 4,479 1.1 
Nitrates 255 0.3 3,233 0.8 
Fuels 
Coal 295 0.3 713 0.2 
Petroleum 6,861 7.2 12,649 3.2 
TOTAL 15,078 15.9 95,896 24.1 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
• Intra-zonal trade exists for other raw materials. However, 
they are less important, being estimated at 10 per cent of the 
value of those in the table. 
b Include some of mineral origin. 
0 Includes manufactured goods. 
commodities in intra-zonal trade and is almost the 
only one where production has increased because of 
greater trade. Lumber transactions in 1946-51 aver-
aged 41.5 million dollars a year, more than a third of 
the total value of the zonal trade in raw materials, 
excluding foodstuffs. In contrast to the sizeable value 
of lumber exports, however, its position is weakened 
by the fact that sales depend mainly on one market, 
Argentina. 
Until 1949, the main types of lumber exported by 
Brazil, Chile and Paraguay to Argentina differed in 
each case. This permitted specialized use of the lumber 
in Argentina for certain well-defined purposes: Bra-
zilian pine for construction scaffolding, Chilean rauli 
for cabinet work and cedar from Paraguay for building 
timber. Since 1951, when Argentina gave Chile the 
same customs treatment granted to Brazilian pine 
after 1941, Chilean pine appeared in Argentina in 
fairly large quantities. This pinewood, however, 
scarcely affects the market for the Brazilian variety, 
since Chile's exports are mainly sent to the Andean 
provinces of Argentina, near the Chilean frontier. In 
1946-51, Argentina purchased 75 per cent of Brazil's 
pinewood exports, and 69 and 80 per cent, respectively, 
of Chile's and Paraguay's total lumber exports. In 
these three countries, the curve of aggregate lumber 
exports closely follows any fluctuations in Argentine 
purchases. These imports decisively influenced the 
level of zonal lumber activity and this is clearly illus-
trated by the drastic reduction in the output of pine-
wood from Brazilian sawmills, as a result of the drop 
in sales to Argentina. In Chile, the adverse effects on 
lumber production of the decline in domestic building 
activity were partly offset by increased exports to 
Argentina, the quantum of which rose by 50 per cent 
between 1949 and 1951. 
Copper is the most important raw material of 
mineral origin. Its trade is beginning to show the 
pressure of economic development towards increasing 
self-sufficiency within the region, in so far as essential 
goods are concerned. Although the value of copper 
exports was less than a third of lumber, its intra-zonal 
trade has increased relatively more since the pre-war 
period. Furthermore, its position in the trade pattern 
shows fundamental changes. Chile is now able to in-
clude copper in its trade agreements, since the system 
whereby the large foreign mining companies dis-
tributed copper abroad has been gradually changed 
to one whereby the state acquires the entire output 
and makes the exports. The inclusion of copper and 
the decisions as to the volume to be exported have 
acted as decisive factors in the conclusion of trade 
agreements between Argentina and Chile, as well as 
between Argentina and Peru. 
Other common non-ferrous metals play a very small 
part in intra-zonal trade. The factor limiting trade 
under this heading is apparently that some zonal 
metals (apart from copper) are produced in forms un-
suitable for the requirements of consumer industries. 
This is particularly the case with tin. Countries in the 
zone can obtain the raw material from Bolivia to pro-
duce solder and metal for bearings, but not the pure 
arsenic-free metallic product required for tinplate in 
which to preserve foodstuffs. Brazil and Chile import 
tin in increasing quantities from other regions.5 
5 Brazil requires approximately 1,000 tons of tin for making 
tinplate, and Chile 400 tons, annually. A smelter has been built 
at Volta Redonda, Brazil, with a capacity for refining 2,500 tons 
a year of domestic tin oxide. 
The small trade in Peruvian electrolytic zinc is due, 
firstly, to the low requirements of the principal pur-
chasing industry which produces alloys for manufac-
turing bronze and, secondly, to the fact that plants 
for galvanizing iron prefer to use fire-refined zinc. This 
is produced in Mexico and is usually cheaper than 
Peruvian electrolytic zinc. 
In the case of lead, republics in the zone mainly 
satisfy their requirements by importing Mexican pig 
lead, although some electrolytic lead is purchased from 
Peru. Apart from its uses in welding, sanitary installa-
tions and some other marginal items, it provides a 
small amount of the raw materials for specialized 
manufacturing activities. Moreover, the long-estab-
lished Argentine refining industry buys lead concen-
trates from the La Quiaca region in Bolivia and those 
produced in Chile by a lead-zinc mine close to the 
frontier at Aysen. Output from the latter will be 
processed at a metallic-zinc plant to supply the 
Chilean market.6 
The decline in the trade of sulphur shows a marked 
contrast to the progress of industries using this deposit, 
particularly those producing superphosphates which 
account for most of the zonal sulphur consumption. 
This weakening of trade is mainly due to difficulties 
in Chile, the principal zonal producer, in quoting 
sulphur from high Andean deposits at world prices. 
Due to the distances and to difficulties in transporting 
the fuel required for thermal processing of the ore, 
among other factors, its costs are higher than quota-
tions for the Texas product, which Argentina, Brazil 
and Uruguay usually import. 
Chilean nitrate is acquiring importance in the trade 
pattern, particularly through the increased demand of 
Brazilian agriculture. Purchases by Brazil in the last 
two years resulted in the accumulation of balances in 
the payments mechanism between these countries. 
These balances exceeded Chilean importers' demand 
for foreign exchange to buy Brazilian products and 
therefore remained partly inactive. There were also 
increased Chilean nitrate exports to Argentina, al-
though on a smaller scale, these being used only for 
fruit-growing and for some marginal crops. 
(C) FUELS 
Table 6 shows that the importance of petroleum has 
been halved since 1939. Stationary Peruvian output, 
coinciding with an increased domestic demand, has 
affected Peru's petroleum exports to the southern zone. 
During 1946-51, Bolivia exported an annual average 
of 12,873 tons of petroleum products to Argentina. 
Agreements by both countries concerning the con-
struction of the Yacuiba-Santa Cruz railway, to be 
financed with an Argentine loan, were intended to 
increase the volume of the petroleum trade. Since 1951 
Chile has sold crude oil, obtained from wells in Tierra 
del Fuego, to Uruguay. These are emergency exports 
6 This project is still under study, with no final decisions having 
yet been made. 
which will cease when the refinery at Concón, near 
Valparaiso, has been completed. 
Coal is imported by Argentina from Chile and Peru. 
Chilean exports, mainly consisting of fines, averaged 
nearly 23,000 tons a year in 1946-51, slightly lower 
than the pre-war figure. Exports from Peru, under a 
vigorous development programme, consist of anthra-
cite produced primarily for delivery to Argentina in 
part-payment for wheat. This trade was conducted on 
the basis of return freights, but collapsed in 1952 when 
Argentina failed to produce a wheat surplus. In 
1946-51, sales of Peruvian anthracite to Argentina 
averaged 31,011 tons a year. This total should be 
substantially increased in the future, under the Peru-
vian programme for expanding exports to the Argen-
tine market. 
(d) MANUFACTURED GOODS 
Official statistics are inadequate to judge the general 
evolution and trends of the trade in manufactured 
goods within the zone. The different standards fol-
lowed in each country to classify the products which 
might be grouped under this heading make it difficult 
to form a broad basis for comparison, without under-
taking detailed work within each series of national 
statistics. They were, however, the basis for the re-
marks in chapter I concerning the position of certain 
manufactured goods in the bilateral trade of some of 
the countries. It should, however, be noted that official 
statistics, covering lists of goods traded by different 
countries in the group, show that products in the initial 
stage of industrial development are gradually being 
excluded as between pre-war and present periods. Such 
products are leather goods, wooden appliances, textiles 
for home use and prepared foods. It can also be seen 
that during 1945-50 this same elimination process 
affected various manufactured goods which had 
lengthened the trade lists during the Second World 
War. In particular, the following articles have lost 
their importance: plywood, glass and earthenware, 
enamel ware, nuts and bolts, tubular and other prod-
ucts of the mechanical industry, school equipment, 
sports goods and pharmaceutical preparations. Cotton 
textiles, which took first place in the trade of manu-
factured goods, particularly those exported by Brazil, 
reached their highest figure in 1947. Thereafter they 
declined in importance, due to the expansion of textile 
industries in the other countries of the zone. 
The weakening of intra-zonal trade in manufactured 
goods parallels the increasing quantitative restrictions 
(on imported products which are similar to those made 
domestically) being adopted in varying degrees by the 
major countries in the zone. The decline is also because 
these countries, in their mutual trade, seldom share in 
the exclusive quotas for imported manufactured goods 
which some of them grant or have tended to grant in 
favour of both Europe and North America. By selling 
in the latter markets some of their own exports which! 
are hard to place, they may accept in exchange im-
ported goods which are normally prohibited. 
T A B L E 7 . P E R C E N T A G E I M P O R T A N C E O F Z O N A L T R A D E 
Exports to Imports from, 
Latin America World Latin America World 
1934-38 1946-51 1934-38 1946-51 1934-38 1946-51 1934-38 1946-51 
Argentina 97.4 92.5 8.4 
Bolivia 99.7 98.4 3.3 
Brazil 98.3 96.4 7.0 
Chile 73.4 77.3 3.4 
Paraguay 99.7 90.4 29.8 
Peru 95.6 78.9 14.2 
Uruguay 97.3 85.2 13.2 
TOTAL FOR ZONE 9 6 . 0 8 9 . 9 8 .2 
12.6 90.7 82.6 8.9 12.6 
2.7 96.9 96.9 31.5 40.7 
10.1 94.5 93.6 15.0 10.5 
12.3 78.9 77.1 12.2 25.3 
41.6 79.5 79.6 44.3 39.1 
30.9 87.5 85.6 9.8 13.8 
5.5 86.4 93.2 14.7 21.6 
12.0 90.4 86.2 12.2 14.5 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
T A B L E 8 . P R E - W A R T O T A L S A N D B A L A N C E S O F V I S I B L E I N T R A - Z O N A L T R A D E 
F.o.b. values in thousands of dollars 
(Average 1934-38) 
Importing countries 
Exporting countries Argentina Bolivia 
Argentina — 2,329 
Bolivia 721 — 
Brazil 13,947 33 
Chile 1,914 622 
Paraguay« 2,098 1 
Peru 3,198 906 
Uruguay 6,196 — 
TOTAL IMPORTS FROM ZONE 2 8 , 0 7 4 3 , 8 9 1 
Percentage of total imports from 
zone 29.6 4.1 
Argentina — —1,608 
Bolivia + 1,608 — 
Brazil +16,057 + 220 
Chile + 1,409 - 529 
Paraguay + 1,435 + 1 
Peru + 205 - 861 
Uruguay - 3,272 + 39 
+ Balance 20,714 260 
- Balance 3,272 2,998 
NET BALANCE +17.442 - 2 , 7 3 8 
Chile Paraguay Peru Uruguay 
Total Percentage 
exports of total exports 
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SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
• C.i.f. values. 
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TABLE 9. POST-WAR TOTALS AND BALANCES OF VISIBLE INTRA-ZONAL TRADE 
F.o.b. values in thousands of dollars 
(Average 1946-51) 
Importing countries Total Percentage 
. exports of total exports 
Exporting countries Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Peru Uruguay to zone to zone 
Argentina . 9,160» 86,123 28,053 10,349» 16,210 12,366» 162,261 40.0 
Boliviab 1,889 — 251 201 20 192 5 2,558 0.6 
Brazil 94,378 893 — 9,888 1,669 1,386 16,926 125,140 31.6 
Chile 17,888 2,761 10,462 — 165 2,882 2,315 36,473 9.2 
Paraguay» 9,372 2 15 — — 11 2,078 11,478 2.9 
Peru0 6,830 5,941 1,136 26,944 11 — 6,859 47,721 12.0 
Uruguay 3,416 311» 6,393 137» 354» 215» — 10,826 2.7 
TOTAL IMPORTS FROM ZONE 133,773 19,068 104,380 65,223 12,568 20,896 40,549 396,457 
Percentage of total imports from 
10.2 100.0 zone 33.7 4.8 26.3 16.5 3.2 5.3 
Trade balances d 
Argentina — - 7,271 + 8,255 - 1 0 , 1 6 5 - 977 - 9,380 - 8,950 
Bolivia + 7,271 — + 642 + 2,560 - 18 + 5,749 + 306 
Brazil - 8,255 - 642 — + 574 ' - 1 , 6 5 4 - 250 - 1 0 , 5 3 3 
Chile +10,165 - 2,560 - 574 — - 165 +24,062 - 2,178 
Paraguay + 977 + 18 + 1,654 + 165 — — - i ;724 
Peru + 9,380 - 5,749 + 250 +24,062 — — - 6,644 
Uruguay - 8,950 - 306 +10,533 + 2,178 +1,724 + 6,644 — 
+ Balance 36,743 18 21,334 5,477 1,724 36,455 306 102,057 
— Balance 8,255 16,258 574 34,227 2,814 9,630 30,029 102,057 
NET BALANCE +28,488 - 1 6 , 5 1 0 +20,760 - 2 8 , 7 5 0 - 1 , 0 9 0 +26,825 - 2 9 , 7 2 3 ± 76,073 
SOURCES: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. Brazil and Paraguay: Statistical Yearbook. Uruguay: Report 
of the Comptroller of Exports and Imports. 
» Average 1946-50. b Average 1946-49. 0 1951 January to November. 
d The + or — signs refer in each case to the countries heading the columns. 
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T A B L E 1 0 . INTRA-ZONAL E X P O R T S OF P R I N C I P A L F O O D S T U F F S 
(F.o.b. values in thousands of dollars) 
Exporting countries 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Peru 
Average 1934-38 
Total exports to zone 45,51(5 1,153 21,352 4,356 2,293 11,113 
Products exported 
Sugar . 321 — 142 — — 2,837 
Edible oils and fats 137 — — — — — 
Cocoa — — 580 — — — 
Coffee — — 3,837 — — 80 
Fruit 429 — 1,452 921« — 7 
Cattle 1,876 222 — — — 28 
Wheat and flour 34,277 — — 400 — — 
Maté 14 — 4,696 — 377b — 
Total exports of important food-
stuffs to zone 37,054 222 10,707 1,321 377 2,952 
Percentage share of each coun-
try in exports of foodstuffs to 
zone 65.5 0.4 18.9 2.3 0.7 5.2 
Total of important foodstuffs 
over total exported to zone. . 81.4 19.3 50.1 30.3 16.4 26.6 
Average 1946-51 
Total exports to zone 162,261 2,558 125,140 36,473 11,478 47,721 
Products exported 
Sugar 89 — 4,114 — — 25,344° 
Edible oils and fats 6,727 — 588 — — — 
Cocoa — — 4,110 — — — 
Coffee — — 20,916 — — — 
Fruit 10,108 — 5,303 1,976 — — 
Cattle 18,849 144d — — 357 — 
Wheat and flour 81,889 — — 38 — — 
Maté 131 — 7,766 — 705 — 
Total exports of important food-
stuffs to zone 117,793 144 42,797 2,014 1,062 25,344 
Percentage share of each coun-
try in exports of foodstuffs to 
zone 60.8 0.01 22.1 1.1 0.5 13.1 
Total of important foodstuffs 
over total exported to zone.. 72.6 5.6 34.2 5.5 9.3 53.1 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
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Chapter III 
TRADE P O L I C Y 
1. Introduction 
In recent years the trade policies of the seven coun-
tries in the southern zone of Latin America have shown 
both marked differences and similarities. The differ-
ences lie mainly in the decisions adopted by these 
countries in relation to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade; some have joined the multilateral 
system proposed under the agreement and others 
have not. The similarities lie in the common tendency, 
with the possible exception of Peru, towards nego-
tiating bilateral trade agreements for the quantitative 
exchange of goods. These agreements are usually of 
short duration and the values involved are settled 
through the compensation mechanism described in 
chapter IV. Recently some bilateral agreements have 
been made on a barter basis, particularly as a result 
of the policy of the food-exporting countries. Such 
countries are faced by the need to improve supplies 
of certain goods essential to their economic develop-
ment. They require the importing countries to supply, 
against the foodstuffs or at least for a substantial part 
of their value, goods which are equally essential. 
In the past the basic trade policies of the countries 
within the zone were almost identical and followed 
the principle of ensuring that exports to the great 
industrial centres should not be subject to tariffs 
higher than those applied to similar products from 
other regions. In compensation for the treatment 
granted to the region's primary goods by the principal 
purchasers, these received a reciprocal guarantee that 
their exports to Latin America should not be subject 
to higher tariffs than those granted to another State 
for the same merchandise. Thus, the so-called most-
favoured-nation clause was usually included, on a 
reciprocal basis, in the trade agreements ratified 
between Latin America and the countries of Europe 
or North America. This clause was frequently uncon-
ditional, but did not recognize the right of countries 
outside the region to enjoy the exclusive tariff reduc-
tions granted to other Latin-American republics, 
particularly neighbouring ones. Nevertheless, there 
were in fact few incentives for regional or zonal trade 
relations arising out of this exception to the most-
favoured-nation clause. Exclusive privileges applied 
principally to frontier traffic such as that which Brazil 
and Uruguay regulated by the treaty of 1933, modified 
later in 1935. They also covered a few specialized 
natural commodities, particularly foodstuffs. This was 
the case of the 1938 agreement between Argentina and 
Chile by which Chile allowed 60,000 head of cattle 
to enter free of duty each year. Regional trade, not 
specifically mentioned within the reciprocal reductions 
or exemptions laid down in the respective bilateral 
agreements, was subject to tariffs under the most-
favoured-nation clause. In other words, they were 
subject to the same tariffs as similar products from 
other parts of the world. 
For a century, there have been various unsuccessful 
attempts to introduce broad regional preferences or 
exclusive bilateral agreements. But the main concern 
of trade policy has been to defend the flow of exports 
of primary products to the large consuming centres. 
A careful study of the commercial treaties during the 
early period shows that eight such agreements, grant-
ing specific preferences to neighbouring States or to 
the entire region, were not ratified. They are listed, 
and their aims summarized, in table 13 at the end of 
this chapter. In some cases, it becomes clear on analysis 
that ratification was not possible due to contractual 
obligations with countries purchasing the primary 
regional commodities.1 A similar fate has befallen 
several recommendations made during international 
meetings. These proposals included the adoption of 
exclusive preferences of different kinds, covering both 
tariffs and exceptional reciprocal treatment to favour 
new branches of production. There were other pro-
posals, intended to be the first steps towards the 
gradual construction of an economic policy for the 
zone or between its component countries. Table 14, 
at the end of this chapter, briefly summarizes these 
proposals. Certain broad preferences which had 
been ratified to foster the flow of trade, and in 
some cases transport of goods by national ship-
ping lines, were not renewed upon expiration, for 
example the Chilean-Argentine agreement in force 
between 1856 and 1868.2 Notwithstanding various 
attempts at the government level, no customs unions 
were introduced within the region or within sectors 
of the southern zone of Latin America constituting 
natural geographic units, such as the River Plate 
basin or the Patagonian territories of Chile and 
Argentina south of latitude 42.3 Bilateral prefer-
ences between neighbouring States thus continued 
to be restricted almost exclusively to foodstuffs and 
certain other natural products, since this trade does 
not particularly attract suppliers outside the area. 
1 The clause in the treaty of free exchange for food products 
between Argentina and Paraguay, in 1936, and exclusive recipro-
cal exemptions agreed upon in the Chilean-Argentine modus 
vivendi of 1932, could not be maintained and remained inopera-
tive, due to prior obligations with third parties, which had 
previously been granted unconditional most-favoured-nation 
treatment. 
2 In this treaty both countries agreed upon "perfect reciprocity 
and free concurrence of industries". Moreover, they established 
absolute customs exemption for land traffic under the "Free 
Cordillera" system; preferential tariffs for products transported 
by sea, and freedom for transit trade. 
3 There are certain similarities between the systems of customs 
exemption applied by Argentina and Chile, without discrimina-
tion, to certain essential goods imported into their territories. 
In 1945 both countries considered, without reaching an agree-
ment, the possibility of establishing a customs union for their 
territories south of latitude 42. As a preliminary step towards 
successive stages of trade expansion, the union contemplated: 
(a) reciprocal elimination of duties for non-competitive goods; 
(b) gradual reduction of duties on semi-competitive goods; and 
(c) gradual reduction, at a later stage, for competitive goods. 
For the remaining goods, covering the main items of 
trade with countries outside the region, the most-
favoured-nation clause continued to prevail, that is, 
a tariff system which basically reflected the principal 
concern to maintain conditions for fostering basic 
exports to world markets. 
2. Evolution of trade policy 
The description of the zonal trade structure con-
tained in chapter II shows that products forming the 
main basis for bilateral trade were certain foodstuffs 
essential to the importing country: Argentine wheat 
for Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru; Argentine 
cattle and meat for Chile and Peru; and Peruvian 
sugar for Chile. These goods often enjoyed tariff reduc-
tions or exemptions, which the importing countries 
tended to grant individually, owing to the essential 
nature of the foodstuffs for their domestic needs. 
Incentives were thus provided which strengthened 
their traditional trading importance. After 1930, this 
system was supplemented by the incentive for prefer-
ential exchange rates. Conversely, products exported 
by countries suffering from a deficit in foodstuffs were, 
with one or two exceptions, accorded tariff treatment 
equal to that granted to similar goods originating in 
highly-developed manufacturing centres in Europe 
and North America. For this reason, often allied to 
cheaper ocean freight rates, such goods could be 
quoted at prices ensuring their preferential position 
on the market. 
The prevailing tariff system, based on the most-
favoured-nation clause, provided no means to com-
pensate for the disadvantages of lower productivity. 
The trade agreements reciprocally entered into by the 
countries of the southern zone were thus weakened 
and such instruments were usually ineffective in cor-
recting the disequilibrium due to the different position 
of each party in the mutual trade. 
Document E/CN. 12/165, "Trade trends and 
policies in Latin America", presented at the third 
session of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
held at Montevideo in 1950, adequately analysed the 
origins of the evolution brought about in trade policy 
by the simultaneous effects of, firstly, the decline in 
the capacity to import and, secondly, the increased 
demand for imports stimulated by industrial develop-
ment. To prevent these factors from prejudicing the 
rate of growth of real income, trade policy became 
more complicated, with the dual object of restricting 
or containing the capacity to import and to protect 
industrial expansion. Under the impact of this new 
turn of events, customs tariffs, previously employed 
for fiscal reasons, began to be used with a view to 
protection. In fact, the rise in tariffs was theoretical, 
partly because current obligations with third parties 
for the reduction or freezing of duties (which were 
applied multilaterally under the most-favoured-nation 
clause) limited the efficiency of this method of pro-
tection. In some countries, particularly in Argentina, 
duties became a declining tax because of the rigid 
system of valuation, the relatively lower yield being 
offset by revenue derived from profits arising from 
the different exchange rates.4 In order to bring imports 
to a level in harmony with the balance-of-payments 
position and to prevent certain foreign imports from 
competing with domestically-produced merchandise, 
preference was given to the introduction of direct 
methods of quantitative control on the entry of foreign 
goods. These became subject to restrictions, quotas, 
import permits, differential exchange rates and, in 
some cases, to prohibitions. 
4 Table 11 represents the different level of the average incidence 
on taxed merchandise in Chile and the United States. It should 
be noted that in both cases, when computing the values, those 
corresponding to duty-free goods have been omitted. 
T A B L E 11. COMPARISON OF TARIFF TREATMENT OF IMPORTS TAXED 
IN CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES, IN 1 9 4 6 
(Values in thousands of dollars) 
Customs 














Percentage of customs duties on imports. . 
United States 
Percentage of customs duties on imports.. 
SOURCES: Avakitìo de Cowtsfcio Rxtefio? de 
United States. 
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1 here was considerable flexibility in the new means 
for the discriminatory regulation of foreign trade. 
Such measures could be applied without limitations 
arising out of treaties with other countries, since the 
contracted obligations covered only customs treat-
ment and, in exceptional cases, quotas for products. 
These means of regulation, being outside the scope 
of the most-favoured-nation clause, thus enabled 
trade operations to be conducted on a bilateral basis 
by means of simple administrative decisions. The 
need for adaptation to the method of compensation 
fostered by the European countries during the period 
between the two World Wars, had a considerable 
influence on the introduction of these new methods, 
the fulfilment of which largely remained in the hands 
of exchange control authorities. 
As customs agreements lost ground as instruments 
for conducting foreign trade, the policy progressively 
departed from such agreements and began to be con-
ducted entirely on the basis of exchange regulations. 
Thus all the republics in the southern zone, trans-
ferring their mutual trade relations to a new sphere, 
commenced to conclude agreements for the quanti-
tative exchange of products. These agreements usu-
ally cover foodstuffs delivered in exchange for 
primary goods for industrial uses, to which a certain 
tonnage of less essential goods may sometimes be 
added. The inclusion of such goods in the agreements 
is due either to the importing country's wish to meet 
the price of foodstuffs, or to an attempt to foster 
exports of manufactured goods which industrial 
growth produced as a surplus to domestic consump-
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tion. Some of the factors mentioned in chapter IV, 
which deals with the principal payments problems of 
the southern zone, have often, hampered the fulfilment 
of agreements covering the quantitative exchange of 
basic products. This was particularly the case with 
non-essential goods, which were very sensitive to 
price competition from more industrialized countries. 
Furthermore, such goods seldom or never entered 
into the "linked" or similar operations described in 
chapter I. Nevertheless, in some bilateral channels 
(particularly those of Argentina and Brazil, where 
payments problems were less important) quantitative 
exchange agreements appear to have had a direct 
influence upon the strengthening and expansion of 
trade in the southern zone. 
These new methods for conducting foreign trade 
gave rise to some decided forms of zonal preference. 
Several agreements were signed, some of them for six 
years' duration, between Brazil, on the one hand, and 
Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. Under 
them, within the variations corresponding to each 
bilateral sector, it was agreed to purchase from Brazil 
a given quantity of cotton textiles and to consult 
that country before purchasing such merchandise 
elsewhere, when offered at lower prices.5 Argentina, 
in turn, in handling a similar type of clearing agree-
ment with Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uru-
guay, introduced a system of automatic permits for 
imports of given merchandise, although in the last 
two years it has been restricted through difficulties 
arising in the Argentine balance of payments. Argen-
tina and Brazil, as mentioned in chapter II , agreed 
in 1950 on a procedure for mutual exemption from 
import permits in their fruit trade. The decisively 
favourable influence which this caused on such trade 
clearly showed that this type of exemption could 
facilitate an effective form of preference. In 1952 
Chile had credit balances with Argentina and Brazil 
and thus as an exception, continued to admit some 
of their goods without permits. 
Although such contemporary trade policies still 
lack a precise structure and are somewhat limited in 
application, it cannot be denied that these steps do 
indicate an initial approach to new trade formulas. 
3. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
During the last three years, the different positions 
adopted by countries of the zone towards the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade have introduced 
fundamentally contradictory elements within the 
over-all trade policy. Because of these, foreign trade 
measures designed to assist regional preferences are 
somewhat subordinated to new international obliga-
tions outside the actual zone. 
It will be recalled that the General Agreement, in 
which thirty-four countries are associated for the 
provisional application of some of the regulations 
contained in the Havana Charter, extends the effects 
of the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause to 
all Contracting Parties, with certain exceptions for-
mulated at the time of ratification. This clause 
favours a long list of merchandise included in ad hoc 
bilateral negotiations between the Contracting Parties, 
both at the meetings which led to the agreement and 
5 The rapid advance of domestic textile industries within the 
zone and some difficulties in the consultation mechanism meant 
that these agreements were not in practice applied to any great 
•extent. 
others held later. The most-favoured-nation clause of 
the agreement, however, extending beyond the field 
of tariffs to which it had usually been restricted in 
bilateral treaties, now comprises all foreign trade 
resources for which contractual obligations were only 
occasionally accepted in the past. Brazil and Chile, 
for instance, had introduced in their convention on 
economic co-operation, signed in 1947 and ratified in 
1952, a clause by which each party assured the other 
of a relative share in the supply of given products, 
should imports of such goods be restricted by quotas. 
Argentina and Brazil had also undertaken similar 
obligations. Now the most-favoured-nation clause of 
the General Agreement establishes the interde-
pendence of all Contracting Parties, who automati-
cally enjoy benefits granted by any of them to a third 
State, whether or not that State is a party to the 
General Agreement. Moreover this ruling covers 
quotas, permits, tariffs or other benefits. If any of the 
Contracting Parties to the GATT wishes to assume 
special obligations with a neighbouring country, or 
. to establish a customs union which had not been 
excepted upon accession to the Agreement, such 
steps, under the terms of the Agreement, require prior 
consultation with the other members. The consulta-
tion has to include a plan for the new customs or 
free-trade area,6 providing that duties or regulations 
"shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive 
than the general incidence of the duties and regu-
lations of commerce applicable in the constituent 
territories prior to the formation of such union". 
Of the twenty Latin-American republics, Brazil, 
Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nica-
ragua, Peru and Uruguay7 signed the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Colombia, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador and Mexico sent observers to its meetings. 
In the southern zone of the region, Argentina, 
Bolivia and Paraguay remained outside the new body. 
No precise official information is available regarding 
the reasons for each national attitude towards the 
GATT. In Brazil, Chile and Peru the opinion seems 
to have prevailed that, within the over-all advantages 
and limitations which it offered, respective national 
interests could best be defended through participation 
in the Agreement, particularly in relation to the safe-
guarding of basic exports to traditional consuming 
centres. Moreover, Brazil and Peru, before ratifying 
their accession and undertaking the respective bi-
lateral tariff negotiations with the other members, 
were permitted to raise their customs tariffs, so that 
the negotiations could be based on a higher tariff 
level. They apparently wished by this means to avoid 
inequalities resulting from the reciprocal tariff reduc-
tions which they would have to agree upon with the 
European and North American countries once they 
had acceded to the Agreement. As those reductions 
mainly referred to primary goods, on the one hand, 
6 Article X X I V of the agreement defines a customs union as 
"the substitution of a single Customs territory for two or more 
Customs territories, so that (i) duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce . . . are eliminated with respect to sub-
stantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the 
union, . . . and (ii) substantially the same duties and other regula-
tions of commerce are applied by each of the members of the 
union to the trade of territories not included in the union". 
7 On 1 November 1952 the respective ratification was still 
awaiting approval by the Uruguayan Parliament. At the seventh 
meeting of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement, 
held in Geneva in October-November 1952, the period granted 
to Uruguay for acceding to the Protocols of Annecy and Torquay 
was extended to 30 April 1953. 
T A B L E 1 2 . B R A Z I L : STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE 
(Percentages of total value; average 1945-49) 
Exports Imports 
Cattle on the hoof 0.0 0.3 
Raw materials 36.7 24.2 
Foodstuffs 56.4 18.8 
Manufactured goods 6.9 45.8 
SOURCE: Foreign trade statistics, Brazil. 
and to manufactures,8 on the other, and as demand 
for the latter is very sensitive to price movements 
arising from the tariff reduction (which is seldom the 
case with the former), they appear to have sought in 
the formula of the prior raising of tariffs an element 
for counteracting the inequality of its effects. More-
over, the percentage importance of customs incidence 
on the total value of imports, in the case of Brazil, 
which averaged only 10.8 per cent in 1946, was no 
more than 8.2 per cent in 1949, when it joined the 
GATT. 
Peru, in turn, which since 1931 had an agreement 
with the United Kingdom substantially reducing the 
duties on numerous British goods, could now place 
these at the level of the new tariffs. This increase in 
duties was, however, confined to goods usually pro-
hibited due to balance of payments difficulties. Such 
goods could be imported exceptionally from Great 
Britain and were not subject to the prohibitions 
because sterling was available. 
Chile, which maintains a tariff system based on 
gold, upon acceding to the GATT, did not forego its 
right to continue automatically to raise customs duties 
on a par with currency devaluation. 
There appeared to be additional considerations for 
Uruguay joining the GATT. The agreement with the 
United States in 1942, which had an important bearing 
on the wool trade with that country, led to low cus-
toms duties for a large range of 151 articles from the 
United States, among which were goods which 
Uruguay now produces domestically, following diver-
sification programmes. Most of the goods covered by 
the United States agreement remained, after 1942, 
outside the scope of any tariff increase, as that agree-
ment, through circumstances at the time of signature, 
simultaneously consolidated the rate and the valua-
tion, so that the duty was specific instead of ad 
valorem. 
Under the most-favoured-nation clause, all the 
countries supplying Uruguay with products similar 
to those included in the United States agreement, 
enjoyed practically the same benefits, without the 
need for bilateral arrangements with Uruguay, which 
consequently found its margin of international nego-
tiation narrowed. Since the General Agreement, the 
United States Government believes in negotiating 
new customs treaties only within the Agreement,9 so 
8 The case of Brazil, mentioned above, and set forth in table 12, 
is typical. 
9 This was not an absolute rule, however, as the 1939 agree-
ment between the United States and Venezuela was modified in 
1951 outside the terms of the General Agreement. This was due 
to the abrogation of the treaty between Mexico and the United 
States; imports of Venezuelan petroleum to the United States 
had enjoyed, under the most-favoured-nation clause, the same 
low duties as Mexican petroleum. Apparently, to avoid the price 
movement provoked by the abrogation of this latter treaty, the 
agreement with Venezuela had to be modified. 
that it seemed unlikely that the treaty between 
Uruguay and the United States could be modified by 
direct bilateral understanding. Uruguay's accession 
to the GATT caused the possibility, which occurred 
later, for a partial modification of the agreement with 
the United States. Thus, negotiations conducted 
within the terms of the Agreement replaced the pre-
vious specific duty for some goods by an ad valorem 
rate, based on valuations determined by any possible 
changes in the real price of these goods. 
Responsible sources in Buenos Aires indicate that 
Argentina's abstention from the GATT was due to 
the conviction that prevailing international trade 
conditions made it premature for certain countries to 
accept the obligations imposed by the Agreement, if 
their payments position depended upon world market 
prices for certain products in the world market and 
upon the extent of convertibility of payments for such 
products. A further consideration may have been 
that the incentive required at the present stage of 
industrial growth made it inadvisable to hamper the 
expeditious use of the protective measures necessary 
to support a given manufacturing activity. 
4. Repercussions of the GATT 
The scope of the obligations contracted under the 
General Agreement and the repercussions thereof are 
only now becoming evident. Brazil, upon signing the 
Agreement, excluded from its obligations to other 
Contracting Parties the special tariff benefits granted 
to Paraguay for certain products. Chile formulated 
reserves concerning its obligations with Argentina, 
Bolivia and Peru, based on the neighbouring-country 
formula, while Peru made a similar reservation re-
garding Chile. Uruguay also reserved certain exclusive 
treatment previously recognized for Paraguay. Argen-
tina, Bolivia and Paraguay, without acceding to the 
Agreement, acquired the right, under the uncondi-
tional most-favoured-nation clause included in their 
treaties with Brazil and Chile, to enjoy all customs 
or any other privileges which these Republics might 
contract with third powers through that instrument. 
Although Chile, as already mentioned, joined the 
Agreement with the reservation covering customs 
preferences contracted with neighbouring countries, 
some of the Contracting Parties requested from Chile 
the same exceptional benefits granted under the 1932 
treaty with Argentina and the protocol of 1938 to 
certain Argentine goods, including an exemption from 
the increased duties which automatically result, since 
1932, from Chilean currency devaluation. These 
requests were based on the fact that under the GATT 
mechanism the unconditional most-favoured-nation 
clause included in the provisional treaty of 1942 
between the United States and Chile gave all Con-
tracting Parties access to the preferential Argentine-
Chilean system, with the sole exception of concessions 
covering the small frontier traffic. Although all the 
Contracting Parties were provisionally and without 
exception granted the same preferential treatment as 
Argentina by the Chilean customs, since the end of 
1952 such treatment was restricted to Argentina 
alone, as the result of a study carried out on this 
subject. 
Also in the case of Chile, other Contracting Parties 
to the Agreement claimed the same treatment given 
to Peru by an agreement of 1951, by which Chile 
would purchase 5,000 tons of Peruvian cotton in 
2 2 
exchange for a similar quantity of Chilean steel, 
based on a reciprocal reduction of duties for these 
specific tonnages. Similar requests were also received 
in Santiago from Contracting Parties in relation to 
the treaty between Chile and Cuba, signed at the 
beginning of 1952, under which Cuba, within certain 
quantitative arrangements, was to supply most of 
Chile's tobacco imports. 
The more anomalous effect of the GATT, however, 
lies in the different position in which countries within 
the zone are placed for purposes of exclusive prefer-
ences or eventual customs unions such as that con-
sidered on several occasions by Argentina and Chile 
and which received renewed official attention at the 
beginning of 1952. These differences depend on 
whether or not the countries are Contracting Parties. 
In the case of Argentina and Chile, a situation may 
arise analogous to that recently observed in Central 
America, between Nicaragua, which is a Contracting 
Party to the GATT, and El Salvador, which is not. 
Both concluded, in August 1951, a treaty designed to 
establish a free trade area between the two countries 
under the rules of article X X I V of the Agreement.10 
The authorization of the Contracting Parties was 
extended to Nicaragua at the sixth meeting, at 
Torquay. A proviso was made that annual reports be 
submitted by the Parties on the measures adopted in 
accordance with certain articles of the treaty. These 
articles reserve the right to impose quantitative import 
restrictions on specific merchandise and to introduce 
modifications in the lists of products benefiting from 
customs exemptions covering exports and imports 
from one country to another. 
From the foregoing, it appears that the General 
Agreement's immediate repercussions on trade rela-
tions in the southern zone, as far as may be judged 
in the brief period which has elapsed, is a tendency 
to revert, at least theoretically, to the former pre-
dominance of the unconditional most-favoured-nation 
clause, extended now to arrangements for the quan-
titative exchange of products, and to non-customs 
bilateral preferences. 
5. The GATT and manufacturing development 
Responsible sources indicate that, to varying 
degrees, there is concern in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, 
over the difficulty of harmonizing manufacturing 
development programmes with certain obligations 
contracted under the General Agreement. These obli-
gations impose prior requirements to be fulfilled by 
an importing Contracting Party before applying 
quantitative restrictions which differ from those per-
mitted under the Agreement, in cases of serious 
10 On 21 February 1953 Argentina and Chile reached a com-
bination of the agreement in which, after expressing the convic-
tion "that by means of financial resources, the establishment of 
a common market and the co-ordination of the economic develop-
ment of both countries, they might reach an increase in total 
production much greater than that which would result from the 
isolated action of Chile and Argentina", the following clauses 
are contained: 
"1. Both Governments shall draw up economic plans with a 
view to achieving the objectives contained hereunder, permitting 
commercial interchange to reach its broadest scope; co-ordinate 
the respective productions and the commerce of their articles 
increasing exportable surpluses; foster the industrialization proc-
ess by capital contributions and all other resources within the 
range of the respective Governments and, in short, complement 
the economies of Chile and Argentina; 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments and until 
normal conditions are restored.11 
I t will be recalled that there must be prior consul-
tation by those countries wishing to protect develop-
ment programmes by reserving certain sectors of the 
domestic market entirely or partially for domestic 
industry and therefore proposing indiscriminate im-
port restrictions affecting goods on which duties had 
previously been agreed with Contracting Parties to 
the Agreement. Such consultations may lead to full 
approval of the proposals, or to negotiations for a 
substitution of products in the lists of reciprocal 
reductions. Such, for instance, was the case of mine 
fuses, where Chile had reduced duties for imports from 
Great Britain in return for tariff concessions granted 
by that country, under the Agreement, to Chilean 
products. When proposing to restrict such imports in 
support of its own fuse-producing industry, Chile had 
first to reach agreement for withdrawing them from 
the list of mutual reductions concluded with Great 
Britain, which in turn nullified the tariff reduction on 
Chilean beans. 
Where the reply to consultation regarding projected 
restrictive measures is negative, the regulations 
nevertheless appear to permit support of given 
domestic industrial activities to foster their develop-
ment (through quantitative import restrictions on 
similar foreign products), to extend beyond periods 
of balance-of-payments difficulties, under conditions 
which in practice amount to protection. In Chile and 
Uruguay, however, and particularly in Brazil, the 
delay inherent in the consultative procedure, the 
uncertainty as to the results, and the difficulties offered 
by adjustments designed to substitute merchandise 
of equivalent customs importance in the lists of 
reciprocal reductions, are indicated as discouraging 
psychological factors, which might to some extent 
adversely affect given industrial enterprises. Further-
more, it has been maintained more than once that 
different conditions would be established for indus-
tries in countries with similar economic structures, 
according to whether or not they are contracting 
parties to the GATT. Those countries outside the 
G A T T are exempt from the problems of reconciling 
manufacturing development programmes with the 
requisites imposed by the Agreement for the appli-
cation of measures to defend those programmes. The 
Confederation of Brazilian Industries, in 1951, re-
quested the Government of Brazil to renounce its 
membership of the GATT, because it was felt that 
its application would, for some years at least, be in-
compatible with the interests of domestic economic 
"2. As a fundamental part of these economic plans, the 
Governments of Chile and Argentina shall negotiate, within a 
period of 120 days from this date, a treaty tending towards the 
gradual elimmatiqji of Customs duties, taxes, exchange margins, 
excessive rates, and any other measure which burdens or restricts 
imports or exports between the two countries; 
"3. Moreover, within the same period, the Governments of 
Chile and Argentina shall agree to facilitate as far as possible 
payments between the two countries, particularly in order to 
derogate or modify prevailing regulations on exchange rates, 
transfer of funds, distribution of foreign exchange, administrative 
and banking procedure which hamper such payments; and 
"4. The preceding system, to which both Argentina and Chile 
hope the other neighbouring countries will adhere, shall be sus-
ceptible of integration with the other countries in the continent". 
11 At the seventh meeting of the Contracting Parties to the 
General Agreement, in October-November 1952 at Geneva, regu-
lations were adopted for holding consultations with Brazil and 
Chile concerning their import restrictions. 
development.12 Brazilian sources familiar with both 
trade and industrial aspects of these problems admit 
that adaptation of industrial development pro-
grammes to the obligations arising out of the GATT 
presents considerable difficulties, particularly if there 
should be any decline in balance of payments prob-
lems. Nevertheless, the period which has elapsed 
since the Agreement came into force has been too 
12 At the seventh meeting of the Contracting Parties to the 
GATT, held in Geneva from 2 October to 10 November 1952, 
Brazil stated that it had set up a commission to revise its customs 
tariffs, with a view to adjusting them to the country's present 
economic conditions and in order to give more concrete shape to 
Brazil's accession to the General Agreement. 
short to illustrate with any clarity the scope of the 
regulations or their degree of adaptability to the 
requirements of economic development. Moreover, 
responsible circles have suggested that the under-
taking in the recently ratified convention on economic 
co-operation between Brazil and Chile, to study the 
over-all problems arising out of the General Agree-
ment, might be undertaken on a broader plane. This 
might perhaps be effected through a committee for 
Latin-American Contracting Parties to the GATT. 
Its aim should be to seek methods of reconciling the 
objectives of joining the Agreement with the interests 
of economic development and of inter-Latin-American 
trade. 
T A B L E 1 3 . COUNTRIES IN THE SOUTHERN ZONE OF LATIN-AMERICA : 
REGIONAL PREFERENCES IN UNRATIFIED TREATIES 
Year Contracting Parties Synthesis of preferences 
Argentina-Portugal Argentina excludes the privileges "which trade with the countries of the River Plate and 
its tributaries enjoys or may enjoy". 
Uruguay-Prussia Uruguay excepts the advantages granted or to be granted to neighbouring States. 
Argentina-Paraguay Both countries decide that products they exchange shall not be taxed higher than their 
national products. 
Argentina-Bolivia The Contracting Parties agree to the free and reciprocal trade of their products, exempting 
them from import and export duties. 
Brazil-Chile Both countries agree on mutual free trade, without any duties, for products enumerated in 
an ad hoc list. They agree to maintain an exceptional preference clause favouring the 
American countries, and each grant national treatment on a reciprocal basis, to the ships 
of the other. 
Argentina-Brazil The treaty lists articles exempt from duty or subject to consolidation, and sets forth the 
mutual obligation of both republics to include each other, reciprocally and fairly, in the 
enjoyment of quotas or contingents which either may establish for third parties. 
Argentina-Brazil The Contracting Parties agree "not to practise any policy such as barter or compensation 
which artificially diverts the course of Argentine products in Brazil (wheat and flour) 
and of Brazilian coffee, cocoa, rice, maté, tobacco and timber, in Argentina. 
Argentina-Chile Institutes the "Free Cordillera" system. 









T A B L E 1 4 . AGREEMENTS RECOMMENDING REGIONAL PREFERENCES 
Ytar International meeting Held at Recommendations approved 
1931 Four th Panamerican Trade 
Conference 
1936 Conference for Consolidating 
Peace 
1939 Conference of Treasury Minis-
ters of Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay 
1933 Meeting of Foreign Ministers 
of Argentina and Chile 
1933 Argentine-Chilean Conference 
1940 Meeting of Treasury Ministers 
of Argentina and Brazil 
1941 Regional Economic Conference 






Rio de Janeiro 
Montevideo 
To study the possibility of abolishing customs between Argentina" 
Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay and of achieving greater economic 
unity between these republics. 
To exclude reciprocal privileges accorded between neighbours, from 
most-favoured-nation clauses with third Powers.» 
To harmonize trade of the participants, resorting to tariff advan-
tages and exchange co-ordination.b 
To tend towards exclusive preferences between neighbouring and 
contiguous countries, and, as a general aim, among the Latin-
American States. 
To take steps towards a continental customs union, commencing 
with one between Argentina and Chile, to be extended gradually 
to the other republics. 
To foster the production of goods not yet manufactured by both 
countries, by means of a guarantee that their trade should be 
free from protectionist duties during ten years, and from domestic 
n r o v f a v t l q 1 m û i c i i p o c r a f l np tnnr t r i r l a i n f l i p m T a • 
cedures by which, when deficits arose in the mutual balance, the 
creditor countries would try to restore equilibrium by increasing 
imports and not restricting exports. 
To recommend the study of a regional customs union and its 
extension to other neighbouring countries. To recommend in-
creasing the mutual purchase of goods of regional origin, estab-
lishing preference over similar goods from other countries. Should 
the participants abrogate instruments contracted with third 
powers limiting this faculty, they should, in the new ones, 
reserve their right to grant the preference indicated. To tend 
towards introducing an exchange regulation fund. 
SOURCE: Instrumentos internacionales de carácter bilateral suscritos por la República Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 
y Culto, Buenos Aires, 1950. 
» Restrictions placed on trade between the participating countries, imposed by the unlimited and unconditional most-favoured-
nation clause contracted with third parties, were not eliminated as a result of this meeting. 
b Argentina and Brazil, following the Conclusions of the Conference of Montevideo in 1939, had on 13 April 1939 signed a protocol 
on exchange problems in which the granting of mutual permits was assured, in Argentina, at the official rate, "in such a way as not to 
prejudice national industry and the normal progress of trade", and in Brazil "under the best conditions laid down in the exchange system". 
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Chapter VII 
T H E S T R U C T U R E O F P A Y M E N T S 
1. Introduction 
Payments policies between the seven countries in 
the southern zone of Latin America exhibit a pro-
nounced tendency to exclude the use of convertible 
currencies, replacing them with bilateral payments 
agreements in current accounts. Widely varying types 
of agreements exist, ranging from official clearing 
systems, covering all direct commercial operations, 
to the quantitative matching of goods aimed at bal-
ancing trade in mutually essential items. 
The extent to which these systems have achieved 
their purpose is surprising, since all countries of the 
zone have to some degree participated in them. Be-
tween 1946 and 1951 the visible trade between Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay amounted to an annual average of 396.5 
million dollars. More than four-fifths of the imports 
and exports were settled by debits or credits in current 
accounts, without recourse to convertible currencies. 
The marked use of current accounts in the payments 
system is illustrated by table 15, showing the intra-
zonal payments structure. 
T A B L E 1 5 . PAYMENTS STRUCTURE OF THE SOUTHERN ZONE OF LATIN AMERICA 
(Average f.o.b. values for 1946-51, in millions of US dollars) 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Peru Uruguay Total 
Bilateral trade in clearing account 
Exports 159.0 2.3 129.8 22.3 9.4 6.8 9.8 333.4 
Imports 128.8 12.8 99.3 34.9 12.1 16.2 29.7 333.4 
Balance + 30.1 - 1 0 . 4 + 24.4 - 1 2 . 6 - 2.6 - 9.4 - 1 9 . 5 ± 54.5 
Bilateral trade in dollars 
Exports 3.3 0.2 1.4 14.2 2.1 40.9 1.0 63.1 
Imports 4.9 6.3 5.0 30.4 0.5 4.7 11.3 63.1 
Balance - 1.6 - 6.0 - 3.6 - 1 6 . 2 -(- 1.5 +36.2 - 1 0 . 3 ± 37.7 
Percentage trade in 
clearing account 96.3 67.2 95.2 53.4 95.6 77.6 72.2 84.1 
Percentage trade in dol-
27.8 lars 3.7 32.8 4.8 46.6 4.4 22.4 15.9 
Total trade 
Exports 162.3 2.6 125.1 36.4 11.5 47.7 10.9 396.5 
Imports 133.8 19.1 104.4 65.2 12.6 20.9 40.5 396.5 
Net balance + 28.5 - 1 6 . 5 + 20.8 - 2 8 . 8 - 1.1 +26 .8 - 2 9 . 7 ± 76.1 
SOURCE: Argentina: Banco Central. Bolivia, Chile, Peru: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. Brazil 
and Paraguay: Statistical Yearbooks. Uruguay: Memorandum, of the Export-Import Comptroller. 
Table 15 shows that the visible bilateral trade in 
dollars represented almost 16 per cent of the total 
trade between the seven countries. An annual average 
of 76.1 million dollars—mainly in dollars received from 
surpluses with other areas—was used to meet the debit 
balances resulting from the surplus of imports over 
exports in each bilateral trade channel.1 Table 15 also 
shows that the net beneficiaries were Argentina, with 
28.5 million dollars annually; Brazil, with 20.8 million; 
and Peru, a substantial intra-zonal creditor mainly 
because of its trade with Chile, with 26.8 million. 
Conversely, the 76.1-million-dollar debit balance was 
borne by the remaining four countries: Bolivia with 
16.5 million, Chile with 28.8, Paraguay with 1.1, and 
Uruguay with 29.7 million dollars. 
The distribution of the net balance has not differed 
appreciably during recent years. In 1948, when the 
International Monetary Fund prepared a report on 
1 Sterling and European currencies were also used for liquidat-
ing balances, although on a much smaller scale. 
the possibility of establishing multilateral payments in 
Latin America, the distribution of the balance was 
similar to that in table 15, although comprising fewer 
countries.2 Then, as now, Bolivia and Uruguay showed 
net debit balances with all others in the group. In-
creased exports to creditor countries, under short-term 
or medium-term arrangements, would still undoubt-
edly remain below the levels required to liquidate their 
unfavourable balances. Thus, it is hardly probable that 
use of currencies from other areas to pay for intra-
zonal trade debts will be eliminated, at least in the 
near future, even if the entire trade were to be con-
ducted under clearing account procedure. 
No official efforts to facilitate further research on 
multilateral payments had been made prior to the sur-
2 Eight years before, in 1940, the United States and eight 
Latin-American countries, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, 
sponsored a conference for the establishment of a trade-payments 
centre to be called the Inter-American Bank. This project was 
never ratified. 
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vey of the International Monetary Fund, or the report 
on intra-regional trade (E/CN.12/165), prepared by 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America for presentation to the third session at Monte-
video in 1950. Both these reports arrived at similar 
conclusions. However, from statements of senior offi-
cials of certain countries in the group, the obstacles 
encountered during the last two years in liquidating 
intra-zonal trade balances appear to have reawakened 
interest in a fresh approach to the subject. This has 
been chiefly because the use of such balances in other 
areas could only be effected through triangular opera-
tions outside both the sphere of government initiative 
and, at times, its control. The interest in this subject 
is accentuated by the problems arising from the diver-
sity of payments systems, whose principal features are 
discussed below. The experience of the European Pay-
ments Union, which uses other currencies to support 
the trade transactions of its member States, could 
provide a basis for examining the practical advantages 
to be derived from a multilateral compensation plan 
under existing conditions. In carrying out such a study, 
consideration must be given to the present tendency 
in certain Latin-American countries of not liquidating 
balances in the same account for the value of products 
which have different priorities of importance. 
In the above discussion of balances, and as illus-
trade in table 15, the amounts listed refer to the intra-
zonal trade in visible goods. The extent to which 
capital transfers and payments for invisible trade 
items are liquidated through clearing accounts is diffi-
cult to ascertain, due to insufficient data. However, 
invisible trade items appear to reach a high percentage, 
if judged by all transactions concluded between Argen-
tina and the remaining countries of the group, except 
Brazil, as shown in table 16. 
T A B L E 1 6 . A R G E N T I N A : C L E A R I N G O P E R A T I O N S 
CONCLUDED W I T H N E I G H B O U R I N G C O U N T R I E S 


















84.1 10.0 5.9 
82.7 12.7 4.6 
79.4 10.6 10.0 
92.4 3.6 4.0 
56.4 35.7 7.9 
SOURCE: Banco Central, Argentina. 
A number of different factors have contributed to 
the present payments structure. From the start, the 
principal trade-clearing agreements contracted be-
tween countries of the southern zone were affected by 
the specific situation of Argentina. Because of uncer-
tain demand prospects on overseas markets, resulting 
from the Second World War, Argentina endeavoured 
to dispose of its surplus agricultural products in South 
America. This was the same policy followed by Argen-
tina in Europe during the last ten years, based upon 
reciprocal concessions through bilateral trade agree-
ments and the fixing of trade quotas. The Argentine 
Central Bank established accounts for liquidating pay-
ments with Bolivia, Chile,3 Paraguay, Peru and Uru-
3 No trade payments agreement exists between Argentina and 
Chile, there being a tacit understanding for the liquidation of 
transactions "on account". 
guay. Up to December 1948 payments made for 
Argentine exports in these accounts enjoyed a prefer-
ential rate of exchange amounting to a subsidy of 
20 per cent.4 
Countries with inadequate production of foodstuffs 
hoped that trading accounts would help alleviate their 
chronic trade disequilibrium with Argentina. In cer-
tain cases, the monetary difficulties arising from a 
rapid decrease in the foreign exchange holdings accu-
mulated during the Second World War constituted 
the decisive factor in favour of participating in the 
system. With the exception of Peru, all countries of 
the zone showed interest. Peru has entered into only 
one payments agreement, which was concluded with 
Argentina and concerns the exchange of Argentine 
chilled meat and wheat for Peruvian electrolytic cop-
per and petroleum. Due to the diversity of its exports 
and the demand for them in world markets, Peru 
remained apart from the trading obligations inherent 
in clearing agreements.5 It would be difficult to recon-
cile the free exchange system, which Peru maintained 
until 1945 and re-established in 1949, with agreements 
involving trade in specific quantities of goods, unless 
effected by government-controlled agencies or assisted 
through the granting of special tariff reductions. This 
was the case for the 1951 agreement to trade Peruvian 
cotton for Chilean iron, previously referred to' in 
chapter III . Of the visible trade operations effected 
outside the clearing account system (less than 17 per 
cent of the total trade in the southern zone), approxi-
mately half is derived from Chilean-Peruvian trade, 
which is carried out on a dollar basis. It is probable 
that this figure will be substantially reduced in the 
near future because of recent attempts to conclude 
payments agreements between Chile and Paraguay, 
between Paraguay and Uruguay, and, although still 
in the preliminary stage, between Chile and Uruguay.6 
Co-ordination of these agreements would serve to 
complete a process which, in just over ten years, has 
reduced the zonal use of convertible currency in nor-
mal trade operations to small proportions. 
An examination of these agreements indicates that 
they frequently involve the use of clearing operations. 
These may be defined as government bank accounts, 
subject to periodic or ad hoc adjustment, which are 
4 The rate of exchange for this zonal trade under clearing 
agreements was 4.01 Argentine pesos per dollar, as against the 
rate of 3.35 pesos applying to all other countries. 
5 In treaty negotiations with countries dealing in United States 
dollars, experience has shown that creditor countries frequently 
reject efforts to conclude agreements designed to balance trade 
with their debtors. This is because the resulting equilibrium 
would prevent them from acquiring balances of free currencies 
which they need for settlements in other areas. The debtor, more-
over, to avoid increasing the deficit, may diminish imports from 
the creditor country or else transfer them to markets which will 
purchase its own exports. The consequent state of chronic dis-
equilibrium is thus transformed into an obstacle to bilateral 
trade expansion or stability. Chile, owing to the pressure on its 
balance , of payments in convertible currencies, has endeavoured 
to diversify the source of its supplies of sugar, since sugar is 
mainly responsible for the considerable passive balance with 
Peru that must be settled in United States dollars. 
6 In March 1952, Uruguay limited the use of dollars for freight 
payments, granting preference, under certain conditions, to the 
use of vessels belonging to countries linked to Uruguay by pay-
ments agreements. However, Chilean vessels have traditionally 
transported the general merchandise exchanged between Brazil 
and Uruguay, as well as the sugar shipped from Peru to Mon-
tevideo, for which freight is paid in dollars. Thus, discussions are 
proceeding to allow this traffic to continue under a part-payment 
system, involving the value of Chilean iron exported to Uruguay, 
of Uruguayan dolomite exports for Chile's iron and steel indus-
try, and of transport performed by Chilean vessels. 
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utilized to balance the payments arising from the trade 
in products of equal value. This trade is arranged to 
avoid currency payments and the value is usually 
liquidated through clearing accounts. The entire struc-
ture may thus be considered as a vast payments system 
on current account, although any two contractual par-
ties are unable to make multilateral transfers of the 
balances. 
In studying obstacles to trade within the zone, the 
research undertaken between government officials re-
sponsible for foreign trade and by private organiza-
tions was extended to the practical trade problems 
which occur in bilateral accounts. Not only were the 
principal characteristics of this trade determined, but 
in addition such restrictive measures as parity differ-
entials, surcharges, adjustment of balances, inadequate 
private credits and re-exports. 
Rearranging the payments structure, within the 
wide field of agreements of this type already concluded 
between different countries of the zone, would elimi-
nate certain unfavourable factors in the trade of essen-
tial products and would encourage the diversification 
of exports. Moreover, an examination of the system 
provides certain guiding principles on the fundamental 
aspects of payment problems in this part of Latin 
America. 
2. Parities 
Trade agreements between Argentina and Brazil, as 
well as between Argentina and Uruguay, contain pre-
cise provisions for the mutual recognition of parities 
existing between the respective national currencies and 
the United States dollar. Moreover, Argentina oper-
ates the neighbouring countries' accounts, mentioned 
earlier, with strict regard to parity with the dollar, not 
only for the basic rate of exchange but for preferential 
rates as well. Excluding these bilateral agreements, a 
mutual recognition of currency parities, by countries 
whose trade with Argentina is liquidated through the 
neighbouring countries' accounts, has not been specifi-
cally established in the respective agreements. For 
trade between Argentina and Chile, which is not based 
on any formal contract, the accounts in Argentina 
follow the official clearing procedure. In Chile, they 
operate entirely free from intervention by the govern-
ment or the Central Bank. Following long-established 
custom, amounts to be settled between the two coun-
tries are liquidated through private bank operations, 
in accordance with the fluctuations of the supply or 
demand for the exchange. Paraguay also operates its 
clearing with Argentina without regard for dollar pari-
ties, which would seem to be in keeping with the par-
ticular nature of trade between these two States.7 
More than 50 per cent of this trade consists in exchang-
ing Paraguayan wood for Argentine wheat. For many 
years, the trend of Paraguay's commercial policy has 
been to fix, irrespective of parities, the unit of account 
used in liquidating the respective transactions, with 
two considerations in mind. The first has been to en-
sure the continuance of the River Plate market for its 
lumber exports. The second has been to mitigate, where 
possible, the effects of the exchange rate accorded to 
these exports on the prices of foodstuffs, especially 
wheat imported from Argentina, and which are af-
fected by the corresponding selling rate of exchange. 
7 In January 1953, after approving the exchange budget for 
the year, Paraguay established the exchange rate for the Argen-
tine peso as 2.50 guaranis at its basic value, when the rate at 
parity with the dollar would have been 3 guaranis. 
Although the absence of, or non-compliance with, 
parities is evident in various trade sectors in the south-
ern zone, it tends to be particularly obvious in two 
bilateral channels and a serious obstacle to the normal 
development of trade is apparent. The trade channels 
involved are, firstly, Chile and Argentina and, secondly, 
Chile and Brazil. 
For Argentina and Chile in particular, their lack of 
pre-established parities (in addition to their respective 
devaluations over the past five years) have had ex-
tremely divergent effects on the unit of account used 
in mutual clearing operations. In Argentina, the price 
of this unit in national currency was adjusted each 
time in accordance with variations in the basic exchange 
rate and the differential rates. In Chile—apparently 
as a result of a policy to moderate the price rise of 
certain Argentine foodstuffs—the price of the unit in 
Chilean pesos remained unaffected by exchange depre-
ciations and was almost stationary. At the present 
time the difference between the units of account and 
the exchange rates under parities is so great that the 
clearing value of one dollar in Argentina can be pur-
chased in Chile for half this amount. The situation 
with Brazilian-Chilean clearing is similar, but on a 
smaller scale, since the corresponding undervaluation 
in Chile was approximately a third of the price repre-
sented by the parity value.8 
In a general way, this phenomenon is a barrier to 
the export of Chilean products to Argentina and 
Brazil. These sales must be accompanied by a price 
increase which will compensate the exporter for the 
disadvantages of undervaluation and which could 
otherwise be avoided by exporting to countries where 
rates are fixed at parity with the dollar. At the same 
time, when the prices of Argentine and Brazilian com-
modities are on the same comparative level as those 
of other supplying countries, Chilean importers are 
able to acquire such commodities with less domestic 
ties with less domestic currency than would otherwise 
be the case. The favourable difference is equivalent to 
the undervaluation affecting Chilean monetary units 
used in settling clearing accounts with Argentina and 
Brazil. With regard to both imports and exports, 
undervaluation contributes to Chilean difficulties in 
supplying a sufficiently large quantity of merchandise 
to Argentina that is as essential in nature as the food-
stuffs which the latter supplies to Chile. In addition 
to this injurious effect to the bilateral expansion of 
trade, undervaluation necessarily alters the relation-
ship between world prices and the price schedule 
regulating commercial activities between Argentina 
and Chile. Above all, the disrupting influence on trade 
is essentially due to the uncertainties that are caused, 
since one of its components (in this case Chilean 
exports) invariably finds more remunerative sales 
through trade with other markets. An annex to this 
chapter entitled "Effects of the absence of monetary 
parities between Argentina and Chile", explains some 
individual characteristics of this problem. 
3. Price differentials 
In the exchange of commodities between the seven 
countries of the zone, particularly essential products, 
higher prices are more often obtained as a result of 
payments through clearing than payments in United 
States dollars for exports. This phenomenon is ob-
served in all cases where agreements are still in force, 
8 Quotation for 10 December 1952. 
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as shown by several examples. For instance, in 1952, 
Argentina concluded a sale through a clearing account 
of semi-refined sunflower-seed oil, worth 350 dollars 
per ton, at a price varying between 404 and 470 dollars. 
For sales in free currencies, the same country in 1952 
accorded a discount, through the rate of exchange, of 
30 per cent in the price of cattle hides exported and 
20 per cent in the export of wool. In the same year, 
•Brazilian pine, valued at 90 dollars per 1,000 square 
feet in convertible currency, was exported under clear-
ing arrangements at a value of 125 dollars. Chilean 
copper, which during the second half of 1952 was 
being sold at 803 dollars per ton, was exported under 
payment through clearing at 1,000 dollars. 
It would appear obvious that these price differen-
tials for clearing-account transactions, over and above 
the prices of United States dollar sales, should de-
crease, or be eliminated, when the importing country 
reciprocates with exports of essential goods. However, 
definite information on this point is lacking, at least 
in so far as the numerous cases examined are con-
cerned. In exporting goods of a similar nature, the 
contractual parties in general benefited from higher 
prices through quantitative agreements than from 
transactions concluded in dollars. The most recent 
case is that of the exchange of Argentine edible oils 
for Chilean iron, negotiated in 1952, the prices for 
which show surcharges varying from 20 to 30 per cent 
compared with United States dollar sales. 
If both parties in trade of this type impose similar 
surcharges on the goods exchanged, neither will obtain 
net profits. However, in the domestic sector, this is 
equivalent to an income transfer favouring the ex-
porter at the expense of the import consumer. The 
need to protect the consumer, by the officials who 
control maximum prices for essential goods, particu-
larly foodstuffs, usually explains the difficulties of 
southern zone countries to obtain these goods through 
clearing arrangements or barter. Time and again, 
where such purchases would have enabled a country 
needing foodstuffs to utilize its inactive balances 
accumulated through exports, the final decision has 
favoured the lower-priced markets outside the region, 
despite the drain on domestic resources of convertible 
currencies. 
The maintenance of surcharges, particularly in trade 
of more or less equivalent essential products, contrib-
utes to the uncertainties characteristic of trade through 
the clearing systems. Of ten clearing agreements regu-
lating payments between the seven countries of the 
region, only two specify that payments will be made 
through clearing operations.9 With regard to the 
others, the exporter may at any time require the 
importer to liquidate a balance in United States 
dollars. For example, Argentine sheep exports for 
refrigerating plants in Chilean Patagonia, exports of 
Argentine wheat to Chile, Chilean copper sales to 
other South American countries on the Atlantic and 
Bolivian tin sent to Chile have been frequently effected 
outside the clearing system and in convertible dollars. 
This has often been the result of decisions by financial 
authorities in the exporting country, when granting 
the necessary permits. 
Since payment agreements do not specify the type 
of goods to which they apply, such refusals to author-
ize exports payable through the account frequently 
9 Article 1 of the payments agreement between Brazil and 
Uruguay, 27 August 1948, and article 1 of the agreement between 
Argentina and Brazil, 22 October 1948. 
act as a hidden obstacle to the transactions planned, 
thereby further impeding trade in the southern zone. 
It is not easy to induce countries to accept con-
tractual obligations limiting their right to demand 
payment in United States dollars for essential goods. 
This is especially true when their exchange holdings 
are low, or when there is an increased foreign demand 
for goods whose proceeds are urgently required in 
order to obtain indispensable supplies from other 
areas. Nevertheless, several formulas have been sug-
gested for adapting the procedures used in payments 
agreements within the zone, with the object of regular-
izing commercial operations. Among these, the most 
important suggests that the compensation of values 
through clearing arrangements be divided into two 
groups, namely, essential and non-essential goods, 
both of which would be determined in advance. This 
division, involving a contractual assurance that ex-
ports of essential goods be counterbalanced by an 
equivalent amount of essential imports, would be con-
ditioned by an agreement not to fix higher prices than 
those for similar types of merchandise exported to 
free-currency areas.10 
From one point of view, this formula might help to 
ensure an uninterrupted interchange of basic com-
modities and prevent certain of these being used as 
stop-gaps to relieve emergencies arising from a restric-
tion in supplies from traditional markets. As such, it 
would promote a more stable and mutually advan-
tageous trade in essential goods. However, it remains 
to be seen whether dividing the clearing account into 
two groups of products would restrict trading opera-
tions in non-essential goods to the level of the country 
exporting least, and thus interfere with the diversifi-
cation of exports. The practical consequences of this 
proposed programme upon the respective bilateral 
trade channels should first be examined, taking into 
account the problems of adjusting unfavourable bal-
ances within each group of products. Only then could 
an adequate criterion be evolved for contractual agree-
ments eliminating the overvaluation apparent between 
payments settled by clearing in the southern zone and 
those effected in convertible currencies. 
4. Adjustment of balances 
Since only one clearing account is used to settle the 
value of merchandise essential to a different degree, 
United States dollars are often needed for the payment 
of luxury or non-essential goods, due to the clause 
requiring adjustment of balances in hard currency.11 
In general, the precautions taken by a debtor coun-
try to prevent deficits from exceeding the amounts 
agreed upon bring about periodic stoppages of the flow 
of supplies and leave the market to goods from coun-
tries with which the country has a surplus or a wider 
margin of credit. Such types of restrictions are typified 
in clearings between Brazil and Chile. At the end of 
1947 the foreseen credit of 3.2 million dollars, as 
stipulated in the agreement, was exceeded by Chile, 
whose debt at the time amounted to some 5 millions. 
As exchange holdings in Chile were insufficient to 
10 In the 1947 commercial agreement between Argentina and 
Brazil, Argentina was required to sell wheat for five years at the 
minimum price obtainable from other countries during the month 
immediately preceding the despatch of the Brazilian quota. 
11 Although there appears to be a general preference for dividing 
exports into three groups (namely high-priority goods, ordinary 
exports, and goods for which there is slight demand), the division 
into two, for purposes of account, would apparently assist in 
classified bilateral agreements. 
28 
repay the debt in convertible exchange, reciprocal 
trade remained practically stationary for five months 
until an arrangement could be devised for gradually 
liquidating the obligation. At the same time, exchange 
authorities of both countries reduced import permits 
to a minimum. Chile, the debtor country, was faced 
with the necessity of reducing its imports since, under 
the clearing mechanism, new credits received by 
Chilean importers to pay for articles purchased in 
Brazil were automatically applied by the government 
to offset the original debt, so that the envisaged oper-
ations were cancelled. The same situation occurred, 
under somewhat different circumstances, during the 
first half of 1952. This time, however, the reverse was 
true, for Brazil was the debtor, and exchange authori-
ties, in order to confine the unfavourable balance to 
the lowest possible level, were forced to limit permits 
for imports from Chile drastically. (See table 17.) 
T A B L E 1 7 . B R A Z I L : AVERAGE NUMBER OF PERMITS 
ISSUED MONTHLY FOR IMPORTS OF CHILEAN MER-
CHANDISE 
(In thousands of dollars) 
194 8 2,590 
194 9 953 
195 0 1,619 
195 1 3,352 
1952 (first two quarters) 1,167 
SOURCE: Banco do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro. 
There have been various recommendations for meas-
ures to minimize the depressive effect on trade exerted 
by the clause for adjusting balances. This, as already 
seen, is mainly applied in the form of preventive 
restrictions of permits,. The recommendations are 
found to be on the same plane as measures for regula-
ting the prices of essential merchandise. In accordance 
with these suggestions, the clause concerning the 
adjustment of balances by means of convertible cur-
rency would continue to apply to mutually-defined 
essential goods. However, favourable balances accu-
mulated through trade in non-essential or dispensable 
commodities would be reduced through greater pur-
chases by the creditor country. In other words, the 
balances would be liquidated by goods. In Brazil, 
officials in the Import-Export Department of the 
Banco do Brasil have suggested that the obligation of 
using convertible currencies, in settling debts result-
ing from operations carried on under payments agree-
ments, should be restricted to those cases where the 
debt is a result of greater purchases by the debtor 
country than was originally foreseen in the agreement. 
If, however, debts were the result of smaller purchases 
on the part of the creditor country than mutually 
agreed upon, the solution would be to increase them.12 
Although there is no clause agreed upon for adjusting 
balances in United States dollars between Argentina 
and Chile, an agreement was signed in April 1952 
whereby the values settled in the clearing were divided 
l a Among the "recommendations" made by the Treasury 
Ministers of Argentina and Brazil, in October 1940, was the 
following: "When a persistent debt occurs within periods of less 
than six months, the country with excess exports over imports 
should, on request from the other country, adopt the necessary 
measures for restoring the equilibrium, preferably through the 
use of means which will increase imports, and not decrease 
exports". In the payments agreement between Argentina and 
Brazil, on 28 October 1948, the possibility of settling the un-
favourable balance was considered through various means: gold 
•shipments, internationally acceptable means of payment, other 
into separate merchandise classifications, each with 
more or less the same intrinsic value, and which each 
country agreed to exchange in commensurate 
quantities. 
5. Private credit 
With some exceptions, payments agreements regu-
late the international credit mechanism utilized by 
the members, but they do not stimulate private credit 
to fulfil its role in trade promotion. In addition, 
quantitative import restrictions in the region have 
frequently diminished private credit facilities, par-
ticularly during the last two years. They have done 
this by preventing the importer from transferring to 
his suppliers, through the respective clearing accounts, 
the value of the merchandise in question before it has 
been dispatched to its destination. The same results 
are accomplished by the refusal to authorize customs 
clearance of goods on consignment, or, in other words, 
to permit sales under deferred payment.13 
In the case of banking credits granted to importers 
to facilitate the introduction of foreign goods, selective 
control of imports shows certain tendencies to reserve 
this type of credit for essential imports, requiring the 
importer to finance anticipatory payments for the 
total value of the transactions when the imports cover 
non-essential goods. In some countries, a plan has 
even been studied for partially substituting the system 
of selective control, based on permits, for one of State 
control of bank credits requested by importers. This 
would reduce the demand for foreign exchange and 
cause fewer inconveniences, in the opinion of qualified 
government officials, than those brought about by the 
system of permits. 
In the trade of the southern zone of Latin America, 
limitations" placed'on private credit, according to pres-
ent information, have resulted in discouraging experi-
ences. The goods traded under certain forms of private 
credit are sometimes removed from the customs by 
consignees only after much delay, and at other times 
may even be abandoned. Payments are frequently not 
made under the stipulated terms. For many items, 
particularly non-essential machinery and domestic and 
manufacturing articles, European and North American 
trade with Latin America achieved a considerable 
expansion in the past, following a practice which still 
persists to-day. This has been to extend credits as far 
as the local distributors, through a mechanism of 
responsible agencies maintained by the head offices 
of the firms in each country. The distributors in turn 
are assisted by local banks whose central offices are 
in the country of the export firms. Branches of the 
export firms may conclude sales under conditions of 
deferred payment, and send their remittances to the 
head offices when the total is collected. For inter-Latin-
American trade, however, the situation is weak. There 
are few such commercial organizations as exist for 
Chilean nitrate, or, in the field of finance, as the over-
seas offices of the Banco de la Nación, Argentina, or 
the Banco do Brasil. These ensure the maintenance 
currencies acceptable to the creditor, currency of the debtor, or 
exports of merchandise by the debtor. In August 1952, Brazil, 
the debtor, reached an agreement with Western Germany to 
reduce the debt gradually by exporting goods of a value to 
exceed by 20 per cent the value of Brazilian purchases, until an 
equilibrium could be re-established. 
13 Among recent measures of this type are those adopted by 
Argentina covering the export of cattle to Chile. Until the last 
half of 1952 these were dispatched under private credits, but 
after that time were to be paid for prior to their shipment. 
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of stable patterns of credit and international payments 
capable of contributing to specialization in intra-zonal 
trade. The perishable nature of some agricultural 
products found in zonal trade may exclude them from 
the system of consignment shipping or from sales 
"collect".14 Therefore, an improvement in payments 
agreements, by the inclusion of standards for per-
mitting these practices, would help to lessen the dis-
advantages of the organization of private credit in 
intra-regional trade, compared with the facilities char-
acteristic of trade between the zone and Europe or 
North America.15 The same credit facilities would con-
tribute to greater export diversification if the principle 
of selective credit control over imports would exclude 
non-essential goods imported from zonal sources. 
6. Re-exports 
Under the Argentine-Brazilian payments agreement 
of October 1948, goods originating within their terri-
torial limits and that were objects of trade between 
the two countries were to be destined exclusively for 
their respective consumption, or for transformation by 
industry in the importing country. In addition, the 
same contract agreed to ensure that the transfer of 
capital, through clearing procedures, would correspond 
only to direct operations between the two parties. The 
remaining commercial and payments agreements bind-
ing the republics of the southern zone, with the 
exception of certain indirect references, make no men-
tion of the re-export of merchandise purchased through 
clearing or as a result of compensation.16 
An examination of certain official resolutions, taken 
from triangular trade arrangements and involving 
re-export operations, gave the general impression that 
if purchases are made under a system of clearing or as 
a result of compensation, they are understood to be 
imported for domestic consumption. Nonetheless, some 
officials have been inclined to consider that when mer-
chandise is once cleared through customs, and assum-
ing no contrary commitments exist, there is no reason 
why it cannot be freely re-exported to another country. 
In Uruguay, especially, there appears to be no doubt 
as to whether merchandise traded through bilateral 
agreements may be re-exported to other markets. This 
attitude parallels the country's policy of favouring 
agreements designed to facilitate the transit of goods 
14 Garlic, for example, is excluded from the "collect" shipments 
employed in Chilean exports to Brazil. 
15 A study is being conducted in Brazil to determine the neces-
sary measures for extending the Banco do Brasil, which already 
has branches in Asunción and Montevideo, to other South 
American capitals, thus forming a network of offices to facilitate 
foreign trade credits and capital transfers. Similarly, the 1951 
report of the Export-Import department of the Banco do Brasil 
expressed the aim of studying a policy for developing inter-
Latin-American trade, through credit assistance that its depart-
ment could extend, in the economic co-operation treaty, signed 
in 1947 between Brazil and Chile, and in force since 1952, both 
countries agree to assist the establishment of national banks in 
the respective countries. The same type of agreement is found 
in the financial and economic treaty of 1946 between Argentina 
and Chile, but not ratified by the Chilean Congress, and in the 
economic and commercial treaty of 1948 between Bolivia and 
Peru. 
on such a large scale that it is partly equivalent to the 
free entrance and exit of capital in United States 
dollars. 
The absence of rulings (in the payments agreements 
or in the treaties to which they are supplements) con-
cerning the balancing mechanism that re-exports could 
provide, shrouds them with constant uncertainty, 
particularly concerning the opinions of officials who 
decide upon the issue of the respective permits, when 
it is finally considered as permissible. However, this 
absence of rulings does not prevent many efforts being 
made to re-export, especially through triangular oper-
ations. Due to prevailing exchange rates, particularly 
during 1951 and 1952, there were attempts to convert 
a portion of the Argentine and Brazilian balances, 
immobile in some countries of the region because of 
insufficient domestic demand, for balances in the 
United States or Europe. It was therefore necessary 
to export goods from Argentina or Brazil, destined to 
the clearing or compensation country which held the 
credits, then to cover the value by charging that credit, 
and finally to re-export the goods to a third market. 
In some of these transactions the operation was only 
permitted because the first recipient did not require 
the entry of the goods into the country before re-
exporting. For example, there were projects for export-
ing Argentine merchandise to the United States, such 
as grease, hides and others, under triangular operations 
where the values were to be covered by Argentina 
clearing through Peru. There were also sales of Brazil-
ian goods, under the same kind of circumstances, 
which were to be settled in Brazil by way of clearing 
in Chile. These generally lost their attraction for the 
merchants involved when the respective exchange 
authorities required the entry of the goods at the first 
port of arrival, except when the undervaluation of 
the respective clearing currency offered sufficient mar-
gin to absorb the additional costs of customs duties 
and transport. During most of 1952, when the clearing 
dollar of Brazilian-Chilean trade dropped in value by 
more than 30 per cent to the official parity, triangular 
trade operations became notably active, since the 
difference permitted the covering of supplementary 
costs such as transport and duties and even assured 
substantial profits. 
The lack of contact, or of an exchange of informa-
tion, between national bodies directly concerned with 
foreign trade, and which is particularly marked as 
regards exchange rates, contributes to the initiative— 
for disposing of surplus credits in the areas where they 
can be absorbed—being entirely in private hands. It is 
by no means exceptional for the government to ascer-
tain, only after goods have been moved, that these in 
fact are multiple operations which are sometimes in 
conflict with permanent export interests. This fact 
was noted, during research on this study, in more than 
one country. 
16 In the Argentine-Chilean treaty of 1952, agreeing to the 
exchange of cattle for copper, it was established that trade in 
these products be considered for domestic consumption, with each 
government committing itself to measures for preventing their 
re-export. 
ANNEX 
Effects of the absence of monetary parities between Argentina and Chile 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
The absence of monetary parities between Argentina 
and Chile, together with the lack of connexion between 
their respective exchange systems, exerts a strongly 
disruptive influence upon their mutual trade. The 
barrier thus created is among the most serious of all 
the present obstacles hampering regular trade relations 
between the two countries. 
Most commercial transactions are liquidated through 
bank accounts in Argentine pesos, which, in Chile, 
are referred to as Nacionales de exportación.11 In 
Argentina, these accounts form part of the official 
clearing mechanism employed, with slight modifica-
tions, in trade with Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru 
and Uruguay. They are particularly used in cases 
where bilateral payments agreements are in effect, but 
there is no such agreement with Chile, where a defacto 
situation exists. In Argentina, the Central Bank 
directly controls all clearing operations which are 
based on a strict parity with the dollar. Payments in 
Chile are liquidated through private channels, without 
government intervention or fixed parities. The value 
of the currency, in which the transaction is accounted, 
fluctuates according to the Chilean money market or 
to Argentine differential exchange rates. 
These accounts, and the commercial items to which 
they refer,''are shown in table 18. 
17 To avoid confusion between Argentine and Chilean pesos, 
the term "nacional" is used for the Argentine peso throughout 
this annex. 
Table 19, referring to 1951, indicates the significance 
of apparent Argentine-Chilean trade activity, with 
transactions for each of the exchange rates outlined. 
The table also shows the profit obtained by the 
Argentine Treasury, in actual currency, as a result 
of the margin between various exchange rates for 
this trade. 
2 . A R G E N T I N E E X P O R T S 
As shown by the preceding table, the basic exchange 
rate of 5 "nacionales" per dollar predominates in 
Argentina's exports to Chile, covering almost 90 per 
cent of this total. In contrast, there is an even greater 
use of the 7.50 exchange rate for Chilean exports to 
Argentina, covering over 98 per cent, or practically 
all, of the trade in this direction. 
Theoretically, the relative overvaluation abroad of 
the 5 "nacionales" rate used for exports and the rela-
tive undervaluation of the 7.50 exchange rate used 
for imports tend to exert an unfavourable influence 
upon trade, discouraging both Argentine exporters and 
importers, as well as Chilean exporters. Only Chilean 
importers of Argentine goods are favoured, excluding 
the effect of the favourable or adverse influence of 
domestic prices upon the goods in both countries. How-
ever, the depressive effect of the exchange structure 
upon Argentine exports is offset by subsidizing, through 
the use of a 7.50 rate, all export goods that the govern-
ment wishes to stimulate. The subsidy is financed by 
T A B L E 1 8 . A R G E N T I N E - C H I L E A N T R A D E — A R G E N T I N E C L E A R I N G ACCOUNTS 
Exchange rate 
Account Use ("nacionales" per dollar) 
"Special Exports, Circular 1308" 
"Special Exports, Circular 1310" 




5.00 and 7.50 
Official free market® 
Official free market 
SOURCE: Banco Central, Argentina. 
• The principal goods cleared by Account 1308 are: Argentina: semi-refined oils, meat, tanned 
leather, livestock, flour, wool, quebracho, lard and fats, oil seeds, combed woven goods, wheat; 
Chile: coal, fine coal, coke, cement, copper, ferro-manganese, iron books, lumber, nitrate. 
b The principal goods cleared by Account 1310 are: Argentina: books, woven goods, various 
manufactures; Chile: oats, miscellaneous manufactures, nuts, sodium sulphate, wine. 
" T h e official free exchange rate is at present approximately 14 "nacionales" per dollar, 
resulting in a Chilean price of 4.64 pesos per "nacional". 
T A B L E 1 9 . A R G E N T I N E - C H I L E A N T R A D E IN 1 9 5 1 , C L A S S I F I E D 
ACCORDING TO A R G E N T I N E E X C H A N G E R A T E S 
















5.00 30,145 89.8 401 1.4 +29,745 42,068 
7.50 2,750 8.2 29,230 98.2 - 2 6 , 4 8 0 
14.00» 685 2.0 127 0.4 + 558 
TOTAL 33,580 100.0 29,758 100.0 + 3,822 
SOURCE: Dirección General de Estadística, Chile. 
• Subject to fluctuations. 
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the Argentine Treasury through the differential ob-
tained from the purchase and sale of foreign exchange. 
For some marginal exports or those for which there is 
only slight demand abroad, an even greater stimulus 
is provided by an official free market rate, valued at 
approximately 14 "nacionales" per dollar. 
The incentive to purchase Argentina's products has 
been strengthened in Chile by a similar policy for 
encouraging imports from Argentina. Whereas Ar-
gentina has consistently raised the value in "nacio-
nales" of the currency used in clearance with Chile, in 
relation to the general devaluation of its exchange 
rates, Chile has not followed suit, excluding Argentina 
from the successive effects of its own devaluations. 
Thus, with some fluctuations, that unit of account 
retained a value in Chile very close to its original level, 
varying progressively from the actual value, in Chilean 
pesos, of the foreign exchange accruing from exports 
to other countries. Chilean exports to Argentina, par-
ticularly in 1949, have continued to suffer from the 
unfavourable consequences of this policy, providing 
lower prices than could otherwise have been obtained 
from sales to other markets. Nevertheless, the system 
has continued, principally due to a Chilean policy for 
reducing price increases of the foodstuffs imported 
from Argentina. 
3 . C H I L E A N E X P O R T S 
Table 20 illustrates the two situations limiting 
Chilean exports to Argentina, namely, the disruption 
of the relationship between the official Chilean and 
Argentine exchange rates and exchange rates assigned 
to Chilean exports which generally differ from exports 
to Argentina. 
T A B L E 2 0 . C H I L E : R E L A T I O N S H I P B E T W E E N T H E P R I C E VARIATIONS OF T H E 
" N A C I O N A L " U S E D F O R E X P O R T AND T H E G E N E R A L E X P O R T E X C H A N G E R A T E 
Bank price Exchange 
average for Percentage variation rate for Percentage variation 
export general 
Year "nacionales" Annual 1948-52 exportsa Annual 1948-52 
194 8 10.23 43 
194 9 10.44 2.1 43 — 
195 0 11.23 7.6 60 39.5 
195 1 10.27 - 8.5 90 50.0 
1952b 11.23 9.3 9.8 122 25.5 183.7 
SOURCE: Quotations of "nacionales" used for exports: Banco de Chile. General export 
exchange rates: International Financial Statistics. 
• For some exports, this exchange rate is lowered through the use of mixed rates. However, 
most manufactured, and many agricultural, products benefit from the rate without any reduc-
tion whatsoever. 
b Average for the first ten months of 1952. (The quotation of the "nacionales" used for 
exports on 10 November 1952 was 13 Chilean pesos.) 
Although the quotations for the "nacionales" used 
for exports in the annual averages in table 20 show 
slight variations, sharp fluctuations exist, causing 
rapid price decreases. The most severe reaction oc-
curred in October 1950, when a decline in Argentine 
exports to Chile caused a price decline of 26 per cent, 
or, in Chilean pesos, from 12.30 to 9.15. Similar 
examples, though less severe, occurred intermittently 
between 1950 and 1952. 
Fluctuations in the price of foreign exchange may 
take place in Chilean bank exchange rates, and even 
in the rates officially fixed at parity, due to the absence 
of any official mechanism for purchasing foreign ex-
change accruing from exports to Argentina or else-
where. When importers are not interested in acquiring 
foreign exchange, the exporter must necessarily resort 
to private banking institutions or await a recurrence 
of demand. In both cases he runs the risk of receiving, 
in Chilean pesos, a lower payment than was originally 
anticipated. 
From 1951 to 1952, there were periods when the 
supply of exchange in the Argentine-Chilean account 
exceeded the demand in Chile, thereby strongly dis-
couraging exporters. Travellers and tourists proceed-
ing to Argentina were allowed to purchase drafts so 
as to diminish the credit balance in the account. 
Normally, travellers use Argentine bills, which, for 
different reasons, have been accumulating in ever-
increasing numbers in Chile, and costing 6.50 Chilean 
pesos.18 However, since drafts could be obtained at the 
u 10 November 1952 quotation. 
rate assigned to trade, or approximately 4.64, it was 
an unusually attractive offer inasmuch as travellers 
were able to purchase their exchange at almost a 30 
per cent discount on the price of notes. Thus, the 
Chilean capacity to import goods from Argentina was 
reduced to the ratio of 1 dollar for every 14 draft 
"nacionales" sold.19 
In addition to other unfavourable factors influencing 
Chilean exports to Argentina, there is one of a psy-
chological nature, resulting from the methods of 
accounting for customs dues in Argentine pesos. For 
example, it may be assumed that a Chilean exporter 
dispatches merchandise valued at 2,000 Argentine 
pesos and classified in Argentina as corresponding to 
the exchange rate of 7.50. The Argentine customs, 
after permitting its entrance, provide a clearance 
certificate (certificado de despacho a plaza) valued at 
400 dollars (2,000 divided by 5) for which the importer 
is obliged to pay 3,000 "nacionales" to the bank, at 
the rate of 7.50 per dollar. The total credit accorded 
19 Since the Argentine Central Bank conducts its operations-
with Chile using dollar parity, the monetary value of the dollar 
can indiscriminately equal 5, 7.50 or 14 Argentine pesos, depend-
ing upon the type of exchange rate assigned to the merchandise 
or service involved. Conversely, the same dollar in Chile costs, 
in every case, 65 Chilean pesos, at the 10 November 1952 quota-
tion. If this dollar is purchased in Chilean banks in order to 
import essential goods, it is obtained by buying 5 export "nacio-
nales" at 13 pesos each. If it is purchased to acquire secondary 
imports, to cover service charges or to pay for travellers' or 
tourists' expenses, it is obtained by purchasing 14 "nacionales" 
in Santiago, but always at the same price of 65 pesos. Therefore 
the price of each "nacional" is 4.64 Chilean pesos. 
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the exporting country, however, is 400 dollars, so that 
the difference of 1,000 "nacionales", resulting from the 
margin between the exchange rates, is credited to the 
Argentine Treasury.20 
Frequently this operation is interpreted to mean 
that a surcharge of 2.50 "nacionales" per dollar is 
being imposed on all imports from neighbouring coun-
tries. This interpretation, however, is erroneous, since 
similar imports from other countries, billed in dollars, 
are indiscriminately assigned the 7.50 exchange rate. 
4 . U N D E R V A L U A T I O N 
Table 20 shows the progressive divergence between 
the price of the "nacional" used for exports and that 
of the exchange rates fixed by Chile for exports to 
third parties. This has necessarily resulted in an in-
30 The Chilean Government does not receive profits from the 
purchase and sale of the exchange used in Argentine-Chilean 
trade. 
creasing undervaluation of the exchange derived by 
Chilean exports to Argentina, particularly of manu-
factured or agricultural products whose exports to 
other markets are free from the disadvantages of 
mixed exchange rates. 
The significance of this unique system may be seen 
in tables 21 and 22. Its effect can be noted on com-
modities traditionally exchanged between Argentina 
and Chile, as well as on the export of manufactured 
articles which result from their industrial development. 
Since traditional trade items between Argentina and 
Chile are also exchanged between Brazil and Chile, an 
extra column was added to these two tables indicating 
the effects of the Chilean exchange system upon the 
different values received by Chilean exporters for 
selected commodities sold to Argentina, Brazil or to 
other countries. Conversely, the tables show the reper-
cussions of this system upon exchange rates for im-
ports, which, regardless of the type of goods, vary 
according to their origin. 
T A B L E 2 1 . C H I L E : S I G N I F I C A N C E I N C H I L E A N P E S O S O F A D O L L A R 
R E C E I V E D F O R E X P O R T S A 
Exports Exports Exports Percentage of undervaluatione 
to to to — 
Argentina Brazilb other countries Argentina Brazil 
Peas and oats 65 
Sulphur 65 
Malted barley — 
Cement 65 
Copper and manufactures0 45 
Ferromanganese 65 
Hemp fibre 65 
Fresh and dried fruit 65 
Iron and steel 65 
Flax 65 
Lentils'1. 65 
Alerce, coigue and mafiiu lumber. 65 
Cypress, lenga, lingue and roble 
lumber 65 
. Laurel and rauli lumber« 65 
Miscellaneous manufactures in-
cluding medicine' 65 
Quillay 65 
Nitrates 50 
Sodium sulphate and/or copper 
sulphate 65 
85 122 - 4 6 . 7 - 3 0 . 3 
85 122 - 4 6 . 7 - 3 0 . 3 
85 122 — - 3 0 . 3 
85 122 - 4 6 . 7 - 3 0 . 3 
60 60 - 2 5 . 0 — 
85 122 - 4 6 . 7 - 3 0 . 3 
85 122 - 4 6 . 7 - 3 0 . 3 
60 60 + 8.3 — 
— 122 - 4 6 . 7 — 
85 122 - 4 6 . 7 - 3 0 . 3 
85 91 - 2 8 . 6 - 6.6 
— 122 - 4 6 . 7 — 
60 + 8.3 
— 106.50 - 3 9 . 0 — 
85 122 - 4 6 . 7 - 3 0 . 3 
60 60 + 8.3 — 
50 50 — — 
85 122 - 4 6 . 7 - 3 0 . 3 
SOURCE: Decree No. 76 of 6 February 1952 of the Ministry of Economy of Chile, and export 
dollar bank quotations. 
»10 November 1952 quotations. 
b The free-market dollar, when used in clearing operations with Brazil, also undergoes an 
undervaluation as regards the export dollar used in other convertible currency regions: this 
discount was 32 per cent on 10 November 1952. The undervaluation results from an accumulation 
in Chile of financial credits from Brazil for which there is neither sufficient demand nor an official 
mechanism for their purchase. 
c The 45-peso rate is assigned to exports traded for Argentine cattle. For other countries, 
the rate assigned to copper is 60 pesos to a price of 35.5 US cents per pound of copper. The sur-
plus, plus a discount on the basic price of 35.5 cents (the discount amounting to 10 per cent for 
refined copper and 7 per cent for semi-refined), is settled at the free-market rate. 
d 50 per cent at the 60-peso rate and 50 per cent at the free-market rate. 
• 25 per cent at the 60-peso rate and 50 per cent at the free-market rate. 
' Proceeds from these exports are granted the free-market rate if the product has been pro-
duced from Chilean raw materials or from foreign raw materials imported under the free-market 
rate, or if the cost of the foreign raw material does not exceed 20 per cent of the total f.o.b. price 
charged to the foreign purchaser. If it exceeds 20 per cent, the credits derived from the exports 
are liquidated at the official rate in proportion to the value of the raw material used. The remainder 
is settled at the free-market rate. 
' This column demonstrates the percentage undervaluation in Chile of the exchange derived 
from exports to Argentina and Brazil in comparison with similar products exported to other 
countries, although in some cases these have shown a slight overvaluation. This percentage par-
tially shows the degree of encouragement that would be given to exports to Argentina and Brazil, 
if liquidation of the value accruing from exports were to be effected in terms of dollar parity. 
If this payment should represent an excessive profit for the exporter, it may be lowered by a 
mixed exchange rate or by other means to achieve the same end. 
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T A B L E 2 2 . C H I L E : V A L U E OF AN I M P O R T D O L L A R I N C H I L E A N P E S O S " 
Imports 
from Imports 
Argentina from Imports 
on accounts Brazil from Percentage overvaluations 
Nos. 1308 through other — 
and 1310 clearing countries Argentina Brazil 
Semi-refined oils and/or oil seedsb. 65 60 60 + 8.3 
Livestock on the hoof, excluding 
beef cattle transported by rail-
- 4 6 . 7 - 3 0 . 3 way 65 85 122 
Beef cattle and meat transported 
by railway0 45 — 122 - 6 3 . 1 — • 
Unginned cotton 65 60 60 + 8.3 — 
Cocoa — 85 122 — - 3 0 . 3 
Cow hides 65 85 122 - 4 6 . 7 - 3 0 . 3 
Vegetable and chemical tanning 
- 4 6 . 7 - 3 0 . 3 fluids including quebracho. . . . . 65 85 122 
Miscellaneous manufactures 
including medicines 65 85 122 - 4 6 . 7 - 3 0 . 3 
Greasy and non-greasy wool 65 85 122 - 4 6 . 7 - 3 0 . 3 
Books 65 85 122 - 4 6 . 7 - 3 0 . 3 
Wheat 50 — 50 — — 
SOURCE: Foreign Exchange Budget for 1952, Chile. 
a 10 November 1952 quotations, plus 0.50 bank commission in the case of account No. 1308. 
b During the second half of 1952, Argentina and Chile agreed to exchange 7,000 tons of 
semi-refined sunflower-seed oil for 15,050 tons of Huachipato iron and steel products. 
0 The "nacional" used for export of the 1308 account was assigned to imports of cattle 
transported by railway, whereas the price of 9 Chilean pesos was established for meat, the dollar 
being thus worth 45 Chilean pesos. The "nacionales" used in these imports are derived from the 
exports of copper to Argentina and are liquidated at the same price. The cattle-copper exchange 
agreement was extended, in September 1952, to 1 January 1953, and the value per head received 
in central or northern Chile continued to be 995.60 and 935 (or US$199.12 and US$187) respec-
tively, whereas copper is priced at US$1,000 per ton. 
d This column illustrates the percentage of the difference between the actual price paid in 
Chile for imports from Argentina and the hypothetical price under parity. It also demonstrates 
the modifications that would take place under a system of parities. 
the difficulties caused by other anomalies in the ex-
change system must be analysed with regard to their 
effect upon the trade of secondary goods Jan d upon 
services. 
5 . C O N T R A D I C T O R Y E F F E C T S O F MARGINAL E X C H A N G E 
The absence of a parity, as already noted, together 
with the fact that Chile has neither established official 
nor multiple exchange rates for use in the clearing of 
accounts with Argentina, has resulted in the unit of 
account producing, through the various Argentine 
exchange rates, two different rates in Chile. The more 
general rate is the "nacional" used for export, whose 
Chilean value is derived from supply and demand on 
the Santiago money market. The value of the second, 
and more marginal, rate is lower and inversely pro-
portional to the highest Argentine rate. The latter 
notably influences the reciprocal trade of both coun-
tries due to the opposing effects which occur, as illus-
trated in table 23. 
The Chilean exchange rate of 4.64 pesos per "na-
cional" (corresponding to 14 Argentine "nacionales" 
per dollar) aggravates the effect of undervaluation 
upon the disequilibrium in Argentine-Chilean trade. 
Table 23 demonstrates that Argentine commodities 
benefiting from the most favourable exchange rate, 
including certain manufactured goods as well as other 
products, also benefit in Chile from the most-favoured 
rate for the importer, namely, the marginal one. In 
contrast, however, similar Chilean products exported 
to Argentina do not receive comparable treatment. In 
fact the opposite holds true, since the Chilean exporter 
suffers from the most unfavourable exchange rate, 
which is the 4.64 marginal rate. The Argentine im-
porter, in a similar manner, must also use the most 
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Tables 21 and 22 indicate the serious barriers which 
undervaluation, as defined above, raises to the elimina-
tion of the traditional disequilibrium of Argentine-
Chilean trade relations, long the cause of its inherent 
weakness. The recent reversal of the position, due to 
the decline in Argentina's agricultural exports, is only 
temporary and is not likely to alter the fundamental 
trend. Since Chile has a deficit in food production, the 
undervaluation exaggerates its predicament in liqui-
dating annual trade balances with Argentina, from 
whom the largest share of food imports is received.21 
In contrast to the generally monopolistic nature of 
these foodstuff imports, whose entrance into Chile 
(particularly in the case of meat) is not hindered by 
supplies from other sources, the commodities utilized 
by Chile for payment almost invariably face competi-
tion in the Argentine markets of similar products from 
other countries. Undervaluation reduces the ability of 
Chilean goods to compete on the Argentine market, 
even tending to eliminate them. If normal exchange 
conditions prevailed, there would undoubtedly be a 
greater demand for Chilean commodities. 
The importance of this situation naturally varies 
according to the success with which Chilean goods— 
hindered in Argentina by the exchange system—may 
be sold in other countries, thereby providing sufficient 
dollars to liquidate the debit balance with Argentina. 
Having reviewed the effects of undervaluation on 
primary Chilean commodities exported to Argentina, 
21 T h e undervaluation represents another tariff advantage, un-
foreseen in the Argentine-Chilean t r e a t y of 1933 , for imports of 
Argentine products into Chile. W h e n such imports correspond to 
goods classified by the Chilean E x c h a n g e Budget as belonging 
to the free-market rate , the surcharge d u t y amounts to 1 ,140 
per cent , whereas for the same products from other countries 
it is 2 , 0 2 0 per cent . 
T A B L E 2 3 . E F F E C T OF THIS MARGINAL EXCHANGE RATE ON ARGENTINE-CHILEAN 
TRADE 
(a) Upon Argentine exports 
Exchange rates Exchange rates Price of Percentage 
for Argentine for Chilean Argentine pesos reduction for 
exporters importers for Chilean Chilean 
(in Argentine (in Chilean importers (in importers (in 
Pesos Per pesos per Chilean pesos terms of basic 
dollar) "nacional") * b per "nacional") exchange rate) 
Semi-refined oils, meat, livestock, 
flour, wheat, wool and seeds 5.00 13 13 
Tanned leather, quebracho, tallow 
and grease, combed woven goods 7.50 13 8.67 33.3 
Books, carded woven goods, miscel-
laneous manufactures, capital 
transfers, freight and other services 14.00 4.64° 4.64 64.3 
(b) Upon Chilean exports 
Exchange rates Exchange rates Price of Percentage 
for the for the Chilean peso for the surcharge in the 
Chilean Argentine Argentine price to Argentine 
exporter importer importer importer 
(in Chilean pesos (in Argentine (in Argentine pesos (in terms of basic 
per "nacional") pesos per dollar) per Chilean peso) exchange rate) 
Coal, fine coal 13.00 5.00 0.076 
Cement, copper, ferro-manganese, 
iron, books, lumber and nitrate.. 13.00 7.50 0.114 50.0 
Oats, miscellaneous manufactures, 
nuts, sodium sulphate, wines, capi-
tal transfers, freight and other 
services 4.64« 14.00 0.213 180.0 
SOURCE: Banco Central, Argentina. 
» 10 November 1952 quotation for "national" used for export. 
b Plus bank commission of 0.10 per "national" used for export. 
° Marginal exchange. 
unfavourable, or 14-peso, rate. But if Chile exports the 
same goods, to Peru for example, then the Chilean 
exporter will enjoy the best exchange, in contrast to 
the lowest rate received for sales to Argentina.22 
Unless other policies are adopted, this situation will 
represent a serious obstacle to the application of the 
Argentine-Chilean Convention of April 1952, accord-
ing to which trade permits are to be reciprocally 
granted for numerous products with equal values, 
many of them light manufactured articles. 
The inequitable exchange treatment imposed upon 
secondary commodities also affects payment for both 
capital transfers and invisible trade items. The ex-
change rate in Argentina, for investments abroad and 
for service charges, is the highest in domestic currency. 
In Chile, the same items for payment in Argentina 
may be effected at the lowest or marginal rate. 
The obstacles to Argentine-Chilean trade caused by 
both the lack of parities and the existence of a mar-
ginal exchange rate have been indicated. They have 
resulted in intricate private exchange operations, such 
as a combination of the "nacional" used for export 
with the marginal rate and with Argentine paper cur-
rency, in order to adjust exchange rates to a level at 
which business is possible. Argentine bills are used to 
such an extent that, in Chile, the possibility of adopt-
22 For example, if sodium sulphate is imported into Argentina, 
it is subject to the rate of approximately 14 "nacionales" per 
dollar. For the Chilean exporter this was equivalent to the 10 
November 1952 rate of 4.64 per "nacional", namely, 65 pesos per 
dollar. A similar Chilean export to Peru, at the same date, would 
have brought in 122 pesos for each dollar. 
ing a bilateral agreement determining the limit for all 
normal goods traded with Argentina had already been 
considered in 1951. It would be applied so that pay-
ment for transactions exceeding the adopted limit 
could be freely liquidated in the currency of either 
country. In fact, with the tacit approval of both gov-
ernments, the bank note is at present used to adjust 
the exchange quotations for livestock, which Chile 
imports from Argentina against copper exports. The 
price agreed upon in April 1952 was that of 996.60 
"nacionales" per head, at the basic rate of 5 "nacio-
nales" per dollar used by Argentina for livestock 
exports. This is equivalent to 199.32 dollars in account 
No. 1308, providing the Argentine exporter with 
996.60 Argentine pesos. But this sum really represents 
the cost for cattle on the range, requiring an additional 
charge of 400 "nacionales" per head of cattle—which 
rose to 564 in 1953—for transport charges to the 
border. Thus the tacit understanding has been to raise 
no objections to Chilean payment of this transport 
charge in Argentine notes. The final exchange rate for 
the Argentine exporter is in effect 7.65 pesos per dollar. 
Fundamentally, as seen above, the problems are 
generally derived from Argentina's application, with-
out discrimination, of the same system of parities in 
force for all its foreign trade. In contrast, Chile main-
tains an exceptional procedure in its trade with 
Argentina entirely different to its trade policy with 
other countries. It is easy to picture the destructive 
consequences with which mutual trade is faced through 
the uncertainty arising from the lack of correlation 
between the two exchange systems. Trade policies are, 
at present, anything but propitious for a closer contact 
between the respective economies. In the middle of 
1951 the favourable opinion in each country for finding 
a solution to this problem led to official consideration 
of a new formula. According to this, both countries 
would abandon the present system and agree to a 
clearing procedure for liquidating mutual operations in 
dollars on account, to which both parties would apply 
the same exchange rate, pegged to the United States, 
for similar transactions. However, the agreement 
would required certain reservations, particularly re-
garding internal price fluctuations prejudicial to the 
consumer, such as have occurred in Chile for certain 
basic food supplies traditionally provided by Argentina. 
Later, during the preparatory discussions held in 
Santiago in February 1953, resolutions were adopted 
for the study and regulation of an agreement to 
co-ordinate production and to intensify mutual trade. 
The two governments expressed "agreement to facili-
tate payment between the two countries as far as 
possible, principally by abrogating or modifying the 
present policy for exchange rates, movements of capi-
tal, distribution of exchange, and administrative or 
banking procedures which hinder such payments". 
Chapter VIII 
O C E A N T R A N S P O R T 
1. Introduction 
Trade within the southern zone of Latin America 
is closely related to the development of maritime 
shipping, since about 80 per cent of this commerce is 
conveyed by ships. Associated with the significance 
of maritime transport in foreign trade are the con-
siderable effects of freight charges on the ultimate 
cost of the merchandise and the repercussions of their 
expenditures and receipts on each national economy. 
In the southern zone the importance of sea transport 
to the various countries and the depletion of foreign 
exchange holdings resulting from the lack of domestic 
shipping lines are readily apparent. Thus, during 
1946-51, the total value of trade between the seven 
republics reached a yearly average of 396.5 million 
dollars (f.o.b.) with total payments for ocean freight 
representing 63 million. Domestic lines carried only a 
value of about 19 million dollars, and the foreign lines 
accounted for a total of 44 million dollars.1 
Problems of sea traffic are closely interrelated with 
those of foreign trade. On the one hand, changes in 
the latter are directly reflected in the supply of and 
demand for freight, creating conditions either favour-
able or adverse to the activities of shipping lines. On 
the other hand, characteristics of the vessels, such as 
age or speed, may influence the pattern of trade, either 
facilitating or obstructing its flow. Concerning the 
importance of studying sea traffic in relation to the 
improvement of foreign trade, certain documents 
presented by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America to the meeting of the Expert Working Group 
on the Iron and Steel Industry in Latin America, held 
in Bogotá in October 1952, stress the effect of freight 
charges on the ability of Latin-American goods to 
compete with similar items brought from outside the 
region. These documents, comprising a preliminary 
study of the local factors that influence costs, com-
pare conditions of location which should exist with 
others in specified industries, if prices are to be main-
tained at normal levels. Seven imaginary steel plants 
were selected for different Latin-American locations, 
and an eighth, similar to the first seven, was assumed 
for the United States Atlantic seaboard at Sparrows 
Point. Their comparative costs were then determined 
as influenced by local factors. Using the iron and 
steel industry as an example, it is established that the 
theoretical cost of a ton of pig-iron would be 43 
dollars at San Nicolás, Argentina, in a plant with an 
annual production capacity of 850,000 tons; 30.3 
dollars in the Huachipato steel mill, Chile, having a 
capacity of 230,000 tons; 31.9 dollars in Chimbóte, 
Peru, with a capacity of 150,000 tons, and 27.6 dollars 
in Sparrows Point, assuming its production capacity 
1 During 1951, the freight value of goods exported by Chile to 
Argentina and Brazil amounted to about 24 and 17 per cent, 
respectively, of their f.o.b. price. By virtue of these and other 
data, the average value of freight within the zone was estimated 
at around 20 per cent. 
to be 1 million tons. The slight difference between 
costs in industries favourably situated suggests that 
the exploitation of relative competitive advantages 
for their respective products in foreign markets 
depends, in the long run, upon transport costs. 
The study of the relationship between maritime 
traffic and foreign trade was hindered by a lack of 
basic official information. It was thus necessary to 
approach private shipping companies of different 
nationalities to obtain data for a report, however 
brief, on the characteristics of sea transport along the 
southern coasts of Latin America and their connexion 
with the growth of trade between countries of the 
southern zone and the region as a whole. The absence 
of statistics, in certain cases, and their fragmentary 
character in others, has made it necessary to replace 
or supplement them by approximate calculations and 
estimates. The latter are submitted with due reserve,, 
although, in the opinion of shipping officials examining 
them, they may be considered as representative of 
existing conditions. 
For these reasons, this chapter should only be con-
sidered as a first approximate survey of ocean trans-
port in relation to trade within the zone. Neverthe-
less, it does identify certain basic problems which 
could be studied further when more complete data 
are available. These problems include: the influence 
on regularity of traffic due to equilibrium or distur-
bance of the balance of trade; the effect of low speeds, 
translated in terms of imposing a heavier increase on the 
price of the goods than any affecting similar products 
from other parts of the world; the lack of port and 
harbour facilities, and other obstacles. All these could 
be eliminated if bilateral agreements, in which the 
shipping policy of each country is expressed, took 
into consideration the over-all interests of the freight 
market in the southern zone of Latin America. 
2. Importance of ocean transport in the zone 
About 80 per cent of the goods involved in reciprocal 
trade between countries of the southern zone are 
transported by sea. Such a high proportion is due prin-
cipally to difficulties inherent in land transport across, 
the Andes. Moreover, in the Argentine-Brazilian and 
Chilean-Peruvian trade sectors, goods are often trans-
ported between points so widely separated as to-
render the sea route more economical. 
Table 24 shows the average annual tonnage of goods 
conveyed by various means of transport between 
countries of the zone, during the period 1946-48. 
After 1949, there was a reduction in the tonnage of 
intra-zonal trade, chiefly because of a drop in wheat 
exports from Argentina and sand from Uruguay. In 
1951, the total volume of freight carried in the 
southern zone was only 4,150,000 tons.2 
4 Exports of Uruguay sand to Argentina declined from 2,300,000 
tons in 1949 to 261,000 tons in 1950. 
TABLE 2 4 . INTRA-ZONAL TRADE BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES—AVERAGE 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 4 8 
(Thousands of tons) 
Importers 
Exporters Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Peru Uruguay Total 
Argentina — 47.9 386.4 172.9 81.3 108.7 146.0 943.2 
Bolivia 26.2 — 2.2 0.4 0.3 3.2 0.0» 32.3 
Brazil 752.5 2.6 — 39.2 1.7 1.3 132.4 929.7 
Chile 131.6 15.4 72.3 — 0.5 59.6 9.6 289.0 
Paraguay 168.8 0.0» 0.1 0.0» — 0.1 56.9 225.9 
Peru 108.8 73.4 4.4 581.1 0.0« — 123.2 890.9 
Uruguay 2,321.6b 0.8 25.7 1.0 4.2 0.2 — 2,353.5 
TOTAL 3,509.5 140.1 491.1 794.6 88.0 173.1 468.1 5,664.5 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
» Less than 500 tons. 
b More than 80 per cent of this figure corresponds to sand transported by river. 
TABLE 2 5 . MARITIME INTRA-ZONAL TRADE, 1951 
(Thousands of tons) 
Importers 
Exporters Argentina Brazil Chile Peru Uruguay Total 
Argentina — 1,006.8 114.0» 99.9 1,220.7 
Brazil 637.6 — 13.2 34.8 123.0 808.6 
Chile 201 » 108.2 — 34.2 111.1 454.5 
Peru 245.0 12.8 436.0 — 62.2 756.0 
Uruguay 57.2 16.5 0.5 — 74.2 
TOTAL 1,083.6 1,185.0 579.7 169.4 296.3 3,314.0 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
» Estimated by subtracting, from total reciprocal trade, the tonnage transported by the 
Transandean and Antofagasta-Salta Railways. 
In order to determine the quantity of cargo trans-
ported by sea routes, consideration must be given to 
the fact that trade between Argentina and Uruguay 
is carried on almost entirely by river. The same is 
true for Paraguay, and only a low percentage of 
Argentine-Chilean trade is carried overland, mainly 
by the Transandean Railway and the railway from 
Antofagasta to Salta. Deducting the volume trans-
ported by other than sea routes from the aggregate 
trade tonnage in 1951, it is estimated that 80.2 per 
cent of this total was carried by sea (see table 25). 
The fact that ocean freight is used in a high per-
centage of this trade and that transport costs repre-
sent, on the average, 20 per cent of the f.o.b. price 
of the goods conveyed, emphasizes the importance, 
to the economy of the zone and to its foreign exchange 
position, of possessing vessels with sufficient capacity 
to undertake the trade. Nevertheless, no official sta-
T A B L E 26 . T H E PART PLAYED BY DOMESTIC SHIPPING 
LINES IN INTRA-ZONAL TRADE, 1 9 5 1 







SOURCES: » Shipping companies. b Incomplete statistics of 
Lloyds of Brazil. ° Estimated. d Administración Nacional de 
Puertos, Montevideo. 
tistics exist to determine, for each country, the cargo 
carried between the zone by vessels sailing under local 
flags.3 However, with figures supplied by the principal 
Argentine and Chilean shipping companies, and a 
partial estimate of the possible percentage of Bra-
zilian, Uruguayan and Peruvian merchant fleets, 
table 26 was compiled. 
Merchant fleets of the southern zone countries can 
be assumed to have transported, in 1951, about 
8 7 7 , 0 0 0 tons of the cargo pertaining to intra-zonal 
trade, somewhat more than 27 per cent of its total 
tonnage. About 65 ships4 sailing under the Argentine, 
Chilean, Brazilian, Peruvian and Uruguayan flags 
carried this cargo, their net5 tonnage amounting to 
approximately 5 0 8 , 0 0 0 tons. This tonnage also repre-
sents about 27.5 per cent of the total cargo capacity 
of these five countries, which stands at 1.9 million 
tons. 
The possibility of an eventual increase in intra-
zonal trade by domestic merchant fleets with their 
present freight capacity, can be judged by table 27. 
3 There is also a lack of statistics- to indicate the fulfilment of 
the agreements whereby Argentina and Brazil, Argentina and 
Chile, and Brazil and Uruguay are to transport their respective 
commercial products in their own ships, sharing the cargo in 
equal amounts of tonnage. 
4 The difficulty of giving the exact number of vessels belonging 
to each country engaged in intra-zonal trade in any particular 
year arises from the fact that coasters are in the habit of making 
voyages to ports outside the zone. 
5 Weight of ship's cargo capacity, plus weight of fuel, lubricants, 
water, food and crew. 
Argentina» 




TABLE 27 . PERCENTAGE TONNAGE OF TOTAL FOREIGN 
TRADE TRANSPORTED IN DOMESTIC VESSELS, 1951 
Tonnage Percentage of 
transported foreign trade 
Argentina 3,496,600 19.9 
Brazil" 878,019 7.3 
Chile 675,456 8.9 
Peru 246,050 9.6 
Uruguay 61,434 2.8 
SOURCES: Argentina: Síntesis Estadística, 1951. Brazil: Mer-
cantile Marine Commission. Chile: Asociación Nacional de 
Armadores. Peru: Estimated. Uruguay: Administración Nacio-
nal de Puertos. 
• Data corresponding to 1950. 
Table 27 shows the small importance of sailings 
under local flags in transport involving all trading 
activities of certain countries in the zone. Argentina 
and Chile, with the largest share of intra-zonal trans-
port, carry only limited quotas of their world trade. 
3. Main characteristics of zonal shipping services 
As stated above, 877,000 tons of the cargo involved 
in intra-zonal trade, representing 27 per cent of the 
total tonnage, was carried by sixty-five vessels sailing 
under zonal flags in 1951. According to data supplied 
by a report on merchant fleets of the southern zone 
countries (see annex A to the present chapter), twenty 
are exclusively engaged on the route, via the Straits 
of Magellan, between southern ports on both oceans. 
They carried about 330,000 tons, in 1951. These ships 
are generally slow, varying between 9 and 11 knots 
and occasionally 12 knots. Their average deadweight 
is J,6,100 tons. 
The other forty-five vessels engaged in intra-zonal 
trade carry out regular itineraries to the northern 
hemisphere, mainly from ports of the River Plate, in 
the case of the Atlantic, and from Valparaiso, in the 
case of the Pacific. Those vessels, which do not usually 
pass from one ocean to the other, have an average 
deadweight slightly higher than 8,000 tons and a 
mean speed ranging from 15 to 16 knots. 
About 73 per cent of intra-zonal maritime traffic is 
covered by ships with European, North American and 
Panamanian flags, having speeds rarely lower than 15 
knots'and frequently higher. Although complete data 
are not available concerning their cargo capacity, 
existing figures indicate an average over 8,000 tons 
deadweight.6 Of such vessels, those travelling through 
the Straits of Magellan in 1951 carried about 735,000 
tons of intra-zonal cargo. 
Summarizing these statements tends to be ham-
pered by the difficulty of generalizing on the many 
and complex elements involved. For 1951, however, 
some 63 per cent of intra-zonal goods carried by zonal 
vessels enjoyed transport conditions not much inferior 
to those of travelling under foreign flags operating in 
the same waters. Conversely, about 37 per cent of 
these goods do suffer from conditions of transport 
that are inferior to those offered by foreign vessels 
with higher speed and larger cargo capacities. This 
percentage consists of goods transported from one 
ocean to the other via the Straits of Magellan, and 
therefore, affects the operations of the reciprocal trade 
between countries on different sides of the southern 
zone of the Latin-American continent. 
4. Disequilibrium of traffic 
It is characteristic of trade between southern coun-
tries on both oceans that goods travelling westwards 
have a much higher specific value than those carried 
in the opposite direction. This means that an equilib-
rium for balancing payments necessarily involves an 
inequality in the volume of cargo transported in each 
direction and vice versa. The causes and consequences 
of this phenomenon are examined below. 
To judge the differences in unit values between 
products transported in each direction, it is helpful 
to use some examples for 1951. Among Argentine 
statistics for exports to countries on the Pacific are 
wool (at an average value of 3,170 dollars per ton), 
sunflower oil (at 470 dollars) and meat (at 312 dollars). 
From Brazil, also en route to the Pacific, are cotton 
(at 1,186 dollars per ton), coffee (at 931 dollars) and 
cocoa (at 428 dollars). In the opposite direction, only 
cotton exported by Peru to Argentina and copper 
sold by Chile to countries along the Atlantic coast 
show high average unit values. Other goods, such as 
Chilean cement and nitrate or Peruvian anthracite 
and petroleum, have low unit values. In the same 
year the average price of goods exported by Argentina 
and Brazil to Chile and Peru was 196.4 dollars per ton. 
Conversely, exports from Peru and Chile to Argentina 
and Brazil registered an average value of only 97.1 
dollars per ton. 
The effects of this uneven balance in ton-value 
transported between both oceans and its influence on 
the net balance of trade, can be seen in table 28. 
6 In the pamphlet, Situación del Transporte Marítimo en Chile, 
published in 1952 by the Asociación Nacional de Armadores, 
Valparaíso, it is established that sixty-seven foreign vessels which 
ply regularly along the Chilean coast possess an average dead-
weight capacity of 8,800 tons. 
TABLE 2 8 . DISEQUILIBRIUM OF OCEAN TRAFFIC BETWEEN THE SOUTHERN 
ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC 
(In thousands of tons) 
1946-47 1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 
Pacific-Atlantic 433 457 421 568 734 
Atlantic-Pacific 274 276 207 137 191 
Difference 159 181 214 431 543 
Percentage of tonnage transported 
from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
in relation with that transported 
in the opposite direction 63.2 60.5 49.1 24.2 26.0 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
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Table 28 shows the ratio of east-west cargo trade 
to that in the opposite direction. This ratio, which 
fell from 63 .2 per cent in 1 9 4 6 - 4 7 to 26 per cent in 
1 9 5 0 - 5 1 , indicates the increasing disequilibrium in 
the balance of traffic. Atlantic to Pacific cargo has 
fallen so low that it only represents about a quarter 
of the amount carried in the opposite direction. 
This increasing disequilibrium coincides with that 
shown in recent years by export and import trade 
accounts between the eastern and southern countries. 
As explained in chapter II of this report, such accounts 
(especially those of Argentina with Chile and Peru) 
traditionally registered favourable balances for the 
former. After 1949, the fall in Argentine agricultural 
exports reduced the space occupied in the holds of 
vessels plying between east and west. At the same 
time, the trade balances rapidly became adverse for 
Argentina and Brazil, as early as 1950. 
T A B L E 2 9 . FOREIGN TRADE BALANCE BETWEEN THE 
SOUTHERN ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC SEABOARDS 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 
- 1 0 . 8 - 2 8 . 1 - 2 9 . 4 - 6 . 7 +4 .7 +7.1 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
NOTE: The sign ( + ) or (—) indicates a balance in favour of, 
or against, Chile and Peru. 
In addition to this factor, a disequilibrium in the 
traffic balance between both oceans has two other 
effects: (a) loss of regularity in departure services for 
shipping lines with itineraries, and (b) an increase in 
their transport costs, since sailings from the Atlantic 
to the southern Pacific are made with half-empty 
holds. In 1952, some Argentine boats even sailed on 
ballast to Chilean ports where they were to load cargo 
for Buenos Aires. Table 30 shows the loss of regularity 
in departure services of ships running between Argen-
tina and Chile, due to the disequilibrium of shipments. 
It suggests how greatly trade relations are prejudiced 
by the disruption of regular shipping itineraries. 
T A B L E 3 0 . MARITIME TRAFFIC BETWEEN ARGENTINA 
AND CHILE, 1 9 5 1 
Number of days' interval Number of sailings Number of sailings 
between sailings from Argentina from Chile» 
0 - 5 12 16 
6-10 11 2 
11-15 5 5 
16-20 3 3 
21-40 1 
More than 40 1 2 
TOTAL NUMBER OF SAILINGS 33 30 
SOURCE: Shipping companies of Argentina and Chile. 
° Figures do not include sailings of flags foreign to the zone. 
For sailings both from Valparaiso and Buenos Aires, 
there were four occasions in 1951 when the departure 
intervals were longer than twenty days, including one 
of sixty-two days. However, on three occasions, two 
vessels sailed from Valparaiso on the same day. A 
similar event occurred twice in the case of Buenos 
Aires. 
These facts underline the difficulties of co-ordinating 
the aims of commercial policy in the zone with those 
of increasing and regularizing local maritime transport 
services linking the countries. The intrinsic weakness 
of trade between the republics on the southern 
Atlantic and Pacific seaboards, especially in the cases 
of Argentina, Chile and Peru, is the traditional trend 
towards a disequilibrium in their trade balances. 
This factor is discussed in chapter II of this report. 
To correct this weakness and given the essential 
nature of the foodstuffs supplied by Argentina, it is 
evident that the aim of a commercial policy favour-
able to the development of both zonal trade and the 
respective domestic economies should be a relative 
equilibrium in trade balances. Logically, this equilib-
rium ought to be based, not on a reduction of imports 
from Argentina, but on an increase in Chilean and 
Peruvian exports to Argentina. These should be in 
the same proportionate value as the foodstuffs from 
Argentina. Since the equilibrium of these trade bal-
ances intensifies the disequilibrium in tonnages trans-
ported between the Atlantic and the Pacific, the 
reconciliation of a commercial policy with one of 
encouraging sea traffic in zonal ships raises a number 
of questions which require additional study. 
5. Freights and costs 
Frequent mention is made of the problem of estab-
lishing freight costs in vessels sailing under zonal 
flags. These costs invariably influence the competitive 
capacity of the products transported, when destined 
for markets in which similar goods are offered from 
other parts of the world. This problem arises continu-
ously in the intra-zonal trade which countries on the 
Pacific conduct with those on the Atlantic via the 
Straits of Magellan. 
The lack of balance in traffic between both oceans; 
competition from faster and more efficient European 
and North American vessels; the type of cargo which, 
from the Pacific, is generally mixed and therefore 
more difficult to handle (from the Atlantic, conversely, 
it chiefly consists of natural products, in sacks or in 
bulk, with smaller freight costs)—all such factors 
cause freight rates to be extremely variable. 
Generally speaking, freight rates are fixed ad 
valorem. However, rates for equal cargoes and dis-
tances often differ for each country, since they have 
to be adjusted to the exchange rates at which the 
respective shipping companies convert their income. 
This applies whether funds are earmarked to cover 
expenses of ships in the country where payments are 
collected or whether they are transferred to the 
country of registry. 
At present, ocean traffic between Argentina, Chile 
and Peru is governed by a freight-rate schedule 
approved by the Argentine Ministry of Transport, 
fixed in Chilean pesos for traffic to that country and 
paid in dollars for Peru. Nevertheless, for cargoes 
over 500 tons, the decree permits shipowners to fix 
prices by agreement. Peru recognizes the tariff fixed 
by the Argentine Ministry of Transport for goods 
coming from Argentina and Uruguay. In the ocean 
traffic between Argentina and Brazil, freight charges 
are fixed by agreement. For shipments between 
Brazil and Chile, principally carried by a Chilean 
line, the company owning the ships determines the 
charges. 
These various methods of establishing freight rates, 
the absence of international exchange-rate agreements 
covering the conversion of freighting revenues into 
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national currencies, plus the competition of "tramps" 
and "outsiders", all combine to alter prices in the 
freight market continuously. Although, at a given 
moment, they are usually automatically regulated by 
the ship offering a lower rate, they often differ for the 
same merchandise. There is no need to comment on 
the unfavourable repercussions of this situation upon 
normal trade. 
6. Factors of cost 
Shipping costs to some extent reflect the quality of 
equipment, and differ when vessels are powered with 
coal, oil boilers or diesel engines.7 The type of engine 
influences the number of crew, the fuel, the amount of 
space occupied by fuel storage in relation to cargo, 
and, above all, the speed. Many other factors also 
exert pressure on costs, particularly the expenses of 
handling cargo, port dues, the extent to which the 
hold-space is used, the disturbed balance of traffic in 
relation to its direction, the length of each haul, and 
so on. Each company may fix the operating costs of 
its vessels, but freight rates will also depend on com-
petition with other lines, on freight agreements and 
on the demand for transport in the sectors covered 
by the itinerary. 
Table 31, drawn up with the help of Argentine and 
Chilean shipping companies, enumerates the factors 
which intervene in operating expenses. The table is 
7 The effect on costs exerted by available cargo space and the 
personnel required to install and maintain coal-burning boilers 
can be reduced through the employment of oil-burners, and 
especially by diesel engines. In a coal-burning ship displacing 
10,000 tons deadweight, for example, 30,000 vertical cubic feet 
will be required to maintain a supply of 800 tons of coal, which 
would necessarily reduce cargo space. If petroleum is used, the 
horizontal tanks can utilize the double floor of the ship, and 
thereby constitute a minimum restriction of space. In addition, 
the petroleum can be supplied in a third, or less, of the time 
required for loading coal. By the same token, the same ship used 
in the example will consume an average of 45 tons of coal daily 
to enable it to travel at the rate of 10 knots per hour, 30 tons of 
petroleum to travel at 12 knots, and 15 tons of petroleum to 
travel at 15 knots if powered by a diesel engine. 
T A B L E 3 1 . PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF E X P E N S E S 
FOR A 20-YEAR-OLD V E S S E L OF 5 , 0 0 0 TONS, WITH OIL 
BOILERS, ON THE BASIS OF DAILY OPERATING E X -
PENDITURE OF 1 , 0 0 0 DOLLARS 
Expenses of the vessel itself 
Catbles and telegrams 0.3 
Fuel 14.7 
Consumption, miscellaneous 2.5 
Social laws 2.8 
Wages and overtime 12.0 
Insurance 3.3 
Food 2.6 
Renewal of equipment 1.7 
General and unforeseen expenses 1.9 
Action costs 6.3 
Repairs 1.9 50.0 
Expenses in port 
Agencies and commissions 7.6 
Taxes 0.2 
Port dues 2.1 
Loading 37.1 47.0 
Others 
Consular fees 1.0 
Unspecified 2.0 3.0 
TOTAL 100 .0 
SOURCE: Argentine and Chilean shipping companies. 
based on the calculation that a ship twenty years old, 
of 5,000 tons deadweight, with oil boilers, would incur 
a daily running expenditure of 1,000 dollars at sea 
and 750 dollars in port. However, the actual distri-
bution of costs would depend upon the individual 
characteristics of each vessel, and the influence of 
causes unrelated to the ships themselves, which 
modify the duration of different voyages. 
A summary examination of certain important cost 
factors follows. However it should be recalled that 
those arising from the unequal balance of tonnage 
carried between both oceans have already been men-
T A B L E 3 2 . RATIO OF SPEED TO FREIGHT COSTS FOR GIVEN CLASSES OF GOODS 









15 knots (dollars) 
{From Chilean ports to Buenos Aires) 
Coal Lota 2,600 11 7 20.00 
Cement Valparaiso 2,860 12 8 10.00» 
Copper (bars) Antofagasta 3,430 14 9 20.00 
Copper (sheets) San Antonio 2,800 12 8 22.00 
Pig-iron Corral 2,445 10 6 14.50 
Steel San Vicente 2,620 11 7 14.50 
Nitrate Iquique 3,655 15 10 13.00 
{From North American, European and Brazilian ports to Buenos Aires) 
Coal Cardiff 6,300 27 18 11.60" 
Cement Hamburg 6,665 28 18 13.00 
Copper (bars) Antwerp 6,405 27 18 30.80 
Copper (sheets) Antwerp 6,405 27 18 30.80 
Copper New York 5,870 24 16 24.60 
Pig-iron New York 5,870 24 16 21.00 
Steel Victoria 1,408 6 4 18.00 
Sulphate of ammonia Hamburg 6,665 28 18 22.40 
SOURCE: Shipping lines of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. 
» This rate is levied if payment is made in Argentina pesos on the Transfer Account. If pay-
ment is made in dollars, the cost rises to US$12 and sometimes as high as US$24. 
b The freight of coal from Great Britain, at US$16.80 in March 1952, registered closing prices 
down to US$11.60 in the second half of that year (120 and 83 shillings, respectively). This was due 
to the hold-space left unoccupied by lower coal exports of North American coal to Europe, 
beginning in March. This together with other factors, resulted in the general decline observable 
in the freight of solid cargoes during 1952. 
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tioned and receive special mention in annex B to this 
chapter entitled "Increased transport costs due to 
traffic disequilibrium between the South Atlantic 
and Pacific". 
(A) S P E E D 
Speed, which depends upon the type of engine, has 
a definite influence on transport expenses and, 
together with cargo capacity, usually determines the 
efficiency of each vessel in the development of foreign 
trade. Faster ships make a greater number of runs in 
a year than slower ones and thus reduce the influence 
of general expenses on their operating costs. More-
over, the demand for the transport of perishable goods, 
or others in whose early arrival the importers are 
interested, is greater for more rapid ships. 
The problem of slower local vessels, contrasted with 
the higher speeds of foreign craft trading within the 
zone, especially affects commerce between Argentina, 
Brazil and Uruguay, on the one hand, and Chile and 
Peru, on the other, especially for trade via the Straits 
of Magellan. 
Table 32, listing relative freight charges on various 
classes of merchandise shipped to Buenos Aires from 
Chilean and European ports, clearly shows the 
relationship between speed and freight costs. 
Table 32 shows that freight charges for products ex-
ported by Chile to Argentina are lower than those for 
similar articles brought from Europe and the United 
States. As the distance covered in the second case is 
twice that of the first, it may be concluded that the 
cost per ton-mile is much lower for transport from 
Europe. This is partly because the lines serving Europe 
have faster ships, generally with speeds of 15 knots or 
more, as against 9 or 10 knots typical of the traffic 
within the zone that is carried by local vessels. It 
should however be pointed out that, for transport 
between Argentine and Chilean ports, the potential 
advantages from faster units would be offset by the 
difficulty of navigating the channels in the extreme 
south, and by the time spent in port in relation to the 
total period for the voyage. Conversely, the benefits 
of increased speed would be better exploited by lines 
making longer runs, such as those between Brazil and 
Chile. This is illustrated in table 33. 
T A B L E 3 3 . R A T I O OF S P E E D OF S H I P P I N G TO F R E I G H T T A R I F F S FOR G I V E N C L A S S E S 
OF GOODS 
Days at sea at 
a rate of Dec. 1951 
Port of Distance — — Freight cost 
Class of merchandise embarkation (miles) 10 knots 15 knots (dollars) 
{From Chilean ports to Rio de Janeiro) » b 
Sulphur Antofagasta 4,270 18 12 29 36.25 
Nitrate Iquique 4,476 19 12 30 37.50 
Copper sulphate Antofagasta 4,270 18 12 36 45.00 
Onions Valparaiso 3,307 15 10 38 47.50 
Copper (ingots) Antofagasta 4,270 18 12 27 33.75 
Copper (sheets) San Antonio 3,676 15 10 29 36.25 
Cement Valparaiso 3,707 15 10 15.0 
Wines Valparaiso 3,707 15 10 1.35 per case 
{From North American and European ports to Rio de Janeiro) 
Sulphur New York 4,763 20 13 22.50 in sacks 
Sulphate of ammonia Hamburg 5,550 23 15 21.00 
Copper sulphate Liverpool 5,145 21 14 j ^ ' s o (liquid) 
Onions Lisbon 4,232 18 12 
Copper (ingots) Antwerp 5,290 22 15 30.80 
Copper (sheets) Antwerp 5,290 22 15 30.80 
Cement Hamburg 5,550 23 15 21.00 
Wines Lisbon 4,232 18 12 1.70 per case 
SOURCE-, Brazilian and Chilean shipping companies. 
* Prices obtained from the tariff list of the Compañía Chilena de Navegación Interoceánica, 
without including the surcharge of 25 per cent on freight to Rio de Janeiro. 
b Freight costs including the 25 per cent surcharge. 
The influence of speed on freight rates is noticeable 
in the case of Chilean goods transported to Rio. These 
rates are higher than those paid on similar goods 
originating from Europe or North America. 
The time required for voyages from Europe or the 
United States, using ships capable of 15 knots, since 
it is shorter than from Chilean ports with ships of 
10 knots, is of course one factor influencing the im-
porter. Assuming that goods and prices are equal, there 
is naturally an advantage for the exporter offering a 
more rapid delivery. Furthermore, speed has other 
effects on the competitive ability of zonal products. 
For instance, if a Chilean product is offered in Brazil 
(quoted f.o.b. Iquique) at the same price as a similar 
one from Germany (f.o.b. Hamburg), the latter will 
suit the Brazilian purchaser better. Although the dis-
tance from Hamburg to Rio is 24 per cent greater 
than between Iquique and Rio, freight charges are 
30 per cent lower for European merchandise. The 
following calculation, based on craft displacing 5,000 
tons deadweight, shows freight rates payable for 
European products shipped to Brazil if, instead of 
using speeds of 15 knots or over, they were carried in 
vessels capable only of 10 knots. The latter is usually 
the case for local ships of the zone. 
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T A B L E 3 4 . THEORETICAL FREIGHT CHARGES FOR EURO-
PEAN PRODUCTS TRANSPORTED TO RIO DE JANEIRO 
IN 10-KNOT CRAFT 
Freight cost (dollars) 
Class of Fort of_ in 15-knot in 10-knot 
merchandise embarkation craft craft 
Sulphate of ammonia. Hamburg 21 24.5 
Copper sulphate Liverpool 19.60 ||8.8 ( l i^id) 
Copper (ingots) Antwerp 30.80 35.2 
Copper (sheets) Antwerp 30.80 35.2 
Cement Hamburg 21 24.4 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
(B) LOADING OPERATIONS 
Table 31 showed that loading and port dues account 
for almost 40 per cent of the operating costs of mer-
chant ships. This expense includes stevedores and 
similar workers, whose wages vary according to pre-
vailing daily rates for dock labour, social legislation, 
dock and warehouse installations, and mechanization. 
This last greatly affects rates, providing a partial check 
to the upward trend of wages and, in some ports, to the 
substitution of payments based on cargo handled at 
fixed wages rates. 
Table 35 shows the costs of handling selected types 
of cargo, in 1952, in ports of the southern zone. 
As may be seen from table 35, handling costs in 
Atlantic ports are notably higher than for those on the 
Pacific. In Brazil and Argentina they reach a level 
between four and nine times higher than in Chilean 
and Peruvian ports. In the case of Montevideo, they 
were one and one-half to three times higher. 
(C) PORT DUES 
Expenses under this heading, closely related to 
handling costs, cover pilots, tugboats, buoys and 
wharfage among others. They vary considerably in 
different ports due to their dependence on mooring 
and subsequent facilities, as well as on local rates. 
A tabulation of these expenditures in selected 
American ports is shown in table 36. 
The charges for handling cargo and port dues, shown 
in table 36, are not comparable without some clarifica-
tion of the services which they each cover. But such 
research is outside the scope of this preliminary study. 
During 1951 and part of 1952 the intensity of mari-
time traffic in the southern zone and the frequency of 
runs suffered from the consequences of congestion in 
the port of Rio de Janeiro and, to a lesser extent, in 
other Brazilian ports. In Rio, ships had to wait be-
tween eight and twenty days to obtain mooring, 
causing European and North American freight con-
ferences to agree upon a 25 per cent surcharge, as of 
March 1951, on products despatched to certain 
Brazilian ports. This surcharge raised Brazilian ex-
penditures on import freight charges, from 13.7 per 
cent of the f.o.b. value of the imports, to more than 
17 per cent in the second half of 1951.8 The Brazilian-
American Mixed Commission (in a programme for 
improving port facilities that involves investments of 
43.2 million dollars) estimates that 5 million dollars 
is required for the modernization of the port of Rio 
de Janeiro, where there are insufficient wharves. Exist-
ing quays were built in 1910, covering 3.3 kilometres of 
waterfront, the total goods being handled amounting 
to 2.3 million tons at that time. Although to date the 
length of the wharves has been more than doubled, 
8 Relator io Anual da Carteira da Exporta¡ao e Importa cito do 
Banco do Brasil, 1951° 
T A B L E 3 5 . COSTS OF HANDLING CARGO IN SELECTED PORTS, 1 9 5 2 
(Average per metric ton, including loading and unloading costs, day-wages of stevedores, 
supervision of stowage, overtime, social legislation, etc. (in dollars) 
Products 
Steel Oats Sugar Sulphur Barley Cement Copper Timber* Nitrate 
Argentine ports 
Buenos Aires 4.02 3.75 4.30 3.75 3.82 3.28 4.60 
Brazilian ports 
Santos 




















Antofagasta. . . . 
Coquimbo 
Valparaiso 
San Antonio . . . . 
Talcahuano 




























Montevideo. . . . 1.81 1.88 1.81 
SOURCE: Argentine, Brazilian and Chilean shipping companies. 
' Costs per ton of 500 feet. 
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T A B L E 3 6 . PORT DUES IN SELECTED AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1 9 5 2 
(Pilot charges, tugboats, buoys, wharfage and others; in dollars) 
Per landfall Remarks 
Argentina 
Buenos Aires 1,277.71 In dock 
Rosario (after B.A.) . . . . 1,031.49 In dock, grain elevator 
Rosario (direct) 1,950.78 In dock, grain elevator 
Brazil 
Rio de Janeiro 1,089.72 In dock, for ten days 
Santos 1,087.07 In dock, for ten days 
Chile 
Iquique 31.77 In dock; at anchorage US$19.67 
Antofagasta 58.87 In dock; at anchorage US$31.97 per diem 
Valparaiso 77.92 In dock; at anchorage US$19.67 one day only 
San Antonio 72.75 In dock; at anchorage, within breakwater US$48.16 
San Vicente 34.80 In dock; at anchorage, no charge 
C o r r a l . . . 52.96 In dock 
Ecuador 
Guayaquil 240.00 At anchorage in the River Guayas 
North America 
San Francisco 414.78 In dock 
New York 689.00 In dock, at Brooklyn 
New York 756.00 In dock, at Manhattan 
Boston 408.55 In dock 
Peru 
Ilo 13.72 At buoy 
Mollendo 13.92 At buoy 
Callao 316.62 In dock 
Uruguay 
Montevideo 358.97 In dock 
Montevideo 118.14 At anchorage, unloading fuel 
SOURCE: Argentine, Chilean, Brazilian and Uruguayan shipping companies. 
the cargo has increased more than five times and con-
sequently loading and unloading operations are slower. 
At the end of 1952, apparently owing to a lower volume 
of Brazilian imports because of payments difficulties, 
operations in the port of Rio de Janeiro became more 
normal. 
In the first eight months of 1952 tonnage passing 
through Brazilian ports showed a decrease of more 
than 10 per cent compared with the same period in 
1951. 
(D) EXCHANGE RATES 
A disturbing factor in determining operating costs 
and freight charges is the absence of international 
agreements for standardizing the exchange regulations 
imposed by each country on its shipping lines. In some 
countries the rate applied to internal conversion of 
freight revenues is the same as that for the cargo itself. 
In others, regardless of the rate of exchange applying 
to imported goods, a special rate is accorded to freight 
rnartrpc T n c n m p pniint-ripo i-tiic ic carpi* ac ftii* friii*-
market rate, and in others it is lower. Moreover, other 
factors affect the rate of exchange. For example, in 
Uruguay a dollar for the payment of export freight 
charges must be bought at the highest rate. This is the 
free rate, valued at approximately 2.80,9 and since 
it is equivalent to 24 Argentine pesos in Montevideo, 
a dollar for the payment of export freight charges can 
be bought in Buenos Aires for 14 Argentine pesos. If 
this same dollar is remitted from Argentina to a 
Chilean shipping company, the latter will receive a 
sum in Chilean pesos equivalent to only half a dollar, 
due to the mechanism explained in chapter IV of this 
report dealing with the absence of monetary parity 
between Argentina and Chile. However, a Chilean 
exporter or importer, for an amount equalling half a 
9 Quotation of February 1953. 
dollar, can remit the value of a dollar to Argentina to 
pay freight charges in the latter country. The effect of 
these discrepancies in exchange regulations is to hinder 
the development of shipping, unless they are removed 
by means of ad hoc agreements between the countries 
concerned. 
7. Distribution of hold-space 
Three zonal agreements have been' reached for a 
more equitable distribution of cargo in national vessels 
and for the development of shipping services among 
the signatory countries. In 1946 Argentina and Brazil 
agreed to share the transport of cargo in their recipro-
cal trade equally. In the same year Brazil and Uruguay 
came to a similar agreement, renewed six years later. 
In 1952 Argentina and Chile agreed on measures to 
ensure that goods traded between the two republics 
should be given transport priority in their own vessels, 
the tonnage being shared equally. 
Isolated agreements of this nature have certain 
inadequacies. For example, in particular they do not 
consider the over-all market for freighting services, 
and therefore the shipping companies operate in rela-
tively narrow bilateral itineraries. In order to save 
dollars, as mentioned in chapter IV, Uruguayan 
authorities stipulated that freight contracted in ships 
other than those belonging to countries of origin of 
the goods transported, or to those for which they are 
destined, can only be settled by a special payments 
account. Chilean shipping lines, carrying cargo be-
tween Brazilian and Uruguayan ports and also be-
tween Peru and Montevideo, found themselves par-
tially ousted from those routes where there was an 
increase in services by some European vessels belong-
ing to countries linked with Uruguay by the system 
of payments on special account. 
8. Co-ordination of shipping 
Early in 1952 Argentine and Chilean shipping com-
panies considered the possibility of a freight associa-
tion, to ensure a stable clientele for regular traffic lines 
between the southern coasts of both oceans. Customers 
would be offered prompt embarkation, fixed prices for 
transporting basic products and, in every case, a uni-
form rate for merchandise of the same class, with 
perhaps an annual bonus in favour of exporters and 
importers who made use only of vessels within the 
association.10 It was felt that, initially, shipping com-
panies of both countries could work out a common 
tarilf for ships sailing from Chile to Argentina. Every 
effort was made to co-ordinate this tariff with the one 
fixed by the Argentine Ministry of Transport for cargo 
boats sailing from the latter country. 
Partly because of the uncertainty which began to 
characterize world freight markets in the second 
quarter of 1952 and of the risk involved in fixing tariffs 
during transitional market periods, the scheme went 
10 On the transport of timber between Brazil and Argentina, 
an annual bonus of 5 per cent of the freight charges is issued to 
exporters who employ only vessels belonging to the association 
concerned. 
no further than preliminary conversations. Maritime 
co-ordination between Argentina and Chile, as a start-
ing point for subsequent co-ordination with merchant 
fleets of other Latin-American countries, is also con-
nected with the proposal to create favourable condi-
tions for intergovernmental agreements. They would 
be necessary if the bilateral agreements causing in-
efficient distribution of hold-space11 were not to 
conflict with the common interests of the shipping 
lines concerned. It would also help to remove another 
obstacle hampering the development of shipping 
activities, namely, the discrepancies in exchange regu-
lations fixed by each country for its maritime freight 
system. 
11 In certain sectors of Latin America, shipping agreements 
facilitate national measures based on using local vessels for the 
transport of imported goods. For example, a measure adopted by 
Chile in 1950 was to ensure that half of the imported goods com-
ing from ports included in regular Chilean shipping itineraries 
should be carried in Chilean ships. Thus, the Compañía Sud-
americana de Vapores, the Grace Line, and the Gulf andiSouth-
American Line reached an agreement for sharing cargo trans-
ported between the United States and Chile. Under this agree-
ment, the first two divide equally their traffic from Atlantic 
ports to Chilean ports. In the case of transport between the Gulf 
of Mexico and Chile, the first and third of the companies guaran-
tee each other a share not less than 35 per cent of the total cargo. 
ANNEX A 
National merchant fleets and shippin g routes in the southern zone 
1. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS 
To provide a better understanding of the character-
istics of sea traffic in the southern zone of Latin 
America, a brief summary of the position of the zonal 
merchant fleets is given below. I t refers to the number 
of units under each flag, their deadweight tonnage and 
their classification by age and speed. But it should be 
noted that the summaries contained in the tables for 
each nation appearing below are not complete, al-
though they are representative of the individual posi-
tion as regards shipping. As stated in the introduction 
to this chapter, the available official information is 
either out of date, or refers only to the principal ship-
ping companies or lacks certain indispensable data. 
This is true of most of the data on zonal shipping lines. 
Tables 37 and 38 represent the principal character-
istics of vessels belonging to the two Argentine ship-
ping companies which, between them, own 76 per cent 
of the total tonnage. 
TABLE 3 7 . ARGENTINA: DEADWEIGHT OF VESSELS OWNED BY THE FLOTA M E R -
CANTE DEL ESTADO AND THE FLOTA ARGENTINA DE NAVEGACIÓN DE ULTRAMAR 
Age (years) 
Deadweight tonnage 0-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31-10 Above 40 
2.000- 5,000 4 — 2 1 2 — 
5.001- 7,000 2 5 — 2 1 1 
7,001-10,000 16 5 — 1 6 — 
Above 10,000 3 12 — 1 — — 
TOTAL 25 22 2 5 9 1 
Percentage of fleet 39.0 34.4 3.1 7.8 14.1 1.6 
















TABLE 3 8 . ARGENTINA: SPEED OF VESSELS OWNED BY THE FLOTA MERCANTE 
DEL ESTADO 
Age (years) 
Mean speed (in knots) 0-5 6-10 
8 - 1 0 — — 
11-13 4 1 
14-16 11 3 
Above 16 3 — 
TOTAL 18 4 
Percentage of f l e e t . . . . 54.7 12.1 
SOURCE: Flota Mercante del Estado. 

























An analysis of tables 37 and 38 shows that the units 
of Argentina's two principal shipping companies have 
satisfactory characteristics. Of a total of sixty-four 
ships, twenty-five, or 39.1 per cent, are new, in the 
sense that they have seen less than five years' service, 
while forty-seven, which represent 73.5 per cent of the 
total, have had less than ten years' service. The time-
limit, beyond which a ship becomes uneconomic to 
operate and must be replaced, depends on a large 
number of factors. But, in general terms, shipping 
companies consider the limit when a unit is classified 
as "old" as twenty years at sea; 26.5 per cent of the 
Argentine vessels shown in table 38 belong to this 
category. 
The cargo capacity per unit of the sixty-four vessels 
is relatively high. Only nine of them, or 14 per cent 
of the total fleet, are of less than 5,000 tons dead-
weight, and sixteen, that is 25 per cent of the total, 
are of more than 10,000 tons deadweight. 
Data on speed is only available for the thirty-three 
units of the Flota Mercante del Estado. Six of them 
are slow, varying between 8 and 10 knots; ten register 
11 to 13 knots, and seventeen travel at the satisfactory 
average speed of more than 15 knots, while three are 
capable of 18 knots. 





fleet Deadweight tonnage 0-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 Above 40 
1,000-5,000 — 4 5 1 2 16" . 28 32.2 
5,001- 7,000 — 12 — — 3 5 20 23.0 
7,001-10,000 20 — — 1 9 7 37 42.5 
Above 10,000 — — — — 2 — 2 2.3 
TOTAL 20 16 5 2 16 28 87 100.0 
Percentage of fleet.... 23.0 18.4 5.7 2.3 18.4 32.2 100.0 
SOURCE: Lloyd Brasileiro, report for 1950. 
"Includes three ships of less than 1,000 tons deadweight each. 





fleet Mean speed (in knots) 0-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31^10 Above 40 
Less than 8 — — 1 1 10 12 13.8 
8-10 — 12 — 1 7 H 31 35.6 
11-13 — 4 5 8 5 22 25.3 
14-16 20 — — — 2 22 25.3 
TOTAL 20 16 5 2 16 28 87 100.0 
Percentage of fleet.... 23.0 b 18.4 5.7 2.3 18.4 32.2 100.0 
SOURCE: Lloyd Brasileiro, report for 1950. 





fleet Mean speed (in knots) 0-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 Above 40 
Less than 8 — — — 1 1 10 12 13.8 
8-10 — 12 — 1 7 11 31 35.6 
11-13 — 4 5 — 8 5 22 25.3 
14-16 on £.\J — — — — 2 22 25.3 
TOTAL 20 16 5 2 16 28 87 100.0 
Percentage of fleet.... 23.0 18.4 S.I 2.à 1Ö.4 ó¿.¿ 100.0 
SOURCE: Asociación Nacional de Armadores, Valparaíso, Chile. 
The eighty-seven units of Lloyd Brasileiro, the big-
gest shipping company in Brazil, are engaged in 
overseas and coastal transport. About twenty of the 
more modern vessels, almost all of more than 7,900 
tons deadweight and with an average speed of 16 
knots, are overseas units. In 1950, they carried 98.5 
per cent of the total tonnage of Brazilian foreign trade 
transported by domestic lines. 
Tables 39 and 40 show that 41.4 per cent of these 
vessels are less than ten years of age, and that 52.9 
are "old" ships, that is, over twenty years old. Twenty-
eight ships (32.3 per cent) are small, that is, of less 
than 5,000 tons deadweight, while 56 (64.3 per cent) 
have a cargo capacity ranging from 5,000 to 9,000 tons 
deadweight. There are twelve slow ships (13.8 per 
cent) with a speed of 7 knots or less. Forty-three craft, 
practically half the fleet, show a mean speed of 10 to 11 
knots, while twenty ships, recently incorporated, can 
average 16 knots. 
An expansion programme of Lloyd Brasileiro aims at 
the acquisition of nineteen ships, totalling 150,000 tons 
deadweight, to cope with foreign trade. In the first 
stage of this short-term programme it is planned to 
acquire five units of 8,500 tons deadweight each. 
The eighteen ships included in table 41 belong to 
three companies. The Compañía Sudamericana de 
Vapores (South American Steamship Company), with 
seven vessels, serves North American Atlantic ports 
and Europe, via the Panama Canal. The Compañía 
Chilena de Navegación Interoceánica (Chilean Inter-
Oceanic Navigation Company) has seven ships plying 
between the ports of Peru and Brazil, via the Straits 
of Magellan, and has recently extended its activities to 
the Pacific Coast as far north as Canada. The Com-
pañía de Muelles de la Población Vergara (Vergara 
Settlement Docks Company) owns three ships which 
carry freight to and from the South Atlantic and the 
Caribbean. Table 41 also includes a tanker launched 
in 1952, belonging to the Sociedad de Navegación 
Petrolera (Oil Tankers Navigation Company), with 
16,785 tons deadweight. Eleven of the eighteen units 
included in the table, that is 61.1 per cent of the total, 
are new (less than ten years old). Seven are more than 
twenty years old, including three launched over forty 
years ago. Half these vessels possess an individual 
cargo capacity of 6,300 tons deadweight, and five of 
them (27.7 per cent) are of almost 10,000 tons dead-
weight each. 
In 1953 the Compañía Interoceánica will add to its 
fleet a vessel built in Spain, of 5,800 tons deadweight 
and a mean speed of 12 knots. In the same year, the 
fleet of the Compañía Sudamericana de Vapores will 
be increased by an ore ship of 10,000 tons deadweight. 
The mean speed of the ships serving Chile's foreign 
trade varies between 9 and 12 knots, with the excep-
tion of five belonging to the Compañía Sudamericana 
de Vapores, which can average 15 knots. The coastal 
service along the Chilean seaboard is carried out by 
forty-two units, totalling 104,966 tons deadweight, or 
an average of 2,500 tons each. 
T A B L E 4 2 . P E R Ú : VESSELS OWNED BY THE CORPORACIÓN PERUANA DE VAPORES 
Age (years) Percentage 
of 
Registered gross tonnage 0-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 Above 40 Total fleet 
Less than 4,000 — 4 — 3 — 1 8 61.5 
4,001-6,000 _ _ _ _ _ 3 3 23.1 
6,001-8,000 — 2 _ _ _ _ _ 2 15.4 
TOTAL — 6 — 3 — 4 13 100.0 
Percentage of fleet — 46.1 — 23.1 — 30.8 100.0 
SOURCE: Corporación Peruana de Vapores. 
The corporation owns thirteen ships of more than 
1,000 registered gross tons. Six are new and seven are 
more than twenty years old. Eight are of less than 
4.000 registered gross tons, and only two are larger 
than 7,000 tons. 
Uruguay's merchant fleet is small. It consists of 
four units for general freight, two of which are new 
(seven years old) and two old (twenty-two and thirty-
one years). There are also two tankers and seven 
ships engaged in coastal traffic, the latter having an 
individual deadweight of 200 to 700 tons. 
2. SHIPPING ROUTES 
The Argentine merchant fleet is mainly concerned 
with trade in the Argentine-Brazilian trade sector. 
Some of the ships engaged in this traffic also share in 
the transport of Brazilian goods to Europe and the 
United States or of imports to Brazil from these 
markets. Of Brazil's total foreign trade tonnage, 
Argentine vessels carried 12.9 per cent in 1949 and 
8.1 per cent in 1950. In the latter year, the participa-
tion of domestic lines in Brazil's foreign trade was 
only 7.3 per cent. 
TABLE 4 3 . URUGUAY: VESSELS ENGAGED IN FOREIGN 
SERVICE 
Number of ships Age Tonnage of freight 
1 7 years 5,885 
1 7 years 6,006 
1 22 years 10,230» 
1 31 years 11,450 
1 tanker . . 15,000 
1 tanker . . 15,000 
» Including the cold-storage chambers with a capacity of 7,032 
cubic metres. 
Seven Argentine ships, belonging to the Flota Mer-
cante del Estado and two belonging to Navemar S.A., 
run between the ports of the River Plate and those 
of the South Pacific, some voyages continuing as far 
north as the Peruvian coast. In 1952 the frequency 
of these trips received a stimulus from the weakening 
of the demand for hold-space in the Argentine-Bra-
zilian trade sector, especially due to the^fall in 
Argentine wheat exports to Brazil. 
The Brazilian merchant fleet, occupied |\vi thfthe 
demands of coastal traffic, plays a minor role in trade 
with Argentina and Uruguay. 
TABLE 4 4 . RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORLD MERCHANT 
NAVY TONNAGE AND THAT OF THE ZONE 
{Thousands of tons, 1951) 
Country 
Tonnage in 1951 
(gross total) 
Percentage of world tonnage 
1951 1939 
United States 27,331 31.33 16.77 
United Kingdom 18,550 21.26 26.12 
5,816 6.67 7.05 
3,609 4.44 1.05 
3,367 3.96 4.28 
Netherlands 3,235 3.71 4.33 
Italy 2,917 3.34 5.00 
USSR 2,222 2.55 1.91 
979 1.12 0.42 
688 0.79 0.71 
Chile 162 0.19 
Peru 57 0.06 
24 0.03 
Other countries 18,286 20.95 
WORLD TOTAL 87,245 100.00 100.00 
SOURCE: Lloyd's Register of Shipping, London. 
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The most consistent and regular traffic routes be-
tween the Atlantic and the South Pacific coast are 
those of the Compañía Chilena de Navegación Inter-
oceánica, which has, since 1940, carried the greater 
part of the cargo involved in Brazilian-Chilean trade,12 
and about 20 per cent of the solid cargo going by sea 
from Argentina and Uruguay to Chile and vice versa. 
Until 1952, a second Chilean line, the Compañía 
de Muelles de la Población Vergara, with three ships, 
regularly effected the transport of Peruvian sugar for 
consumption in Chile and Uruguay and that of the 
frozen meat exported by Argentina to Peru. Since 
1952 the small demand for cargo space on the Atlantic-
Pacific route caused this company to prefer the trans-
port of frozen meat from the extreme south to the 
central zone of Chile, without abandoning its tra-
ditional service of transporting Cuban and Peruvian 
sugar to Chile. 
Other Chilean ships belonging to semi-regular lines 
make sporadic voyages to Argentina. Their cargo 
space, added to that of the other two Chilean lines, 
carries about half the products constituting the mari-
time foreign trade between Argentina and Chile. For 
years both regular and semi-regular lines, threatened 
by unequal cargo tonnages in interoceanic trade, have 
tended to augment their operations by transporting 
Brazilian and Uruguayan products and—to a lesser 
degree—Indonesian and South African products to 
Chile via Montevideo and Buenos Aires. 
The vessels sailing under the Peruvian flag, belong-
ing to the Corporación Peruana de Vapores, are en-
gaged primarily in the coastal trade, in carrying 
supplies to the Department of Loreto via the Panama 
Canal and the Amazon River, and in the coal and 
wheat trade between Peru and Argentina. 
Uruguay, which possesses only a small merchant 
fleet, deals primarily with the transport of her trade 
12 In 1946-51 it carried about 70 per cent of the total tonnage 
exchanged between Brazil and Chile. 
with Brazil,13 and secondarily, that with Argentina 
and Europe. On a small scale, these vessels take part 
in the coastal trade along the Brazilian seaboard. The 
tankers supply Uruguayan refineries with crude oil 
from Chilean territory in Tierra del Fuego. 
As noted earlier, about three-quarters of the zonal 
maritime trade is transported by North American or 
European ships and those registered in Panama. 
Among the regular sailings which connect southern 
ports on both oceans, is the Moore-McCormack Line, 
which operates from the western coast of the United 
States to the South Atlantic via the Panama Canal, 
returning by way of the Pacific. Recently, owing to a 
reduction in the activities of the Compañía de Muelles 
de la Población Vergara, the Moore-McCormack line 
established a regular monthly service between the 
River Plate and Callao. The Norwegian Westfal 
Larsen Line also operates around South America from 
the coast of the United States, following the same 
route as the Moore-McCormack Line, but in the oppo-
site direction. In addition "tramps" and "outsiders" 
offer competition to these regular services by offering 
transport for Chilean nitrate or Peruvian petroleum 
at reduced rates, provided payment is made in free-
market dollars. Such services are possible since these 
vessels generally return empty from the South 
Atlantic and so are in a position to offer hold-space 
at reduced prices. 
Amongst lines operating in the South Pacific are 
the Grace Line (United States), with nine ships 
totalling 90,000 tons; the West Coast Line (Danish), 
also with nine ships totalling about 50,000 tons; the 
Pacific Steam Navigation Company (British), with 
ten ships and 90,000 tons; the Knutsen Line (Nor-
wegian), with seven ships totalling 72,000 tons, and 
the Johnson Line (Swedish), with five ships totalling 
42,000 tons. 
13 In 1951 Uruguayan ships carried about 58 per cent of the 
export goods from Uruguay to Brazil, and 20 per cent of her 
imports from that country. 
ANNEX B 
Increased transport costs due to traffic disequilibrium between the South Atlantic and Pacific 
The disequilibrium in the volume of cargo carried 
from the Atlantic to the South Pacific and vice versa, 
as stated earlier in this chapter, increases the cost of 
the shipping services by not less than 25 per cent, as 
shown in the succeeding paragraphs. 
The cost of transport is generally expressed in units 
of traffic; or the total cost of transport is determined 
per ton-kilometre or per ton-mile, since the two basic 
factors to be considered are tonnage and distance. 
In the case of sea routes, the cost per ton-mile has a 
theoretical value, when comparing costs with other 
companies or other transport means, since, for any 
company, distance is almost a constant factor. 
The incidence of transport costs to distance closely 
follows a hyperbolic law. It has been assumed, on the 
basis of the laws of mechanics applied to economics, 
that the projection is an equilateral hyperbola, a 
hypothesis that has generally been accepted. The 
equation of this hyperbola takes the following form: 
y 2 + C x 2 + E x + F = 0 (1) 
Coefficient C depends immediately on the "direct 
cost" of transport, that is, on that part of the cost 
which varies in proportion to the intensity of traffic. 
Coefficient E depends on the direct cost, and on the 
terminal cost and the mean cost as well. Coefficient F 
represents the terminal cost, which includes port dues, 
the expenses of handling cargo, those of agencies and 
others, which, taken together, represent a high pro-
portion of total cost. The terminal cost is influenced 
by "indirect expenses", which are those that do not 
depend on the intensity of traffic. Direct and indirect 
expenses, which are of the greatest importance, are 
difficult to distinguish, since many expenses come 
under both headings—such as the depreciation of 
equipment, which for the most part depends on 
traffic, but which may continue to occur even when 
this is suspended—material assets being subject to 
the action of time and obsolescence. The values ob-
tained by equation (1), which includes in its coeffi-
cients the mean cost of transport, are consequently 
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valid for an average utilization of cargo capacity, a 
mean rate of speed, etc. 
To determine the influence exercised on the opera-
tion costs of the ships by the disturbed balance of 
traffic between the east and the south-west, as was 
previously mentioned, and introducing into equation 
(1) the factor of utilized hold capacity, the following 
equation results: 
(L.W. + D.W.)2 2̂ = ( — Cx2 — Ex — F) 
P 2 D.W.2 
in which: L.W. = gross weight of the unloaded vessel 
(lightweight); D.W. = gross weight of the cargo, in-
cluding fuel (deadweight) 
L.W.m+D.W.m 
P D.W.m 
the sub-indices m indicating mean values. 
In the case of Chilean ships operating between Chile 
and the South Atlantic, p equals approximately 1.9, 
where the influence of the disequilibrium in the balance 
of traffic can be demonstrated by examining the 
transport costs of a ship of 6,300 tons deadweight. 
In an analysis of the utilization of the 95 per cent 
hold-space available of this ship used in the Pacific-
Atlantic trade, two hypothetical examples will be 
examined; (a) where 75 per cent of the hold-space is 
utilized, and (b) where 20 per cent of the hold-space 
is utilized. 
In the first example the figures must be rounded off. 
L.W. =3,700 tons 
D.W.i =6,040 tons 
D.W.2 =4,980 tons 
The last two figures are obtained by calculating the 
use of the ships on the basis of their cargo capacity, 
which is more or less 84 per cent of the deadweight 
tonnage. The remaining 16 per cent represents the 
weight of fuel, water, food, the crew, etc. 
The cost incurred in the return trip must be ab-
sorbed by the cost of transport in the Pacific-Atlantic 
direction where traffic is greater as illustrated by the 
equation: 
yi = 
"L.W. (2D.W.J — D.W. 2) 
( — Cx2 — Ex — F) (2) 
P D.W.i 
The return trip in the Atlantic-Pacific direction is 
demonstrated by the equation: 
y2 = 2 
"L.W.+D.W.i 
( —Cx2 —Ex —F) (3) 
L P D . W . I 
If traffic were perfectly balanced and cargo could 
be brought on the return trip enabling 95 per cent of 
capacity to be used in both directions, the cost of 
transport in both directions would be the same, as 
shown by equation (3). 
In the case under consideration, in which 75 per cent 
of the hold-space is utilized on the return voyage, the 
equation would respectively be: 
"3.7(12.08-4.98) 1 
y 
y2 = 2 
1.9 x 36.6 1.9 
( - C x 2 ^ E x - F ) 
'3.7 + 6.04" 
1.9x6.04 
( —Cx2 —Ex —F) 
The relatively high cost of transport in the Pacific-
Atlantic direction is calculated by the quotient — y2 
Therefore: 
(3.7 x 7.1 + 36.6) 6.04 
ZL = = 1,063 
y* 36.6 x 9.74 
This means that in the return voyage only 75 per 
cent use of the hold-space accounts for a rise of 6.3 
per cent in the cost of transport in the direction in 
which traffic is greater. 
In the second example, in which 20 per cent of the 
hold-space is utilized, D.W.2 will equal 2,060 tons. 
Therefore: 
3.7(12.08-2.06) 1 " 
+ 
1.9 x 36.6 1.9 
y l = ( — Cx
2 — Ex — F) 
The cost in the Atlantic-Pacific direction does not 
vary, and the relation between the costs in both direc-
tions is equivalent to : 
(3.7 x 10.02 + 36.6) 6.04 Zl = = 1.25 
y2 36.6 x 9.74 
The increase in the cost of Pacific-Atlantic trade, 
resulting from the return trip being almost on ballast 
(only 20 per cent of hold-space used), is, therefore, as 
high as 25 per cent. This theoretical method of de-
ducing the influence of a disequilibrium in the balance 
of traffic upon freight costs gives figures very closely 
corresponding to rail transport. In the case of ocean 
traffic, the figures obtained for the rise in transport 
costs can be assumed to be lower than the actual 
figures, since indirect expenses are notoriously higher 
than those affecting rail transport under similar con-
ditions. In any event, the result of this calculation 
underlines the minimum influence which the dis-
equilibrium in the tonnage transported between the 
Pacific and the Atlantic exercises on costs and, 
therefore, on freight rates. 
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PLATE I 
LATIN AMERICA (SOUTHERN ZONE) 
Tonnage of goods transported f r o m the Pacific to the Atlantic and vice-versa 






L From P a c i f i c to A t l a n t i c 
Z. From A t l a n t i c t o P a c i f i c 
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Source : Economic Commission for Latin America. 
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PLATE II 
LATIN AMERICA (SOUTHERN ZONE) 
Ratio between the tonnage and value of goods moved between the countries 
of the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards 
Thousands of tons Semi-logarithmic scale 
1000 
5 0 0 
1. Goods moved from P a c i f i c to A t l a n t i c a s a 
percentage of t h o s e t r a n s p o r t e d in the 
o t h e r d i r e c t i on 
2 . F . o . b . values of e x p o r t s from P a c i f i c to A t l a n t i c 
a s a percentage of t h o s e t r a n s p o r t e d in the 




1 9 4 6 1947 
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P A R T I I 
S T U D I E S O F T H E C O M M O D I T I E S IN T R A D E 
In accordance with the statement made in the intro-
duction to part I of this study, at the same time as 
the research undertaken to obtain a knowledge of the 
elements of inter-Latin-American trade in the zone 
and of the general problems facing its development, 
a number of studies were begun on the principal food-
stuffs, raw materials and manufactured goods which 
make up this trade. As in the case of the work for 
part I, the time factor and working methods made it 
advisable to limit the initial research stage to the 
production, consumption and trade of these com-
modities between the southern countries of the region, 
with the aim of broadening the study in the future 
to include the whole of Latin America. 
Among the group of foodstuffs, the work already 
carried out, although incomplete, allows the presen-
tation of the provisional reports which follow, dealing 
with four very important trade items—wheat, sugar, 
meat and fats. Their characteristics of production, 
domestic consumption and the size of the exportable 
surplus are discussed in relation to the possible effect 
of development programmes for agriculture and live-
stock and of the increase which demographic growth, 
among other factors, causes upon demand. 
For raw materials and semi-finished goods, it has 
also been possible to provide a similar and provisional 
report about the prospects offered by markets of the 
southern zone for an increase in the trade of three 
commodities, the demand for which is influenced to 
a certain degree by economic development—iron and 
steel, copper and nitrate for agricultural use. The 
report on iron and steel examines the possibilities 
which an increase in the trade of such products would 
meet in the southern zone of Latin America generally 
and in Argentine-Chilean trade in particular. With 
regard to nitrate, the report deals with its prospects 
on the Brazilian market, where the use of nitrogen 
continues to be linked, in immediate terms and on a 
vast scale, with projects to defend Brazil's agriculture. 
These provisional reports demonstrate a combina-
tion of facts and tendencies illustrating the problems 
and prospects facing the trade in commodities of fun-
damental importance to the commercial relations 
between the Latin-American countries. But it is evi-
dent that no definite conclusions can be reached from 
them, without previously extending the same research 
to other countries of the region which produce or 
import these commodities. 
The study of the trade in manufactured goods is 
particularly complex, especially as noted earlier 
because the nomenclature used for official statistics 
differs from one country to another. The work of 
classifying and compiling the data already carried out 
by the Secretariat, providing evidence of the regressive 
phenomenon which influences most branches of this 
trade, does not at present permit more than con-
clusions of the very general nature used in chapter I. 
A further aspect of such work provides the basis to 
determine the future direction which should be fol-
lowed for clarifying the basic problem of supplement-
ing and specializing in Latin-American exports. 
Chapter VII 
W H E A T 
1. Introduction 
The most important commodity in the trade of the 
southern zone of Latin America is wheat,1 the trade 
position of which appears to be determined by three 
basic factors: 
(a) The curves for consumption and production in 
the zone do not run parallel, causing an appreciable 
decline in net exportable balances. (See plate I I I . ) 
(b) The reduction of wheat availabilities for export 
has provoked a considerable contraction as regards 
the self-sufficiency of the zone through trade, by 
obliging importing countries to divert part of their 
dollar resources to purchase wheat from other regions. 
(See plate IV.) 
(c) The outlook for the next few years appears con-
siderably brighter owing to the programmes for stimu-
lating production in several countries, especially in 
Argentina. If these programmes are satisfactorily 
carried out, the zone, in addition to self-sufficiency 
and a consequent strengthening of reciprocal trade, 
would have substantial export surpluses. 
First, an analysis will be made of the present situa-
tion and, secondly, future prospects. 
2. Present situation2—production 
and consumption 
The disparity between the tendencies of wheat 
production and consumption reduces net exportable 
surpluses, as seen from table 45. 
1 In this study, the word "wheat" includes flour, assessed in 
terms of a wheat ratio of 70 to 100, wherever it deals with export 
and import figures and unless a statement is made to the contrary. 
2 The "present situation" represents the balance between the 
1951 consumption and the average crops for the three-year period 
between 1949 and 1951, which is justified by the distinct nature 
of the determining factors: taking into account the demographic 
growth as regards consumption, and the necessity for weighting 
the very variable effects of climatic influences as regards the 
volume of the crops. For this same reason, the figures for the year 
1952 have been entirely excluded, since they are completely out 
The substantial decline in net exportable surpluses, 
shown in table 45, arises mainly from the increase in 
aggregate consumption as compared with an almost 
stationary production. During the period between 
1934-38 and 1949-51, harvests decreased by 123,200 
tons, while aggregate consumption rose by 1,939,000 
tons in the same period. 
During this time the population of the southern 
zone has increased from 68 millions in 1934-38 to 85 
millions in 1946-50 and to 92 millions in 1951; there 
is approximately a 2 per cent average rate of growth 
each year. 
If the data for production, consumption and trade 
are correlated with the growth of the population, the 
following evolution of annual per capita averages is 
obtained: from 1934-38 to 1949-51 production de-
creased from 111.6 to 81.8 kgs.; from 1934-38 to 1951 
consumption increased from 78.7 to 79.9 kgs.; from 
1934-38 to 1951 net surplus for export fell from 32.8 
to 1.9 kgs. (See plate V.) 
A detailed examination of production and consump-
tion data for each of the countries of the zone indicates 
very differing situations, as may be seen from tables 
46, 47 and 48. 
As regards production, four countries have increased 
their crop: Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay. Of these, 
three show a proportional rise in wheat production 
commensurate with their increase in population. 
Chile, on the contrary has increased its population to 
a much greater extent than its wheat production. 
This has produced a reversal in the position of this 
country, so that, from being a marginal exporter in 
1934-38, it was essential to import in increasing 
quantities during recent years. 
of proportion owing to the effects of an abnormal season of 
drought in Argentina. Actually, the statistical data for the last 
few years are partly provisional, but the possible margin for later 
rectifications cannot materially influence the conclusions. 
T A B L E 4 5 . W H E A T : P R O D U C T I O N , CONSUMPTION AND N E T E X P O R T S ( S O U T H E R N 
Z O N E ) 
(Annual averages) 
Total Net exportable Per capita 
Production consumption surplus consumption 
• •— Population annually 
Period (Thousands of tons) (thousands) (kgs.) 
1934-38 7,591.6 5,357.3 2,234.3 68,038 78.7 
1946-50 7,120.2 6,460.0 660.2 85,090 75.9 
1949-51 7,468.4 7,002.0 466.4 90,339 77.4 
1951 7,868.0 7,297.0 576.4 92,33 7 78.9 
SOURCE: Statistical and Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
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T A B L E 4 6 . W H E A T : P R O D U C T I O N ( S O U T H E R N ZONE) 
(Thousand tons) 
Total 
Year Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Peru Uruguay southern zone 
Average 1934-38... 6,127.7 33.0 144.0 849.9 . . 76.3 360.7 7,591.6» 
194 6 3,907.0 14.0 212.5 904.5 1.3 90.6 216.6 5,346.5 
194 7 5,615.0 14.0 359.4 899.0 2.0 127.0 181.8 7,198.2 
1948 6,500.0 24.0 405.1 1,026.4 1.1 136.8 423.5 8,516.9 
Average 1946-48... 5,340.7 17.3 325.7 943.3 1.5 118.1 274.0 7,020.6 
194 9 5,200.0 28.0 437.5 1,113.5 2.2 129.0 518.3 7,427.3 
195 0 5,144.0 532.0 821.4 0.75 131.0 452.0 7,109.0'' 
195 1 5,796.0 . . 495.0 975.1 0.5 138.0 435.0 7,867.6b 
Average 1949-51... 5,380.0 28.0 488.2 970.0 1.2 132.7 468.4 7,468.3 
1952 2,050.0 . . 580.0 988.0 1 46.0 472.6 4,265.1° 
SOURCE: Statistical Yearbooks. 
» Excluding Paraguay. 
b Including Bolivia with the 1949 figure. 
° Including Bolivia with the 1949 figure and Paraguay with the 1951 figure. 
Due to the absence of complete statistical data, it 
is not possible to make accurate comparisons for 
Bolivia and Paraguay. In Paraguay there is practi-
cally no wheat production, the best years having 
reached only 2,200 tons. In Bolivia the average for 
1947-49 is 33 per cent less than the average for 1934-
38, but there is a tendency to a partial recovery. 
Finally, in Argentina, production dropped from 
6,127,700 tons to 5,380,000 between 1934-38 and 
1949-51 or there is a reduction of 12.2 per cent as 
against an increase in population of 32.6 per cent. 
T A B L E 4 7 . W H E A T : A COMPARISON OF I N D I C E S OF P R O -
D U C T I O N AND P O P U L A T I O N I N C R E A S E ( S O U T H E R N 
Z O N E ) 
Increase of population Increase of production 
1949-51 on 1934-38 1949-51 on 1934-38 
Country percentage) (percentage) 
Brazil 37.6 238.9 
Chile 24.0 14.1 
Peru 20.9 75.0 
Uruguay 15.7 29.6 
SOURCE: Statistical Yearbooks. 
The decrease of 747,700 tons in Argentina's crops 
is greater than the total increase in the four countries 
named in table 47 (628,400 tons). Obviously, the 
wheat situation in Argentina is the key to the whole 
problem concerning the zone, since this country is the 
chief producer, consumer and exporter. 
As regards consumption, there are also very differ-
ing situations. Total consumption has increased in all 
the countries but in variable proportions, since in 
some cases the consumption per capita is greater and 
in others less than the same figure fifteen years ago. 
(See table 48.) 
After a pronounced decline during the period of 
world scarcity (from the middle of 1946 to mid-1948) 
consumption figures as a whole have begun to rise 
almost to the pre-war level. This level has very sub-
stantially risen in Peru, while there is a material in-
crease in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. There also 
appears to have been some growth in Bolivia and 
Paraguay, but, as already indicated, data for these 
two countries are not very reliable. Finally, there is 
an appreciable decrease in Argentina. Many factors, 
sometimes opposing ones, are responsible for this 
situation. For example, the decrease in wheat con-
sumption in Argentina is the result of a higher stand-
ard of living, since bread is being partially substituted 
in the popular diet by more varied foods. The same 
basic factor, that is to say an increase in the standard 
of living, has produced the opposite effect in Brazil, 
the average consumption of wheat being now much 
higher.3 Here, there is, however, a demogeographic 
factor; there is an increasing concentration of popu-
lation in the central, more temperate, areas. There is 
also a social-economic factor: there is a greater pro-
portional increase in the urban and working-class 
population. In general terms these observations also 
apply to Peru. 
3 This is explained by the difference in the average level of the 
gross national product between the two countries. 
T A B L E 4 8 . W H E A T : C O N S U M P T I O N ( S O U T H E R N ZONE) 
Apparent total consumption Estimated population Per capita consumption 
(ithousand tons) (thousand inhabitants)b (kgs. per year) 
Country 1934-38 1946-48 1949-51 1934-38 1946-48 1949-51 1934-38 1946-48 1949-51 
Argentina» 2,778.6 3,355.9 3,335.0 12,964.6 15,961 17,196 214.3 210.3 193.9 
Bolivia 69.2 90.3 85.9 2,569.0 2,916 3,019 26.9 31.0 28.5 
Brazil 1,139.3 1,150.9 1,697.3 37,893.2 49,000 52,633 30.1 23.5 32.2 
Chile 833.9 986.7 1,090.2 4,684.2 5,525 5,809 178.0 178.6 187.7 
Paraguay 33.1 33.0 51.7 921.8 1,238 1,406 35.9 26.7 36.8 
Peru 204.6 257.8 370.4 6,950.6 8,019 8,405 29.4 32.1 44.1 
Uruguay 298.6 330.0 369.7 2,055.6 2,303 2,380 145.3 143.3 155.3 
TOTAL 5,357.3 6,204.6 7,000.2 68,038.0 84,962 90,848 78.7 73.0 77.1 
SOURCES: Yearbooks of the Food and Agriculture Organization and national statistics. 
» Data for Argentina has been adjusted in relation to the decrease of around one million tons of reserves accumulated between 
1949 and 1951. 
b For the average 1949-51 the figures for 1950 were used. 
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The actual levels of per capita wheat consumption 
may be considered satisfactory in Argentina, Uruguay 
and Chile. There still remains a large margin for a 
possible increase in the rest of the countries of the 
zone. 
3. Evolution of trade until 1951 
The position of wheat in the reciprocal trade of the 
countries in the southern zone has undergone con-
siderable changes during the post-war period. 
The decline of wheat's significance in intra-zonal 
trade, which is clearly visible in table 49, is similar to 
the fall of Argentina's exports, as may be seen in 
table 50. 
It should be noted that the sharp decline, from 89.1 
to 59.5 per cent between 1934-38 and 1949-51, of 
Argentine participation in the net imports of the 
other countries, corresponds to a much smaller reduc-
tion in volume, which has only decreased by 10 per 
cent. On the other hand, the participation of the 
zone in Argentina's exports has increased, rising from 
33 per cent in the years 1945-47 to 42 per cent in the 
years 1949-51, after a temporary drop to 27 per cent 
during 1946-48. These divergences evidently arise 
from opposing tendencies between the decrease in 
Argentina's production and the increase of ^imports 
in other countries. 
If exports from Chile and Uruguay to the zone 
are added, the figures are appreciably modified and 
it appears that the proportion of zonal self-sufficiency 
is higher. 
In the relative reduction in zonal trade, the effect 
of the world wheat crisis during the years 1946 to 
1948 must be taken into account. Since Argentina was 
not a member of the "Combined Food Boards" in 
Washington, nearly all the importing countries, owing 
to severe rationing, resorted to Argentina to obtain 
some help in alleviating the scarcity. The result was 
to extend to numerous countries the markets for 
Argentine wheat with a resulting reduction in that 
available to neighbouring countries, thus causing the 
price of wheat to rise. In 1937-38, Belgium, Brazil, 
Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
absorbed 80 per cent of Argentina's wheat exports. 
In the years 1946-48, the share of these traditional 
purchasers dropped to less than 50 per cent. 
Once the scarcity had passed, zonal trade showed 
a partial tendency to return to its former pattern. 
The consequences of events during the difficult years, 
however, could not be completely erased. Some of 
Argentina's new clients continued their mutual trade, 
T A B L E 4 9 . W H E A T : R E L A T I V E I M P O R T A N C E I N INTRA-ZONAL T R A D E 
(Value in thousands of dollars) 
1934-38 1946-48 1949-51 
Aggregate value of all the products exported within the 
southern zone by the countries of the zone 94,940 
Value of wheat exported within the zone by countries 
of the zone 36,813 
Percentage of wheat in the total 38.8 
Aggregate value of all the products imported by the 
countries of the southern zone from the countries of 
the zone 102,900 
Value c.i.f. of wheat imported by countries of the 
southern zone from the countries of the zone 39,781 
Percentage of wheat in the total 38.7 















SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 






Exports from Argentina to the 
southern zone 
(Thousand tons) (Percentage) 
Total imports 







1 9 3 4 - 3 8 . . . . 3,349.1 1,109.5 33.5 1,245.4 89.1 
1946-48 1,984.8 538.5 27.2 1,188.0 45.3 
1949-51 2,379.0 997.1 42.0 1,675.1 59.5 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
T A B L E 5 1 . R E L A T I V E I M P O R T A N C E OF W H E A T IN T H E T R A D E O F T H E S O U T H E R N 
ZONE 
Total wheat exports of Exports to the Total imports Imports from 
Argentina, Chile, southern zone of wheat in Argentina, 
Uruguay southern zone Chile, Uruguay 
Period (thousand ions) (Thousand tons) (Percentage) (thousand tons) (percentage) 
1934-38 3,448.8 1,170.2 33.9 1,245.4 93.6 
1946-48 2,038.7 582.7 28.7 1,188.0 49.0 
1949-51 2,486.4 1,077.8 43.4 1,675.1 64.4 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
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Table 52. W H E A T : I N C O M E AND E X P E N S E S F O R W H E A T I M P O R T S AND E X P O R T S IN T H E S O U T H E R N ZONE 
(Annual averages in thousands of dollars) 
1934-38 1946-48 1949-51 
With With With 
Total southern Total southern Total southern 
values zone Percentage values zone Percentage values zone Percentage 
Exporting countries: 
Argentina 96,164 34,277 267,832 67,479 228,100 93,381 
Chile 798 400 262 75 — — 
Uruguay 3,309 2,136 3,130 2,844 9,317» 6,793» 
TOTAL 100,271 36,813 36.7 271,224 70,398 26.0 237,417 100,174 42.2 
Importing countries: 
5,457 Bolivia 1,348 1,233 2,483 4,966b l ,961b 
Brazil 33,693° 32,813° 105,969 49,315 125,219 100,346 
Chile 411 356 5,354 5,073 12,421 3,002 
Paraguay l ,105d 1,105d 4,514« 4,164« 6,222' 6,222' 
Peru 4,083 3,824« 18,847 13,751 24,623 b 5,797b 
Uruguay 458 450 8,252 6,281 — . — 
TOTAL 41,098 39,781 96.8 148,393 81,067 54.6 173,451 117,328 64.8 
Balances: 
(1) Total exports 
less total imports. 59,173 122,831 63,966 
(2) Total imports 
less impor ts from the 
southern zone 1,317 67,326 56,123 
SOURCE: National statistics. 
• 1949 and 1950 only. b 1949. c 1934r-37. d Based on indirect data: exports from Argentina and Uruguay plus 15 per cent for 
freight. • Calculated on the basis of the quantum of imports and the value of exports from Argentina. ' 1950. ' Indirect data: exports 
from Argentina to Peru plus 20 per cent for freight. 
especially in the form of barter. The most notable 
case is that of India, which has become a regular 
market for half a million tons of wheat annually, in 
exchange for jute sacking. On the other hand, neigh-
bouring countries of the zone made new trade links 
with other wheat-exporting countries, especially 
Canada and United States. In the year 1948 Brazil 
joined the International Wheat Agreement, ensuring 
for a period of five years an annual quota of 360,000 
tons at a price which, although paid in dollars, was 
less than Argentina's export price.4 This last factor, 
that of price, has come to play an important role in 
the change of direction of the normal flow of trade.5 
Both the decline in the net exportable surplus of 
wheat and the reduction in the effective coefficient 
for self-sufficiency in the southern zone, have had 
serious consequences as regards the foreign exchange 
situation in these countries. 
Table 52 provides a comparison of income and 
expenses, in terms of thousands of dollars, during 
the three periods being considered. 
From table 52 it is evident that the decrease in the 
capacity for zonal self-sufficiency in wheat has been 
4 Peru and, since 1949, Bolivia and Paraguay are also members 
of the International Wheat Agreement with the option of receiv-
ing respectively 200,000, 75,000 and 60,000 tons respectively 
per year. 
5 A comparison of prices paid in the years 1947 and 1948 is very 
complicated due to their considerable fluctuations. In the case of 
Brazilian imports, the average price paid for Argentine wheat, 
153 dollars c.i.f. per ton, may be compared with the price of North 
American flour, 166 dollars c.i.f. Since flour is worth at least 40 per 
cent more than grain wheat, a ton of North American flour, in 
terms of wheat, cost 119 dollars. In 1948, Argentine wheat cost 
196 dollars per ton c.i.f. while North American flour was never 
more than 171 dollars. This difference corresponds to the margin 
between the top prices reached in United States: 3.20 dollars per 
bushel in Chicago, or around 117 dollars per ton, and in Argentina 
60 pesos f.a.s. per quintal, or about 180 dollars. On the other hand, 
small quantities of Chilean wheat in 1947 and Uruguayan flour 
in 1948 were bought by Brazil at prices which were even higher 
responsible for expenses of 67 million dollars during 
1946-51. The volume of imported wheat rose from 
48,000 tons in 1934-38 to an annual average of 
562,000 tons in 1949-51. 
To reach a more precise appreciation of these facts 
and trends, table 53 examines the potential loss of 
foreign exchange in the southern zone as a result of 
the divergence between production and consumption. 
Table 53 shows that the decrease in the net surplus 
of wheat for export means a decrease in income of 
131 million dollars annually for Argentina, while 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Peru had to 
increase their purchases by almost 92 million dollars. 
Uruguay alone shows a higher income, although for a 
sum which has little influence on the general balance 
for the zone. 
To appreciate fully these facts, they must be con-
sidered in relation to the total value of imports or 
T A B L E 5 3 . M O V E M E N T O F F O R E I G N E X C H A N G E B Y 
W H E A T I M P O R T S AND E X P O R T S 
(Millions of dollars) 
Situation 1934-38 Situation in Country at present prices* 1951b Difference 
Argentina + 335.0 + 204.0 - 131.0 
Bolivia - 4.2 - 6.8 - 2.6 ' 
Brazil - 114.4 - 161.3 - 46.9 
Chile - 2.1 - 28.3 - 26.2 
Paraguay - 3.8 - 6.3 - 2.5 
Peru - 14.8 - 28.3 - 13.5 
Uruguay + 6.2 + 1 1 . 3 + 5.1 
TOTAL + 2 0 1 . 9 - 15.7 - 217 .6 
SOURCE: Economic Commision for Latin America. 
* Volume of actual exports for 1934-38 calculated on the basis 
of 100 dollars per ton f.o.b. ; volume of imports calculated on the 
basis of 115 dollars per ton c.i.f. The price of 100 dollars corre-
sponds to a quotation of 2.40 dollars per bushel in the Chicago 
market. 
b Similar prices applied to the import needs or to the export 
possibilities resulting from the balance between consumption in 
1951 and the average production for 1949-51. 
exports, as the case may be, in these countries. 
Table 54 shows the proportion which the actual needs 
of wheat, at the prices which have been taken earlier 
as a basis, comprise in total imports for 1950, and 
compares this proportion with the theoretical result 
of maintaining import needs at the 1934-38 level and 
calculating them at present prices. The difference 
between the two sets of figures permits a measurement 
of the pressure exercised upon the capacity to import, 
owing to the unequal rise in the production and con-
sumption ratio. The same calculation, applied to the 
income derived from wheat by the exporting countries, 
indicates in turn how aggregate exports have modified 
these resources. 
Combining the increase in the budgets for imports 
withfthe reduction in resources caused by exports, the 
pressure of the relative lack of wheat upon the re-
sources of the southern zone as a whole may be esti-
mated at 7.5 per cent. This fact aggravates the diffi-
culty which faces nearly all the countries of the zone, 
that of balancing their foreign exchange budgets. 
Obviously, the solution of the wheat problem 
depends fundamentally upon a substantial increase 
in production, as much in Argentina as in the im-
porting countries, at least where climatic and soil 
conditions allow reasonable production prospects. 
4. Production prospects 
(a) IN GENERAL 
In the republics of the southern zone, the recog-
nition of the importance of developing wheat produc-
tion has given rise to studies, programmes and various 
efforts towards accomplishing this goal. Broadly 
speaking, the results obtained to date may be noted 
from table 55. 
T A B L E 5 4 . WHEAT: INFLUENCE OF THE RELATIVELY SMALLER AMOUNT OF WHEAT 
AVAILABLE UPON THE RESOURCES OF FOREIGN TRADE IN THE SOUTHERN ZONE 
I. Exporting countries 
Percentage ratio between 
the value of wheat exports 
and total resources derived 
from exports in 1950 
Percentage ratio between 
the volume of the exports 
of wheat in 1934-38, 
estimated at present prices* 
and total resources derived 










- 1 1 . 1 
4- 1.6 
- 8.8 
I I . Importing countries 
Percentage ratio between 
the value of wheat imports 
and total resources applied 
to imports in 1950 
Percentage ratio between the 
volume of wheat imports in 
1934-38, estimated at actual 
prices, and total resources 
applied to imports in 1950 Difference 
Bolivia 16.0 10.0 + 6.0 
Brazil 14.6 10.4 + 4.2 
Chile 11.4 - 0.6 +12 .0 
Paraguay 25.0 15.2 4- 9.8 
Peru 15.1 8.0 + 7.1 
Total weighted 14.4 8.5 + 5.9 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
T A B L E 5 5 . WHEAT: EVOLUTION IN CULTIVATED AREAS AND AVERAGE YIELDS IN THE ZONE 
Area cultivated or harvested Production Average yields 
(thousands of hectares) (thousands of tons) (kgs. per hectare) 
Country 1934-38 1946-48 1949-51 1934-38 1946-48 1949-51 1934-38 1946-48 1949-51 
Argentina 6,783 4,752.2 4,706 6,634 5,340.7 5,380 980 1,124 1,143 
Bolivia 34 27.0 37 33 17.3 28 950 640 757 
Brazil 151 406.1 669.2 144 325.7 488.2 960 802 730 
Chile 800 746.4 839 851 943.3 970 1,060 1,250 1,156 
Paraguay 1.8 1.7 . . 1.5 1.2 833 700 
Peru 109 114.8 154 76 118.1 132.7 700 1,029 868 
Uruguay 484 410.1 494.6 365 274.0 468.4 750 670 947 
TOTAL 8,361 6,458.4 6,901.5 8,103 7,020.6 7,468.5 969 1,087 1,082 
SOURCES: For 1934-38, Yearbooks of the Food and Agriculture Organization; other years, national sources, except for Bolivia. 
NOTES: Argentina: Figures for harvested areas have been used. Taking into account the areas sown, the average return is appreciably 
modified: it is reduced to 907 kgs. in 1946-48 and to 953 in 1949-51. For the other countries the data refer to the areas cultivated, bear-
ing in mind that there is no appreciable difference with the harvested areas. Bolivia: All the figures are from FAO. Data for 1934-38 
refer only to the year 1938; data for 1946-48 refer only to the years 1947 and 1948; for 1949-51 there is no available data except for 
the year 1949. Paraguay: Data for the period 1946-48 only represent the year 1948. Peru: For 1949-51, only the years 1949 and 1950. 
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Table 55 shows the following facts. In recent years 
it is seen that the areas sown have greatly increased 
in Brazil, adequately in Peru and only slightly in 
Chile. They are insignificant in Paraguay and there 
has been a decline in Argentina. Yields have improved 
in Argentina, Chile, Peru and Uruguay, and have 
decreased in Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay. The 
reduction of the harvested area in Argentina coincides 
with an increase in the average yield. This may partly 
be explained by the fact that marginal ground has 
been abandoned, either because it was not sown or 
since it was more advantageous for the farmer to 
leave the crop as livestock fodder. Partly, also, it is 
due to the progress obtained through the use of 
selected seed. Conversely, in Brazil, the considerable 
increase in arable land has resulted in a substantial 
reduction in the average yield. Chile presents a differ-
ent example, since, with a stationary arable area, 
larger crops are being obtained owing to improvements 
in agricultural techniques. Peru and Uruguay are the 
only countries where larger average yields are com-
bined with larger areas sown. 
Taken as a whole the average yield for the southern 
zone has progressed satisfactorily between 1934-37 
and 1949-51. However, if Argentina is excluded, the 
average yield only showed an increase of 4 per cent. 
These yields should now be compared with those 
at present obtained in other parts of the world. 
These figures show that the increase in yields is a 
general phenomenon, though of varied intensity. 
Canada, the United States and Australia have re-
cently reached the same level as the countries of South 
America, thus nullifying the previous advantage of 
these countries in the pre-war period. If the yields 
from the countries of Latin America are compared 
with those in Europe under intense cultivation, even 
greater progress is evident in the European countries, 
with the exception of Italy. 
The relative backwardness of the Latin-American 
countries is perhaps related to the lack of agricultural 
mechanization and the very reduced use of fertilizers. 
South America used only 150,000 metric tons of pure 
fertilizer elements in the agricultural year 1948-49, 
as against 6 millions consumed in Europe and nearly 
T A B L E 5 6 . WHEAT: COMPARISON OF AVERAGE YIELDS 
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(Metric quintals per hectare) 
Country 1934-38 1948-50 Increase 
Canada 7.1 10.5 3.4 
United States 8.7 11.1 2.4 
Australia 8.0 10.9 2.9 
New Zealand 21.1 27.0 5.9 
Europe: 
Belgium 27.3 31.6 4.3 
Denmark 30.4 35.8 5.4 
France 15.6 18.3 2.7 
Italy 14.4 14.8 0.4 
Netherlands 30.3 35.4 5.1 
United Kingdom 23.1 26.8 3.7 
Average for the 6 European 
countries 16.1 17.9 1.8 
Argentina 9.8 11.4 1.6 
Chile 10.6 11.6 1.0 
Southern zone total 9.7 10.8 1.1 
SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization and national 
statistics. 
4 millions in North America. In the year 1949-50, the 
average consumption of fertilizers in Latin America 
as a whole stood at 3.18 kgs. per arable hectare as 
against 17.83 kgs. in the United States and Canada.6 
As regards tractors for agriculture, FAO figures show 
90,000 units7 in the whole of Latin America, as against 
972,000 in Europe and 4,235,000 in North America. 
These statistics should not cause disillusionment. 
On the contrary, they rather indicate reasons for 
optimism in the future, because they show how 
enormous are the possibilities for increasing agricul-
tural yields in general and the production of wheat 
in particular. This is especially true when the use of 
agricultural techniques are incorporated and 
intensified. 
On the other hand, there are still vast tracts of 
land suitable for cultivation, even though their 
preparation for use would require heavy investments 
in many cases. 
The studies and research in the different countries 
are very satisfactory. In the experimental stations of 
Brazil, for example, experiments in wheat cultivation 
with measured quantities of fertilizer have given 
returns of from between 20 to 30 quintals per hectare. 
In Paraguay, experiments by STICA with selected 
varieties have trebled the yields, raising them from 
6 to 18 quintals. 
(b) B Y INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES 
In Argentina a number of adverse factors have 
caused wheat harvests to be low during the last few 
years. Among these factors, apart from the weather, 
is the man-power exodus from the country districts. 
Faced with this situation, the Argentine Government 
asked the Instituto de Economía Rural, in 1947 to 
study new types of agricultural equipment to deter-
mine those best suited to domestic agricultural con-
ditions. In the Economic Plan for 1952, the govern-
ment gave priority to its plans for agrarian mechani-
zation. The effect of this official policy has caused a 
growth in the value of tractor imports as follows: 
Year Millions of Argentine pesos 
194 7 28.9 
194 8 75.0 
194 9 31.1 
195 0 50.7 
195 1 137.5 
During 1952, 41.5 million dollars (310 million 
Argentine pesos) were allocated for the purchase of 
10,000 tractors, mainly from Western Germany. 
This had its results in the harvests at the end of that 
year. On the other hand, it is evident that the imports 
which have been made to date only cover a relatively 
small proportion of domestic requirements. Evalua-
tions of the actual need vary considerably, but have 
recently been estimated at between 75,000 and 100,000 
tractors. In 1950, the number of units in existence in 
Argentina was thought to total 20,000. 
The second Argentine five-year-plan provides for 
the domestic manufacture of tractors, and such a 
plant could also be responsible, during the next few 
years, for the maintenance and renewal of imported 
units. As regards the other elements for agricultural 
mechanization, Argentina's industry is in a fair way 
to produce the majority of them, or at least could 
6 According to FAO statistics. 
7 In 1951 this figure rose to 118,000. 
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provide for current maintenance and overhaul. As 
there is also a lack of other machinery, particularly 
machines for sowing and reaping, it is probable that 
a temporary increase in such imports will occur. 
Meanwhile steps have been taken to make the maxi-
mum use of the available equipment. In addition, more 
silos have been built, and credit to farmers increased, 
with the specific aim of stimulating the purchase of 
new machinery, since this had become increasingly 
difficult owing to the high price in terms of grain. It 
has been estimated that the price of a tractor in 
Argentina rose between 1928 and 1949 from 47 to 
193 tons of grain.8 
The official goal for the 1952-53 wheat campaign 
was to raise the area sown to 7 million hectares and 
the harvest to 8 million tons. As regards sowing, the 
desired objective has not been attained9 and it was 
lower than that of pre-war years (average 1937-39: 
8,266,000 hectares). For the harvests, when this 
report was compiled, the total has been estimated at 
more than 7 million tons. To draw a comparison the 
harvests for the years 1946-47 and 1950-51 may be 
cited: 
Agricultural year 1946-47: 
Area sown 6,673,500 hectares 
Harvest 5,615,000 tons 
Agricultural year 1950-51: 
Area sown 6,554,200 hectares 
Harvest 5,796,000 tons 
This comparison shows an appreciable increase for 
the harvest of 1952-53 as regards the yield per hectare, 
which would now be above 12 quintals. 
In Brazil for many years there has been considerable 
official interest in increasing wheat production. This 
received a strong impulse as a result of the grave crisis 
of 1946. Since then the area sown has increased 
steadily, passing from 300,000 hectares in 1946 to 
705,000 in 1951. During the same period, production 
rose from 212,000 to 495,000 tons, due to a number of 
means for encouraging production. Among them is the 
partial mechanization of the agricultural work, di-
rected by the Servicio de Expansao do Trigo. A further 
factor was the establishment of a remunerative official 
price.10 
In the State of Rio Grande do Sul, where wheat 
harvests have recently shown marked advances, this 
crop is now sown in areas formerly dedicated exclu-
sively to pasturage and rotation with livestock is now 
practised. 
In 1952, the area sown increased by about 100,000 
hectares and it was hoped that the harvest would reach 
700,000 tons. It was also hoped that the efforts to 
encourage new methods and techniques would cause 
an improvement in the quality of the seed, thus 
increasing the proportion of the harvest which could 
be used for bread. In 1950, from a harvest of 532,000 
tons, only 160,000 were used commercially for bread-
making. Moreover, it is calculated that a quantity of 
70,000 tons was used for farm consumption, and some 
•60,000 tons for seed. The rest of the harvest consisted 
of wheat of inferior quality, not suitable for bread-
making. 
8 Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Survey 
of Latin America, 1949. It should be noted that this ratio has been 
•established from the price paid by the user making a direct 
import. The commercial price corresponded in 1950 to 300 tons 
of wheat. The tractor, which is worth 2,450 dollars in the United 
'States, costs the North American farmer 30 tons of wheat. 
8 It stood at 6,057,500 hectares of wheat, according to data 
published at the beginning of February 1953. 
It is uncertain whether there are errors in the data 
submitted by farmers to the statistical services. 
Nevertheless, there is a definite tendency towards a 
proportional increase in the harvest sold for bread-
making. From 160,000 tons in 1950 it rose to 270,000 
tons in 1951, in spite of a reduction of 37,000 tons in 
the gross volume of the harvest. 
It is not possible to estimate the curve of the future 
growth of wheat production. Some Brazilian tech-
nicians estimate that the long-term production will 
reach a level almost equivalent to self-sufficiency. This 
would introduce a fundamental change in the whole 
structure of intra-zonal trade. By limiting the pros-
pects to the medium-term and taking into account 
earlier observations, it appears probable that the esti-
mate of an average of 1 million tons of wheat imported 
annually will be maintained. 
In Chile, there are also plans for increasing wheat 
production. The Corporación de Fomento has acquired 
mechanical equipment, which is hired to farmers, to-
gether with technicians for its use in sowing and reap-
ing. The use of fertilizers has been stimulated by tax 
reductions equivalent to half the price of the nitrate. 
But, as in Argentina and Brazil, the price incentive 
is the factor which seems to have the greatest effect. 
It rose from 85 pesos per quintal in 1937 to 395 pesos 
in 1950 and has been increased to 880 pesos for the 
year 1952-53.11 
Obviously a relationship must be established be-
tween these figures and those of the general level of 
prices, which are as follows: 
Indices of retail prices Indices of wheat price to the farmer 
1937 100 100 
194 6 307 224 
195 0 601 465 
195 1 775 553 
195 2 976 (May) 769 
195 3 1,035» 
» Base: 880 Chilean pesos per quintal. 
It may be seen that the price of wheat has always 
been maintained at a lower rate than the index of 
retail prices. Nevertheless, for the first time in 1952 
the price of wheat for the future harvest was an-
nounced before sowing and for the first time was 
higher to the index of retail prices at that moment. 
On the other hand, the mechanism of guaranteed 
prices had to make wheat cultivation during the last 
few years a more remunerative activity than the 
average agricultural and stockbreeding activities. 
Indices for wholesale prices 
Indices for wheat 
Vegetable Animal 
products products 
194 7 100 100 100 
195 2 252 .(May) 256 (May) 282 
195 3 . . 380 
10( The price paid to the farmer is 150 cruzeiros per sack of 60 
kgs. on the farm, including the value of the new sack, which is 
worth from 11 to 12 cruzeiros. This price is equivalent to 2,500 
cruzeiros per ton. A comparison with the price of imported wheat 
shows that the latter averaged 1,854 cruzeiros during 1951. At 
first sight it would seem from this comparison that wheat cultiva-
tion in Brazil is uneconomical. Actually the difference in price is 
due to the disparity in the internal and external value of the 
cruzeiro. Thus, the wheat situation is in no way different from 
almost all the agricultural products of Brazil, the exceptions Jpeing 
coffee and cocoa. The difference between domestic production 
prices and those on the world market stand at 30 and sometimes 
even 60 per cent. 
11 In the last instance it was reduced to 820 pesos, but after the 
period of sowing. 
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The latest rise in the price of wheat has caused an 
appreciable increase in the area sown. It has risen 
from 750,000 hectares to 842,000 thus almost reaching 
the maximum figure of 867,000 hectares in 1948. 
With a yield equal to that achieved in the five-year 
period 1946-50 or 12 quintals per hectare, the harvest 
should reach a million tons. In ratio to apparent 
aggregate consumption over the last two years, a 
harvest of this size would leave a negative balance 
of nearly 200,000 tons. This is taking into account 
that per capita consumption has increased consider-
ably during the last few years, passing from 178 kgs. 
in 1946-50 to 187 in 1949-51, which may be attrib-
uted to a certain reduction in supplies of meat and 
vegetables, either through smaller production or a 
rise in prices. This increase in domestic consumption, 
related to the reduction of the cultivated area since 
1950, has caused a spectacular rise in the quantum 
of imports which in turn has become a very heavy 
burden on the budget for foreign exchange. An increase 
in wheat production is therefore of paramount im-
portance. But this is not easy to achieve, given the 
relative limitation of the area which can be cultivated 
and the type of soil, it seems improbable that the 
relatively high yields which have already been 
achieved can be surpassed. On the other hand, the 
demographic growth of 1.7 per cent annually requires 
an increase of about 20,000 tons per year to be made 
available for consumption. 
Assuming that the area sown is 850,000 hectares, 
it would be necessary to produce an immediate average 
return of 14 quintals in order to meet present needs, 
adding, on an average, one more quintal every five 
years to compensate for the increase in population. 
Alternatively, if the average yield for the five-year 
period from 1946-50 is taken as permanent, it would 
be necessary to add 130,000 hectares immediately to 
the area already devoted to wheat cultivation, in-
creasing this area by 80,000 hectares every five years. 
In practice, if the incentives for production are 
maintained at the present level, it is hoped that the 
two forms of development can be combined to a 
sufficient extent to compensate for the vegetative 
increase in consumption, probably maintaining at 
least part of the present deficit. 
The lack of exportable Argentine wheat and the 
need for such Argentine imports created an acute 
problem in Paraguay in 1952. The necessity for im-
porting wheat to be paid for in dollars was only solved 
due to a special loan from the International Monetary 
Fund. Domestic consumption is at present estimated 
at 70,000 tons annually, while Paraguay's production 
is very low. Wheat is not cultivated there, except in 
a few districts in the south-east of the country whose 
total area, in the years for which statistics are avail-
able, was less than 3,000 hectares. 
In Paraguay, the Technical Service of Inter-
American Agricultural Co-operation (STICA), which 
has been working for several years in this country 
and is now linked with the Point Four programme, 
has paid particular attention to the wheat problem. 
Such studies and experiments have led to the con-
clusion that in a few years the country could attain a 
high level of self-sufficiency. On its model farm, 
STICA has studied more than a thousand varieties 
of wheat and has selected some thirty varieties which 
give a good yield in Paraguay. They have singled out, 
as preferable to all others, Brazilian wheat Frontana 
2-56, because of its greater resistance to plagues. 
STICA is now working on the increase of seeds of 
this variety so that it will be possible to develop wheat 
cultivation within the next few years. Complete self-
sufficiency in wheat is impossible, since wheat grown 
in the country has to be mixed in certain proportions, 
with hard or semi-hard imported wheat, to make bread. 
According to agricultural technicians, wheat culti-
vation in Paraguay is not as economical as in Argen-
tina and will be less advantageous than other Para-
guayan crops, especially maize. Nevertheless, it has 
been considered necessary to supply at least a part 
of Paraguay's consumption with local production, to 
relieve the considerable burden which imports involve 
when there is no possibility of reciprocal trade with 
Argentina; Argentine wheat must thus be paid for in 
dollars. In 1952 wheat and flour imports required the 
use of about a fifth of the resources normally derived 
from exports. 
Since the programme to be adopted by the author-
ities is as yet unknown, it is impossible to provide 
accurate figures for production prospects in Paraguay. 
Thus, it is probable that in the near future import 
requirements w7ill be almost equal to those of con-
sumption. 
In Peru, the government has put a development 
plan into action based on the utilization of selected 
seed, an increased use of fertilizers and the develop-
ment of mechanization. In the south of the country, 
the region of Arequipa, there are already high yields 
of more than 30 quintals per hectare. In other dis-
tricts, on the contrary, the yield is less satisfactory. 
I t is hoped to increase harvests by means of progress 
in these regions and not by devoting more land to 
wheat cultivation. The objective of the programme 
is to become self-sufficient by 1956. 
In Uruguay, the average yield obtained during 
eight years from the experiments carried out in the 
district of Maldonado increased to about 19 quintals, 
and in one case to 30 quintals per hectare. The new 
districts of extensive cultivation in the north of the 
country are giving better harvests at less cost than 
in the traditional areas with poor ecological condi-
tions. Yields have been improved where a rotation of 
wheat and sugar-beet crops has been carried out. 
Mechanization has also had a favourable influence.12 
Nevertheless, the agricultural and livestock plans for 
Uruguay, as well as the recommendations of the 
Technical Mission under the joint auspices of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment and the Food and Agriculture Organization, do 
not foresee any expansion in wheat cultivation to 
provide an increasing surplus for export. Their advice, 
in fact, is to maintain wheat production at the level 
necessary to meet consumption needs and to improve 
sugar-beet output to satisfy the domestic demand 
as well. 
13 The increase in agricultural mechanization during recent 
years should be noted: 
Number of tractors, according to 1930 census 1,606 
Number of tractors, according to 1946 census 3,172 
Imports after the census of 1946 up to and including 1950 9,719 
Number of harvesters, according to 1930 census 128 
Number of harvesters, according to 1946 census 1,317 
Imports after the census of 1946 up to and including 1950. 2,038 
In 1951 imports of agricultural machinery taken as a whole 
were 33 per cent greater for the number of units and 100 per cent 
greater in value according to figures for 1950. At the end of 1948 
the number of harvesters reached 2,524 and a census of units in 
service during the agricultural year 1948-49 shows a figure of 
2,522. 
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T A B L E 5 7 . W H E A T : P R O S P E C T S F O R PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 
( S O U T H E R N ZONE) 
(Millions of metric tons) 
1953 A nnual average for 1956-60 
Country Production Consumption Balance Production Consumption Balance 
Argentina 7.40 4.00« +3 .40 8.00 3.65 +4.35 
Bolivia 0.03 0.09 - 0 . 0 6 0.05 0.10 - 0 . 0 5 
Brazil 0.70 2.00 - 1 . 3 0 1.40 2.40 - 1 . 0 0 
Chile 1.10 1.25 - 0 . 1 5 1.25 1.35 - 0 . 1 0 
Paraguay 0.07 - 0 . 0 7 0.05 0.08 - 0 . 0 3 
Peru 0.15 0.40 - 0 . 2 5 0.30 0.45 - 0 . 1 5 
Uruguay 0.50 0.38 +0.12 0.50 0.40 +0.10 
TOTAL 9 .88 8 .19 + 1 . 6 9 11.55 8.43 + 3 . 1 2 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
» Including the replacement of a commercial reserve of from 500,000 to 600,000 tons. 
5. General prospects of the wheat trade 
Fromfthe foregoing analysis we can draw up a 
rather favourable table of the evolution of the rela-
tionship between production and consumption for the 
next few years. (See table 57.) 
From ¿table 57 it may be seen that in 1953 the 
southernSizone will again show an appreciable net 
surplus for export after having entirely covered 
domestic needs. For the second half of the present 
decade the wheat available for export will be sufficient 
both to cover the needs of all the other Latin-American 
countries, and to leave about a million tons for trade 
with Europe and Asia. The position will thus reach 
and may even surpass that existing in the pre-war 
period, considerably relieving the pressure upon for-
eign exchange, budgets, both for importing and ex-
porting countries. But these favourable prospects are 
dependent upon a steady prosecution of development 
programmes for production, with the aim of reversing 
the tendencies which were recently predominant. 
Perhaps'^thejsize of the problems resulting from a 
persistence, during the next five years, in the tenden-
cies^shownffrom the pre-war period to 1951 has not 
beenjplaced in its proper perspective. The projection 
of these tendencies, as shown in tables 52, 53 and 54, 
leads|to the'situation shown in table 58. 
The last figures, 362 and 582 millions of dollars, 
represent respectively 13.9 and 21.5 per cent of the 
total value of imports into the southern zone in 1950. 
In this way the exceptional position of wheat in the 
foreign trade of these countries is underlined. 
T A B L E 5 8 . W H E A T : P R O J E C T I O N OF T H E W H E A T D E F I C I T 
IN C O U N T R I E S O F T H E S O U T H E R N ZONE W I T H STA-
T I O N A R Y PRODUCTION 
Quantities which would be Quantities which would be 
lacking to meet lacking to return to the 













1955 410 47.15 2,610 267.15 
1960 1,250 143.75 3,450 363.75 
1 9 7 0 . . . . . . 3,150 362.25 5,350 582.25 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
• Basis: Ratio between the average production for 1949-51 and 
consumption for 1951 increased by 2 per cent annually. 
b Figure • plus the net exportable surplus for the period 1934-
1938, i.e., 2,200,000 tons. 
0 Estimated at 115 dollars per ton, basis c.i.f. 
d By adding to the former figure the equivalent of the net ex-
portable surplus calculated at 100 dollars per ton, basis f.o.b. 
The situation which arose in 1952, as a result of 
the loss of the Argentine harvest, provides a forecast 
of the difficulties which a lack of productive increase 
would cause in the southern zone during the years to 
come. The loss of the wheat crop in 1952 was such 
T A B L E 5 9 . W H E A T PRODUCTION, T R A D E AND CONSUMPTION I N 1 9 5 2 
( S O U T H E R N ZONE) 
(Thousands of tons; millions of dollars) 
Imports Exports 
Apparent 
Country Production Volume Value Volume Value consumption 
Argentina 2,050 200 24.0 — — 2,250 
Bolivia 28 60 5.4 — — 88 
Brazil 580 1,250 140.0 — — 1,830 
Chile 988 187 28.0 — — 1,175 
Paraguay 0.5 60 7.0 — — 60.5 
Peru 1 4 6 250 2 4 . 0 — — 3 9 6 
Uruguay 472.6 — — 172 21.7 300.6 
TOTAL 4,265.1 2,007 228.4 172 21.7 6,100.1 
SOURCES: Production: Official statistics, except for Bolivia and Paraguay where the most 
recent available figures have been repeated. Imports: Official estimates for Brazil, Chile and 
Paraguay. Estimates based on former data for Bolivia and Peru. For Argentina a plurilateral 
exchange based on maize. The value has been estimated with the price of wheat in the United 
States at the beginning of the operation. Exports: Data for Uruguay's exports correspond to the 
imports received by Brazil and Paraguay. Values f.o.b., calculations based on the c.i.f. prices. 
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that it caused an immediate situation resembling that 
which a projection of the former trends might have 
forecast at the end of the next decade. Aggregate pro-
duction in 1952 did not reach more than 4,265,000 
tons, while consumption requirements (basis 1951) 
reached 7,440,000 tons, leaving a deficit of 3,175,000 
tons. At an average price c.i.f. of 115 dollars, the loss 
in foreign exchange would have represented 365 
million dollars. In fact, it only reached a loss of some 
200 millions, due to the considerable reduction in 
Argentine consumption. 
Table 59 requires some additional comments. The 
difference between Uruguay's apparent consumption 
and its normal consumption is due to the fact that 
this country accumulated reserve stocks. The figures 
for the five importing countries are not abnormal in 
themselves. The most serious difficulties to be faced, 
especially by Brazil and Paraguay, do not arise from 
the quantity or the price of wheat imports, but from 
the fact that they must be paid for in dollars, instead 
of obtaining them from Argentina in exchange for 
their own products. In particular, in Paraguay, since 
exports to Argentina as a whole represent a third of 
the total trade, the purchase of wheat from other 
sources resulted in a reduction of nearly 25 per cent 
in the capacity to import. 
In Brazil, dollar payments for imported wheat and 
flour represent nearly half the outstanding balance 
with the United States. Brazilian export products to 
Argentina continue to be restricted because, during the 
course of 1952, Argentina had an unfavourable trade 
balance with Brazil.13 
It is thus apparent from these facts that the lack 
of Argentine wheat for export to neighbouring coun-
tries has caused an appreciable decrease in reciprocal 
trade, especially with Paraguay and Brazil. 
6. Prospects for intra-zonal trade 
To clarify the possibilities for encouraging the trade 
in wheat among the countries of the southern zone, 
table 60 examines two opposing hypotheses. The first 
(A) shows the figures which would result from sta-
tionary production, such as that which occurred 
between 1934-38. The second (B) indicates the more 
probable data if the individual countries made a 
progressive effort to carry out their plans for develop-
ing production. 
Table 60, once more, shows the predominant part 
played by Argentine production, not only as regards 
the position of the zone as a whole but also for the 
trade possibilities among the individual countries. It 
is apparent that, as wheat exports from Argentina 
become less, the prospects for intra-zonal trade also 
become proportionately less. Prospects depend upon 
the volume of wheat available in Argentina and also 
upon its availability on the international market. 
This is particularly true in the case of wheat in 
Argentine-Brazilian trade. 
13 At the beginning of the second quarter of 1952, Argentina's 
debt to Brazil, according to Brazilian sources, amounted to about 
1,500 million cruzeiros, or about 75 million dollars, which was the 
equivalent, at that time, of 860,000 tons of wheat f.o.b. at the 
international price appearing from a purchase of 75,000 tons from 
the United States in July at a unit price of 98.90 dollars c.i.f. At 
the end of September, the balance of payments owing to the 
United States was estimated at 250 million dollars and the dollar 
payments for wheat were estimated at 140 million. 
T A B L E 6 0 . W H E A T : P R O B A B L E A V A I L A B I L I T I E S F O R 
E X P O R T AND I M P O R T R E Q U I R E M E N T S ( S O U T H E R N 
Z O N E ) 
(Thousands of tons) 
Period 1953-55 Period 1956-60 
Hypothesis A Hypothesis B Hypothesis A Hypothesis B 
Importing countries: 
Bolivia 70 60 70 50 
Brazil 1,650 1,300 1,900 1,000 
Chile 270 150 370 100 
Paraguay . . . . 70 60 80 30 
Peru 260 200 300 
TOTAL 2,320 1,770 2,no 1,180 
Supplying countries: 
Argentina. . . . 1,950 3,050 1,750 4,350 
Uruguay 120 120 100 100 
TOTAL 2,070 3,170 1,850 4,450 
NET SURPLUS - 2 5 0 +1,400 - 8 7 0 +3,270 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America, based on 
previous tables and comments, especially tables 57 and 58. 
According to table 61, there still remains a deficit 
of 185 million cruzeiros or alternatively 100,000 tons 
of wheat in Argentina's trade with Brazil. The prob-
lem would be fairly simple to solve if Brazil could 
export to Argentina approximately the same tonnage 
of iron and steel. Until today, the increase in Brazilian 
iron and steel production has only covered the growing 
domestic needs and Brazil's development plans for 
the next three years with difficulty will allow any 
surplus above the rate of increase in domestic con-
sumption. It is possible that before Brazil has sub-
stantial export surpluses to send to Argentina, the 
latter will have developed its iron and steel industry 
fully. It would provide a great incentive to the trade 
between the two countries if raw materials for the 
future Argentine iron and steel plant at San Nicolás 
T A B L E 6 1 . T H E T R A D E OF A R G E N T I N E W H E A T F O R 
B R A Z I L I A N PRODUCTS 
Wheat imports by Brazil 
Thousands Millions of 
of tons cruzeiros 
Actual requirements 1,300 
Quota in the International Agreement. . 360 
Balance to cover 940 
Estimated value" 1,760 
Compensatory exports to Argentinab 
Thousands Millions of 
of tons cruzeiros 
Coffee 28.5 548 
Pine 332.0 503 
Cotton thread 5.3 357 
Cacao 6.3 93 
Hardwoods 48 
Ferro-manganese and ferro-silicon 26 
ESTIMATED TOTAL 1 ,575 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
• On the basis of the prices in force during the second half of 
1952, or about 2.40 dollars per bushel which corresponds to 100 
dollars per metric ton, f.o.b. 
b Possibilities for absorption by Argentine markets estimated 
according to imports made in 1951. 
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could be supplied with iron and manganese from 
Urucum in the Matto Grosso, some 25 kilometres 
from the Paraguay River. Brazil would thus enjoy 
new means for payment, which could contribute to 
more substantial wheat purchases from Argentina. 
Conversely, there is a tendency in Brazil to acquire 
wheat from Uruguay. Negotiations for such trade are 
difficult owing to the high grain prices in Uruguay. 
In order to ensure a satisfactory price for the 
farmer, the Uruguayan Government has fixed an 
official purchase price. From 1 August 1952, this price 
reached 17.55 Uruguayan pesos per quintal in bulk 
from store in Montevideo and, at the rate of exchange 
of 1.519 per dollar and including expenses, it rose to 
118.10 dollars f.o.b. This was 30 per cent more than 
the international price at that date. On the other 
hand, the Uruguayan Treasury has to bear a heavy 
burden both to keep the price of bread at a moderate 
level and to provide a price which encourages the 
farmer to increase his harvest. According to the Banco 
de la República, wheat production for the year 1950 
gave farmers an income of 62 million pesos, 26 million 
of which came out of the public treasury. Thus, Uru-
guayan official experts are not inclined to increase 
production for export purposes. They are moré in-
clined to share the view of the FAO and International 
Bank mission which was mentioned earlier. Never-
theless, there is one factor which might influence the 
final decision of the Uruguayan authorities, that is 
the very unfavourable trade balance with Brazil. In 
1951, in spite of having sold 40,000 tons of flour and 
11,000 tons of wheat to Brazil, the trade balance 
showed the following figures: exports from Brazil to 
Uruguay, 310 million cruzeiros; exports from Uruguay 
to Brazil reduced to f.o.b. values, 170 million, in which 
wheat and flour were responsible for rather more than 
100 million. In order to provide a balance of trade, 
it would have been necessary to more than double 
wheat and flour exports, raising them to around 
150,000 tons in terms of wheat. This is precisely what 
Brazil is trying to accomplish by offering Uruguay a 
stable market for the wheat surplus during a number 
of years. 
Between Chile and Argentina the trade in wheat 
has been very irregular. During the three-year period, 
1946-48, Chile imported a total of 135,000 tons of 
wheat, of which 123,000 came from Argentina. For 
the three-year period, 1949-51, Chilean imports rose 
to 365,000 tons, of which Argentina was only respon-
sible for 92,000. For various quotations, the prices 
charged in Buenos Aires were much higher than those 
for wheat from Canada or the United States and as, 
in both cases, they had to be paid for in foreign 
exchange on the free market, Chile chose the most 
advantageous source of supply. On the other hand, 
Argentina had no difficulty in selling her exportable 
surplus during these years. The four principal clients, 
Brazil, India, Italy and Germany, between them 
bought in 1950 and 1951 more than 2 million tons 
annually, leaving only half a million tons for other 
countries, among which are several from which 
Argentina imports essential products such as iron and 
steel and different types of machinery. 
As regards trade relations between Chile and Argen-
tina, this problem cannot be examined independently. 
In this reciprocal relationship, wheat is not so im-
portant as in the case of trade between Argentina 
and Brazil or between Brazil and Uruguay. Chilean 
trade with Argentina is more concerned with cattle 
on one side, as against copper on the other. In addi-
tion, if a comparison is made of the actual trade be-
tween these two neighbouring countries, the possi-
bilities they have for selling their principal products 
and their primary import needs, this comparison 
shows a considerable rise in the actual levels. Wheat 
is only one element, the fourth in order of importance, 
in a problem where cattle, copper and lumber are 
predominant. But fats and edible oils, wool and 
leather on the Argentine side, and steel, sulphur and 
possibly, within a year or two, pulp or newsprint on 
the Chilean side, should also be included. As regards 
nitrates, its part in trade with Argentina will grow 
in proportion to the use of fertilizers there. 
As regards trade between Argentina and Paraguay, 
the two key products are wheat (50 per cent of the 
value of Argentine exports) and lumber (70 per cent 
of Paraguayan exports). Argentine sawmills on the 
banks of the Paraná River require Paraguayan raw 
materials, which they can obtain economically by 
river transport. There is reason to hope, once the 
crisis caused in Argentina by the recent drought has 
passed, that trade between the two countries will 
return to its normal level. The problem here is rather 
one for Paraguay. Faced with growing needs, a 
decision must be taken either to stimulate the domestic 
cultivation of wheat or to develop other commodities 
suitable for export. 
In the trade relations between Argentina and 
Bolivia, in 1949 wheat was responsible for some 23,000 
tons out of a total of 57,000 imported by Bolivia. 
It has already been seen earlier that Bolivia, by par-
ticipating in the International Wheat Agreement, 
could receive substantial quantities of wheat at fixed 
prices. Imports from Argentina, also made at inter-
national prices, have not exceeded 40 per cent of all 
wheat imports into Bolivia. 
In the trade between Peru and Argentina, there are 
also many fluctuations. In the period 1934-38, Peru 
imported an average of 128,000 tons of wheat annu-
ally, of which 106,000 came from Argentina. In the 
post-war years, although Peru imported wheat on a 
much greater scale, the porportion from Argentina 
was smaller, reaching its lowest level in 1949 when 
Peru received 220,000 tons of wheat of which Argen-
tina was only responsible for 28,000 tons. In the same 
year the influence of the International Wheat Agree-
ment is apparent, since the 171,000 tons of wheat 
bought by Peru from the United States, Canada and 
Australia averaged a c.i.f. unit price of 100 dollars, as 
against the 28,000 tons from Argentina which cost 
187 dollars. In the following years Argentine prices 
drew closer to the international level and Argentina 
regained part of the Peruvian market in the ratio to 
which Peruvian needs exceeded the quota permitted 
under the International Wheat Agreement. Wheat 
imports from Argentina rose to 40,000 tons in 1950 
and to 75,000 in 1951. In this last year wheat was 
responsible for approximately a third of the value of 
all Argentine exports to Peru. 
PLATE III 
LATIN AMERICA (SOUTHERN ZONE) 
WHEAT 
Net production, consumption and exports 
(1951 potential) 
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PLATE IV 
LATIN AMERICA (SOUTHERN ZONE) 
W H E A T 
I n t r a - z o n a l t r a d e 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
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PLATE V 
LATIN AMERICA (SOUTHERN ZONE) 
WHEAT 
Per capita production, consumption and exportable surpluses 
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PLATE VI 
W H E A T 
C o m p a r a t i v e yields 
Kilogrammes per hectare Natural scale 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
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PLATE VII 
LATIN AMERICA (SOUTHERN ZONE) 
W H E A T 
Projection for 1 9 7 0 based on present trends as well as future development plans 
Thousands of tons Natural scale 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
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Chapter VII 
S U G A R 
1. Introduction 
Sugar constitutes an important item in the recipro-
cal trade between the countries of the southern zone 
of Latin America. Three of these countries—Bolivia, 
Chile and Uruguay—import all, or almost all, the 
sugar they consume; two of them—Argentina and, 
more recently, Paraguay—cover their requirements 
with their own production and only show minor figures 
in foreign trade statistics; the two remaining coun-
tries—Brazil and Peru—regularly produce more than 
their domestic requirements. Sixty per cent of Peru-
vian production is exported, thereby constituting one 
of the principal balance of payment assets. Brazil, on 
the contrary, does not export more than 2 or 3 per cent 
T A B L E 6 2 . S U G A R PRODUCTION IN T H E S O U T H E R N ZONE 
OF L A T I N A M E R I C A 








Argentina. . . . 410 607.3 +197.3 48 
Bolivia 1 3.6 + 2.6 260 
Brazil 1,031 1,577.1 +546.1 53 
Chile. — — — — 
Paraguay. . . . 6 16.8 + 10.8 180 
Peru 382 454.3 + 72.3 19 
Uruguay 1 2.6 + 1.6 160 
TOTAL 1,830. 2,661.7 +830.7 45 
SOURCES: Figures for 1934-38 were taken from the Food and 
Agriculture Organization. Figures for 1946-50 for Argentina: 
Argentine Industrial Census of 1946 and indices published in July 
1952. Bolivia: FAO. Brazil: I B G E Statistical Yearbook, supple-
mented by data from the Getulio Vargas Foundation (Conjuntura 
Económica, August 1952, p. 7 et sqq.). Paraguay: Banco de Para-
guay. Peru: 1951 Report of the Banco Central de la Reserva. 
Uruguay: Recopilación Agropecuaria, 1950. 
of total production, which, although amounting to a 
substantial quantity, is only equivalent to 0.6 per cent 
of the value of all exports. As regards the relative 
significance of sugar to total imports, it is interesting 
to note that 8 per cent of the capacity to import in 
Bolivia is devoted to sugar, whereas in Chile it repre-
sents 5 per cent, and in Uruguay almost 6 per cent. 
Taking the zone as a whole, it may be seen that 
sugar production in the pre-war years did not exceed 
total consumption by any appreciable amount. During 
the second half of the last decade, both maintained a 
relative balance, and in certain years, consumption 
even exceeded production, as illustrated in plate VI I I . 
2. Evolution of production and consumption 
Tables 62 and 63 demonstrate that, while consump-
tion increased at a higher rate than production in 
absolute terms, percentage increases were even 
greater. 
T A B L E 6 3 . A P P A R E N T SUGAR CONSUMPTION I N T H E 
S O U T H E R N ZONE OF L A T I N A M E R I C A 
(Thousands of tons) 
Country 






Argent ina. . . . 408.4 612.1 203.7 50 
Bolivia 22.5» 34.6 12.1 54 
989.4 1,475.7 486.3 49 
Chile 123.0 161.6 38.3 31 
P a r a g u a y . . . . 12.9 16.7 3.8 29 
Peru 76.5 157.6 81.2 106 
Uruguay 52.0 80.4 28.4 55 
TOTAL 1,684.7 2,538.7 854.0 51 
SOURCES: See sources for table 62. 
• 1935-39. 
T A B L E 6 4 . P E R CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF SUGAR IN T H E S O U T H E R N ZONE O F 
L A T I N A M E R I C A 
Average 1934-38 Average 1946-50 Difference 
Per Per 
Total capita Total capita 
consumption Population con- consumption Population con- Per 
{in thousands (in thousands sump- (in thousands (in thousands sump- capita 
of of lion of of Hon Con- con-
Country ions) inhabitants) (in kgs.) tons) inhabitants) (in kgs.) sumption sumption 
Argentina... 408.4 12,964.6 32 612.1 16,335 37 203.7 5 
Bolivia 22.5 s 2,599.0» 9 34.6 2,950 12 12.1 3 
Brazil 989.4 37,892.2 26 1,475.7 49,782 30 486.3 4 
Chile 123.0 4,684.2 26 161.6 5,619 29 38.6 3 
Paraguay. . . 12.9 921.8 14 16.7>> 1,288 13 3.8 - 1 
Peru 76.5 6,950.6 11 157.6 8,159 19 81.1 8 
Uruguay. . . . 52.0 2,055.6 25 80.4 2,329 35 28.2 10 
TOTAL 1,684.7 68,068.0 25 2,538.7 86,462 29 +854.0 + 4 
SOURCES: See sources for table 62. 
» Total consumption for 1935-39; population for 1937. 
b Total real consumption in 1946-50 was 173.9, equivalent to a per capita consumption of 
21 kgs., revealing an increase of 97,400 tons total consumption and 10 kgs. per capita consump-
tion as compared with the pre-war years. 
71 
An individual analysis by country reveals few 
changes. Argentine production and consumption re-
main balanced, while Bolivian and Uruguayan pro-
duction are still insignificant. Exportable surpluses 
have increased in Brazil, but they have slightly de-
creased in Peru. The most important change has taken 
place in Paraguay, where, during the pre-war years, 
domestic output only satisfied 50 per cent of the 
requirements, and where a balance between consump-
tion and production has now become possible, but 
only through a small reduction of per capita avail-
abilities. 
In calculating per capita consumption, gross figures 
were used. That is to say that the amounts of sugar 
used as a raw material in preserve factories, production 
of alcoholic beverages or other uses were not deducted 
from total consumption. Their exclusion is extremely 
difficult owing to the consumption for clandestine 
alcohol production which exists on a large scale in 
those countries where sugar prices are maintained at 
a low level. Nonetheless, a considerable difference may 
be noted between per capita consumption levels, rang-
ing from 12 kgs. annually in Bolivia to 37 in Argentina. 
With the exception of Uruguay, it has been a char-
acteristic of the countries importing sugar to show 
the smallest consumption increases. Considering the 
zone as a whole, it would appear that, with the excep-
tion of Paraguay and Bolivia, sugar consumption has 
been sufficient. Despite the fact that the minimum 
annual sugar requirement per person was determined 
at Hot Springs as 15 kgs., in fact this figure is generally 
surpassed in most European and American countries. 
For instance, in recent years it reached 40 kgs. in the 
United States and Cuba, 45 in Canada, 48 in the 
United Kingdom (pre-war figures), 38 in the Nether-
lands, 29 in Belgium and 23 in France. In Latin 
America the highest figures are those for Venezuela 
and Colombia, with 43 and 57 kgs. respectively, in-
cluding consumption of unrefined country sugar 
(panela). (See plate IX . ) 
Thus, the total consumption for the southern zone 
of Latin America in 1951 clearly exceeded the pro-
duction of these countries. Already in 1946 and in 
1950 there had been small negative balances of 3,700 
T A B L E 6 5 . COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTHERN ZONE OF 
LATIN AMERICA : INCREASES IN 1 9 5 1 OF PRODUCTION, 
AND TOTAL AND PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF SUGAR 
OVER AVERAGE INCREASES FOR 1946-50 
J. öliii apparent I~'<lï Cüpiiit 
Production consumption Population consumption 
(ithousands of (kgs. per 
Country (thousands of tons) inhabitants) year) 
Argentina 46.2 40.8 1,309 
Bolivia" 2.4 8.2 69 3 
Brazil 243.2 325.2 3,991 3 
Chile — 11.7 293 
Paraguay" 5.6 5.6 118 3 
Peru 2.3 77.7b 399 8 
Uruguay 7.2° 81 1 
TOTAL 299.7 476.4 6,260 4 
SOURCES: See sources for table 62. 
" Figures for 1950. 
b Figure includes an increase in stocks. Real consumption was 
192,000 tons, or an increase of 18,100 tons over 1946-50. Real per 
capita increase actually amounted to a little more than 1 kg. 
See note b to table 64. 
0 On the basis of assuming domestic production equal to the 
average for 1946-50. 
tons and 7,300 tons respectively. After adjusting the 
figures in table 65, on the basis of the real consumption 
data for Peru, the increase in the total consumption 
is reduced to 433,100 tons. As a result, zonal consump-
tion exceeds production by 10,400 tons. Regarding per 
capita consumption, two countries have shown fixed 
levels: Argentina, prior to 1951, had already reached 
the highest figure in the zone, and Chile, where sugar 
imports represent the heaviest burden. The zonal 
average per capita consumption rose to 32 kgs. in 1951. 
According to available data, consumption in 1952 
has further increased. In Chile, for example, imports 
approximate 220,000 tons, exceeding consumption for 
1951 by some 45,000 tons. 
The rise in average per capita consumption within 
the southern zone is due to a large extent to the in-
crease of real income during the post-war years. How-
ever, it is evident that such a rapid expansion of 
consumption would not have been possible if the 
respective governments had not instituted a policy of 
low prices for the domestic consumer.1 A similar policy 
was adopted both in producer and importer countries, 
being maintained through the use of either differential 
exchange rates or direct subsidies.2 The decline in 
world sugar prices since 1947, only interrupted in 1951, 
also contributed to increased consumption.3 
3. Production and consumption prospects 
Although estimates of future consumption are sub-
ject to change, broadly speaking, the average per 
capita consumption for the zone will be more or less 
35 kgs., provided no unusual modification is made in 
the relationship between total real income, quotations 
on the international market and the present low 
domestic prices. Table 66 illustrates the estimated 
total consumption for 1960 on the basis of three 
separate hypotheses. In the third of these, which pre-
supposes that the present relationship between real 
income and prices will remain constant, the per capita 
consumption for Argentina and Uruguay has been 
estimated as the same as that for 1951, and calculated 
\ Retail prices between August and December 1952 for refined 
sugar per kilogramme were: 
Argentina 2.90 Argentine pesos 
Brazil 4.50 cruzeiros (Sao Paulo) 
Chile 10.40 Chilean pesos 
Paraguay 3.20 guaranis 
Peru 1.80 soles (Lima) 
Converting these prices at the free-market rate of exchange in 
January 1953, the following are equivalents according to: (a) 
official free market; (/>) parallel free-market prices in dollars: 
(a) (6) 
Argentina 0.21 0.126 
Brazil 0.25 0.125 
Chile 0.095 0.08 
Paraguay 0.065 0.053 
Peru 0.116 0.116 
2 Sugar in Chile is one of the few articles still benefiting from 
the preferential import exchange rate of 31 pesos per dollar, 
despite the raising of the exchange rate applied to other consumer 
goods to 60, and other import exchange rates to 110. Using this 
as a basis, the retail price for granulated sugar at the beginning of 
1953 was officially 10.48 pesos per kg., or little less than 10 US 
cents. At the same time, raw sugar cost more than 10 US cents 
c.i.f. Chilean ports and then received a surcharge of 7.26 pesos 
for costs and profit before delivery, refined, to the consumer. This 
surcharge includes the loss of weight due to transport and refining. 
In Bolivia, there is a subsidy on consumption of 7 bolivianos 
per pound. 
3 In Uruguay raw-sugar imports rose from 22,000 to 29,000 tons 
between 1947 and 1950. Total c.i.f. cost at Montevideo was 
reduced from 5.2 million dollars in 1947 to 4.5 in 1950. 
at 35 kgs. for Brazil and Chile, and 30 kgs. for the 
remaining countries. The total consumption figure of 
3,846,000 tons represents an average per capita con-
sumption of 34.7 kgs. 
T A B L E 6 6 . P O S S I B L E P R O J E C T I O N S OF TOTAL SUGAR 
CONSUMPTION, I N 1 9 6 0 IN T H E SOUTHERN ZONE 
Total sugar consumption 
(thousands of metric tons) 
Calculated 
population Hypothesis: Hypothesis: Hypothesis: 
(thousands per capita per capita estimated 
of consumption consumption per capita 
inhabitants) 1946-50 1951 consumption 
Argentina 21,000 777 777 777 
Bolivia 3,400 41 51 102 
Brazil 65,000 1,950 2,145 2,275 
Chile 7,000 203 203 245 
Paraguay 1,650 21 26 50 
Peru 10,000 210" 220» 300 
Uruguay 2,700 95 97 97 
TOTAL 110,750 3,323 3,605 3,846 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
" Based on real consumption. 
A comparison of the last total, i.e., 3,846,000 tons, 
with the 1951 production reveals that in order to 
satisfy the consumption rise for 1960, and maintain 
the 1946-50 export-import schedule, production must 
be increased to the amounts shown in table 67. 
In the case of Argentina, an increase of 123,000 
tons in sugar production would require the additional 
cultivation of 50,000 hectares on the basis of a yield 
of 30 tons of sugar cane per hectare and 82 kgs. of 
sugar per ton of harvested cane.4 In keeping with this 
increase, and corresponding to a production plan 
recently proposed under the Argentine second five-
year plan for 1957, there would then be 300,000 
4 Average 1946-50 yields. 
T A B L E 6 7 . E S T I M A T E D SUGAR CONSUMPTION F O R 1 9 6 0 









Argentina 653.5 777 123.5 
Brazil 1,820.3 2,376.4 556.1 
Paraguay 22.4 50 27.6 









Bolivia 36.8° 96 59.2 
Chile 173.3 245 71.7 
Uruguay 85.0 92 7.0 
985.2 
SOURCES: See tab le 62 . 
a Includes estimated consumption plus average 1946-50 exports 
for Brazil and Peru. 
b Estimated consumption less domestic production in 1950 for 
Bolivia and Uruguay. 
° 1950 figures. 
hectares under cultivation. It should be noted that 
the plan mentions the possibility of improving yields 
by stimulating seed selection, the use of fertilizers and 
mechanization. In addition, the plan includes the 
building of a pilot sugar-beet refinery. The complete 
fulfilment of the plan will raise Argentine sugar pro-
duction to a level somewhat higher than the present 
domestic requirements. 
In Bolivia, the future of sugar production and con-
sumption is linked to the development of the eastern 
part of the country. In the'Santa Cruz area, produc-
tion has been encouraged in recent years by the 
establishment of new plants. 
In Brazil, conditions are favourable for an increase 
in sugar production. The tendency to expand sugar 
cultivation is strong, particularly in Sâo Paulo, where 
higher yields are obtained than in most of the other 
States. The problem of dissimilar economic yields be-
tween plantations in the north and south of the coun-
try has been solved through new dispositions taken 
by the Sugar Institute. These have fixed a uniform 
price for raw sugar at a sufficient level to permit con-
tinued production in the north, to assure a profit in 
the Sâo Paulo region, and to provide resources for the 
institute itself to carry out a development programme, 
particularly aimed at the development of anhydrous 
alcohol production. 
In Paraguay, sugar-cane cultivation also shows good 
prospects. Production at present gives a satisfactory 
yield of 45 to 50 tons per hectare, with up to 12 per 
cent sugar extraction, thus sufficing to satisfy con-
sumption requirements. The principal problem facing 
the sugar industry in Paraguay is some lack of man-
power and capital. In Peru, the increase in domestic 
consumption presents a serious problem. Owing to the 
limited land area available, it is difficult to effect any 
considerable increase in the area devoted to sugar 
production, which for years has stood at 50,000 hec-
tares. In addition, with high yields of almost 80 tons 
of sugar cane per hectare (in 1946-50), which is higher 
than that in Cuba, Brazil or Paraguay, the margin 
for greater yields is necessarily restricted. 
From 1930 to 1940, production of sugar, from cane 
as well as beet, was established in Uruguay. However, 
it progressed slowly until recently when the National 
Fuel, Alcohol and Portland Cement Administration 
(ANCAP) decided to establish a plan to develop sugar 
production. ANCAP selected approximately twenty 
varieties capable of yielding 8 to 9 per cent of sugar 
and 50 to 60 tons per hectare. Beginning with the 
August 1952 crop, a production of from 7,000 to 8,000 
tons annually is expected. With an investment of 
10 million pesos, it is hoped to reduce the foreign 
exchange expenditure for importing sugar by approxi-
mately 800,000 dollars. 
Chile is one of the few remaining countries in the 
world with no sugar production. In recent years, the 
Development Corporation (CORFO) has devoted ex-
tensive research to the possibilities of sugar beet, 
resulting in a plan for rational cultivation which is on 
the way to fulfilment in 1952. Previous experiments 
have been encouraging, with crops of 40 tons per hec-
tare and a sugar yield of 18 per cent. Using 13,000 
hectares of irrigated land, under a five-year rotation 
plan with grass and wheat, production of more than 
10,000 tons of sugar could be obtained, assuming crops 
of 30 tons per hectare and 12.5 per cent sugar yield. 
With the planting of the first crop, simultaneous con-
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struction of a sugar beet mill was undertaken. Present 
plans are that production could begin industrially in 
1954 to reach a target of 10,000 tons in 1955. 
Summarizing the prospects for production and con-
sumption, it may be estimated that by 1960 the 
import requirements of Bolivia and Uruguay will be 
reduced to but half the approximate consumption 
needs, while Chilean imports will remain stationary 
at the 1951-53 level, as expressed by the following 
figures: 
Bolivia 51,000 tons 
Chile 220,000 tons 
Uruguay 49,000 tons 
or a total of 320,000 tons, representing an increase of 
43,000 tons over the five year period 1946-1950. 
On the other hand, Peruvian capacity to export, 
assuming a production increase of some 10 per cent, 
appears destined to decline by some 50,000 tons in 
1960. Thus Peru will not have more than 250,000 tons 
available for export by that date. Assuming as a 
hypothesis that the southern zone would be able to 
fill its entire sugar requirements, 70,000 tons would 
still be required which could be obtained either from 
Brazil or, on the long term, from Paraguay, and, with-
out omitting a further source of regional supply, from 
Cuba. 
4. The position of sugar in intra-zonal trade 
At a first glance it appears that the role of sugar in 
the trade between the countries of the southern zone 
is of considerable significance, but this is not so great 
when compared with that of production and consump-
tion. This is due to the fact that the two most impor-
tant countries—Brazil and Argentina—are self-suffi-
cient and make exports on a small scale. In contrast, 
sugar plays an outstanding role in the trade of Peru, 
Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay. 
T A B L E 6 8 . T O T A L E X P O R T S AND IMPORTS OF S U G A R W I T H N E T B A L A N C E S 
( S O U T H E R N Z O N E ) 
(Thousands of tons) 
1934-38 
Net 
Country Exports Imports balancea 
Argentina 2.6 1.0 + 1 . 6 
Bolivia — 21.5 - 21.5 
Brazil 41.6 — + 4 1 . 6 
Chile.. — 123.0 - 1 2 3 . 0 
Paraguay — 6.9 — 6.9 
Peru 305.5 — +305.5 
Uruguay — 51.0 - 51.0 




Exports Imports balancea balances 
0.9 5.7 - 4.8 - 6.4 
— 31.0 - 31.0 - 9.5 
101.4 — +101.4 +59.8 
— 161.6 - 1 6 1 . 6 - 3 8 . 6 
0.7 0.6 + 0.1 + 7.0 
296.7 — +296.7 - 8.8 
— 77.8 - 77.8 - 2 6 . 8 
399.7 276.7 +123.0 - 2 3 . 3 
SOURCE: Foreign trade statistics. 
» Exports ( + ) , Imports ( —). 
Comparing total figures for trade with those for 
production, it may be observed that aggregate exports 
in 1934-38 represented 19.1 per cent of production, 
and that this figure declined to 15 per cent in 1946-50. 
Imports stood at 12.1 per cent of consumption in. 
1934-38, but only 10.9 per cent in 1946-50. Lastly, 
while in 1934-38 the net exportable surplus of the zone 
to other parts of the world was 8 per cent of produc-
tion, it declined in 1946-50 to 4.6 per cent. I t has 
already been noted that in 1951 the net exportable 
surplus was transformed into a net import deficit 
amounting to 54,000 tons. 
An analysis is made in tables 69 and 70 of the 
fluctuations in zonal trade with reference to total 
sugar exports and imports. 



















the zone centage 
(A) Exporters 
Argentina 2,600 2,515 97 
Brazil 41,600 4,108b 10 
Peru 304,299° 138,881 46 
TOTAL h 348,499 145,504 42 
(B) Importers 
Argentina 975 174 18 
Bolivia 21,481 20,466 95 
Chile 122,650 109,587 89 
Uruguay 47,733" 3,862« 8 
TOTAL h 192,839 134,089 70 
900» 536» 60 - 1,700 - 1,979 - 3 7 
101,412 24,323 24 +59,812 +20,215 + 1 4 
298,212d 183,946* 62 - 6,087 +45,065 + 1 6 
400,524 208,805 52 +52,025 +63,301 + 1 0 
7,510e 7,510« 100 + 6,535 + 7,336 + 8 2 
29,359' 26,988' 92 + 7,878 + 6,522 - 3 
161,734 118,537 73 +39,084 + 8,950 - 1 6 
77,809 55,878 72 +30,076 +52,016 + 6 4 
276,412 208,913 76 +83,573 +74,824 + 6 
SOURCE: Foreign trade statistics. 
»1946-48 only. b Excluding 1938. 0 Excluding 1937. d Excluding 1950. * 1946-48 only. ' 1947-49 only. « Excluding 1935. 
h Totals do not include Paraguay since data for origin of Paraguayan imports are not available. According to FAO data, Paraguay 
imported an average of 6,900 tons, exporting 700 tons in 1946-50. 
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T A B L E 7 0 . V A L U E O F I N T R A - Z O N A L S U G A R T R A D E 




















Argentina 327 321 
Brazil 1,450 142 
Peru 6,063 2,837 
TOTAL 7,840 3,300 
(B) Importers 
Argentina 69 12 
Bolivia 866 817 
Chile 3,126 2,706 
Uruguay 3,458 221 
TOTAL 7 ,519 3 , 7 5 6 
98 178 86 48 
10 12,242 3,292 27 
47 37,751 25,344 67 
42 50,171 28,722 57 
17 1,447 1,447 100 
94 4,662 4,326 93 
87 22,427 16,153 72 
6 12,190 8,457 69 
50 40,726 30,383 75 
- 149 - 235 - 5 0 
+10,792 + 3,150 + 1 7 
+31,688 +22,507 + 2 0 
+42,331 +25,422 + 1 5 
+ 1,378 + 1,435 + 8 3 
+ 3,796 + 3,509 - 1 
+19,301 +13,447 - 1 5 
+ 8,732 + 8,236 + 6 3 
+33,207 +26,627 + 2 5 
SOURCE AND NOTES: See table 69 . 
The above figures demonstrate a definite tendency 
towards greater self-sufficiency within the southern 
zone. From the pre-war years until 1946-50, exports 
to destinations within the zone increased by 63,000 
tons and absorbed 52 per cent of the total exports 
instead of the previous 42 per cent. The rise in value 
was even more marked, passing from 42 to 57 per 
cent, with an annual increase in value of 25 million 
dollars. Figures for imports show the same tendency 
but to a greater extent. The quantum of intra-zonal 
imports increased from 70 to 76 per cent, while in 
value they rose by 27 million dollars, or from 50 to 
75 per cent. The remarkable difference between the 
comparative increase in quantum and value is due to 
the fact that 69 per cent of Uruguayan sugar imports 
are now made within the zone, as compared with 6 
per cent in pre-war years. It is of additional signifi-
cance that a large proportion of these imports are 
of refined sugar, which has a higher unit value. 
(a) C H I L E A N AND U R U G U A Y A N I M P O R T S 
To complete the description of the role of sugar in 
zonal trade, reference must be made particularly to 
the purchases of Chile and Uruguay, which are the 
principal importers in this group of countries, the 
figures for 1946-50 being shown in table 71. 
T A B L E 7 1 . S O U R C E OF C H I L E A N AND U R U G U A Y A N SUGAR I M P O R T S , 
T O T A L I M P O R T S D U R I N G 1 9 4 6 - 5 0 
(Metric tons; value in thousands of dollars) 
Chilean imports Uruguayan imports Totals 
Tons 
Thousands 
of dollars Tons 
Thousands 
of dollars Tons 
Thousands 
of dollars 
Brazil 48,557 5,186 56,054 8,847 104,611 14,033 
Peru 544,121 75,578 223,334 33,435 767,455 109,013 
SUB-TOTAL 592,678 80,764 279,388 42,282 872,066 123,046 
Cuba 167,151 22,044 29,785 6,128 196,936 28,172 
Colombia — — 4,001 683 4,001 28,172 
Dominican Republic. . . 50,218 9,065 — — 50,218 9,065 
Panama 17 72 — • — 17 72 
SUB-TOTAL 217,386 31,181 33,786 6,811 251,172 37,992 
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 810,064 111,945 313,174 49,093 1,123,238 161,038 
United Kingdom 52,329 7,828 52,329 7,828 
Belgium — .— 1,692 249 1,692 249 
Poland — — 991 141 991 141 
Formosa — — 13,115 1,946 13,115 1,946 
Portuguese possessions. — — 5,006 1,109 5,006 1,109 
United States 1,922 530 — — 1,922 530 
SUB-TOTAL 1,922 530 73,133 11,273 75,055 11,803 
GRAND TOTAL 811,986 112,475 386,307 60,366 1,198,293 172,841 
SOURCES: Chilean and Uruguayan trade yearbooks. 
A prominent influence upon sugar prices is that of 
transport. In the first half of 1952 ocean freight and 
other costs between Peru and Chile represented 12.76 
dollars per ton, f.o.b. Peruvian port to c.i.f. Chilean 
port, while sugar imported from Cuba f.a.s. to c.i.f. 
Chilean port stood at 19.96 dollars per ton. In the 
first case transport cost 15 per cent of f.o.b. value, 
and in the second, 24 per cent of f.a.s., value. 
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In view of the difference in transport costs between 
Cuba and Peru, it would appear anomalous that Chile 
and Uruguay import sugar from Cuba. It is inter-
esting to analyse some of the factors for this situation: 
the cost price of Cuban sugar is lower than in other 
countries; similarly, the Peruvian harvest is not suffi-
cient to supply the entire demand of the southern 
zone, unless the exports to other countries, which Peru 
has traditionally maintained be discontinued. In 1951, 
Peru exported 10,000 tons of raw sugar to the United 
States, as well as 2,000 tons of refined sugar. The 
United States quota allocated for 1953 was increased 
to 44,500 short tons! for which a higher price is being 
obtained than on the international market.5 If this 
quota is maintained during the next few years, Peru 
will have some 250,000 tons available as an exportable 
surplus. After deducting the 40,000 tons exported to 
Bolivia, the balance would be insufficient to cover 
Chilean requirements completely and would exclude 
the entire demand of the market in Uruguay. 
Until today Brazil's exports to the southern zone 
have been slowed down by price obstacles. Sugar is 
classified in Brazil among the "costly" commodities, 
that is, those whose domestic cost price in cruzeiros 
exceeds that on the international market. In mid-1952 
the price of Brazil's quotations for sugar exports was 
55 per cent higher than the ruling world price. From 
that date there was a marked reduction in world 
prices and the unfavourable ratio as regards Brazilian 
exports almost reached a difference of 90 per cent. 
(.B) S U G A R AND B I L A T E R A L B A L A N C E S 
As demonstrated in table 72, reference will be made 
to another aspect of the sugar trade concerning its 
relationship to the bilateral balances resulting 
between individual countries. 
5 Due to the policy of the United States and its system of 
quotas, the price of imported sugar is related to the price of 
domestic production. I t has been observed that sugar prices 
during slump years have been higher in the United States than on 
the international market, although in 1951 United States prices 
were slightly lower. According to the Sugar Report of October and 
November 1952, average Cuban f.a.s. prices compare since 1948 
as follows: 
Export prices World 
to U. S. prices Difference 
1948 4.66 4.23 + 0.43 
194 9 4.95 4.16 + 0.79 
195 0 5.09 4.98 + 0.11 
195 1 5.07 5.68 - 0.61 
1952 (9 months) 5.32 4.24 + 1.08 
Prices are calculated on the basis of US cents per British pound. 
The prices in the United States were calculated after delivery in 
New York, but exclude tax and transport and insurance costs 
from Havana. World prices were calculated at Cuban f.a.s. prices 
for other countries. 
T A B L E 7 2 . T R A D E B A L A N C E S O F C H I L E AND U R U G U A Y W I T H T H E I R P R I N C I P A L 
SUGAR S U P P L I E R S 
(Thousands of dollars) 
(A) Chile 
Exports Imports Sugar Balance excluding 
to Brazil from Brazil Balance imports sugar 
194 6 9,240 11,333 - 2,093 — 2,093 
194 7 7,638 13,141 - 5,503 — - 5,503 
1948 7,417 12,156 - 4,739 3,214 - 1,525 
194 9 12,165 12,999 - 834 1,972 + 1,138 
195 0 12,965 11,274 + 1,691 — + 1,691 
1946-50 average. 9,885 12,181 - 2,296 1,037 - 1,259 
1951 13,349 6,156 7,193 — + 7,193 
Exports Imports Sugar Balance excluding 
to Cuba from Cuba Balance imports sugar 
194 6 6,163 6,475 - 312 5,242 + 4,930 
194 7 4,402 4,149 253 3,653 + 3,906 
194 8 4,692 1,043 3,649 418 + 4,067 
194 9 4,161 4,661 - 500 4,058 + 3,558 
195 0 2,670 9,219 - 6,549 8,673 + 2,124 
1946-50 average. 4,418 5,109 - 691 4,409 + 3,718 
195 1 
Exports Imports Sugar Balance excluding 
to Peru from Peru Balance imports sugar 
1946 4,291 31,759 - 27,468 17,538 - 9,930 
194 7 3,564 35,697 - 3 2 , 1 3 3 19,472 -12 ,661 
194 8 3,063 35,563 - 3 2 , 5 0 0 14,210 - 1 8 , 2 9 0 
194 9 1,885 32,680 - 3 0 , 7 9 5 11,037 - 1 9 , 7 5 8 
195 0 1,643 17,977 - 1 6 , 3 3 4 13,321 - 3,013 
1946-50 average. 2,889 30,735 - 2 7 , 8 4 6 15,116 - 1 2 , 7 3 0 
1951 2,848 14,221 - 1 1 , 3 7 3 11,867 + 494 
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T A B L E 7 2 (<continued) 
(B) Uruguay 
Exports Imports Sugar Balance excluding 
to Brazil from Brazil Balance imports sugar 
194 6 3 , 1 3 6 1 7 , 1 6 4 - 1 4 , 0 2 8 2 ,032 - 1 1 , 9 9 6 
194 7 2 ,012 1 8 , 3 7 0 - 1 6 , 3 5 8 2 ,875 - 1 3 , 4 8 3 
194 8 10 ,005 19 ,603 - 9 ,598 3 ,960 - 5 ,638 
194 9 13,741 16 ,700 - 2 , 9 5 9 — - 2 ,959 
195 0 2 , 4 5 0 17 ,272 - 1 4 , 8 2 2 — - 1 4 , 8 2 2 
1 9 4 6 - 5 0 average. 6 ,269 17 ,822 - 1 1 , 5 5 3 1 ,773 - 9 ,780 
1951 7,017 2 0 , 0 2 3 - 1 3 , 0 0 6 
Exports Imports Sugar Balance excluding 
to Cuba from Cuba Balance imports sugar 
194 6 672 6 , 9 1 8 - 6 , 2 4 6 5 ,459 - 787 
194 7 3 ,143 562 + 2,581 — + 2 ,581 
194 8 3 ,158 517 + 2 ,641 — + 2 ,641 
194 9 2 9 4 820 - 526 81 - 4 4 5 
195 0 11 1 ,210 - 1 ,199 588 - 611 
1 9 4 6 - 5 0 average. 1 ,456 2 , 0 0 5 - 549 1 ,226 + 677 
195 1 6 
Exports Imports Sugar Balance excluding 
to Peru from Peru Balance imports sugar 
194 6 3 4 4 1 0 , 9 2 8 - 1 0 , 5 8 4 10 ,478 - 106 
194 7 196 10 ,951 - 1 0 , 7 5 5 8 ,555 - 2 ,200 
194 8 18 6 , 9 4 9 - 6 ,931 4 , 9 2 8 - 2 , 003 
194 9 147 5 ,235 - 5 ,088 4 ,665 - 423 
195 0 3 6 9 5 ,795 - 5 ,426 5 ,309 - 117 
1 9 4 6 - 5 0 average . 215 7 ,972 - 7 ,757 6 ,787 - 970 
1951 . . 8 , 3 6 4 
SOURCES: Chi lean a n d U r u g u a y a n t rade yearbooks . 
As may be seen in tables 71 and 72, Chilean sugar 
trade is relatively stable only with Cuba. This latter 
country constitutes an important market for a number 
of Chilean agricultural products, including a type of 
bean, the red kidney bean, which is almost exclusively 
grown for export to Cuba. Thus, to a certain point, 
Chilean imports of Cuban sugar are counter-balanced 
by exports. The trade agreement of April 1952 between 
these two countries, includes the export of 60 thousand 
tons of Cuban sugar annually to Chile. 
The situation of Chile with Peru and Brazil is quite 
different. Chile had heavy debit balances with both 
countries in 1946-50, even exceeding the value of the 
sugar imported from them. The trend with regard to 
Peru over the five years, and in 1951 as well, has been 
towards a reduction of trade in both directions. Exclud-
ing sugar, Chile had reached by 1951 a small favourable 
trade balance with Peru. But the value of sugar im-
ported from Peru appeared as a total of 11 million 
dollars, almost entirely as a negative balance, to be 
paid in foreign exchange. Furthermore, it would appear 
difficult for Chile to develop a greater export trade 
with Peru. In contrast, in Brazil the trend has been 
towards a higher fertilizer consumption and the possi-
bility of normalizing the export price of sugar, result-
ing from the recent exchange law passed by Congress, 
thus providing an opening for an increase in reciprocal 
trade. In the chapter dealing with the situation of 
Chilean nitrate on the Brazilian market, special 
reference is made to this aspect of the trade relation-
ship between Brazil and Chile. 
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PLATE Vili 
LATIN AMERICA (SOUTHERN ZONE) 
SUGAR 
Production, total apparent consumption and net exportable surpluses 
Thousands of tons 
Semi-logarithmic 
scale 
3 0 0 0 




3 0 0 0 
2 5 0 0 t - Total apparent consumption 
Natural scale 
1-100 
1 9 3 4 - 3 8 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
4 6 1950 
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PLATE IX 
LATIN AMERICA (SOUTHERN ZONE) 
SUGAR 
P e r capita consumption 









Argen t i na 
















1 9 3 4 - 1 9 3 8 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
1 9 4 6 - 1 9 5 0 1951 
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Chapter VIII 
C A T T L E A N D B E E F 
1. Introduction 
Up to the present, the trade in beef has had little 
significance in intra-zonal trade, although it is a sub-
stantial export commodity to other regions. Con-
versely, the trade in cattle on the hoof is almost 
entirely local, and of considerable importance both in 
tonnage and value as well as in the role it plays in 
satisfying basic nutritional requirements. 
This chapter is restricted to an analysis of cattle 
and beef alone, inasmuch as trade in other types of 
meat or animals is relatively insignificant, with the 
exception of the movement of sheep between Argen-
tina and Chile in the southern extremity of the 
continent. 
Before analysing intra-zonal trade, it is convenient 
to present a general summary of the principal factors 
affecting the problem of cattle and beef in the countries 
of the southern zone. 
2. Evolution since pre-war years 
As a'basis it may be stated that, until 1940, several 
countries of the southern zone, with the exception of 
Chile and Bolivia, were in a position to meet their 
needs for beef from domestic cattle resources. At that 
period there were no beef imports and the movement 
of cattle was for the most part in a different direction 
from that existing today. 
From that time, the basic features and development 
of the beef problem can be outlined as follows (see 
plate X ) : 
Cattle herds and beef production have not increased 
in proportion to the demographic growth; 
Per capita consumption has increased by more than 
16 per cent, or by 4.9 kgs., and aggregate consumption 
by 44 per cent; and 
Since the slaughtering rate and beef yield per animal 
have remained more or less constant, and the increase 
in herds is less than that required by demographic 
growth, it indicates that higher consumption can only 
be met by large reductions in zonal exports to the 
rest of the world. 
( a ) A N I M A L POPULATION 
At a first glance, it might appear that aggregate 
herd increases have been favourable, but, by com-
paring these aggregate figures with the demographic 
growth, it may be noted that, with the exception of 
Peru and Bolivia, the ratio has been regressive in all 
the countries. An even more eloquent factor is the 
comparison between the actual increase—or decrease 
as in the case of Chile and Paraguay—and what the 
increase should have been to maintain within each 
country the pre-war ratio between the human popu-
lation and the herds available for food purposes. 
T A B L E 7 3 . C A T T L E POPULATION ( S O U T H E R N ZONE) 
Pre-war 
Per capita 
Herds ratio of 
(thousands animals to 
Years of head) population 
Present situation 
Per capita 
Herds ratio of 
(thousands animals to 

































SOURCES: Argentina: 1937, census: 1952.» Bolivia: 1938, FAO; 1947, Dirección de Estadística. 
Brazil: 1937, National Meat Institute; 19S0, census. Chile: 1936, census; 1951, Sinopsis Estadística. 
Paraguay: 1938, 1951, STICA. Peru: 1929, FAO; 1949, Ministry of Agriculture. Uruguay: 1937, 
FAO; 1951, census. 
a The cattle census of November 1952 gave a total of 42,263,000 cattle. Previous winter 
censuses showed a lower proportion of small animals. The 1952 census, technically more perfect, 
covered the full total, thus differing from the previous surveys. Thus, to establish comparable data 
for the years covered by this report, it was decided to reduce the 1952 census to a conservative 
figure. 
It is unnecessary to enter into a detailed analysis used for comparison or of the causes leading to the 
either of the events which occurred between the dates present situation. It is sufficient to mention that the 
T A B L E 7 4 . C A T T L E : E V O L U T I O N OF H E R D S IN R E L A T I O N 
TO DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH 
(Thousands of head) 




Difference between pre-war 
herds projected in terms 
of demographic growth 
Argentina.. 1937-1952 + 6,793 - 5,210 
B o l i v i a . . . . 1938-1947 + 1,199 + 999 
Brazil 1937-1950 +11,794 - 3,132 
Chile 1936-1951 - 387 - 1,074 
Paraguay. . 1938-1951 - 182 - 1,628 
Peru 1929-1949 + 1,039 + 451 
Uruguay.. . 1937-1951 - 143 - 1,459 
+20,113 - 1 1 , 0 3 3 
SOURCE: See table 73. 
years of extreme drought during the last decade 
caused considerable damage to livestock, especially 
in Argentina and Uruguay. As for Paraguay, the 
effects of the political upheavals during this same 
period are still being felt. Perhaps the most significant 
example of the fundamental trend in cattle develop-
ment is presented by Brazil, where despite a remark-
able impetus, the calving rate of cattle still lags 
behind the demographic growth. 
(.B) T H E B E E F I N D U S T R Y AND PRODUCTION 
A comparison between slaughtering figures for 
1936-42 and for the present indicates an increase 
approximately proportional to the growth of herds, 
as seen in table 75. 
T A B L E 7 5 . C A T T L E I N D U S T R Y AND S L A U G H T E R I N G R A T E IN F I V E S O U T H E R N - Z O N E 
C O U N T R I E S 
Present situation 
Head of cattle Period 
Percentage 
rate of 




Argentina 7,080,033 1936-40 21.0 7,700,000 1951 22.0 
Brazil. . . 4,596,000 1940 11.3 5,964,715 1950 11.3 
Chile. . . . 530,321 1943 15.3 515,515 1951 18.2 
Paraguay 535,339 1938-42 14.3 500,508 1950 13.5 
Uruguay. 1,379,814 1940-42 16.6 1,371,895 1951 16.8 
TOTAL 14,121,507 16,052,633 
SOURCES: Argentina: 1936-40, bulletin published by the Ministry of Agriculture; 1951 
includes figures for slaughterings in the interior estimated at 3,881,000 head. If the total cattle on 
the hoof exported be included, the percentage would rise to 21.6 per cent in 1936-40 and to 22.6 
per cent in 1951. Brazil: Statistical Yearbook. Chile: Agricultura e Industrias Agropecuarias of the 
Dirección General de Estadística; 1943 is the first year for which data is available, and figures for 
that year included an estimate—based on the meat yield—of total slaughterings within the 
country amounting to 25,000 head; the percentage for 1951, after deducting the number of cattle 
imported, was calculated on the basis of the operation within eight of the principal cities in terms 
of the same operation during 1949 in proportion to the country as a whole. Paraguay: STICA; 
includes imported cattle and that part of the industry destined for export; the percentage was 
calculated allowing for deduction of imported cattle. Uruguay: Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock. 
Regarding meat production from slaughtering, 
which includes that produced from cattle imported 
on the hoof, table 76 demonstrates that, despite an 
increase in absolute figures, per capita availabilities 
have decreased in all countries of the zone, except 
Uruguay. 
T A B L E 7 6 . B E E F PRODUCTION IN F I V E S O U T H E R N - Z O N E C O U N T R I E S 
1936^12 Present situation Difference 
Year Kilo- Year Kilo-
or grammes or grammes Per 
period Tons per capita Period Tons per capita Total capita 
Argentina... 1936-40 1,522,200 112.72 1951 1,666,130 95.20 + 143,930 - 1 7 . 5 2 
Brazil 1942 803,056 18.67 1950 955,956 18.16 + 152,900 - 0.51 
Chile 1937-41 113,365 23.10 1951 119,388 20.00 + 6,023 - 3.10 
Paraguay. . . 1938-42 95,390 95.29 1951 80,235 60.39 - 15,155 - 3 4 . 9 0 
Uruguay.. . . 1940-42 264,935 122.03 1949 288,602 122.65 + 23,667 + 0.62 
TOTAL 2,798,935 3,110,311 +311,370 
Peru 1950 157,739 18.57 
TOTAL, 
incl. Peru 3,268,050 
SOURCES: Argentina: 1936-40, calculated on the basis of 215 kgs. average yield of meatfper 
animal; 1951, partly estimated on the basis of 215 kgs. yield of animals slaughtered in municipal 
and private plants; household production not included. Brazil: 1942, first year when official 
statistics published beef production separately; rural production not included. Chile: 1937-41, 
official statistics; 1951, calculated on the slaughtering and average yield of 1949; figures include 
meat from imported cattle. Paraguay: Calculation based on slaughterings employing average yield 
rate derived from information from the Corporación Paraguaya de Carnes. Peru: Panorama 
Ecónomico del Perú, 1951. Uruguay: 1941-45, Plan Agropecuario Nacional. 1949, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Livestock. 
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(C) E X P O R T S AND CONSUMPTION 
Table 76 indicates the per capita production but 
not total availabilities for domestic consumption. To 
obtain this, exports must be subtracted, but not 
involving the mere total given in foreign trade year-
books. Foreign trade figures must first be converted 
to product weight from slaughterhouses. Once this 
conversion is effected, the figures shown in table 77 
appear. 
T A B L E 7 7 . E X P O R T S OF FROZEN AND P R E S E R V E D B E E F F R O M F I V E S O U T H E R N - Z O N E 
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TOTAL 915,625 396,334 -519 ,291 
SOURCE: Foreign trade statistics. 
» Based on the ratio 100/103 for frozen meat and 100/276 for preserved meat. Data for 
Uruguay in 1940-42 and 1949 was published in the Agricultural Plan as well as in the Agricultural 
Statistics Summary. Frozen meat includes chilled meat. Such meats as charqui or tasajo, the trade 
in which declined considerably during the pre-war years, are not included. b Estimated. 0 1937-38. 
d 1942. « 1940-42. f 1940-42 and 1949. * Figures published in the Second five-year plan. 
As shown in table 77, the quantum of meat exports 
declined in twelve years by 56.7 per cent. By absolute 
figures, the decrease is greater for Argentina than for 
the otherjfexporting countries. But the proportional 
decline is higher for Brazil and Paraguay, where 
domestic consumption at present absorbs all available 
production. In Uruguay, where the per capita export 
figure is still very high, there has also-been a marked 
relative decline. 
The data from preceding tables allow an approxi-
mate estimate of the aggregate and per capita con-
sumption figures for the countries of the southern 
zone to be made. 
T A B L E 7 8 . A P P A R E N T A G G R E G A T E B E E F CONSUMPTION I N S I X S O U T H E R N - Z O N E 
C O U N T R I E S 
1936-42 Present situation 
Import (+) Apparent Import (+) Apparent 
Productiona Export ( —) consumption Productiona Export ( —) consumption 
Argentina 1,522,200 -626 ,891 895,309 1,666,130 - 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 1,416,130 
Brazil 803,056 -118 ,810 684,246 955,956 - 16,305 939,651 
Chile 113,365 — 113,365 119,388 — 119,388 
Paraguay 95,390 - 39,612 55,778 80,235 - 12,944 67,291 
Uruguay 264,935 -130 ,312 134,623 288,602 -117 ,085 171,517 
TOTAL 2,798,946 - 9 1 5 , 6 2 5 1,883,321 3,110,311 - 3 9 6 , 3 3 4 2,713,977 
Peru . . . . 157,739 + 6,288 164,027 
TOTAL, incl. Peru . . . . 3,268,050 -390 ,046 2,878,004 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
YEARS OF REFERENCE: Argentina: 1936-40 and 1951. Brazil: 1942 and 1950. Chile: 1937-41 
and 1951. Paraguay: 1938-42 and 1951. Uruguay: 1940-42 and 1949. Peru: 1950. 
» Production figures include meat obtained from imported cattle. 
An examination of the figures in table 78 reveals 
that aggregate consumption increased in twelve years 
by 830,000 tons, or by 44 per cent. Thirty-seven per 
cent of the increased consumption, or 310,000 tons, 
came from higher production, and the remaining 63 
per cent, or 520,000 tons, from reduced exports. 
Of the three countries where increases in average 
consumption have taken place, two, Argentina and 
Uruguay, had already achieved the highest levels in 
the world. The increases in Argentina reflect the 
growth of real income combined with abundant 
supplies of meat at low prices. The same factors are 
present in Brazil although on a smaller scale, and 
here again surpluses formerly destined for export have 
been utilized for domestic consumption. However, in 
contrast to the situation in Uruguay and Argentina, 
Brazilian meat exports have almost entirely been 
eliminated, a similar situation prevailing in Paraguay. 
In Chile the problem presents different aspects, since 
for many years it has been necessary to supplement 
domestic beef production with imported cattle. The 
outstanding event in recent years is the increase of 
import requirements. Supplies depend mainly upon 
the possibilities of obtaining livestock from Argentina 
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T A B L E 7 9 . A P P A R E N T P E R CAPITA B E E F CONSUMPTION IN S I X S O U T H E R N - Z O N E 
C O U N T R I E S 
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TOTA.L 1 ,833 ,321 64,637 29 .1 2 ,713 ,977 79 ,784 34 .0 + 5.9 
Peru 164,027 8 ,493 19.3 
TOTAL, incl. Peru 2 , 8 7 8 , 0 0 4 88 ,277 32.6 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Lat in America. 
YEARS OF REFERENCE : Argentina: 1 9 3 6 - 4 0 and 1951. Brazil : 1942 and 1950 . Chile: 1 9 3 7 - 4 1 
and 1951. P a r a g u a y : 1 9 3 8 - 4 2 and 1951. Uruguay : 1 9 4 0 - 4 2 and 1949. Peru : 1950. 
and in financing their purchase. Thus, an increase in 
real income does not here show the same direct rela-
tionship to meat consumption in Chile.1 • 
As forjunder-consumption or over-consumption of 
beef, on a per capita basis, shown in table 79, the 
information is inadequate for any definite conclusions 
to be reached. In addition, only incomplete data are 
available for the consumption of other types of meat 
and fish in the southern zone. Further, such figures, 
once completed, should be examined in the light of 
the type and quantity of each national diet, as well 
as the dietary habits of each nation, to relate them 
to the norms established at the Hot Springs Confer-
ence. These standards proposed an annual per capita 
consumption of 54 kgs. of meat and fish as a balanced 
diet. 
(d) INTRA-ZONAL T R A D E 
As already mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, the cattle trade in the southern zone has 
experienced a marked growth since pre-war years. 
(See table 80.) 
Certain comments should be made on the two pre-
ceding tables. In the first place, it should be noted 
that aggregate figures for exports and imports include 
those to all markets and from all sources. However, 
1 The fact that sea-food and shell-fish are more readily available 
must also be taken into account . 
T A B L E 8 0 . C A T T L E E X P O R T S FROM F I V E S O U T H E R N -








P a r a g u a y 
Peru 
Uruguay 
8 1 , 1 0 0 
4 , 6 0 0 
6 5 , 9 0 0 
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TOTAL 151 ,600 276 ,332 136 ,077 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
» Indirect d a t a : Brazilian statistics indicate imports from 
Bolivia of 592 tons. 
b Brazilian statistics show 1 0 , 0 0 0 tons imported from P a r a g u a y , 
those of Paraguay do not account for any exports whatsoever, 
since exports of cat t le were strictly prohibited. 
in practice they may be considered as representing 
intra-zonal trade with the exception of Peru whose 
imports come from Central America.2 
An outstanding fact at a first glance is the marked 
increase in trade during the immediate post-war period 
and its decline at a later date. Actually, the regressive 
tendency is apparent since 1949. Thus, Argentine 
cattle exports of 373,823 head in 1946-48 declined to 
124,700 in 1949-51. This is related to the decline in 
the export industry due not only to an increase in 
domestic consumption, but also in a certain degree 
to the adverse effects of unfavourable weather condi-
tions. 
T A B L E 8 1 . C A T T L E I M P O R T S 
(Head) 
1934-38 1946-50 
1951 average average 
Bolivia 5 ,000 3 1 , 7 6 7 » 9 , 1 2 5 » 
2 0 , 5 0 0 1 1 , 0 2 5 ° 3 2 , 0 0 0 e 
Chile 2 2 , 6 0 0 141 ,835 117 ,191 
P a r a g u a y 81 ,000 2 6 , 6 1 7 ' ' — 
Peru 1 ,800 6 , 9 5 0 ° 1 4 , 7 6 5 
Uruguay 3 , 4 0 0 4 7 , 2 4 3 — • 
TOTAL 134 ,300 265 ,437 173 ,081 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks, Peru, 1 9 5 1 : Panorama de la 
Economía del Peru. Chile, 1951: Instituto de Economía Agrícola. 
» Average for 1 9 4 6 - 4 8 . 
b Indirect d a t a : Argentine exports to Bolivia. 
0 Average for 1 9 4 6 - 4 9 . 
d Average for 1 9 4 8 - 5 0 . 
° Calculated on the basis of the weight of kilogrammes. 
The discrepancy is even more marked in Uruguay, 
where before the war substantial numbers of cattle 
were exported to Brazil. But the drought of 1942-43 
considerably depleted cattle herds; its effects were 
still being felt in 1947 and 1949, when Uruguay had 
to import 233,000 head, not for domestic consumption, 
but to maintain activity in the frozen-meat industry 
for export. Since 1949, Uruguay discontinued all 
cattle imports and only exports on a small scale to 
Brazil. 
2 E x p o r t s outside of the southern zone in 1 9 3 4 - 3 8 amounted t o 
402 head, and 2 ,800 in 1 9 4 6 - 5 0 , but only 123 in 1951 . I t is possible, 
of course, t h a t these small surpluses can be at tr ibuted to certain 
inaccuracies in properly classifying cat t le destined for consump-
tion purposes and those for reproduction. 
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1925 T o Chile from Argentina 54 ,100 F r o m Argentina to Chile 61,501 + 7,401 
1 9 4 6 - 4 8 T o U r u g u a y from Argentina 2 3 4 , 4 1 5 F r o m Argentina to Uruguay 191 ,917 - 4 2 , 4 9 8 
1946 T o P a r a g u a y from Argentina 83,222 F r o m Argentina t o Paraguay 78,070 - 5 ,152 
1950 T o P a r a g u a y from Argentina 12 ,320 F r o m Argentina to P a r a g u a y 4 5 , 3 3 0 + 3 3 , 0 1 0 
1 9 4 6 - 5 1 T o Chile from Argentina 827 ,043 F r o m Argentina to Chile 861 ,716 + 3 4 , 6 7 3 
1951 T o Brazil from P a r a g u a y 32 ,000» F r o m P a r a g u a y to Brazil b - 3 2 , 0 0 0 
SOURCE: National statistics. 
a Es t imated on basis of weight: 10 ,000 tons. ' E x p o r t prohibited. 
Before the war, Peru exported small quantities of 
cattle to Brazil and, some years before, to Chile as 
well. At present, Peru must import at an ever in-
creasing rate in order to supply the domestic demand. 
Thus, Argentina remains the sole large and permanent 
exporter in the southern zone. 
3. Contraband as an important factor 
Another aspect is the discrepancy between export 
and import figures. According to these statistics, it 
would appear that in the period 1934-38 the southern 
zone exported 17,000 head of cattle which did not 
arrive at their destination. By 1946-50 this difference 
declined to 11,000. But if total Peruvian imports from 
Central America are deducted, the figure of 17,000 
head is once again attained. In 1951, the difference 
amounted to 22,000 head—excluding the Peruvian 
imports—but in that particular year apparently im-
ports exceeded exports. If the reciprocal data is sub-
jected to careful analysis, even greater differences are 
discovered, some examples being illustrated in 
table 82. 
To a certain degree, the disparities shown above 
underline the importance of contraband in the cattle 
trade of the southern zone. This is particularly true 
when there is only one side to the illegal trade, that 
is, when the cattle movement was declared normally 
on one side or other of the frontier. This also explains 
where the discrepancies appear in the statistics. 
Since it is impossible to estimate the real extent of 
contraband, the available statistical data must be 
. accepted, but bearing in mind that it only reflects 
partial data. 
4. Purpose of imports 
Another aspect of the growth of cattle imports is 
their ultimate purpose among the importing countries. 
Some of these—Bolivia, Chile and Peru—import to 
compensate for their inadequate meat production. 
Among others—Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay— 
imports provide sufficient raw materials for the 
refrigerating plants which re-export the meat and the 
by-products. Following this criterion in classifying 
imports, the following facts appear. (See table 83.) 
Perhaps it might be maintained, in the case of 
Brazil, that an indeterminate proportion of the im-
ports is directly used for consumption in certain fron-
tier areas. This is probable, but it is more than neutral-
ized by some uncontrolled imports destined for the 
refrigerating plants in Rio Grande, Santa Catarina 
and Paraná. The meat industry in the entire River 
Plate basin, as well as along its tributaries, is mainly 
controlled by a few international companies, with 
refrigerating or processing plants distributed through-
out Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Paraguay. The 
movement of cattle thus generally follows the raw-
material requirements of these plants. Another factor 
influencing the flow of trade is that of transport costs. 
It is more economical to slaughter cattle from the 
north of Uruguay at the Brazilian refrigerating plant 
of Sant'Ana do Livramento, for example, than it is 
to transport them to Montevideo. In much the same 
way, the plants in Paraguay are better situated to 
process cattle from the frontier regions of Argentina 
than are those to the south of Corrientes. These facts 
explain why large imports of cattle are made by 
Paraguay and Uruguay, although their cattle popu-
lation is already greater than that required domesti-
cally. 
T A B L E 8 3 . C L A S S I F I C A T I O N OF C A T T L E I M P O R T S ACCORDING TO 
ECONOMIC U T I L I Z A T I O N 
(Head of cat t le) 
Imports for consumption 
1934-38 1946-50 1951 
Bolivia 5 , 0 0 0 31 ,767 9 ,125 
Brazil — — — 
Chile 2 2 , 6 0 0 141 ,835 117,191 
P a r a g u a y — — — 
Peru 1 ,800 6 , 9 5 0 14 ,765 
Uruguay — — — 
TOTAL 2 9 , 4 0 0 180,552 141,081 
Percentage 22 68 84 
Imports for industrial processing 
1934-38 1946-50 1951 
2 0 , 5 0 0 11 ,025 2 7 , 0 0 0 
8 1 , 0 0 0 26 ,617 — 
3 , 4 0 0 4 7 , 2 4 3 — 
104 ,900 84 ,885 
78 32 
2 7 , 0 0 0 
16 
SOURCE: Preceding tables. 
The difference in the prices paid in one country or 
another also constitutes a motive for illicit exports. 
Such appears to be the case of cattle raised in Para-
guay, particularly in the north-eastern zone, where 
the price offered for a two-year-old heifer is from 
1,200 to 1,400 cruzeiros, in contrast to the official 
Paraguayan price in mid-1952 of 880 guaranis per 
unit of 370 to 400 kgs. according to the official price.3 
At the free exchange rate, the Brazilian price is three 
times that of Paraguay. According to well-informed 
sources in Asunción, the flow of uncontrolled trade 
in cattle to Brazil may still be estimated at a minimum 
of 15,000 head annually. In years of less rigorous 
control measures, it may have reached 50,000. 
Regarding the illegal passage of cattle from Argen-
tina to Brazil, Uruguay or Paraguay, it is probable 
that the system of frontier control has caused sub-
stantial reductions during 1952. 
In the case of trade through legal channels, it has 
been shown in table 83 that imports for consumption 
are tending to expand at the cost of imports for indus-
trial processing. This trend is not a new one. It was 
already in evidence during the period of the First 
World War, but during the Thirties it was interrupted 
by the absolute decline of imports for consumption. 
The evolution of Argentine exports of cattle on the 
hoof contributes very clearly to the interpretation of 
the phenomenon. 
T A B L E 8 4 . A R G E N T I N E E X P O R T S O F C A T T L E ON T H E HOOF, C L A S S I F I E D ACCORDING 
TO ECONOMIC UTILIZATION 
Consumption Processing Total exports Total exports 
-— • to southern to all 
Head Percentage Head Percentage zone markets 
1914 33 ,135 29 82 ,188 71 115,323 115 ,556 
1925 65 ,932 54 5 5 , 5 2 3 4 6 121,455 130 ,306 
1 9 3 4 - 3 8 . . . . 30 ,023 37 50 ,170 63 80 ,193 81 ,081 
1 9 4 6 - 5 0 . . . . . 175 ,996 65 9 3 , 4 5 9 3 5 2 6 9 , 4 5 5 2 7 2 , 4 5 4 
1951 . 113 ,169 84 2 0 , 9 0 8 16 134,077 134 ,200 
SOURCE: E c o n o m i c Commission for L a t i n America. 
T A B L E 8 5 . A R G E N T I N E F R O Z E N B E E F E X P O R T S TO P E R U AND B R A Z I L 
Exports to Peru Exports to Brazil Totals 
Tons Dollars Tons Dollars Tons Dollars 
194 3 2 ,269 2 7 7 , 8 8 0 — — 2 ,269 2 7 7 , 8 8 0 
194 4 2 ,226 249 ,300 7 ,956 1 ,395 ,202 10,182 1 ,644 ,502 
194 5 3 ,999 4 2 6 , 3 0 0 — — 3 ,999 4 2 6 , 3 0 0 
194 6 4 , 8 0 0 654 ,528 — — 4 , 8 0 0 6 5 4 , 5 2 8 
194 7 4 , 4 0 0 706 ,020 — — 4 , 4 0 0 7 0 6 , 0 2 0 
194 8 11 ,000 2,803,668 — — 11 ,000 2 , 8 0 3 , 6 6 8 
194 9 12,085 5 ,635 ,360 — — 12,085 5 , 6 3 5 , 3 6 0 
195 0 5 ,595 2 ,490 ,307 — — 5,595 2 ,490 ,307 
195 1 7 ,953 3 ,060 ,700 521 2 0 8 , 9 6 0 8 ,474 3 , 2 6 9 , 6 6 0 
SOURCE: Argentine foreign trade statistics. 
Total values for Brazil were converted to dollars a t the r a t e of 3 .36 in 1944 and 5 .00 in 1951. 
T o t a l values for Peru were converted to dollars a t the ra te of 4 .00 until 1948, 3 .36 for 1949, 
calculated average of 3 .90 for 1950 and 5 .00 for 1951. 
The consequences of this phenomenon upon the 
meat industry in general, as well as its possible future 
course, will^be discussed in the second part of this 
chapter. 
5. Frozen m e a t 
The trade in frozen meat is only a few years old in 
the southern zone. The earliest trade was between 
Argentina and Peru as the importer. At the start 
there were certain technical difficulties due to a lack 
of refrigerating space in ships of the two merchant 
fleets and also the problem in .Peru of insufficient 
storage or distribution facilities. However, little by 
little these obstacles were overcome so that supplies 
reached the figure shown in table 85, a maximum of 
12,085 tons in 1949 and some decline in 1950-51. 
Although both governments in 1949 signed a trade 
agreement, including provisions that 25,000 tons of 
frozen meat would be dispatched annually for five 
years, the exchange rate modifications of the same 
year in Peru caused the market price of imported 
meat to rise above domestic meat, thus slowing down 
3 J u l y 1952 prices. 
imports. Since 1951 imports once again have increased 
in the ratio to which price levels tended to balance 
one another. Table 85 also shows the sporadic Argen-
tine exports to Brazil. 
6. Value of the southern zone trade 
Table 86 shows the total value, in thousands of 
dollars, of intra-zonal trade in beef and cattle. 
7. Production and consumption 
Prospects for the future can be assumed if based 
both on the cattle and meat market situation in 1951 
and trends since the pre-war period. Table 87 shows 
what would be the situation in each of the countries 
of the southern zone—except Bolivia—by 1960, 
assuming the following conditions are accepted: 
(a) That the annual demographic growth will be at 
the same percentage rate as in the immediately pre-
ceding period; 
(b) That the annual percentage growth in total 
herds will also be similar to that in the immediately 
previous period; 
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T A B L E 8 6 . F . O . B . VALUE OF INTRA-ZONAL EXPORTS OF 
CATTLE AND FROZEN B E E F 
(In thousands of dollars) 
1934-3S 1946-50 1951 
Cattle 
Argentina 1,876 19,094.6 18,459.2 
Bolivia 222 143.6» 149 .2° 
Paraguay — 6 2 5 . 0 ° 
Peru 28 — — 
Uruguay 1,792 240.0 566.0 d 
TOTAL 3 ,918 19,478.2 19,799.4 
Frozen bee} 
Argentina 4 2 ,458 3,271.2 
GRAND TOTAL 3,922 21,936.2 23 ,070 .6 
SOURCE: Foreign trade statistics. 
» Average for 1 9 4 7 - 4 9 , all of which was exported to Brazil. 
b Indirect data : Value of Brazilian imports from Bolivia. 
0 Indirect d a t a : Value of Brazilian imports from Paraguay. 
d 1950. 
(c) That the extraction rate and yield from slaught-
ered meat will not vary; and 
(.d) That per capita beef consumption will remain at 
the 1951 level. 
In comparing tables 87 and 77, it will be observed 
that slight differences appear. These may be explained 
by the inclusion, firstly, of data for Peru and Chile and, 
secondly, by commercial cattle operations in table 87. 
These additions largely compensate each other so that 
the final disparity does not exceed 4 per cent. Another 
aspect of this comparison reveals that between the 
pre-war years and 1951 exportable surpluses in the 
zone declined by more than half. In terms of prices 
at the end of 1951, this is equivalent to a decline in 
resources of some 250 million dollars. By 1960, there 
would be a further reduction of 71.5 per cent, equal 
T A B L E 8 7 . T H E O R E T I C A L BALANCES B E T W E E N E S T I -
MATED B E E F CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION FOR 1 9 6 0 
Exports ( + ) , imports ( — ) 
(Metric tons in terms of cat t le slaughtering) 
1951 I960 Balance 
A r g e n t i n a . . . . + 2 6 8 , 2 0 1 + 75,936 + 2 1 0 , 2 6 5 
Brazil + 10,905 + 17,615 + 6 ,710 
Chile - 35,157 - 57,873 - 22 ,716 
Parag"=>y _I_ 12 944. - 11,269 - 24,213 
Peru - 9,241 - 42 ,209 - 32,968 
Uruguay + 117,085 + 1 2 7 , 0 0 0 + 9 ,915 
TOTAL + 3 8 2 , 5 3 7 + 1 0 9 , 2 0 0 - 2 7 3 , 3 3 7 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
NOTES: Argentina: Cattle exports include exportable surpluses 
converted to meat a t the rate of 225 kgs. per head in 1937-38 , and 
270 kgs. in 1951. Brazil: The equivalent of meat derived from im-
ported cattle was deducted from the exportable surplus, assuming 
1951 and 1960 imports as the same. Chile: Meat production from 
domestic cat t le was considered to be unchanged. Imported cattle 
were judged to yield 300 kgs. of beef per head. Only imports from 
the central and northern zones were considered. Peru: Lacking 
sufficient material to compare the post-war and pre-war periods, 
1950 consumption and imports were used as a basis. Cattle im-
ported from Nicaragua was provisionally calculated to yield 200 
kgs. per head. Uruguay: Catt le exported during 1940-42 was 
estimated to yield 210 kgs. per head. 
Details of years and periods used appear in table 78. 
to approximately 130 million dollars, in the aggregate 
value of net exports to other regions. If the curves 
assumed from these tables are further extended (see 
plate X I ) it will be seen that aggregate consumption 
would reach the level of production in 1964, represent-
ing an ultimate additional loss of 50 million dollars in 
net export resources. 
However, extreme caution should be used for these 
figures. To project a consumption curve for a commod-
ity such as beef is very fortuitous, due to the elasticity 
of the various factors which may influence it. Meat 
consumption reacts rapidly to a situation of combined 
factors. The increase or decline in per capita real 
income produces a more serious effect on this type of 
consumption than on the majority of other basic food-
stuffs, at least in urban areas. 
On the other hand, the production curve reflects the 
effects of normal incentives resulting from a rise in 
demand or livestock development programmes. An 
analysis of these factors would permit a readjustment 
of table 87 by the addition of elements which would 
show the immediate future in a more favourable light. 
But before undertaking this analysis, other more gen-
eral considerations should be taken into account. 
The fundamental problem is how livestock develop-
ment can be accomplished, maintaining the export 
capacity of the large producers and at the same time 
ensuring that the import requirements of the other 
countries do not increase disproportionately. 
On the basis of present conditions for livestock 
birth-rates and the relationship of the use of natural 
pasture land, for the time for fattening and the meat 
yield from slaughtering, the increase of herds in rela-
tion to demographic growth rests upon the problem of 
the land available. 
For sufficient beef to be available in 1960 to main-
tain the average per capita consumption without a 
further reduction in the present exportable surplus, 
585,000 additional tons would be required. On the 
basis of the yield in meat, according to countries, this 
amount is equivalent to an additional 3,135,000 head. 
If the average slaughter rate of 15.1 per cent4 is applied 
to this last figure, it may be seen that an increase of 
such size will require an additional availability in total 
herds of more than 20 million head. Estimating that 
an average of 4 hectares per head is the normal amount 
4 16 ,052,000 head slaughtered in 1951, from a total of 
106,204,000 animals. 
T A B L E 8 8 . I N C R E A S E OF B E E F CONSUMPTION AND T H E 





by 1960 (tons) 






animals to be 
slaughtered 
Argentina 266,000 215 1 ,237,209 
Brazil 220,808 160 1 ,380,050 
Chile 22,716 225 100,960 
Paraguay 16,190 180 89 ,944 
Peru 32,968 160 206 ,050 
Uruguay 25,294 210 120,448 
TOTAL 583,976 3 ,134 ,661 
SOURCES: Economic Commission for Latin America, according 
to data obtained from official documents. F o r Peru, Panorama 
Económico del Peni, 1951, of the Sociedad Nacional de Industrias. 
86 
of land required in the southern zone,5 it will be neces-
sary to increase pasture land during the period up to 
1960 by 80 million hectares. In other words, during 
this nine-year period, in order to satisfy consumption 
requirements, which in total are not great, it will be 
necessary to increase the area devoted to livestock 
by 800,000 square kilometres; this is equivalent to 
the area of the four southern states of Brazil com-
bined—Sao Paulo, Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio 
Grande do Sul—or, as a further example, to 30 per 
cent of the entire area of Argentina. 
Fortunately, in addition to the use of greater and 
area, there are other resources for increasing meat 
production. The reason for emphasizing the above 
figures is to demonstrate the urgency for undertaking 
reforms and improvements in livestock techniques, in 
order to intensify the fattening cycle, to achieve a 
reduction in losses due to disease and to obtain higher 
meat yields per animal. In other words, it is necessary, 
at least in those zones with more favourable ecological 
conditions, to pass gradually from extensive livestock 
production to a system more characteristic of intensive 
production. 
It is to their advantage that some countries of the 
southern zone have already undertaken research and 
and drawn up programmes for this purpose. In 
Argentina, according to summaries of the five-year 
plan published at the end of 1952, an increase by 1957 
of 10 per cent in total cattle numbers is envisaged, 
based on 1951 figures. This increase would be a little 
under the demographic growth that will occur during 
these six years. Nevertheless, an increase of 130,000 
tons in beef exports has been proposed, which seems 
to be based on the supposition that aggregate con-
sumption will remain constant, or in fact on a reduc-
tion in per capita consumption.6 On the other hand, 
a 10 per cent increase in cattle herds would give a total 
of not less than 44 million head.7 Meat exports, planned 
at 380,000 tons, will remain 40 per cent below pre-war 
figures. 
In Bolivia, over the short term, it appears probable 
that the need to import cattle will increase. However, 
on a medium-term or long-term basis, a substantial 
development of livestock resources in the eastern part 
of the country may be forecast, capable of satisfying 
all domestic requirements. 
The situation of the meat market in Brazil presents 
two main factors. Since 1942 the curve for the produc-
tion increase and that for the demographic growth 
coincide.8 The second factor shows that, in the mean-
time, per capita consumption is increasing rapidly, 
absorbing practically the whole surplus formerly 
exported. 
In practice, Brazil has ceased to export meat. There 
were periods of shortage when it was necessary to 
import certain quantities of frozen meat. The future 
of such imports depends, among other factors, on the 
development of domestic livestock resources. In fact, 
during the last fifteen years these resources have shown 
a remarkable growth, although insufficient to com-
pensate for the increase in per capita consumption. 
5 This average is in terms of the present situation, but does not 
exclude the use of the same area for other animals or for the 
cultivation of rotation crops. 
6 Based on an estimated population of 20 million inhabitants in 
Argentina by 1957, t h e per capita beef consumption would be 
reduced from 80 .9 to 7 1 . 4 kgs. 
7 See note to table 73. 
8 T h e ratio is not so favourable if taken from 1937. (See 
table 74 . ) 
Unlike the situation in Uruguay, Brazil still has no 
land problem, since the area available for expanding 
|ivcstock resources is still considerable. There are, 
however, other problems. The cattle industry is some-
what out of date in its techniques. It is only in recent 
years and in certain regions that cotton-seed cake has 
begun to be used as an additional item of fodder. In 
the intensive livestock areas of Sao Paulo, railway 
transport difficulties also provide an obstacle to the 
development of meat production. Nevertheless, Brazil 
possesses the basic elements for covering the do-
mestic demand without recourse to imports. 
In Chile the average meat yield from slaughtering 
is higher than in the other countries, although this is 
influenced by the fattened cattle imported from 
Argentina. Cattle stocks in Chile are tending to 
decline; in 1910 the figure stood at 2,300,000 head, 
rising to 2,573,000 in 1936 and falling to 2,186,000 in 
1951. Taking into account the demographic growth 
since 1910, the ratio of cattle to population has de-
creased from 0.70 in 1910 to 0.55 in 1936 and 0.37 in 
1951. Meanwhile, despite a decline in per capita con-
sumption, cattle imports have increased. A serious 
problem is the limited availability of land. Thus, the 
agrarian plan of 1945 was directed towards complete 
self-sufficiency, by reducing the proportion of beef in 
the domestic diet. According to the Ministry of Agri-
culture. total per capita consumption of meat, fowl 
and fish, amounted to 44.9 kgs. in 1944, distributed 
as follows: 
Kilogrammes Percentage 
Beef 23 .7 52 .4 
M u t t o n 6 .4 14.1 
Pork 4 .3 9.5 
Rabbi t 1.5 3.3 
Fowl 3 . 0 6 .6 
Fish and seafood. . . 6 .0 13.2 
Subsequently beef consumption fell to 20 kgs. 
The 1945 agrarian plan further advised an increase 
in the yield of meat per animal, but its fundamental 
thesis consisted of developing milk production, sub-
ordinating meat production to this aim.9 In addition, 
it counselled greater attention to the sanitary condi-
tions for cattle, a reduction in the slaughter of young 
heifers and the establishment of refrigerated ware-
houses to build up reserves for the winter when traffic 
in livestock over the Andes is normally interrupted. 
In addition, the plan suggested reforms in the dis-
tribution system to protect the consumer from prices 
three times higher than those paid to the producer. 
For the future, the plan proposed the utilization of 
the areas of Aisen and Chilod for a livestock industry.10 
Paraguay has at present no concerete plan for 
developing the cattle industry. However, STICA has 
devoted research to this problem and the findings 
coincide with those of local experts. Briefly, Paraguay 
is capable of developing its cattle industry, although 
conditions for the moment are deficient, with the 
exception of a few farms. Thus, it still has vast lands 
not yet used for livestock, a density of animal popula-
tion of only one animal to each 4 or 5 hectares, a 
slaughter rate estimated at 12 per cent and an average 
weight per animal of 365 kgs. Here, the average yield 
in beef does not even reach 50 per cent of the total 
weight of the animals; the rate of calving is a third 
9 Milch-cows in proportion to total cat t le herds almost doubled 
in number between 1910 and 1950. 
1 0 According to the joint report of the International Bank and 
F A O (DeVries report, 1952) , the island of Chilod would be 
better suited to pig farming. 
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below normal, and the death rate between actual 
calving and the period when heifers are branded stands 
at 33 per cent. All of these factors testify to the large 
sphere in which specific improvements could be 
achieved. 
A country with wide livestock development plans 
is Uruguay. The publication of an agricultural and 
livestock plan in 1947, drawn up by the Ministry 
concerned, was followed by a study made by a joint 
mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization. In 1951, this mission presented its 
recommendations, which in August 1952 received the 
approval of Congress. The essential measures prior 
to the plan being carried out are being taken, on the 
basis of funds from domestic sources of 93 million 
pesos and/or a 54-million-dollar loan by the Inter-
national Bank. 
According to the plan, its fulfilment would allow 
beef production to be doubled in less than ten years. 
However, the mission warned that "the meat price 
subsidy has reduced the price to the consumers—in so 
far as the letter of the law is observed—to a level 
entirely out of proportion to the prices for other food-
stuffs, and has therefore distorted the normal con-
sumption structure". The plan thus recommends that 
domestic prices be adjusted to those for exports. If 
this advice be followed, a substantial reduction in per 
capita consumption can be obtained. Accepting this 
assumption, as in the case of Argentina, the aggregate 
consumption would remain constant, permitting the 
export of the entire productive increase obtained dur-
ing the remaining years of the present decade. In this 
way, Uruguay's capacity to export would rise from 
120,000 to 400,000 tons in terms of slaughtered beef. 
This increase could be achieved without extending the 
areas available for pasture, but by raising the density 
of herd population11 as well as by accelerating the 
fattening rate and improving the average meat yield. 
The means proposed to achieve these ends are, briefly, 
the provision of wire fencing to limit the area of the 
properties, the erection of outdoor shelters, a rational 
distribution of the water supply, the use of selected 
seed and fertilizers for improving fodder resources, the 
improved breeding of animals and a systematic attack 
upon livestock diseases. 
8. Problems and prospects for mtra-zonal trade 
According to table 86, exports in intra-zonal trade 
during 1951 were covered 94 per cent by Argentina. 
Imports were distributed between Chile, 67 per cent, 
and Peru, 13 per cent. (See table 81.) It may thus be 
appreciated that Argentine-Chilean trade alone repre-
sents two-thirds of the total intra-zonal trade in beef 
and cattle. The characteristics of this trade are noted 
below. 
9. T h e Argentine-Chilean trade of catt le 
for copper 
During the last ten years Argentine cattle exports 
to Chile rose rapidly, reaching a peak in 1946 and 1947. 
In 1948 and 1949 they declined to a third of the 1946 
total. The evolution of the livestock situation in 
Argentina, the rise in domestic consumption and the 
difficulties of maintaining the level of meat exports to 
Europe, and particularly to the United Kingdom, 
combined to reduce the cattle numbers available for 
export to Chile. By 1950 a slight recovery was noted, 
although the causes for the previous decline had not 
disappeared. The reason for this increase was the 
Korean War and the subsequent world scarcity of raw 
materials, particularly copper. In view of the interna-
tional shortage, Argentina sought to obtain from Chile 
the larger quota of copper required by its developing 
industries. In 1951, the facts described in section 2 of 
chapter X I , under the title of "Copper in Argentine-
Chilean trade", caused an agreement to be reached, by 
which a large share of the Argentine cattle exported 
to Chile was directly traded for copper. Under this 
agreement, Chile decided to export 10,000 tons of 
copper to Argentina. In 1952 the tonnage was in-
creased to 15,800 and should have covered all Argen-
tine cattle exports with the exception of 11,250 head 
for northern Chile in exchange for nitrate and all 
cattle imported south of the 34th parallel, from the 
pre-Cordillera region, which reach Chile through 
passes over the Andes. This trade in the south is 
estimated at some 10,000 to 15,000 head a year,12 but 
it is of much inferior quality to the well-fattened 
11 A t present around 2 hectares per head. 
12 T h e new t r e a t y for 1953 now under study proposes the 
exchange of 2 3 , 7 0 0 tons of Chilean copper for 127 ,000 head of 
cattle . 
T A B L E 8 9 . A R G E N T I N E - C H I L E A N T R A D E IN C A T T L E AND C O P P E R 
Argentine cattle exports to Chile Argentine imports of Chilean copper 
Thousands Thousands ' 
of Argentine Thousands of Argentine Thousands 
pesosh of dollars Tons pesos of dollarsc 
194 9 72 ,825 37 ,438 .2 11 ,142 .3 3 ,387.7 10 ,799.2 2 ,895.2 
195 0 88 ,003 61 ,534 .9 15 ,778.1 6 ,841 .2 35 ,937 .8 7 ,187 .6 
195 1 103 ,108 77 ,810 .7 16 ,362.1 10 ,280.4 63 ,697 .1 8 ,493 .0 
195 2 9 3 , 0 0 0 89 ,544 .3 19 ,808 .8 15 ,800 .0 118 ,500 .0 15 ,800 .0 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
a F igures covering the period from 1949 to 1951 were taken from official statistical sources. 
F o r 1952, amounts listed in the Argentine-Chilean agreement were used, even though these were 
not completely fulfilled. Also, copper for 1952 is priced f.o.b. rather than c.i.f. 
b Conversion of Argentine pesos to dollars is somewhat complicated by the multiple-exchange-
rate system employed in Argentina, as well as for certain modifications introduced in August 1950. 
As a result, the following rates were used: for ca t t le : 3 .36 in 1949, 3 . 9 0 in 1950, 5 .00 in 1951 and 
1952 ; for copper: 3 .73 in 1949, 3 . 90 in 1950, 7 .50 in 1951 and 1952. T h e price listed in Argentine 
statistics for catt le includes the surcharges to be referred to below, and which amount to some 
8 0 0 , 0 0 0 dollars in 1951 and 1 ,900 ,000 dollars in 1952. 
c F o r copper the customs sections used were 1375c, 1378, 1380, 1381 and 1385, that is, cable 
and bare wire, tubes, electrolytic copper and copper, bronze or brass in slabs or sheets. 
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T A B L E 9 0 . C H I L E : T R A D E I N C A T T L E AND C O P P E R 
W I T H A R G E N T I N A 
Imports of Argentine cattle Exports of copper to Argentina* 
Thousands of Thousands of 
Head dollars . Tons dollars 
1 9 4 9 . . . . . 69 ,262 5 ,692.2 3 ,027 .4 1,843.7 
1 9 5 0 . . . . . 6 1 , 9 6 9 5 ,711.2 6 ,896 .3 5 ,437 .4 
1 9 5 1 . . . . . 116,872 16 ,964 .6 7 ,828 .3 6 ,348.7 
1 9 5 2 b . . . . 9 3 , 0 0 0 19 ,808.8 15 ,800.0 15 ,800 .0 
SOURCE: Official statistics. 
" Customs sections used cover : copper sheets and bars, bare 
copper wire, electrolytic copper, and copper and bronze manu-
factured goods. 
b 1952 figures were taken from the trade agreement, although 
these were not entirely fulfilled. Cat t le values for 1951 and 1952 
include the surcharge, b u t exclude imports over the Andean 
passes. 
heifers imported into the central or northern zones of 
Chile. 
Despite certain marked differences, the statistics, 
for both Chile and Argentina, show a tendency 
towards a general balance in the trade of copper for 
cattle. (See table 89.) 
The relative importance of copper as a means of 
barter for cattle amounted to 32.4 per cent in 1949 
according to Argentine statistics, while Chilean sta-
tistics placed it at 26 per cent. Since 1949 it has in-
creased to some 80 per cent according to the terms of 
the 1952 agreement. 
10. Reciprocal prices of cattle and copper 
At first sight, based on the agreement of 1951 and 
the 1952 treaty, the ratio amounts to a little more 
than five head of cattle for one ton of copper. But 
this ratio has been altered, from one year to another, 
in favour of Argentina, inasmuch as the price for 
cattle of 912 Argentine pesos a head fixed by the 1951 
agreement was later raised by the 1952 treaty to 
995.60.13 In the meantime there was no change in the 
price of copper. But the official price did not entirely 
cover the real value of the cattle. From the beginning, 
in May of 1951, Chilean importers paid a small 
supplement of 15 to 20 Argentine pesos her head. As 
domestic prices in Argentina rose, the supplement 
also increased until, by December 1952, it had reached 
an average of 564 Argentine pesos. However, the 
official price of 995.60 Argentine pesos involves a 
currency entirely different in value from the supple-
mentary 564 pesos. The first is used in official negotia-
tions at the ruling official export rate of 5 pesos per 
dollar,- whereas the 564 pesos, with the tacit approval 
of both governments, may be paid in Argentine bills, 
bought by Chilean importers on the free market in 
Santiago. In December 1952 these bills were being 
18 This price applies to catt le destined for the central zone of 
Chile. T h e price for the northern zone was increased from 8 5 0 
Argentine pesos in 1951 to 9 2 7 . 9 0 in 1952. T h e variation in ra te as 
applied to the central and northern zones is due to the quality of 
the animals, those dispatched to the north having a lighter 
average weight. T h e t rea ty of 1952 stipulated the import of 
4 8 , 0 0 0 head into the central zone and 4 5 , 0 0 0 by the north. Of 
these latter, 11 ,250 were traded for nitrate. The price of only 
3 3 0 Argentine pesos was placed upon cat t le imported via the 
mountain passes of the south, since these animals were not only 
lighter b u t inferior in quality. P a y m e n t for this last group is 
effected through the usual channels without any connexion to 
copper or any other specific commodity . 
sold at an approximate rate of 22 Argentine pesos 
per dollar. 
In other words, the average price per head exported 
to Chile in dollar equivalent was as follows: 
9 9 5 . 6 0 Argentine pesos a t 5 per dollar 1 9 9 . 1 0 dollars 
plus 5 6 4 . 0 0 Argentine pesos a t 22 per dollar 2 5 . 6 4 dollars 
or a total of 224.74 dollars per head. It must be 
emphasized that this price applies to fat heifers aver-
aging 540 kgs. weight on arrival in Chile (at Los 
Andes) or 580 to 600 kgs. live weight in pasture. 
The price for cattle exported during the early days 
of the 1951 agreement was 182.40 plus 1, or 183.40 
dollars. Within one year and a half, Argentine cattle 
exports to Chile showed a price increase of 41.34 
dollars per head, or 22.54 per cent, while the copper 
price remained constant. 
A comparison may be made between the price re-
ceived by Argentina for cattle exports with that re-
ceived for exports of frozen beef. A comparison of 
this type is based on the supposition that the f.o.b. 
value of frozen meat from one animal is equivalent 
to the value of the same animal on the hoof with the 
by-products obtained compensating for the cost of 
slaughtering, processing, storage and transport charges 
to f.o.b., taxes, commissions and normal profits made 
by the plants and agents.14 
Argentine meat has various prices according to the 
markets upon which it is sold. In sales to the United 
Kingdom, for example, the new treaty signed at the 
end of 1952 raised the price of chilled beef from 126 
pounds sterling per long ton to 161. In dollar equiva-
lents it rose from the original price of 347.24 per 
metric ton to 443.70. For exports to Great Britain, 
an animal weighing 580 kgs.15 with a 60 per cent yield 
in frozen meat, equivalent to 348 kgs., is valued at 
154.41 dollars per head. Exports to other markets— 
Brazil and Peru for instance—have the price fixed 
by IAPI at 530 dollars per metric ton, or a total of 
184.44 dollars per head. There is therefore a remark-
able difference between both these cases and the price 
charged in Chile. However, Argentina also pays above-
average prices for Chilean copper. 
Since Chile abrogated its former treaty with the 
United States and freely established the price and 
destination of its copper exports, the mineral value 
has been fixed by the Central Bank at 35.5 US cents 
per pound for slabs of electrolytic copper and 35.25 US 
cents per pound for smelted copper. Since the agree-
ment with Argentina stipulates the export of equal 
volume of both types of copper, the mean price must 
be based upon the average for the two, or 35.375 US 
cents per pound. This represents 779.88 US dollars 
per metric ton, while Argentina actually pays 1,000 
US dollars, or 45.36 US cents per pound. 
In other words, the price of Chilean copper for 
Argentina has a surcharge of 28.22 per cent, while 
14 This balance also prevails in Chile in terms of official prices. 
T h e Development Corporation a t present (December 1952) buys 
all Argentine cat t le arriving a t Los Andes a t 25 .70 Chilean pesos 
per kg. on the hoof, reselling it to slaughter-houses a t 26 pesos. 
T h e average weight per animal is 540 kgs. and the average yield 
60 per cent, providing 324 kgs. of meat whose official price is 
around 40 pesos. Thus, for meat on the hoof 14 ,040 pesos ( 2 6 x 5 4 0 ) 
is paid and the wholesale price for the meat is 12 ,960 pesos 
(324x40) . I t must be noted that this represents butchered m e a t 
which has been neither processed nor subject to the transport 
costs of frozen m e a t for export . 
15 T h e weight was estimated at a little higher than average since 
losses due to transport are usually less than those occurring during 
the long journey to Chile for similar animals. 
the price of Argentine cattle, in terms of meat, is 
45.5 per cent higher for Chile than that paid by the 
United Kingdom and 21.85 per cent higher than that 
for other markets. 
In establishing the copper equivalent for the Argen-
tine exports of beef and cattle according to where it 
is sold, the following figures are reached: 
Kilogrammes 
Equivalent in copper a t 1 ,000 dollars per ton for a 
fattened heifer exported to Chile 224 .74 
Equivalent in copper a t 779 .88 dollars per ton for a 
fattened heifer exported to Great Britain 197.99 
Equivalent in copper a t 779 .88 dollars per ton for a 
fattened heifer exported to other markets 2 3 6 . 5 0 
The difference is small between the equivalent in 
copper for cattle exports to Chile and the exports of 
meat to other countries of the southern zone—5.23 
per cent in favour of Chile. However, these calcula-
tions have not allowed for the fact that, in accordance 
with the 1952 agreement, part of the copper is ex-
ported to Argentina in semi-manufactured form. In 
other words, a proportion of the copper includes bars 
and wire following a first rolling. The value added 
for these processes is low, standing at 1.74 Chilean 
pesos per kg., or a supplementary cost of 4.92 per cent. 
Thus, an approximate balance in the reciprocal prices 
is established, leaving for Chile the additional benefit 
obtained from slaughtering by-products, which does 
not involve the use of foreign exchange. 
11. Importance of an absolute balance in 
reciprocal prices 
The question may arise, assuming that the recip-
rocal prices for cattle and copper are in balance, as 
to the advantage of maintaining them both at a 
higher level than that of the prices for trade with 
other countries. I t is evident that there is no advan-
tage in terms of the tonnage exchanged. However, 
there is a distinct disadvantage for both countries if 
the respective domestic prices for imports are fixed 
too high. The present balance based on the price of 
1,000 dollars per ton of Chilean copper and 225 dollars 
per head for cattle would not be altered if the ratio 
were maintained at the price level which Chile receives 
for exports to other countries. If the 4.92 per cent 
additional charge for semi-refining be added to the 
price of 779.88 dollars for copper slabs exported to 
Argentina, the total f.o.b. price would be 818.25 
dollars and would correspond in terms of reciprocal 
prices to 183.89 dollars per head of cattle. Assuming 
that the present exchange rates remain stationary, 
the f.o.b. price of copper in Argentina would be re-
duced from 7,500 Argentine pesos to 6,137 per ton 
and the price of Argentine beef in Chile, on the hoof 
at Los Andes, would decrease from 25.70 to 21.03 
Chilean pesos. But, to modify the present agreement 
between the two countries thus, it would be necessary 
to arrange a previous compromise between the 
exchange regulations of both countries. Their lack of 
connexion provides an unfavourable influence upon 
the terms of trade, which is described in the annex 
to chapter IV, under the title "Effects of the absence 
of monetary parities between Argentina and Chile". 
12. Cattle-for-copper trade perspectives 
The trade prospects of Argentine cattle for Chilean 
copper are subject to development factors, which are 
difficult to forecast. On one hand, there are the meat 
requirements for Chilean consumption. It has already 
been seen that the probability of increasing domestic 
production is relative, at least over the short term, 
so that, in order to maintain the present per capita 
supply, Chile will be more and more dependent upon 
imports. The normal supplier of such imports, par-
ticularly for cattle on the hoof, is Argentina. On the 
other hand, the industrial growth in Argentina has 
the natural corollary of causing an increasing demand 
for copper. Thus, these are parallel factors which 
should contribute to the development of trade. 
However, other less favourable factors are apparent. 
The smaller availability of meat for export in Argen-
tina has caused a definite tendency to restrict exports 
of cattle on the hoof. The flow of such exports to 
Brazil and Paraguay is already interrupted. In the 
case of Chile cattle exports have declined to less than 
half between 1946 and 1951, while the 1952 agree-
ment contains a clause revealing the Argentine desire 
to reduce them even further. This clause states: " T o 
substitute exports of cattle on the hoof gradually by 
chilled and/or frozen meat, up to 20 per cent of the 
total value of the cattle on the hoof exports stipulated 
in the present agreement may be replaced by the 
value of chilled and/or frozen meat to be exported 
under conditions which the Contracting Parties will 
establish by mutual agreement." This clause for the 
moment has not been fulfilled. In 1952 Chile pur-
chased only one shipment of Argentine frozen beef, 
for the small quantity of 140 tons, priced at 550 
dollars f.o.b. Buenos Aires.16 The wholesale price of 
this frozen meat in Santiago was fixed at 41.50 Chilean 
pesos a kilogramme or at a price somewhat higher 
than that for fresh meat. Apart from obstacles caused 
by the lack of transport, warehouses and means of 
distribution for frozen meat in Chile, the future 
development of Argentine exports to Chile appears 
to depend partly upon the extent to which Argentina 
follows a policy of substituting sales of cattle on the 
hoof by those of beef. 
13. The contribution of Bolivia and Paraguay to 
the supply of northern Chile 
Mining companies in the north of Chile are in the 
first stages of carrying out a project of great impor-
tance, over the medium and long terms. This is to 
combine the economic interests of Bolivia and Para-
guay with those of the meat supply for the Chilean 
provinces of Tarapacá and Antofagasta, which will 
diversify and supplement the latter's source of meat, 
which at present is Argentina alone. 
Exports of cattle on the hoof from Argentina to 
Tarapacá and Antofagasta during 1948-52 averaged 
43,550 head annually. These cattle were mainly 
transported by the Socompa Railway and until a few 
years ago came from the surplus production of north-
ern Argentina. However, since increased consumption 
in the provinces of Salta, Jujuy and Catamarca in 
Argentina has gradually absorbed these surpluses, 
exports to the north of Chile have had to come from 
more distant sources, such as the livestock areas of 
Córdoba and Santa Fé. Since the demand for meat 
in the mining area of Chile consistently exceeds the 
16 I t m a y be noted that the numbers for head of cat t le exported 
to Chile have been substantially below the amounts foreseen. T o 
the middle of December, and lacking but a few days to complete 
the year 1952, only 3 2 , 2 5 5 head had been imported into the 
northern zone and 2 1 , 2 9 3 into the central zone. In other words a 
total of 5 3 , 5 4 8 head as compared with the 93 ,000 forecast in the 
agreement. 
available supply, the project outlined above, without 
affecting present Argentine exports, aims at improving 
the levels of supply and stabilizing their future 
prospects. 
To carry out this programme, two areas of land 
were purchased in Bolivia. One is of 120,000 hectares 
at Bañados de Otuquis (Tucavaca) in the zone served 
by the Corumbá-Santa Cruz railway, and the other 
of more than 240,000 hectares is located in the 
Department of Cordillera at Mantellapecua. With 
regard to Paraguay, the negotiations have not as yet 
been completed, but embrace the purchase of 500,000 
hectares of government land through the Instituto de 
Reforma Agraria. According to these projects, once 
the areas are stocked it is proposed to fly half the 
production, after slaughtering, to Chile by means of 
a special airline. The remaining half in Bolivia will 
go towards increasing the supply for domestic con-
sumption, while the remaining half in Paraguay will 
be used for freezing and ultimate export. The aero-
planes to be used for transporting the meat may, in 
turn, be used for the transport of Chilean goods to 
markets in Bolivia and Paraguay. 
In addition, there are other prospects for cattle, 
through agreements for frontier traffic. One, under 
study at present, proposes to stimulate the export of 
breeding stock from Matto Grosso in Brazil in order 
to raise the herd population of Beni, Bolivia, depleted 
by the increasing demand of the Altiplano. This proj-
ect provides for the value of the Brazilian breeding 
stock to be balanced by imports of beef cattle from 
Bolivia for consumption in Guaporé and Acre. 
Another possibility has arisen from the research 
carried out in Paraguay for a number of years by the 
Inter-American Technical Service for Agriculture 
Cooperation (STICA), as well as in 1952 by certain 
Brazilian experts. This would provide for regular 
exports of zebu breeding stock from Brazil for im-
proving the cattle strains in Paraguay. 
T A B L E 9 1 . P A R A G U A Y : I M P O R T S AND P R O C E S S I N G O F 
C A T T L E F O R E X P O R T 








1 9 3 8 . . . 123,984 3 8 , 2 8 6 8 5 , 6 9 8 30 .9 
1 9 3 9 . . . . . . . 202 ,474 79 ,971 122,503 39 .5 
1 9 4 0 . . . . . . . 138,067 19 ,985 118,082 14.5 
1 9 4 1 . . . 177,764 27 ,785 149 ,979 15.6 
1942 . . . 162,279 23 ,084 139,195 14.2 
1943 . . . 169,244 57 ,561 111,683 34 .0 
1 9 4 4 . . . 163,083 64 ,265 9 8 , 8 1 8 39 .4 
1945 . . . 205 ,928 107 ,255 98 ,673 52.1 
1 9 4 6 . . . . . . . 162,880 77 ,084 8 5 , 7 9 6 4 7 . 3 
1 9 4 7 . . . . . . . 8 5 , 3 9 9 b 62,781 2 2 , 6 1 8 73.5 
1 9 4 8 . . . 122 ,315 b 63 ,603 58 ,612 52 .0 
1949 . . . 9 5 , 2 7 7 b 3 9 6 94 ,881 0 .4 
1950 . . . 7 2 , 7 8 8 ° 44 ,811 25 ,977 63 .3 
SOURCE: Inter-American Technical Service for Agriculture Co-
operation, according to official statistics and those from the 
Paraguayan Meat Corporation. 
• Liebig, International Products Corporation and Industria 
P a r a g u a y a de Carnes. T h e latter only operates with domestic 
cattle . 
b Excludes cattle used for preserves consumed within the 
country. 
0 Subject t o revision. 
14. Paraguay and cattle from Argentina 
Despite the fact that the livestock industry has 
been a traditional activity in. Paraguay, the meat-
processing industry has been dependent for many 
years on imports of Argentine cattle. Paraguay has 
three packing plants for preserving and producing 
meat extracts, two of which depend partially upon 
cattle imports. The following table demonstrates the 
development and relative size of such imports since 
1938. 
The three plants in Paraguay have a capacity to 
process 225,000 head annually and require a t least 
150,000 in order to operate economically. Already, by 
1948, there were only 125,000 head available of which 
65,000 came from Argentina. In 1949, when Argentine 
exports were entirely suspended, the Paraguayan 
Government placed 100,000 head of domestic cattle 
at the disposal of these plants. In 1950 Paraguay 
received a quota of 80,000 head from Argentina, but 
the agreement was suspended in the middle of July 
after Paraguay had received only half this amount. 
In 1951, despite a reduced quota of 20,000, Argentina 
was still unable to fulfil the allotment. Although in 
1952 Paraguay received a promise of 30,000 head, the 
net result was generally unfavourable owing to the 
combined effects of a rise in the price of cattle in 
Argentina and the obligation to make payments at 
the basic export rate of 5 Argentine pesos per dollar. 
Whereas in previous years cattle had cost between 
220 and 240 Argentine pesos per head, the price was 
subsequently raised in February 1952 by resolution 
of the Instituto Ganadero Argentino to 530 pesos as 
applied to native Formosa stock. This price—equiv-
alent to 106 dollars—is too high to permit economic 
utilization. According to data from Paraguayan 
sources, the cost of processing requires 34 dollars per 
head, whereas gross income from the sale of meat 
and by-products does not exceed 95 dollars. Therefore, 
since the top price the Paraguayan industry could 
pay per head would be 60 dollars, the only remedies 
would be for Argentina to lower the total cost per 
head to 300 Argentine pesos,17 or alternatively to raise 
the exchange rate to 9 pesos per dollar. It should 
also be taken into consideration that Argentine 
Formosa stock, produced at the rate of some 150,000 
head annually, has gained increasing acceptance on 
local markets whether for local consumption or pro-
cessing in Rosario and Santa Elena. The conclusion 
is obvious. Paraguay, in order to revive and fortify 
her meat industry, as well as to recuperate the foreign 
exchange once provided by exports of meat and its 
by-products, must without delay establish an adequate 
livestock development programme. 
15. Brazilian meat imports 
As seen above, Brazil has almost abandoned its 
former role as a meat exporter and has even resorted 
upon occasion to sporadic imports. The future of such 
imports is closely linked with both the development 
of real income in the urban areas, particularly in the 
Federal District, and the relative price level at which 
meat is sold to the consumer. Over the medium and 
long terms, the general trend of the economic develop-
ment of Brazil is probably towards a gradual increase 
in income. This will undoubtedly give rise to increases 
. 17 According to the press, the price for 1953 has been lowered to 
4 0 0 Argentine pesos. 
in per capita consumption and the resulting need to 
resume meat imports unless the rate of expansion of 
the livestock industry is not accelerated. Although 
these eventual imports will not attain more than 
marginal importance in relation to the aggregate 
domestic consumption, they may reach substantial 
figures in absolute terms, especially during periods of 
shortage caused by adverse factors such as unfavour-
able climatic conditions or a lack of adequate domestic 
transport facilities. Such a situation occurred in 1944 
as well as in 1951 and 1952. At the beginning of 1951 
there were official discussions for importing up to 
100,000 tons of frozen beef as a more or less perma-
nent measure. The conversations with Argentina on 
this subject were unfavourable. In 1952, a few pur-
chases of beef were arranged from both Argentina 
and Uruguay. The contract with Uruguay stipulated 
20,000 tons at a price of 530 dollars, f.o.b., Monte-
video. However, the shipments of the monthly quotas 
were delayed owing to the improved domestic meat 
supply of Rio de Janeiro as a result of the actions 
of the Control Commission for Supply and Prices 
(COFAP), particularly in regard to transport and 
distribution. 
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Chapter XII 
E D I B L E OILS AND FATS 
1. Introduction 
Until today the part played by edible oils and fats 
in intra-zonal trade has been limited. It does not 
correspond with what is possible, given the available 
surpluses in exporting countries, nor with what is 
desirable in view of the level of consumption in the 
importing countries. 
Taken together, the production of edible oils has 
progressed substantially during the period since 1939, 
but this is not the case for butter and animal fats. 
According to figures for 1946-50, consumption is 
satisfactory in Argentina and in Uruguay and only 
just normal in Brazil and Chile. For the other coun-
tries in the southern zone there are signs that con-
sumption is inadequate, but the absence of production 
data does not allow a precise statement to be made. 
However, a comparison between the available figures 
and the level of consumption in other regions of the 
world suggests that it is essential to raise the average 
consumption substantially. 
In the southern zone there are three exporting 
countries, of which Argentina is by far the most 
important. Uruguay, second in order, also shows 
relatively large exportable surpluses. Those of Brazil 
are smaller and are tending to decline as the aggregate 
consumption of the country increases. 
Excluding olive oil, more than three-quarters of the 
imports made by the countries in the zone originate 
from the zone itself. Zonal consumption, according to 
the available data, averages the low level of 5.5 kgs. 
annually, excepting Argentina and Uruguay where 
it reaches some 15 kgs. The full use of the entire 
production of the zone for consumption purposes 
would not raise the supply more than 2 kgs. per 
capita annually. To raise the average consumption 
to 10 kgs., always excluding Argentina and Uruguay, 
it would be necessary to use all the available surpluses 
which the zone at present exports to other regions 
and in addition to raise aggregate production by 15 
per cent. 
2. The present situation 
In table 92 below, a summary is given of the avail-
able data for the productive volume of butter, animal 
fats and edible oils in six countries of the southern 
zone. These data are incomplete in certain respects. 
Although production figures are related to the period 
1946-50, they cover, in all cases except for Argentina, 
only a part of those years. For Paraguay, production 
statistics are lacking for butter and animal fats. The 
figures for Peru are incomplete and there are no 
statistics at all for Bolivia. 
However, these statistical deficiencies do not cause 
any great difference to the aggregate figures. The 
deficiencies, which may be as high as 30,000 tons of 
productive volume not included in the statistics, only 
represent less than 4 per cent of the total, as shown 
in table 92. 
TABLE 9 2 . PRODUCTION OF EDIBLE OILS AND FATS 
IN SIX SOUTHERN-ZONE COUNTRIES 
(Annual average in tons) 
Years referred to 
Total Total Grand for available 
Butter animal fats oils total statistics 
Argentina 45,540 97,600 230,400 373,540 1946-50 
Brazil 24,892a 182,450 119,904 327,246 1948-50 
Chile 6,967 7,890 21,074 35,931 1947-49 
Paraguay . . . . 2,603 2,603 1946-49 
Peru 2,300 1,230 10,880 14,410 1948-50 
Uruguay 2,008 26,073 16,212 44,293 1949 
TOTAL 81,707 315,243 401,073 798,023 
SOURCES: Argentina: Síntesis Estadística and Industrial Census. Brazil: Statistical year-
books. Chile: Industrial statistics, 1949, and direct information furnished by the Instituto de 
Economía Agrícola. Paraguay: Official statistics compiled by the Servicio Técnico Interameri-
cano de Cooperación Agrícola. Peru: Yearbooks of the Food and Agriculture Organization. 
Uruguay: Extracts from Estadística Agropecuaria del Uruguay.. 
• Includes cream. 
As regards the import statistics, summarized in 
table 93, it was possible to obtain more complete 
details from foreign trade yearbooks and from infor-
mation||received directly from official statistical 
services. 
It should be noted that these statistics do not 
reflect the real movement of imports into Paraguay 
and Bolivia, since there are indications that the con-
traband traffic across the frontier, especially in 
regard to imports from Argentina, is very substantial. 
95 
However, in more recent years some changes are 
apparent. Firstly, the doubling of Chilean imports of 
edible oils and, secondly, an appreciable increase of 
Brazilian imports of olive oil.1 
On the basis of data for 1946-50 and by relating 
the figures of tables 92 and 93, an approximate esti-
mate of the aggregate and per capita zonal con-
sumption of edible oils and fats may be made. 
T A B L E 9 3 . I M P O R T S O F E D I B L E O I L S AND F A T S IN T H E S O U T H E R N - Z O N E 
(Metric tons) 
Animal Total Grand Years for 
fats Butter oils total statistics 
Argentina — — 329.3 329.3 1947-48 
Bolivia 2,181.9 281.0 799.0 3,261.9 1949 
Brazil — — 5,539.0 5,539.0 1948-50 
Chile 54.6 993.5 5,963.9 7,012.0 1946-50 
Paraguay 100.0 26.0 456.5 582.5 1950 
Peru 2,489.4 218.0 848.8 3,556.2 1948-49 
Uruguay — — 758.8 758.8 1950 
TOTAL 4,825.9 1,518.5 14,695.3 21,039.7 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America, according to official statistics. 
T A B L E 9 4 . A P P A R E N T TOTAL CONSUMPTION O F E D I B L E O I L S AND FATS 
IN T H E S O U T H E R N ZONE 
Oils Fats Butter Total 
Aggregate Per Aggregate Per Aggregate Per Aggregate Per 
consumption capita consumption capita consumption capita consumption capita 
(tons) (kgs.) (tons) (kgs.) (tons) (kgs.) (tons) (kgs.) 
Argentina 155,117 9.5 54,387 3.3 32,502 2.0 242,006 14.9 
Bolivia 799 0.3 2,182 0.7 281 0.09 3,262 1.1 
Brazil 110,638 2.2 182,450 3.5 24,892 0.4 317,980 6.2 
Chile. 27,038 4.8 7,945 1.4 7,961 1.4 42,944 7.6 
Paraguay 3,060 2.2 100 0.07 26 0.002 3,186 2.3 
Peru 11,729 1.4 3,937 0.5 2,518 0.3 18,184 2.2 
Uruguay 11,647 4.9 24,994 10.5 1,917 0.8 38,558 16.2 
TOTAL 320,038 3.6 278,998 3.1 70,097 0.8 666,120 7.5 
SOURCES: See previous tables. 
T A B L E 9 5 . E X P O R T S O F E D I B L E O I L S AND F A T S F R O M T H R E E S O U T H E R N - Z O N E 
C O U N T R I E S 
(Metric tons) 
Edible Edible 
oils Butter fats Total 
Argentina 75,576 13,038 43,215 131,827 
Brazil 14,805 — — 14,805 
Uruguay 5,324 91 1,076 6,491 






SOURCES: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
It should be recalled that table 94 does not include 
production data for Bolivia and lacks part of the pro-
duction for Paraguay and Peru. For this reason, the 
figures for these three countries are obviously lower 
than reality. As regards average per capita con-
sumption for the southern zone, if an estimated addi-
tion of around 25,000 tons is made, to compensate 
for data which are lacking, a figure of 7.9 kgs. is 
reached instead of 7.5.2 
If this last figure is examined in the light of FAO 
studies on human food levels,3 it may be seen that 
consumption is more than satisfactory in Argentina 
1 There are also indications from Argentine export statistics 
of a substantial increase in Bolivian imports of edible oils. 
s Without accounting for direct consumption in rural areas, 
which largely comprises bacon and lard. 
and Uruguay. In Brazil and Chile, it is within the 
limits of minimum consumption established by FAO. 
In the other countries, although the figures do not 
give the entire availability, it is probable that there 
is under-consumption. 
To raise the consumption level of fats, excluding 
Argentina and Uruguay, to 10 kgs. per capita annu-
ally,4 it would be necessary to increase aggregate 
production by 100,000 tons each year and, for the 
supply of the zone, retain the exports at present dis-
patched to other regions. 
s FAO World Food Survey, Washington, July 1946. This report 
recommends that a daily diet of 2,600 calories should be achieved, 
of which 150 to 200 should be directly provided by fats, repre-
senting an annual average consumption of 6 to 8 kgs. per capita. 
4 Some experts in Chile consider that annual per capita con-
sumption should reach 11 kgs. at least. 
T A B L E 9 6 . I M P O R T S O F E D I B L E O I L S AND FATS B Y C O U N T R I E S ( S O U T H E R N ZONE) 
Tonnage Thousands of dollars 
Zonal Per- Zonal Per-
Tolal imports centage Total imports centage 
Argentina 329.3 4.8 1.5 502.3 3.5 0.7 
Bolivia 3,261.9 1,690.5 51.8 1,457.6 952.1 65.3 
Brazil 5,539.0 — 0.0 7,061.7 — 0.0 
Chile 7,012.0 6,781.7 96.7 3,373.9 3,249.9 96.3 
Paraguay 582.5 515.7 88.5 165.5 86.6 52.3 
Peru 3,556.2 2,251.8 63.3 2,936.8 1,724.8 58.7 
Uruguay 758.8 — 0.0 571.5 — 0.0 
TOTAL 21,039.7 11,244.5 53.4 16,069.3 6,016.9 37.4 
SOURCES: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
" For statistical years, see table 93. 
This total of 153,000 tons exported must be con-
sidered in relation to total imports which scarcely 
reach 21,000 tons (see table 93), of which only half 
comes from the southern zone. 
Tables 93, 95 and 96 show that, although the zone 
as a whole is a net exporter of fats, the trade between 
these countries is insignificant. This is particularly 
true if the relative figures are compared with those 
for imports from Europe, under the form of olive oil. 
The size of such European exports to the zone is 
evident in table 97. The recent decline is partly due 
to the development of olive oil production in some of 
the republics of the zone. 
T A B L E 9 7 . O L I V E OIL I M P O R T S TO T H E S O U T H E R N ZONE 
(Metric tons) 
• Importers 1934-38 1947-50 Difference 
Argentina 18,120 129 - 1 7 , 9 9 1 
Bolivia 250 
Brazil 4,530 4,565 + 35 
Chile 1,090 17 - 1,073 
Paraguay 30 
Peru 380 136 - 244 
Uruguay 3,350 1,455 - 1,895 
TOTAL 27,750 6,302 - 2 1 , 4 4 8 
Source: F AO Yearbooks. 
3. Recent events and trends 
In recent years the over-all situation of the pro-
duction, consumption and trade in fats has shown 
changes of some importance. 
There has been an increase in Argentina of cotton-
seed oil and olive oil, together with a certain recovery 
in ground-nuts. But the market continues to be 
dominated by sunflower-seed oil, the production of 
which fluctuates considerably due to climatic con-
ditions. Thus, for a sown area of 1,600,000 hectares, 
the seed production dropped from 1,021,000 tons in 
1950-51 to only 648,000 tons in the following year. 
The second five-year plan proposes some expansion 
in the production of edible oils of vegetable origin and 
plans factories for the hydrogenization of oils. 
Argentine production of olive oil has reached some 
2,000 tons annually with prospects for a rapid increase. 
The availability of olive trees, which stood at 2 
million fully grown trees in 1948, has increased so 
rapidly, with new plantations, that in 1952 the Aso-
ciación Olivícola Argentina estimated the number at 
10 million. 
In Brazil, exports of cotton-seed oil appear to be 
rapidly diminishing through the growth of domestic 
consumption of fats. This rise in consumption is being 
more fully covered by the initial results of the indus-
trialization of babassu nuts. The cultivation of sun-
flowers, undertaken a few years ago in Rio Grande 
do Sul, appears to be abandoned for the moment. In 
the same State, the yields obtained from olive trees 
have reached 100 kgs. of olives per tree annually, 
which is giving a decided incentive to wider cultivation. 
Up to the present Brazil has been a marginal ex-
porter of edible vegetable oils and imported only olive 
oil. There are, however, the first symptoms of what 
might be a change in this position. In 1951 oil exports 
declined while imports of olive oil increased, a small 
quantity of butter (618 tons) being received from the 
Netherlands and Denmark. In 1951, for the first 
time, lard was imported (250 tons) from Argentina.5 
The present tendency is thus a double one, linking a 
greater domestic use of the edible oil production with 
some imports of lard, butter and olive oil. Such 
imports are those for which Argentina and, to a lesser 
degree, Uruguay could, now or in the immediate 
future, be the nearest suppliers. 
To raise the consumption of fats in Brazil to a 
minimum of 8 kgs. per capita, divided into 4 kgs. of 
edible oils and 4 kgs. of fats and butter, it would be 
necessary for an estimated population of 56 millions 
to use the entire resources of the country by 1953. 
It would also be essential to add to the amount avail-
able in 1948-50, either through an increase in domestic 
production or through imports, the following quan-
tities: edible oils, 100,000 tons; fats and butter, 22,000 
tons, principally in the form of butter whose actual 
per capita consumption does not reach 500 grammes 
annually. 
Imports of such size would be exactly equivalent 
to the level of exports in recent years from Argentina 
and Uruguay, although, in composition, these exports 
were slightly less in edible oils and slightly greater in 
animal fats. By value at present prices this would 
represent some 40 million dollars each year. I t is 
obvious that such an increase in consumption would 
require some increment to the gross national product. 
In addition, as in the case of wheat, there is also the 
5 A thousand tons in 1952. This was due to swine diseases 
which affected production. 
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problem of Brazilian exports to pay for commodities 
with a dollar value. 
In Chile the prospects are also those of a growing 
need to import fats for human consumption. The 
most important event during recent years has been 
the tendency to increase the sowing of sunflowers. 
From 1940 to 1950, the area sown with sunflowers 
steadily increased from 3,000 to 54,000 hectares. In 
1951-52 it declined by 10,000 hectares and it does 
not appear probable that it will again exceed 50,000. 
The cultivation of sunflowers requires irrigated soil 
and a substantial use of fertilizers. The most probable 
trend is the establishment of the domestic production 
of vegetable oils at an average figure around 12,000 
tons annually. Conversely, some increase in the pro-
duction of olive oil has been witnessed, at present esti-
mated at approximately 500 tons annually. 
In recent years a change in the traditional flow of 
such imports has become apparent. In the five-year 
period 1946-50, Chile bought practically all its im-
ported oils from Argentina. In 1951 and 1952, how-
ever, the major part of the purchases were made in 
Europe, 12,000 tons of soybean oil from the Nether-
lands, 5,000 tons for Germany and 7,000 tons of sun-
flower-seed oil from Argentina. The preference given 
to the industrialized soybean oil from Europe was 
due to the fact that the IAPI6 had maintained its 
sales prices without accounting for the fall in edible 
oil quotations on world markets. A purchase of 7,000 
tons of sunflower-seed oil from Argentina, which was 
arranged at the end of 1952 in exchange for steel 
products, indicated a closer relationship between the 
Chilean and Argentine economies. However, this 
agreément was made, as in the case of the financial 
operations regarding livestock and copper, at higher 
price levels than those normally quoted on the inter-
national market. 
The cost of fats imports, in foreign exchange, for 
Chile stands at an approximate figure of 7 million 
dollars, estimating imports of 17,000 tons of oils at 
35 US cents c.i.f. and 1,000 tons of butter at a little 
6 Instituto Argentino de Promoción del Intercambio (Argentine 
Institute for Trade Promotion). 
over 1 dollar a kg. This means that such imports 
represent for Chile an expense equal to half of that 
resulting from wheat import requirements. 
Further, if an attempt is made to raise per capita 
consumption to the level proposed by Chilean experts, 
or 11 kgs. per capita, imports would have to be 
doubled, raising the cost to some 15 million dollars 
annually. As compared with the present total foreign 
exchange budget of Chile,7 and bearing in mind that 
fats are an essential dietary element, the burden does 
not appear excessive. But it is evident that such a 
solution cannot be made over the short term, since 
it would require a previous improvement in real 
income and a gradual transformation of dietary habits. 
In Uruguay, the production of edible oil has con-
siderably increased in recent years. For example, it 
has risen from 28,000 tons of oils (sunflower and 
peanut) in 1946 to 68,000 in 1949 and to 127,000 in 
1951. Since 1949 Uruguay has made considerable 
efforts to provide exportable surpluses, which at 
present may be estimated at around 15,000 tons of 
oils. Exports of animal fats reach an average of about 
3,000 tons annually. As regards butter, exports are 
marginal, depending partly upon climatic factors 
which influence the volume of milk production and 
the comparative profits between the production of 
butter, cheese and caseine. 
A new factor is the growing availability of sunflower-
seed and ground-nut oils, but there are some fears as 
regards prices. From June 1951 to April 1952 North 
American soybean oil fell from 410 dollars to 238, 
later recovering by 10 per cent. The prices of other 
edible oils have also continued to decline more or less 
in the same proportion. At this level production in 
Uruguay can only compete with difficulty on the 
international market. In mid-1952, there were stocks 
in Mongevideo of 10,000 tons of sunflower-seed oil, 
the cost price of which stood at 0.99 Uruguayan peso 
per kg. At the same time it was not possible, on the 
basis of the preferential rate of exchange of 2.35 pesos 
per dollar, to sell it abroad for more than 0.62 peso. 
7 In 1951, it represented 368 million dollars. 
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Chapter XII 
IRON AND S T E E L IN T H E TRADE OF T B E ZONE 
1. Introduction 
Apart from the traditional commodities which 
form the pattern of inter-Latin-American trade, one 
of the best possibilities for the expansion of such trade 
appears to lie in the new iron and steel industries. 
The establishment and development of domestic steel-
making industries and the progress made in certain 
branches of the steel-transforming industry open the 
way for such an expansion. 
Numerous factors would have to be considered to 
provide a more accurate estimate of the real prospects 
for this trade. Among such factors, different aspects 
of the progress made by these industries in each 
country should be analysed to see whether they tend 
to be complementary, or whether, on the contrary, 
they are developing along parallel lines with each 
country seeking self-sufficiency. The expansion possi-
bilities for these industries in each country of the 
zone must also be considered and compared with the 
prospects for demand in order to ascertain which 
countries in the zone might be able to count on export-
able surpluses and which would continue to depend— 
at least partially—upon imports. In addition, research 
is required into some economic factors, such as costs, 
freight charges and other elements which influence 
export prices and market competition with products 
from industrial countries with higher production 
standards. 
Detailed consideration of all these factors is beyond 
the framework of this study, and the observations 
made here are in fact a summary of the material con-
tained in the studies submitted by the Executive 
Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America to the Expert Working Group on the Iron 
and Steel Industry in Latin America, held in Bogotá 
in October 1952.1 These documents examine, in their 
different phases, some of the factors noted above. In 
addition, as an annex to this chapter, a special study 
on the iron and steel trade between Argentina and 
Chile has been added. 
2. Present consumption of finished iron and 
steel products 
The combined annual consumption of the seven 
countries in the zone amounted to nearly 2,400,000 
tons of finished steel in 1951. Of this some 1,100,000 
tons were consumed by Argentina, about 900,000 by 
Brazil, 210,000 by Chile and 104,000 by Uruguay, 
while the combined figure for the remaining countries 
—Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru—did not reach 90,000 
1 These studies were: L.86, "Factors influencing iron and steel 
consumption in Latin America"; L.87, "Influence of local factors 
on the iron and steel industry in Latin America"; L.88, "Structure 
of the steel-transforming industry in Latin America"; and L.91, 
"Influence of the size of the markets on iron and steel industry 
in Latin America". 
tons. Three of the seven—Argentina, Brazil and Chile 
—were able to rely on relatively large domestic sup-
plies, totalling slightly over 1,100,000 tons of finished 
steel annually, while the others depended exclusively 
upon imports, amounting to 1,250,000 tons in 1951. 
A very small proportion of this total corresponds to 
intra-zonal trade, so that the zone's over-all con-
sumption consists largely of imports from other areas 
(about 55 per cent). 
The zone's production, import and consumption 
figures for finished steel are shown in table 98. 
T A B L E 9 8 . A P P A R E N T CONSUMPTION O F I R O N AND 
S T E E L IN T H E ZONE 2 . 
Country 
Production Imports Consumption 





Argentina 300 800 1,100 63 
Brazil 702 196 898 17 
Chile 120 90 210 35 
Bolivia — 15 15 5 
Paraguay — 10 10 7 
Peru — 60 60 10 
Uruguay 12 92 104 43 
TOTAL 1,134 1,263 2,397 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
a The figures are for 1951 in the case of Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
and Uruguay, and correspond approximately to consumption for 
1948 or 1949 in the case of Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru. 
A large proportion of the total finished steel con-
sumption was made up of bars and sections, the 
relative importance of this group of products having 
amounted in 1945-49 to nearly 43 per cent in Argen-
tina, slightly over 37 per cent in Brazil and about 45 
per cent in Chile. Wire and by-products thereof (nails, 
bolts, etc.) accounted for about 15 per cent of total 
consumption, while the proportion for rails and rail-
way accessories ranged from 6 per cent in Argentina 
to 14 per cent in Brazil with tubing accounting for 
9 per cent of the whole. Flat products have been ac-
quiring greater relative importance, although the 
proportions vary to a marked extent from one coun-
try to another, mainly as a reflexion of the uneven 
development of the transforming industries. Con-
sumption of plate and sheet during the period men-
tioned amounted to 17.9 per cent of total consumption 
in Argentina, 15.7 per cent in Brazil and 11.8 per cent 
in Chile, the proportions for tinplate being 7.1, 9.5 
and 5.8 per cent respectively. They are undoubtedly 
lower for both types in Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru. 
The following figures give an approximate idea of 
present consumption of the various types of products 
within the zone: 
99 
Estimated consumption 
(thousands of tons) 
Rails and accessories . . . . 160 
Bars, sections, etc 890 
Wire and wire products . 350 




As regards the present position of the countries 
which have some domestic production of finished 
steel, Argentina, in the first place, has had no inte-
grated steel industry up to the present and tended 
to develop rolling mills based on domestic supplies of 
scrap, on charcoal pig iron (from the Zapla plant) 
and on imports of billets and pig iron. Consequently 
it is even more dependent upon imports than is indi-
cated in table 98. 
Brazil has achieved greater development in iron 
and steel-making than any other country in the zone 
and there are several companies operating plants 
based on charcoal, while one major enterprise is based 
•on coke, the Volta Redonda plant. This plant in 1951 
produced just over 340,000 tons of finished steel, 
mainly plate and sheet, tinplate, bars and sections, 
and rails. Fairly large export figures for billets were 
also recorded for Brazil during 1947 and 1948, owing 
to a production surplus over and above the local 
rolling capacity of those years. 
Finally, since 1950, when the Huachipato plant was 
inaugurated, Chile became the second country in the 
.zone to produce pig iron. By 1951, production for 
the domestic market amounted to nearly 120,000 tons 
of finished steel, that is, over 55 per cent of the coun-
try's total consumption; over and above this figure, 
some exports should be added, mainly to Argentina 
and the United States and, on a lesser scale, to 
Uruguay and Peru. 
It may be concluded from these figures that at 
present none of the countries in the zone has any 
surplus production of finished steel which might be 
•exported to other countries in the region. Although 
some inter-Latin-American transactions in iron and 
steel products have taken place in recent years, this 
has not been due to the existence of real export sur-
pluses, but rather to the need for procuring some 
essential products from the other country, in exchange 
for which it was necessary to deliver goods of com-
parable importance.2 
3. Prospects for expanding consumption 
In addition to the inadequacy of domestic pro-
duction to meet the consumption of the zone, there 
is the additional fact that in all the countries there 
appear to be prospects for a considerable increase in 
such consumption over the next two years. This pri-
marily is due to the fact that present per capita con-
sumption figures are unduly low, even on the basis 
of the individual level of income. Actually, steel con-
sumption for every 100 dollars of national income is 
considerably lower in these countries than, for 
example, in most of Europe. 
In the second place, finished steel consumption over 
the past twenty-five years has, in general, followed a 
downward trend and such a trend could scarcely con-
2 The export of some Huachipato products to Argentina is a 
typical example of this.type of transaction, intended to compen-
sate purchases of edible oils made by Chile in that country. 
3 Document L.86. The reasons for this unfavourable develop-
ment were analysed in some detail and it became evident that a 
similarly adverse development in the capacity to import had 
prevented maintaining a level of iron and steel imports com-
parable with that for the period 1925-29. 
tinue in the future without severely hampering the 
economic development of the countries in the zone. 
In Argentina, for instance, per capita consumption of 
finished steel fell from 107 kgs. per inhabitant in 
1905-09 and from 96 kgs. in 1910-14 to 81 kgs. in 
1925-29, to 48 in 1935-39, recovering only to 58 in 
1950-51. In the meanwhile it fell to little more than 
20 kgs. per capita (1940-44). In Brazil it was only in 
1950, after considerable development of domestic pro-
duction, that the per capita consumption figure for 
the years prior to the crisis was surpassed; but the 
consumption level is still so low that large sectors of 
the country remain outside it. In Chile, in turn, per 
capita consumption had fallen from 37.7 kgs. a year, 
during the period 1925-29, to 28.9 kgs. in 1947-51, 
that is, there was a reduction of 23.4 per cent.3 In 
Uruguay, by contrast, apparent per capita con-
sumption rose from 30 to 43 kgs. between 1948 and 
1951. 
As the result of this unfavourable trend, finished 
steel consumption has fallen behind in relation to the 
factors determining demand. For instance, it has not 
maintained a rate similar to that for income and the 
relationship between steel consumption and industrial 
production has declined considerably, particularly 
when it is remembered that, for manufacturing output 
as a whole, iron and steel-transforming industries 
show the most rapid growth in recent years. Further-
more, consumption of some iron and steel products 
has not increased on a level with certain specific 
requirements: consumption of bars and sections in-
creases more slowly than activity in the building 
industry; the canning industries develop much more 
rapidly than tinplate consumption; whereas con-
sumption of rails and railway accessories has not even 
been sufficient to cover replacements. 
In some cases such discrepancies may be partly 
explained by technological progress (reduction of the 
quantity of steel needed for construction work, the 
use of thinner tinplate, the manufacture of larger con-
tainers) or by the use of substitute products (asbestos-
cement sheets and tubes, glass or cardboard 
containers). 
These factors all combine to indicate that potential 
demand is much higher than the actual figures for 
consumption, so that considerable increases over 
present consumption levels must be anticipated under 
more favourable supply conditions. The difficulties 
in making a quantitative estimate covering the influ-
ence of some of these factors make it very difficult to 
attempt any forecast of future consumption figures. 
Generally speaking, there would appear to be broader 
prospects in Brazil due to the present low level, and 
in Argentina where considerably greater consumption 
might be anticipated from the high level of income; 
in Chile, on the other hand, there seems to be more 
likelihood of satisfying the potential demand on the 
domestic market. With regard to the rest of the coun-
tries in the zone there has to. date been no study 
conducive to a closer understanding of the extent of 
the lag in consumption and prospects for future 
growth.4 
4 An approximate idea might probably be obtained from the 
steel consumption figures per 100 dollars of national income, 
which in recent years have amounted to 9 kgs. in Bolivia, lO 
kgs. in Peru and 16 kgs. in Uruguay, whereas the comparable 
figures for Argentina, Brazil and Chile are respectively 19, 21 and 
26 kgs. (Figures taken from Economic Factors Affecting the Con-
sumption and Production of Iron and Steel in Latin America, 
E/CN. 12/293, Economic Commission for Latin America, United 
Nations, 1953.) 
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4. Possibilities for establishing or expanding 
domestic industries 
Insufficient domestic production in relation to the 
present finished steel consumption in the zone, on the 
one hand, and future prospects of intense increase in 
the demand for these products, on the other, would 
appear to be negative factors for the possibility of 
expanding inter-Latin-American trade in these items. 
Together with these prospects for an increase in the 
demand for iron and steel, it is necessary to consider 
those offered by the establishment of new steel-making 
industries or the expansion of those already existing. 
In general, these are new industries in which the coun-
tries in the zone have as yet barely taken the first 
steps and where there appear to be great possibilities 
for future development. 
In Argentina, as mentioned earlier, the trend has 
been towards the installation of rolling mills using 
domestic supplies of scrap, imports of billets and pig 
iron plus a small output from the Zapla plant. 
Present expansion plans are directed mainly along 
two main lines: first, pig-iron production at Zapla is 
to be expanded, always on the basis of charcoal; 
secondly, it is planned to install an integrated plant 
at San Nicolás, details of which are included in the 
annex to this chapter. 
In Brazil, most of the possibilities for increasing 
local output lie in the plans for expanding the Volta 
Redonda plant. The first stage of these plans would 
raise production to 680,000 tons a year of steel billet 
(about 460,000 tons of finished products, as against 
the 1951 output of 340,000 tons), with the long-term 
aim of reaching a million tons, that is, some 750,000 
tons of finished steel, of which a large proportion will 
be made up of sheet, heavy plate and tinplate. 
Together with the expansion of this and other existing 
industries, new plants are also being installed. These 
new plants include one at Belo Horizonte, which will 
specialize in the production of seamless tubes and 
special steels, having an initial capacity of 80,000 tons 
a year but capable of expansion later to 400,000 tons; 
another in Sao Paulo, yith a production capacity of 
260,000 tons annually of finished steel, and a third 
of similar capacity in Santos. 
Chile is currently engaged in carrying out an invest-
ment plan, amounting to some 12 million dollars, for 
the purpose of expanding the Huachipato plant.5 
This would increase production, under the best oper-
ating conditions, to some 400,000 tons a year of steel 
billet, or about 300,000 tons a year of finished steel. 
The capacity of the Corral plant is also being ex-
panded; this plant, which operates with charcoal, is 
expected to reach a blast-furnace output of 29,000 
tons a year, while it is also planned to establish a 
foundry with an annual production of 12,000 tons of 
light and heavy products. A rather more remote pros-
pect under consideration is that of building a second 
blast furnace for the Huachipato plant. 
Finally, Peru is the fourth country in the zone 
having the basic raw material for establishing an 
integrated steel industry. There is, in fact, plenty of 
iron ore, the most important deposit being at Marcona 
with a preliminary proved reserve of 40 million tons 
5 The plan provides for the establishment of new storage yards 
for raw materials, expansion of the coking plant, installation of a 
sintering plant for using fines, installation of a mixer, of a Besse-
mer converter, and a third Siemens-Martin furnace, as well as 
expansion of the rolling mill installations. 
and probable reserves of 170 million tons of 58 grade 
ore. There are also considerable coal reserves of a 
broadly varying range. The installation of a steel plant 
using electric reduction furnaces is currently under 
consideration; annual production capacity would be 
53,000 tons of finished steel including 15,000 tons of 
sheet. An alternative solution would be to operate on 
a larger scale using a blast furnace providing there 
were serious possibilities for export. In this case, metal-
lurgical coke could be obtained using local anthracites 
blended with petroleum asphalt. 
By contrast, Bolivia and Paraguay appear to have 
no immediate prospects for developing their own steel 
industries, due both to their small domestic markets 
and their much more unfavourable position for the 
availability of raw materials. 
5. Prospects for intra-Lat in-American trade 
Some general conclusions of the possibilities for 
achieving a fairly large zonal trade in these products 
may be gleaned from the foregoing observations con-
cerning the demand prospects for iron and steel 
products in each of the countries in the zone and for 
establishing or expanding local steel industries. . 
Two of the seven cpuntries in the zone—Bolivia 
and Paraguay—will undoubtedly continue to import 
all their iron and steel products and they therefore 
constitute potential markets for the steel industries 
of the other countries. Although their present con-
sumption is relatively small, it must be recalled that 
it has been limited by the capacity to import and does 
not reflect the real extent of domestic requirements, 
which tend to rise. Consequently, there might be a 
considerable expansion of consumption in these coun-
tries, particularly if they could obtain larger quan-
tities of iron and steel by means of agreements without 
further burdening their capacity to import. 
The execution of plans for the installation and ex-
pansion of Argentine steel industries would place that 
country in a position to produce a large part of the 
finished steel used there at present, thus sharply 
reducing imports. Nevertheless, the need for a sub-
stantial expansion in present consumption leads to 
the assumption that even so Argentina will continue 
to import a considerable tonnage of iron and steel, 
either in the shape of finished products or of pig iron 
for rolling within the country. 
In Brazil, development plans for steel production 
reach figures well above the level of present con-
sumption, but here again there are such broad pros-
pects for expanding the domestic market in this coun-
try that it is unlikely there will be any appreciable 
export surplus at least for some time. Consequently, 
Brazil can rapidly achieve self-sufficiency in terms of 
iron and steel, except for special products which, for 
economic reasons, will continue to be imported from 
areas with specialized production; but it will probably 
not be an exporter on any considerable scale to other 
countries in Latin America, except for those items in 
which Brazilian steel-making might specialize, such 
as seamless tubes or the production of ferro-alloys 
and special steels. 
The picture is much the same in Chile, within the 
framework of the more immediate expansions and 
improvements at Huachipato. The Chilean domestic 
market probably has sufficient potential capacity to 
absorb a higher output which, under optimum con-
ditions, could be achieved with the investments cur-
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rently being made. The installation of a second blast 
furnace at Huachipato would, however, lead to a pro-
duction level considerably above domestic market 
requirements, thus providing surpluses which could 
be used for trade with other countries of the zone. 
With regard to Peru, prospects for inter-Latin-
American trade ultimately depend on the decisions to 
be adopted concerning the size of the projected steel 
plant. A domestic output of 53,000 tons of finished 
steel per year would approximately cover the country's 
present consumption, always remembering that im-
ports of some special products from other areas would 
have to continue. But the growing demand trend and 
the impulse to achieve a consumption more in har-
mony with its income level may result in this output 
being insufficient even within a relatively short period, 
so that there will eventually be new import require-
ments. If, on the other hand, a larger plant is con-
sidered, it could meet domestic requirements more 
fully and provide exportable surpluses for other 
countries of the region. 
Thus, prospects for inter-Latin-American trade in 
primary iron and steel products during the next few 
years are confined to trade possibilities between Chile 
and Peru, as countries which will eventually export, 
and Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, which 
will continue to have recourse to imports; such imports 
might be partially covered by the first two countries. 
This is a very general conclusion, since it is still 
necessary to analyse the influence of the economic 
factors which have already been mentioned and which 
would determine whether these trade possibilities 
could, in fact, take definite shape. Furthermore, up 
to the present it has been assumed that there would 
be a parallel development of the existing or planned 
steel industries—as has in fact occurred—in the four 
producing countries in the zone; the possibility should 
also be considered of a combined development in these 
industries, tending towards specialization in given 
f x r n / s c r i f t - \ r r t r l 
« j i p i v u u ^ t o . 
A brief outline of some of the additional factors to 
be considered is given below. 
(a) PRODUCTION COSTS AT VARIOUS S ITES AND FREIGHT 
COSTS 
Price is naturally one of the determining factors of 
the possibilities for trade in iron and steel products, 
since such trade will always be conducted in compe-
tition with exporters from other areas. Ignoring a 
series of less important items, steel production costs 
in the various zonal countries depends fundamentally 
upon two types of factors: locational ones—mainly 
including assembly costs which in turn depend upon 
the location of the basic raw materials and their 
quality—and wage costs; secondly, those relating to 
the size of the steel plants to be established. Freight 
costs must be added to production costs in the differ-
ent locations and for the varying sizes of plant, in 
order to- compare the selling prices of these products 
elsewhere in the zone in relation to the prices for those 
obtainable from other regions. 
6 Apart from production capacity, a number of factors are 
assumed, for purposes of comparison, to be equal for the various 
plants; among them, operations at full capacity is assumed as 
well as production of the same assortment of finished products, 
together with identical transport costs per ton-kilometre, identical 
productivity of labour, similar costs for equipment in the Latin-
American countries, such costs being 20 per cent higher than 
those of the United States, and so forth. 
Document L.87 gives detailed calculations providing 
an appreciation of the position of some countries in 
the zone as regards the influence of locational factors 
upon steel production costs. For this purpose some 
imaginary plants were selected at different sites, 
having the same production capacity6 (250,000 tons 
of finished steel a year), and these are compared with 
a similar plant located at Sparrows Point in the 
United States. For Argentina an imaginary plant is 
assumed to be located at San Nicolás, using domestic 
ore from Sierra Grande and imported coking coal; for 
Brazil, Vol ta Redonda is selected, using domestic ore 
from Lafaieta, while the coke would be obtained from 
a blend of 70 per cent of coal imported from the 
United States and 30 per cent of domestic coal from 
Santa Catarina; for Chile the plant is located at Hua-
chipato, using domestic ore from El Tofo, with 85 
per cent of Chilean coal blended with 15 per cent of 
coal imported from the United States; whereas the 
Peruvian plant is assumed to be located at Chimbóte, 
using ore from the Peruvian deposit at Marcona, and 
for the coke, 85 per cent of domestic anthracites from 
El Santo blended with 15 per cent of imported asphalt. 
The Sparrows Point plant taken as a basis for com-
parison is assumed to be operating with Venezuelan 
ore from El Pao and domestic coal.7 
A comparison of production costs in these plants 
shows clearly the degree of relative advantage which 
each of the countries may have on the exclusive basis 
of locational factors. At a second stage these calcula-
tions are adjusted to the size of the plants according 
to the approximate size of the respective real markets. 
Thus, the Argentine plant at San Nicolás is assumed 
to have an annual capacity for 850,000 tons of finished 
steel (which exceeds current plans in that country). 
The Volta Redonda plant is assigned 716,000 tons; 
the Huachipato plant, 230,000; two alternatives are 
considered for Chimbóte: 50,000 and 150,000 tons a 
year; whereas Sparrows Point has been assigned an 
annual capacity of 1 million tons, this being considered 
to be more or less the best size, beyond which no 
considerable reductions in production costs are 
achieved. 
The results of these calculations are summarized 
in table 99. 
The calculations for plants of equal size show, on 
the basis of the assumptions used in the paper, the 
advantages in relation to Sparrows Point which would 
be enjoyed by Huachipato and Chimbóte, and even 
by San Nicolás and Volta Redonda, if freight costs 
from the United States to Rio de Janeiro and Buenos 
Aires are added, these having been estimated at be-
tween 18 and 22 dollars per ton of finished steel. By 
contrast, the difference between production costs at 
San Nicolás and those of Huachipato and Chimbóte 
appears to exceed the value of the freights required for 
transporting products from these plants to the Argen-
tine market. 
A calculation for the adjusted plants allows an ap-
preciation of the great influence exerted by the size of 
the plants on production costs. While, in absolute 
terms, the decline in unit costs is more marked in the 
steel mill and rolling processes than at the pig-iron 
stage, the proportionate reduction at that stage is 
greater, as may be seen from the curves representing 
1 1maginary plants are also assumed for Colombia, Mexico and 
Venezuela, but these are not considered here as this study is 
concerned only with the southern zone at this stage. 
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T A B L E 9 9 . I R O N AND S T E E L PRODUCTION COSTS I N 
S E L E C T E D IMAGINARY PLANTS 
(Dollars of 1948 per ton) 
Similar plants* 
Pis Steel Finished 
Location xron billet steel 
San Nicolás . . 48.5 64.4 105.3 
Vol ta Redonda . . 46.8 62.1 102.1 
Huachipato . . 32.2 46.2 83.6 
Chimbóte . . 31.1 44.9 81.8 
Sparrows Point 35.9 52.6 100.2 
Plants appropriate to size 
of marketb 
Pig Steel Finished 
Location iron billet steel 
San Nicolás (850,000 tons) . . 43.0 56.7 91.7 
Vol ta Redonda (716,000 tons) .. 39.0 51.4 85.4 
Huachipato (230,000 tons) . . 30.3 44.2 82.4 
Chimbóte (50,000 tons) . 37.8 53.9 102.2 
Chimbóte (150,000 tons) . . 31.9 47.3 89.6 
Sparrows Point (1,000,000 tons) . . . . . 27.6 40.1 72.4 
Sparrows Point (500,000 tons) . . 33.5 47.6 84.0 
Sparrows Point (250,000 tons) . . 36.5 53.4 100.9 
Sparrows Point (50,000 tons) 53.3 77.2 155.0 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
» For 250,000 tons. 
b The basis of calculation for the plants appropriate to the size 
of the market do not coincide exactly with those for the plants 
of equal size, mainly because the possibilities of operating with 
reduced maritime freight rates have been considered. 
unit costs corresponding to the different capacities 
expressed as a percentage of those for the 50,000-ton 
plant.8 
Calculations for the plants of unequal size show that 
the costs for the four imaginary locations in the zone 
would be higher than those for the million-ton plant 
at Sparrows Point; but these differences would, even 
in the case of the San Nicolás plant, be less than the l 
costs at Sparrows Point, if freight charges from the 
United States were added. The only exception is 
Chimbóte, with a 50,000-ton capacity, because its 
small scale would completely offset the locational ad-
vantages, except those resulting from the use of cheap 
hydro-electric power. 
These figures, with all their imperfections and pro-
visos, do permit a more realistic approach to the ful-
filment of the prospects for the inter-Latin-American 
trade already mentioned. 
Thus, the possibility of a surplus production of pig 
iron arising in Chile and being exported to Argentina 
is justified from the economic point of view by a con-
siderable difference in the probable costs at both 
locations. Actually the difference amounts to almost 
13 dollars (of 1948) per ton of pig iron—this figure 
being probably higher than that for the necessary 
transport costs—when San Nicolás is assigned an an-
nual production capacity of 850,000 tons as against 
230,000 for Huachipato. As indicated earlier, the ex-
pansion plans for the San Nicolás plant aim at a lower 
figure, while Chile will not have an exportable surplus 
unless it achieves a capacity considerably higher than 
that assigned to it. But these corrections, in both cases, 
would tend to accentuate the difference. By increasing 
its capacity, Huachipato would also tend to have pig-
8 Nevertheless, between 250,000 and 500,000 tons the reduction 
is more marked in the steel mill and rolling mill processes than at 
the pig iron stage: 25 per cent in the first, and only 20 per cent . 
in the second. 
iron production costs which would at least be no higher 
than those for the imaginary plant at Sparrows Point 
(with a capacity of a million tons) so that it would be 
able to compete favourably on the Argentine market, 
particularly if a reduction in maritime freights were 
obtained. 
On the other hand, the Chilean steel industry is 
approaching a critical stage as regards expansion pos-
sibilities. In fact, once the blast furnace at Huachipato 
is operating at full capacity, any increase in domestic 
market requirements will have to be met by pig-iron 
imports or by the installation of a second blast furnace, 
which, if it does not operate at full capacity but is 
confined simply to meeting the deficit on the domestic 
market, would cause a higher production cost for pig 
iron, instead of bringing about a reduction thereof. 
The only possibility for achieving a reduction would 
lie in operating at full capacity and creating a surplus 
which could be placed on foreign markets. This em-
phasizes the need for long-term arrangements made in 
advance. 
In the case of Peru, the benefits to be derived from 
a higher production capacity with the aim of exporting 
part of the pig-iron production are even more evident, 
since this plant is at a sector in the cost curve where 
the reductions are proportionately stronger as the size 
of the plant increases. The transition from a plant with 
a capacity of 50,000 tons to one with a capacity of 
150,000 tons9 would reduce the cost of pig iron—under 
the conditions assumed for the hypothetical plants— 
to a figure closely approaching that for Huachipato, 
adding in freight costs for transport to Argentina 
which, for special reasons, would probably be no 
higher than those from Chile. 
Apart from the direct advantages for Argentina of 
being able to import pig iron from Chile and Peru at 
prices below those of its own domestic production or 
those obtainable in other areas, consideration must 
also be given to the indirect effect upon rolling-mill 
costs of being able to expand the steel and rolling mills 
beyond the limits of domestic primary production. 
Similarly, Chile and Peru, by increasing their produc-
tion capacity, could not only achieve pig-iron costs 
enabling them to compete on foreign markets, but 
could also cause the pig iron intended for rolling within 
the country to be cheaper, thus reducing finished 
product costs for the domestic market. 
(B ) P O S S I B I L I T I E S FOR SPECIALIZATION 
Even under these conditions, inter-Latin-American 
trade prospects appear limited to the probable export 
of finished steels to Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, of 
pig iron from Chile and Peru to Uruguay and Argen-
tina, this latter country having broad prospects for 
expanding the rolling-mill capacity, but with more 
restricted prospects for primary production. Up to this 
point, greater intra-regional trade in iron and steel 
products is compatible with parallel development of 
the local steel-making industries, with no mutual rela-
tionship beyond that arising from the various natural 
conditions in each country. Nevertheless, considera-
tion should also be given to the possibility of the co-
ordinated development of regional iron and steel 
9 Among current projects in Peru, consideration has been given 
to the question of establishing a plant with an annual capacity 
for 180,000 tons of pig iron, 130,000 of which would be for export, 
while 50,000 would be finished within the country for the domestic 
market. 
industries, tending towards specialization in specific 
types of products. 
While one of the features of the existing or projected 
industries in the zone is the tendency to produce the 
broadest possible assortment of finished steel, such 
wide diversification cannot be achieved in many cases, 
except at a considerable sacrifice in the cost or quality 
of the products. In fact, domestic markets are insuffi-
cient to justify production of some finished steel under 
really economic conditions. The use of modern equip-
ment designed for large-scale production requires a 
heavy investment which adversely affects production 
costs if the capacity is only partially used. Therefore, 
it is usual to find more antiquated equipment, and the 
opportunity is lost of achieving more satisfactory out-
put and quality.10 
Present consumption figures for some types of prod-
uct underline this deficiency, even bearing in mind the 
previous statement that all the countries in the zone 
have a higher potential demand than the present levels 
of consumption. For example, none of these countries 
has a rail consumption approaching 100,000 tons a 
year, a figure corresponding to about the minimum for 
satisfactory production; combined consumption for all 
seven countries may currently be estimated at only 
some 160,000 tons. Argentina is considering a plan for 
re-rolling existing rails instead of replacing them. 
The consumption of thin sheets and tinplate is some-
what similar, since only the sum of several local mar-
kets together could probably justify the installation 
of a continuous strip mill and the necessary auxiliary 
plant for production under optimum conditions.11 
In any event, these are considerations of a very 
general nature which would have to be analysed in 
detail from the point of view of the minimum size for 
the necessary installations, for the possible locations, 
for transport costs, and so forth, requiring considerable 
background information which is not currently avail-
able. 
(C) N E T F O R E I G N E X C H A N G E D E R I V E D F R O M IRON AND 
S T E E L E X P O R T S 
The small net revenue in foreign exchange which 
may accrue from iron and steel exports made by some 
countries in the zone has an adverse bearing on intra-
regional trade prospects for this type of commodity. In 
actual fact, production of pig iron or finished steel 
intended for export implies for the exporting countries 
a foreign exchange outlay which may amount to a 
considerable proportion of the cost of such products. 
This is partly due to the fact that the countries in 
the zone have no coal of the quality required for ob-
taining metallurgical coke and therefore must import 
some of the fuel for the blast furnaces.12 The most 
important factor is, however, that iron and steel re-
quires a much higher capital investment than most 
other branches of industry, so that amortization and 
interest charges have a heavy bearing on production 
costs. This need for a heavy capital investment per 
unit of value added in the production process is one of 
the distinctive features of the steel industry. 
10 The quality of the products is very important when, for 
instance, it is a case of supplying some transforming industries, 
which require very strict specifications, and are difficult to obtain 
unless up-to-date rolling equipment is available. 
11 The combined consumption of the seven countries is at 
present some 500,000 tons of sheet of all kinds and slightly over 
200,000 tons of tinplate. 
Whether the installation or expansion of plants, 
aimed at producing exportable surpluses, is financed 
by means of national savings or by foreign loans, it 
will be necessary in both cases to account for a con-
siderable pressure on the country's foreign exchange 
resources, either for the purchase of equipment abroad 
or for servicing the loans. 
Bearing in mind both these and less important fac-
tors, it may be estimated, according to figures in the 
ECLA documents already quoted, that the proportion 
of production costs corresponding to expenditure in 
foreign currency would be around 43 per cent in the 
imaginary plants of Volta Redonda, Huachipato and 
Chimbote.13 
Once again, this is also an aspect of the problem 
upon which the size of the plants or the possibilities for 
specialization have a considerable bearing. In fact, a 
reduction in costs, that can be achieved thereby, arises 
mainly from the relatively lower charges for amortiza-
tion and interest on the plant required. Thus, the 
importance of the capital intensity required per unit 
of value added tends to decline rapidly as the size of 
the plant is increased or as the use of more modern 
rolling equipment is considered on the basis of wider 
operations. An idea of the influence of the size of the 
plants upon the relative reduction of the capital re-
quired may be obtained from the following figures, 
estimated for the imaginary plant at Sparrows Point, 
which correspond to capital investments per ton of 
finished steel: 
Capital investments (dollars of 1948) 
Capacity -
(tons per year) Blast furnace Steel mill Rolling mill 
50,000 102 62 222 
250,000 87 55 175 
500,000 74 41 163 
1,000,000 72 40 157 
Thus, while the outlay in foreign exchange forms a 
high proportion of the steel cost, tending to reduce 
any interest in exporting it as a source of foreign cur-
rency revenue, this factor's adverse influence is par-
tially offset by the fact that plant expansion would be 
necessary to provide exportable surpluses, implying a 
reduction of the incidence of this type of outlay on 
production costs. 
6. Iron and steel-transforming industries 
From the foregoing it may be concluded that pros-
pects for achieving any substantial inter-Latin-Ameri-
can trade in primary iron and steel products depend 
to a large degree on the planning for a co-ordinated 
development of domestic steel industries. A difficulty 
arises here, since some plants already operating in 
certain zonal countries—and others being constructed 
—were planned on the basis of domestic market re-
quirements, without any consideration being given 
from the beginning to the potential prospects of intra-
regional trade. In this connexion, the position is much 
more favourable as regards the trade prospects for 
items from the iron and steel transforming industry, 
which have been initiated more recently and offer 
12 As stated earlier, for the cost calculations of the imaginary 
plants it was assumed that Huachipato would have to operate 
with 15 per cent of coal imported from the United States, and 
Chimbote with 15 per cent imported asphalt. 
13 Calculated on the basis of annual capacities of 716,000, 
230,000 and 50,000 tons of finished steel, respectively. I t includes, 
apart from amortization costs and interest, imported fuels, pay-
ments to foreign technical staff and other minor items. 
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broader prospects for future development.14 Further-
more, these industries have some general features 
which might be considered as a greater incentive to 
inter-Latin-American trade, such as: 
(a) Greater difficulty in achieving economic produc-
tion based only on domestic markets; 
(ib) A relatively smaller intensity of capital than in 
the primary industry; 
(c) A lesser incidence of transport costs upon the 
value of the end products. 
It is difficult to obtain reasonably exact information 
concerning the minimum sizes which might be con-
sidered for the economic production of specific prod-
ucts of the transforming industry. Not even the degree 
of complexity of a given industry can be taken as an 
adequate indication. Simple industries may require a 
large market in order to achieve efficient production, 
while others, apparently more complicated, may 
operate satisfactorily on a smaller scale. On the other 
hand, it is neither easy to establish on the basis of the 
normal statistics, the actual scale of consumption of 
the various types of products in each country nor, 
therefore, to gain an appreciation of their potential 
requirements.15 In both cases, special research and 
surveys would have to be conducted in order to reach 
approximate conclusions. 
It is obvious that there are several products of the 
transforming industry for which, even a priori domes-
tic zonal markets would individually be insufficient to 
justify the establishment of a domestic industry. Any 
attempt in that direction would thus have to be based 
upon plants designed to satisfy more than one such 
market, thus leading to the need for specialization, 
at least in some branches of the transforming industry. 
Freight costs constitute one of the most important 
economic factors that might tend to limit these spe-
cialization prospects for increasing inter-Latin-Ameri-
can trade. Nevertheless, their effect upon the value of 
the end products is undoubtedly much less than upon 
primary iron and steel items, although, in many cases, 
the relative importance of freight costs does not 
depend merely on the relationship between value and 
weight, but also on the volume and nature of the mer-
chandise carried. This is another of the factors requir-
ing detailed research when specific possibilities for 
exchanging given products are being studied. 
With regard to the relative intensity of capital re-
quired, the difference between the primary iron and 
steel industry and the transforming industry is 
marked. Stress has already been laid on the fact that 
the first is essentially a heavy industry, in which about 
six tons of various raw materials are required for the 
production of one ton of finished steel, valued at 
about 100 dollars; for the second, in contrast, the value 
added is proportionately much higher in relation to the 
investments required. According to figures in docu-
ment L.88, the investment coefficients of various 
industrial groups, expressed as percentages of that 
corresponding to the manufacturing industry as a 
whole, amount in the United States (1945) to 140 for 
14 The manufacture of tubing and other relatively simple 
products is excluded here from the concept of a transforming 
industry because they are considered as part of primary industry. 
15 Foreign trade statistics, which might be the most logical 
basis for such appreciations, are not generally compiled in suffi-
cient detail. Items are, for instance, frequently found which 
include indiscriminately such products as machinery, tools and 
spares for farming, industry or mining. 
the primary production and transformation of iron and 
steel, whereas for secondary transformation the figure 
is only 54. Thus by contrast with the primary industry, 
there is little of the adverse influence of the intensity 
of capital required, in the case of providing exportable 
surpluses. 
Even within these statistical limitations, some im-
port figures may serve to illustrate the importance for 
the zone's economy of some sectors of the iron and 
steel-transforming industry. For instance, in 1947, 
when total imports, and particularly imports of capital 
goods, had reached one of the highest post-war levels, 
the countries in the zone assigned between 20 to 40 
per cent of their total imports to certain durable 
consumer goods, agricultural machinery, transport 
and communications machinery, and implements for 
industry in general. A broad idea of the significance 
of these imports to the region in terms of foreign 
exchange expenditure may be obtained from the 
figures in table 100.16 
These import figures are insufficient in most cases, 
when compared with the potential requirements for 
the various types of products. Document L.86 gives 
figures which reflect, for example, the extent of the 
delays in some zonal countries in replacing their rail-
way and transport equipment in general. That docu-
ment also stresses that in order to reach a level of 
imports sufficient to meet this delay and to enable a 
supply in accordance with the growing requirements 
due to economic development, it would be necessary 
to spend foreign exchange far in excess of the restricted 
capacity to import. The limited prospects for probable 
future increases in the capacity to import, in turn, 
emphasize the importance of developing domestic iron 
and steel transforming industries. 
The availability of raw materials was the first 
economic obstacle in the way of such development. In 
fact, any transforming industry based exclusively upon 
imports from other areas of the primary iron and steel 
products required as raw materials would be exposed 
to fluctuations in the primary industry of the exporting 
countries and to those in the capacity to import of the 
country concerned. This becomes very important for 
countries such as those in Latin America, which over 
the last twenty-five years have experienced two 
periods of heavy import reductions of finished steel. 
These were the crises of the thirties and during the 
Second World War. 
But this difficulty has been losing much of its im-
portance due to the establishment and development 
of domestic iron and steel industries, which have 
meant a future source of supply under more normal 
conditions. There is still the problem of the small size 
of the individual domestic markets in relation to the 
minimum size necessary for an economically justifiable 
output in various branches of the iron and steel trans-
forming industry. This second difficulty will probably 
only be overcome, in many cases, through co-ordina-
tion between one or more countries, tending towards 
specialization, and therefore towards a re-inforcement 
of inter-Latin-American trade. 
16 With the sole purpose of presenting relatively uniform figures, 
conversions to dollars have been made using the rates of exchange 
usually applied to total imports. The presentation of the figures 
in physical nits for the separate items is hampered because these 
products are consigned in units in some countries, and in tons in 
others. Furthermore, several products are included under the 
headings which do not strictly correspond to the iron and steel 
transforming industries, but rather to those of other materials. 
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T A B L E 1 0 0 . IMPORTS OF SOME PRODUCTS OF THE IRON AND S T E E L TRANSFORMING INDUSTRY 
IN THE SOUTHERN ZONE ( 1 9 4 7 ) 
(Thousands of dollars) 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Peru Uruguay Total 
A. Farm machinery and implements 
Tractors 7,262.7 . . 3,297.0 1,218.1 . . . . 1,353.0 
Threshers and harvesters 3,112.6 . . . . 152.4 . . . . 721.0 
Reapers . . . . . . 159.2 
Planters 501.2 . . . . 86.1 . . . . 94.0 
Ploughs and harrows 1,250.7 . . 1,243.2 415.5 . . . . 333.0 
Other machinery and imple-
ments 5,731.4 . . 2,756.6 1,193.8 . . 187.0 
TOTAL 17,858.6 721.6 7,296.8 3,225.1 556.9 4,991.3 2,688.0 37,338.3 
B. Transport and communication 
materials and equipment 
Lorries, chassis and accessories 118,926.3 3,547.8 87,831.2 5,155.7 226.2 8,322.3 10,434.0 
Railway freight cars . . } 
Passenger carriages for rail- } 82.8 15,242.1 4,718.7 . . 1,168.9 
ways 374.2 j 
Locomotives, autocars and 
their accessories 1,682.4 317.7 14,053.0 1,704.0 . . 1,118.4 
Sundries 45,543.8 927.8 61,508.9 7.935.8 371.8 2,531.5 7,701.0 
TOTAL 166,526.7 4,876.1 178,635.2 19,514.2 598.0 13,141.1 18,135.0 401,426.3 
C. Industrial machinery and 
equipment in general 146,834.2 5,488.6 175,176.0 28,591.6 852.4 17,471.7 18,646.0 393,060.5 
D. Durable consumer goods 
Automobiles and parts 45,143.1 562.6 49,942.2 6,968.2 732.0 3,861.8 6,762.0 
Electric appliances 8,141.7 494.3 42,915.7 1,865.5 110.7 1,154.4 774.0 
Others 13,711.4 261.8 7,567.0 658.3 364.0 595.4 2,046.0 
TOTAL 66,996.2 1,318.6 100,424.9 9,492.0 1,206.7 5,611.6 9,582.0 194,632.0 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
ANNEX 
Argentine-Chilean trade in iron and steel products and ferro-alloys 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1951 Chile began to export iron and steel prod-
ucts. These, at least until the end of the current 
decade, could satisfy requirements of the Argentine 
market for products which are still outside its policy 
of self-sufficiency. In turn, part of the surplus of the 
Chilean ferro-alloy industry might, as in the past, be 
absorbed by Argentina, where this type of manufac-
turing, so essential to the steel industry, does not exist. 
As in each case such goods are available from various 
sources, Chilean sales and their stability will depend 
on the competitive nature of their prices, which must 
struggle against the undervaluation of the exchange 
in Chile accruing from exports to Argentina.17 
During the last two years, the Chilean steel industry 
managed to begin and to maintain an export flow to 
Argentina, temporarily overcoming, by the means 
described below, the obstacle of under-valuation which 
is the main problem for the future of this trade. This 
has not been the case with ferro-alloys, in particular 
ferro-manganese, which has been exported to Argentina 
17 See the annex to chapter IV entitled "Effects of the absence 
of monetary parities between Argentina and Chile". 
since 1947. A steady decline has occurred in the ton-
nage of sales to the Argentine market, which was large 
some years ago but almost disappeared in 1951 and 
1952, at a time when this Chilean industry was ready 
for a substantial expansion to increase its exportable 
surplus considerably. 
Over the long term, unless there is some reciprocal 
agreement to co-ordinate specific stages of Argentine 
and Chilean iron and steel production and by-prod-
ucts, and to encourage an increase in the low level of 
iron and steel consumption in both countries, the 
parallel growth of their respective industries appears 
destined to reduce even further the collaboration of 
the Chilean steel industry in supplying the Argentine 
market. As outlined below, it is possible that the 
Chilean exports of primary steel products and those of 
rolled sheets will be welcomed there for many years, 
always providing that the reductions through currency 
under-valuation can be avoided. 
2 . CHILEAN PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS 
Chilean production and exports of iron and steel 
items during the last three years, and the production 
programme for 1953, may be seen from table 101. 
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T A B L E 1 0 1 . C H I L E : P R O D U C T I O N AND E X P O R T S O F IRON AND S T E E L I T E M S 
(Huachipato and Corral; in thousands of tons) 
1950 1951 1952 1953 
Production 
Products Production Exports Production Exports Production Exports forecast 
Foundry pig i ron . . . 9.2 7.5 92.3 72.9 33.0 17.4 100.0 
Steel scrap — — — — 6.0 — — 
Billet 1.0 1.0 4.0 4.0 12.6 1.4 — 
Products of the rod 
mill 12.0 2.4 73.9 9.1 90.0 12.7 90.0 
Products of the sheet 
mill 17.7 1.2 45.9 10.6 67.7 18.0 75.6 
Tubing 1.1 — 3.9 0.5 8.4 1.9 8.4 
TOTAL 41.0 12.0 220.0 97.1 217.7 51.4 274.0 
SOURCE: Compañía de Acero del Pacífico, Chile. 
NOTE: In addition to the output of Huachipato and Corral, there is that of INDAC and 
FAMAE, based exclusively on scrap. The first produces about 12,000 tons a year (10,000 tons of 
bars for concrete and 2,000 tons of alloys and other specialized items), and the second about 5,000 
tons of bars for concrete and strip. Other smaller cold-rolling industries finish products for 
Huachipato, to a total of about 500 tons a year. 
Table 101 shows that Chilean production of iron that the exportable surplus will, over the next few 
and steel has increased threefold since the middle of years, exceed the 9 7 , 2 0 9 tons for 1 9 5 1 . 
1950 as a result of the production at Huachipato. The Chilean domestic market for materials derived 
In 1 9 5 1 this plant delivered 2 1 9 , 9 3 4 tons, of which from the rod mill, particularly round bars for reinforced 
exports totalled 9 7 2 0 9 tons. For 19521 the Production c o n c r e t a m o u n t e d to 4 5 , 0 0 0 tons in 1 9 5 1 , although 
goal was set at 2 1 7 , 6 2 0 tons, and for 1 9 5 3 at 2 7 4 , 0 0 0 , o r i g m a l estimates made when the plant began to 
through enlargements to the steel mill enabling all the & „ „ ^ , , rrxrx , , , J " 
iron from the blast furnace to be converted into steel. ° P e r a t e a l l ? t t e ¿ ° n l y 3 7 ' 5 . 0 0 tonsfi t 0 d ° m e s t f con-
In 1953 development of the sheet mill will be almost sumption. In 1952, according to figures for the first 
finished, thus strengthening Chilean production in the t e n months, the total will not be less than 5 0 , 0 0 0 tons, 
least-developed branch of the Argentine industry. Furthermore, any increase in Chile's building index, 
Notwithstanding the new increase in Chilean pro- which has been steadily falling since 1947, would affect 
duction planned for 1953, it is foreseen as unlikely the domestic demand for bars, sections and tube 
T A B L E 1 0 2 . C H I L E : E X P O R T S OF IRON AND S T E E L 
(F.o.b. values in thousands of tons) 
Foundry pig iron Products of the rod mill Products of the sheet mill Tubing Total exports 
Thousand Thousand Thousand Thousand Thousand 
Tons dollars Tons dollars Tons dollars Tons dollars Tons dollars 
1950 " 
Argentina 1,012 64.4 502 47.0 48 6.5 — — 1,562 117.9 
Colombia — — — — — — — — — — 
Ecuador — — 357 23.6 236 27.4 — — 593 51.0 
United States 7,449 373.3 _ _ _ - — — _ 7,449 373.3 
Peru 10 0.6 1,557 100.1 946 111.2 — — — — 
Uruguay _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2,513 211.9 
TOTAL, 1950 8,471 483.3 2,416 170.7 1,230 145.1 — — 12,117 754.1 
1951 
Argentina 14,482 941.1 1,421 173.9 5,156 994.8 7,635 495.2 28,694 2,605.0 
Bolivia — — 336 48.2 — — — — 336 48.2 
Colombia — — 1,287 124.5 — — — — 1,287 124.5 
Ecuador — — 466 48.8 220 41.3 — — 686 90.1 
United States 53,374 2,674.8 — — 4,094 575.4 500 102.5 57,968 3,352.7 
Peru 10 0.7 5,623 443.5 1,161 209.9 — — 6,794 654.1 
Uruguay 1,444" 112.4» _ _ _ _ _ _ 1,444 i 1 2 . 4 
TOTAL, 1951 69,310 3,729.0 9,133 838.9 10,631 1,821.4 8,135 597.9 97,209 6,987.0 
1952 
Argentina 13,284 1,030.4 — — 16,446 3,181.1 — — 29,730 4,211.5 
Colombia — — 256 31.9 380 94.0 — — 636 125.9 
Ecuador — — 1,067 122.6 290 49.2 — — 1,357 171.8 
United States 1,325 67.0 — — — — 1,863 396.9 3,188 463.9 
Great Britain 2,800 170.9 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2,800 170.9 
Panama — — 14 1.8 4 0.6 — — 18 2.4 
Peru 20 1.7 11,352 1,383.3 885 202.3 — — 12,257 1,587.3 
TOTAL, 1952» 17,429 1,270.0 12,689 1,539.6 18,005 3,527.2 1,863 396.9 49,986 6,733.7 
SOURCE: Compañía de Acero del Pacífico, Chile. 
» Provisional figures, corresponding to real exports for the first eight months of the year, and for the last four to sales effected by 
Huachipato. 
b This export refers to billets. 
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strip.18 Indicating that any forecast as to the size of 
the exportable surplus during the next few years must 
be made with reserve, the competent authorities con-
sider that, after 1953, the surplus may be in the 
neighbourhood of 90,000 tons. 
Table 102 shows that the United States, the main 
purchaser of Chilean iron in 1951, bought 57,968 tons 
in that year, mostly pig iron, in transactions arising 
out of the rearmament emergency and having no nor-
mal future. The second client was Argentina, with 
28,964 tons, of which 19,555 tons were pig iron and 
the remainder billets and products of the steel mill, 
particularly sheet. By 1952 the United States was no 
longer a buyer. Great Britain purchased 2,800 tons of 
billet in an exceptional transaction due to a scrap 
shortage. The main client became Argentina, with 
29,730 tons, of which 16,446 tons were products of the 
sheet mill. Sales to Peru rose from 6,794 tons in 1951 
to 12,257 tons in 1952. Total exports to all destina-
tions amounted to 53,660 tons in 1952 compared with 
97,209 in 1951. 
For some years at least, Argentina will remain the 
most stable and important Latin-American market for 
placing Chilean steel output. For many years, Argen-
tina customarily bought the pig-iron surpluses from 
the charcoal blast furnace at Corral. The oft-expressed 
idea as to the incentive which co-operation in the 
steel-making field would provide for the economic 
development of both countries took concrete form in 
the treaty of December 1946, under the terms of which 
Argentine capital would be invested in Chilean enter-
prises designed to collaborate in supplying that coun-
try's iron and steel requirements.19 This agreement 
was not ratified by the Chilean Parliament. Later on, 
18 Notwithstanding the fall in the building index, the consump-
tion of round bars for reinforced concrete has increased in the last 
two years due to the proportionate increase, within the total 
figure for building, of large-size buildings, which require 50 to 70 
kgs. of iron per square metre, that is, two to three times the 
requirements for ordinary houses. 
19 According to the ideas on co-ordination, after a period of 
reciprocity to solve problems relating to the first stage of produc-
tion, the combined effort would enable the low consumption 
figures for iron and steel products in Argentina and Chile (table 
106) to be raised through the combined utilization of steel in the 
manufacture of equipment, transport material, tractors and 
so forth. 
the development of this industry in both countries 
has not been the subject of any new official attempt 
of a similar nature. 
3 . ARGE NTINE IMPORTS 
Tables 103 and 104 are indicative of current Argen-
tine requirements for iron and steel products. 
At the present rate of demand, Argentina should 
import about a million tons of iron and steel, apart 
from appliances, as indicated in tables 103 and 104. 
The first of these summarizes imports since 1939, by 
item. The second, by means of an estimate drawn up 
in Buenos Aires with the assistance of producers and 
distributors, shows that for the period July 1952 to 
June 1953, demand, which is affected by the decline 
in building, could be met with imports not exceeding 
836,000 tons. 
Within these figures and for its present require-
ments, Argentina must import 85,000 tons a year of 
pig iron of the type supplied by Chile,20 to which 
should be added that obtained from the domestic 
Palpala blast furnace (Zapla) which in 1950 produced 
18,000 tons of pig iron, rising to 35,000 in 1951.21 
(In September 1952, Fabricaciones Militares con-
tracted with Demag, Germany, for technical services, 
to the approximate value of a million dollars, to 
modernize this blast furnace and raise its capacity to 
70,000 tons.) With regard to billet, Argentina should 
import some 100,000 tons a year, both for re-rolling 
and for meeting the demand of those steel mills with a 
higher capacity than the blast furnaces. The demand 
will increase if the world shortage of scrap, together 
with the problems of foreign exchange, hamper scrap 
imports. The deficit could partly be met by the refining 
20 Argentine industry is interested in Chilean pig iron with the 
following composition: carbon, 3.5 per cent; silicon, 2.5 per cent; 
manganese, 0.4 per cent; phosphorus, 1.7 to 1.9 per cent; sulphur, 
0.05 per cent maximum. I t is also interested in a phosphorus 
content of 0.05 to 1.2 per cent. 
21 The price of the Zapla product has been steadily higher than 
for imports, although the difference almost disappeared in 1951, 
when the exchange rate for imports rose from 3.7313 to 5.50 
pesos. Domestic pig iron at 350 Argentine pesos, on the railway 
wagon at Palpala, in 1950 rose successively to 450,490 and 560, 
and in 1952 to 720 pesos in February and 785 in April, plus 208 
for carriage to Buenos Aires, that is, 993 pesos a ton in the capital. 
T A B L E 1 0 3 . ARGENTINA: IMPORTS OF IRON AND S T E E L PRODUCTS 
(In thousands of tons) 
Article 
Average Average 
1939 1940-1944 1945-1949 1950 1951 
Foundry pig iron 55.8 21.1 63.4 93.3 71.2 
Steel billets 0.1 — 36.7 163.6 180.5 
Round and square iron bars and small 
sheet (including rod) 173.6 50.3 61.6 81.9 51.9 
Sections 49.0 11.7 40.2 78.3 103.7 
Rod 14.6 1.1 21.4 15.7 18.7 
22.6 11.0 29.1 51.4 58.2 
Rails 16.5 1.4 37.2 15.7 30.6 
Wire 57.7 27.1 86.8 95.2 62.7 
Sheet iron 109.3 44.5 125.4 130.9 274.7 
Tinplate 66.3 60.6 52.2 58.7 85.4 
Unworked steel with over 0 . 4 % carbon 
in bars, sheet and small sheet 5.7 3.6 19.8 14.0 38.5 
Seamed and seamless iron piping. . . . 39.2 18.8 38.9 65.6 8.1 
Sundries 17.0 2.7 8.4 0.9 4.7 
TOTAL 627.4 253.9 621.1 865.2 988.7 
SOURCE: Dirección General del Servicio Estadístico Nacional, Buenos Aires. 
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process of Argentina's Siemens-Martin furnaces, using 
compact hematite obtainable from Brazil.22 
22 In 1951 and 1952, although Argentina offered high prices 
for some scrap consignments from the dismantling of various 
nitrate workings Chile did not grant export permits, because of 
its own deficient scrap supplies. Table 105 is typical of the 
development of scrap prices in Argentina. 
TABLE 104. ARGENTINA: ESTIMATE OF DEMAND, 
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS REQUIRED OF 
IRON AND STEEL IN THE PERIOD 1 9 5 2 - 5 3 
(In thousands of tons) 
Domestic Balance 
Estimated production to be 
Product demand forecast imported 
Foundry pig-iron 120 35 85 
Billet 100 — 100 
Iron in round bars for concrete and 
other uses; squares, small sheet, 
including 80,000 tons of rod. . . 300 260 40b 
Sections and angles 70 20 50 
Rod 30 10 20 
Strip 100 40 60 
Rails0 50 — 50 
Wires 120 100 20d 
Sheet iron 180 10 170 
Tinplate 65 — 85 
Unworked steel with over 0 .4% 
carbon in bars, sheet and small 
sheet, including tool steel 20 — 20 
Seamed and seamless tubes 95 45 50« 
Old iron • 170 70 100 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
• With regard to the potential possibilities of the Argentine 
market, it should be pointed out that per capita consumption in 
1951 was 68 kgs., which provides a high margin of growth, when 
compared with figures for the countries enumerated below, taken 
from the April 1952 issue of L'Ossature metallique, Brussels: 
1937 1950 
United States 420 628 
Great Britain 279 319 
Canada 208 312 
Belgium 222 255 
Germany 273 238 
France 166 169 
Russia 118 157 
(Chilean estimated consumption is 35 kgs. per capita.) 
b Not including round for concrete, in which Argentina is self-
sufficient. 
° In rails, accumulated extraordinary requirements are esti-
mated at not less than 100,000 tons. 
d 15,000 tons of unprocessed and processed wire and 5,000 tons 
of galvanized round and oval wire. 
e Seamless. This item can be heavily expanded, for tubing in 
petroleum workings. 
' The difficulty in importing, sharpened by the world shortage 
of old iron in recent years, may result in an increase in imports 
of billet. 
T A B L E 105. ARGENTINA: AVERAGE PRICE OF SCRAP 
PER TON AT BUENOS AIRES 
(In Argentine pesos) 
194 8 196.11 
194 9 201.44 
195 0 226.68 
195 1 271.56 
1952 (first six months) 409.85 
4 . ARGENTINA'S POLICY OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
Argentina's foreign purchases of iron and steel have 
been passing through a new phase. This is shown in 
table 103, from which it may be seen that the steel-
transforming industry, both in the type of goods manu-
factured for some time past„and in the incorporation 
of items formerly imported, specifically tends to sub-
stitute imports of manufactured products with raw 
material imports for making them. Thus, taking just 
one aspect, Argentina's foundry capacity,23 which was 
41,000 tons in 1937, had already reached 285,000 in 
1951, when the twenty-four furnaces in operation 
delivered 206,000 tons. This represents24 over a third 
of the domestic rolled-steel requirements, estimated 
for that year at 580,000 tons. But for products of the 
rod mill, of which the Argentine market absorbs some 
half-million tons a year, the plants already in use are 
capable of supplying approximately 330,000 tons. 
Enlargements at present under way will shortly make 
it unnecessary to resort to such imports at all, except 
for specialized products representing only a small per-
centage of the whole.25 
23 See table 106. 
24 See table 106. 
25 As the customs tariff, according to this table, does not pro-
vide sufficient protection for Argentine iron and steel products, 
the development of self-sufficiency has in fact been supported by 
the selective import system applied by the Central Bank. 
TABLE 106. ARGENTINA: SIEMENS-MARTIN FURNACES 
IN OPERATION,11 INSTALLED CAPACITY AND POTEN-
TIAL AND REAL ANNUAL PRODUCTION (BASED ON 3 . 5 
TAPS A DAY AND 2 0 0 ANNUAL WORKING DAYS) 





1937 58 41 14.0 
1942 129 90 62.5 
1948 327 230 128.2 
1951 407 285 206.0 
SOURCE: Private firms. 
» The furnaces in operation in 1951 belonged to the following 
firms: Vulcano, 6; Fábrica Militar de Aceros, 2; Cantábrica, 4; 
Torres y Cita ti, 2; Tamet, 3; Rosa ti and Cristefani S.A., 2; 
Crefin, 1; Santa Rosa, 2. Total: 24 furnaces. 
TABLE 107. ARGENTINA: PRODUCTION OF FINISHED 
STEEL 
(Excluding re-rolling; in thousands of tons) 
1939 : 10.4 
194 5 66.2 
194 6 110.8 
1951 206.1 
SOURCE: Private firms. 
TABLE 108. ARGENTINA: TARIFF TREATMENT OF IRON 
AND STEEL IMPORTS 
SOURCE: Private firms, Buenos Aires. 
Products Rate 
Foundry pig iron Exempt 
Billet Exempt 
Unworked sheet 1 5 % 
Strip 15% 
Plain galvanized wire up to 
No. 14, and barbed wire. 2 8 % 
Mild wrought iron piping. . 4 2 % 
Galvanized piping 4 2 % 
SOURCE: Argentina's tariff schedule. 
Duty 
0.056 a kg. 
0.064 a kg. 
without invoice value 
0.128 a kg. 
0.16 a kg. 
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In the same sector, Acindar S.A. operates a modern 
Norgan continuous mill, which manufactures domes-
tically both rod for the wire-drawing mills and hot-
rolled strip for the plants manufacturing welded or 
seamed piping. Argentine equipment for wire-drawing 
is amply sufficient to meet the domestic demand, 
including barbed wire and high-tension cable, current 
demand for all types being about 80,000 tons a year 
altogether. For welded tubes, the plants for making 
them in diameters ranging from up to 4 inches and 
over 14 inches, exceed domestic requirements. In diam-
eters between 6 inches and 12 inches, equipment is 
being assembled which will shortly cover domestic 
requirements. 
A prominent feature of Argentina's self-sufficiency 
policy for iron and steel is the initial construction at 
the Punta Algerich (San Nicolás) steel plant, 70 kilo-
metres from Rosario and 235 from Buenos Aires. This 
plant will produce 315,000 tons a year of pig iron and 
billet after 1958. This figure will be expanded later to 
a million tons. In view of the vast nature of this 
project, its rate of production, according to the am-
bitious plans, will particularly depend upon the avail-
ability of foreign exchange to purchase equipment 
suitable for coking the Río Turbio coal to be used 
there. 
The new plant will be managed by the Sociedad 
Mixta Siderúrgica Argentina, the State supplying 
80 per cent of the initial 100-million-peso capital. 
Moreover the State undertakes to cover possible defi-
cits. Some 3,300 hectares of land were expropriated 
for the industrial site, of which this unit will form 
the centre. The billet plant will occupy 350 hectares 
and the remainder will be set aside for the surrounding 
State and private transforming plants. Each of the 
three blast furnaces will have a capacity of 1,300 tons 
of iron every twenty-four hours. The gases are to be 
used as fuel for the central power installation of the 
plant. A coke and by-products plant with eighty-nine 
ovens will coke the coal and use volatile substances. 
Six Siemens-Martin furnaces will transform pig iron 
into steel. Four batteries of re-heating ovens are 
planned for rolling the billets, together with a bloom-
ing mill to obtain blooms with square and round sec-
tions, small rectangular sheets and billet in square and 
rectangular sections. A continuous rolling mill will 
transform the billet into merchant bars of standard 
types. The project also envisages a structural mill for 
the manufacture of heavy rails and shapes. The pro-
duction of thick and thin sheet and tinplate with the 
corresponding installations will also be considered in 
the programme. The electric plant planned for the 
new industrial zone, for 125,000 kilowatts, will start 
with a section having three turbo-generators, supply-
ing 25,000 kilowatts each. The iron ore deposits re-
cently found at Sierra Grande, thirty kilometres from 
the sea at Rio Negro, and coal from Río Turbio, near 
Gallegos, will provide basic raw materials for pig-iron 
production at the new plant. In addition, iron ore 
from Urucum in Brazil, shipped by way of the Para-
guay River, might be the subject of negotiations for 
its use at San Nicolás. 
5 . TUBULAR PRODUCTS 
Although, generally speaking, the Chilean manu-
facturing industry for welded tubes meets domestic 
requirements, it should be noted that there is still no 
ad hoc equipment for diameters of 14 to 24 inches, 
which would cost about half a million dollars. In 
Argentina, the American Rolling Mill (Armco) factory 
operates a plant which has maximum efficiency for 
precisely these dimensions. According to some tech-
nical opinions, under a scheme for combined utiliza-
tion, which would improve the use of its capacity, 
arrangements might be made for the temporary export 
to Argentina of raw materials from Huachipato for 
tube manufacture. These tubes could be re-exported 
both to Chile and to other Latin-American countries, 
while Chile would meet the cost of the respective 
services through an Argentine-Chilean clearing agree-
ment. 
• Further, on the subject of tubular products, it might 
be worth while to examine in detail the possibility of 
Chilean-Argentine collaboration in seamless tubes for 
petroleum piping, in sizes from 6 to 12 inches. These 
Chile buys in the United States at the preferential rate 
of 31 pesos to the dollar for the Manantiales oil wells 
in Tierra del Fuego.26 Requirements for such tubes 
appear likely to rise to 15,000 tons annually, for a 
value of 3 million dollars, some 40 per cent of the 
international price of the finished product correspond-
ing to billet. This collaboration would result in full use 
being made of the seamless tube plant now being 
erected in Argentina by a branch of the Italian 
Dalmine group, with a substantial investment and an 
initial capacity of 100,000 tons a year. This plant, 
incidentally, is a potential client for Huachipato billet. 
It would be feasible to draw up an agreement provid-
ing the basis of temporary admission for the manu-
facture of petroleum pipes for Manantiales, using 
Chilean raw materials. 
6 . SUPPLY OF SHEET 
In contrast to the facts observed for rod-mill prod-
ucts, where the development of Argentine industry 
leads to a rapid growth of the margin which its market 
still offers to the foreign supplier, in the line of those 
from the sheet mill there is no large-scale equipment 
nor any plans for such, except for the long-term ones 
depending on the San Nicolás steel plant mentioned 
above. The present demand for sheet is estimated at 
180,000 tons, of which domestic Argentine industry 
supplies only 10,000. The balance offers encouraging 
prospects for Chile as this is a specialized product for 
which Huachipato is preparing a considerable expan-
sion. Table 109, established with the assistance of 
producing and distributing firms in Buenos Aires to 
indicate the position of sheet, shows the percent-
age distribution, by dimensions, of Argentina's 
consumption: 
T A B L E 1 0 9 . ARGENTINA: ESTIMATED ANNUAL REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR SHEET BY TYPES 
Thickness Number Percentage 
Thousands 
of tons 
1 mm. or less 20 or finer 11 19.8 
Over 1 mm. and less than 2.2 mm. 14 to 19 31 55.8 
Over 2.2 mm. and less than 8 mm. 13 to yK" 33 59.4 
Over 8 mm. to 50 mm to 2" 25 45.0 
TOTAL 180.0 
SOURCE: Manufacturing firms, Buenos Aires. 
Any continued Chilean contribution to Argentina's 
supplies of iron and steel would fundamentally depend 
upon the value of exports to Argentina being liqui-
26 This was the policy in 1952. 
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dated in Chile on the same basis as sales to other 
countries. Until today exports to Argentina have taken 
place through decisions which have temporarily offset 
the effects of under-valuation. Thus, the Chilean peso 
equivalent of iron and steel sales to Argentina in 1951 
and part of 1952 was paid to Huachipato in Chilean 
currency, instead of being paid in foreign currency, 
intended to cover obligations abroad, and which would 
have had to be bought at a preferential rate of ex-
change. In turn, under the special arrangement reached 
with Argentina, that country received at the same 
value a total of 8.5 million dollars, on account of the 
dollar debt amounting to 18.5 millions, which the 
Corporación de Fomento and the Instituto de Eco-
nomía Agrícola de Chile owed to the IAPI as a balance 
of the purchase price of wheat and oil bought in 
1946-47. This formula enabled Huachipato, by evad-
ing the under-valuation, to quote practically at the 
same levels as those from competitors.27 In addition, 
this arrangement laid down that iron should be in-
voiced at the average of the respective United States, 
Belgian and French quotations and that if these mar-
kets should suspend their exports or freeze their prices, 
the quotation would be adjusted to the ratio of the 
variations, f.o.b. Buenos Aires, of quebracho, edible 
oil and beef. 
It was feared that, once the deliveries agreed upon 
with IAPI would cease at the end of 1952, the rise in 
Chilean iron quotations, due to its entry into the 
v See tables 110 and 111. 
TABLE 110. ARGENTINA: RATIO OF PRICES AND 
FREIGHTS PER TON, IN DOLLARS, FOR IRON AND 





















































SOURCE: Importers, Buenos Aires. 
T A B L E 111 . ARGENTINA: C . i . f . PIG-IRON PRICES, 






8/1/48 . . . 3.7313 Brazil 337.79 
14/1/48 . . . 3.7313 Netherlands 311.00 
1/2/48 . . . 3.7313 Brazil 337.79 
9/10/48 . . . 3.7313 Belgium 348.91 
26/1/49 . . . 3.7313 Austria 387.07 
12/9/49 . . . 3.7313 France 329.04 
6/12/49 . . . 3.7313 Netherlands 295.37 
17/3/51 . . . 7.50 Norway 587.48 
26/5/51 . . . 7.50 Chile 547.50 
18/8/51 . . . 7.50 Chile 675.00 
9/11/51 . . . 7.50 Norway 661.50 
17/12/51 7.50 Chile 735 
SOURCE: Processing companies, Buenos Aires. 
common system of payments subject to undervalua-
tion, would hamper trade with Argentina. This concern 
was somewhat relieved by a barter agreement reached 
in September 1952 between the governments. Under 
this agreement, 7,000 tons of Argentine edible semi-
refined sunflower oil, was to be exchanged, as from 
October 1952, for 15,050 tons of Huachipato products 
(3,000 of pig iron, 11,500 of sheet and 550 of tinplate 
for meters), with a total value of about 2.9 million 
dollars; this credit would be offset by the value of the 
oil, calculated at 2,020 Argentine pesos in account 
1308 per ton f.o.b. in bulk, that is 404 dollars in 
account 1308. Furthermore, it was agreed that Chile 
would send Argentina, for temporary admission, 1,000 
tons of sheet to manufacture the 225-litre drums for 
transporting the oil. These drums are estimated to cost 
150 Argentine pesos per ton, plus a similar sum for the 
expenses incurred in putting the oil into the contain-
ers, inspecting its quality and embarking it in Buenos 
Aires. The total was covered by Chile through the 
Chilean-Argentine clearing, under a co-ordination 
agreement similar to that for the manufacture in 
Argentina of the petroleum tubes for the wells at 
Manantiales. When the edible oil-iron barter was 
drawn up, the idea remained of studying its renewal 
on a stable basis, perhaps every three years, with a 
pre-arranged mechanism for price adjustment by 
which equal advantages would be assured to both 
parties. 
7 . FERRO-ALLOYS 
Chilean manufacture of ferro-alloys has, since 1945, 
contributed to the supply of ferro-manganese for 
Argentine industry, whose present requirements of 
this essential product for steel-making are estimated 
at about 3,000 tons annually with an approximately 
similar amount of ferro-silicon. Demand for silico-
manganese does not appear to exceed 600 tons. 
Production of ferro-manganese and silico-manganese 
as well as that of ferro-silicon will be increased in 
Chile with the transfer to the industrial area of 
Huachipato of the factory which Carburo and 
Metalurgia S.A. have owned for some time at Nos. 
Its furnaces, with an output of up to 6,000 tons of 
ferro-alloys annually, are currently being enlarged 
with 700,000 dollars of the first quota of an Export-
Import Bank loan for 1.5 millions. I t will enable this 
plant, as from 1954, at its new site at Huachipato 
and using coke dust from the steel plant, to process 
Chile's manganese yield at the rate of 46,000 tons of 
ore annually, thus providing a yield of approximately 
18,400 tons of ferro-manganese. As Chilean demand 
stands at only 3,000 tons a year, exports will be the 
deciding factor for the full use of this industry's 
capacity. Ferro-silicon has more restricted interna-
tional prospects, since it is derived from quartz, a raw 
material which is more commonly found than man-
ganese throughout the world. 
Argentina's purchases of Chilean ferro-manganese, 
which reached a maximum of 2,012 tons in 1948, have 
been declining to a point where, in 1951, they amount-
ed to only 200 tons. Similar exports from Brazil to 
Argentina have risen in an inverse ratio to the Chilean 
exports. Of Brazil's total exports in 1951, amounting 
to 4,615 tons, Argentina absorbed 2,790. Although 
Chilean ferro-manganese has been exported to Europe 
since 1945 at world market prices, undervaluation does 
not allow it to compete in Argentina. In 1951, the 
f.o.b. price of Chilean ferro-manganese for the Argen-
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Since the figures for apparent consumption in Argen-
tina and Brazil show a continued trend upward in the 
demand for copper during 1950 and 1951, it may be 
estimated that the southern zone at present consti-
tutes a market for about 78,300 tons a year of virgin 
and refined copper, distributed as in table 114. 
The fact that zonal production has grown at a 
faster rate than exports to other regions and the 
demand on domestic markets has resulted in a more 
substantial trade between the countries in the zone. 
The small pre-war3 inter-Latin-American trade in cop-
per rose to fairly high figures after the war, but the 
level remains below that of the substantial and sus-
tained imports from sources outside the region. Accord-
ing to table 115, total imports for the countries in the 
southern zone averaged slightly over 50,000 tons 
annually during 1947-49, 14,000 of which came from 
within the region and the remaining 36,000 tons from 
Europe and the United States. During these same 
years, Chile was practically the only country export-
ing to other regional markets. Peru's first large share 
was recorded in 1951, when slightly over 4,000 tons in 
slabs were sent to Argentina and about 2,200 tons 
to Brazil. 
Argentina and Brazil show the highest percentages 
for purchases of copper within the zone in relation to 
their total imports, the figure in both cases amounting 
3 This trade in 1935-37 barely amounted to an annual average 
of 500 tons. 
to about 33 per cent in 1947-49. This proportion, for 
Argentina, rose to 60 per cent in 1951. 
The preceding table indicates the main specifications 
of imported copper in the countries of the southern 
zone. Over 60 per cent is made up of slabs, bars and 
sheets intended to supply domestic transforming in-
dustries. Wires and cables constitute the major por-
tion, and copper tubing the smallest share, of manu-
factured products. This composition of imports mainly 
arises from the type of purchases made by Argentina 
and Brazil, which, apart from Chile, have the most 
highly developed transforming industries. 
Blister copper represents about 45 per cent of the 
total zonal copper imports, almost all the finished 
copper goods being imported from countries outside 
the zone. Raw-material supplies for the transforming 
industries in Argentina and Brazil have usually been 
below their productive capacity. The Chilean trans-
forming industry, which does use domestic copper, has 
exported very few finished goods.4 Thus, prospects for 
inter-Latin-American trade appear to lie in the possi-
bility of shifting to countries within the zone—Chile 
and Peru—the present blister copper purchases, 
amounting to some 20,000 tons, which are now made 
outside the region, and to increase the trade of manu-
factured copper goods. 
* Copper wire exports from Chile ranged between 2,000 and 
5,000 tons a year during 1946-50, mainly to countries outside 
the region. Exports of this article increased sharply in 1951 to 
over 19,000 tons, about 13,400 of which were sent to non-regional 
markets. 
T A B L E 1 1 5 . COMPOSITION AND ORIGIN OF COPPER IMPORTS IN THE SOUTHERN 
ZONE OF LATIN AMERICA 
(Annual average for 1947-49, in thousands of tons) 
Slabs, bars Wires and pipes and Other 
Total and sheets cables tubes manufactures 
Aroentiwa: 
Total 19,400 11,201 5,833 736 1,630 
From the zone 6,503 5,738 534 98 133 
From other regions 12,897 5,463 5,299 638 1,497 
Bolivia: 
Total 272 34 a a 238 
From the zone 33 18 a a 15 
From other regions 239 16 a a 223 
Brazil: 
Total . . . . 23,158 18,219 1,428 656 2,855 
From the zone 7,528 7,518 10 — — 
From other regions 15,630 10,701 1,418 656 2,855 
Chile: 
Total 2,102 226 1,674 136 66 
From the zone 14 — 10 — 4 
From other regions 2,088 226 1,664 136 62 
Paraguay:b 
Total 165 165 
From the zone — — 
From other regions 165 165 
Peru: 
Total 1,805 221 1,325 149 110 
From the zone 50 13 37 — .—. 
From other regions 1,755 208 1,288 149 110 
Uruguay: 
Total 3,313 1,128 1,988 133 64 
From the zone 170 126 43 2 — 
From other regions 3,143 1,000 1,946 131 64 
Total for the zone: 
Total . . . . 50,215 31,029 12,413 1,810 4,963 
From the zone 14,298 13,413 633 100 152 
From other regions . . . . 35,917 17,616 11,780 1,710 4,811 
SOURCE: Foreign trade statistics. 
• Included in "other manufactures". b Wire only, average 1948-49. 
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The first of these possibilities may be somewhat 
restricted by the domestic development of copper 
mines in some of the importing countries within the 
zone. Argentina's second five-year plan, for instance, 
envisages an investment of 6 million pesos in copper 
prospecting. Brazil, in turn, plans to build an electro-
lytic refinery having an annual capacity of 5,000 tons.5 
Nevertheless, there appears to be a considerable mar-
gin for an increase in the trade in blister copper, which 
might be covered through greater intra-zonal com-
merce. 
The possibilities for developing the trade in finished 
copper goods is restricted by the fact that the main 
consuming countries—Argentina, Brazil and Chile— 
have large transforming industries, which are being 
expanded. But, since Chile has sufficient raw materials 
within its borders and is similarly the principal sup-
plier of blister copper for the other two countries, the 
future of intra-zonal trade in manufactured copper 
goods must necessarily be subject to the agreements 
reached in this connexion. In addition, the ability of 
Chile to continue marketing a quota of manufactured 
copper goods appears to depend largely on world sup-
ply conditions. Moreover, the copper-transforming 
industry is relatively simple and requires a fairly low 
capital investment. These factors together constitute 
incentives for the establishment of domestic indus-
tries, even though the local market may be small. 
As regards the demand for finished goods, the strong 
upward trend shown by consumption between the pre-
war and post-war years and the low prevailing level 
notwithstanding that increase leads to the conclusion 
that an expansion in zonal markets may be anticipated 
within the next few years. 
In any case, even if there were no greater trade in 
finished copper goods, the development of the trans-
forming industries would increase the requirements for 
blister copper, which, linked to the imports made up 
to the present from outside the zone, might lead to 
some strengthening of inter-Latin-American trade. 
Following this broad outline of general trade pros-
pects for copper and its manufactures, some recent 
events are indicated below, covering copper agreements 
made between countries in the southern zone. 
2. Copper in Argentine-Chilean trade 
Copper was the principal basis for one of the latest 
arrangements for a quantitative exchange of equally 
essential commodities between countries in the south-
ern zone. According to an agreement between Argen-
tina and Chile in 1952, mentioned in chapter V I I I of 
this study, Argentina's industry was assured of a 
minimum annual supply of 15,600 tons of Chilean 
copper, based on the exchange of 82,000 head of cattle 
to cover the meat shortage in the central and northern 
areas of Chile. 
This agreement marks" a new attitude by both 
countries as regards their reciprocal trade connexions. 
Formerly, cattle were delivered to Chile against pay-
ment on account. Chilean copper was only exported 
against payment in dollars, except when the operation 
covered cables, wire or other manufactures, where the 
1 The plant at Utinga (S2o Paulo) will be partly supplied with 
3,000 tons a year of concentrates from the Camacua mine, exist-
ing proved reserves of which are about 500,000 tons of copper 
ore. Itapera and Caraiva are other Brazilian reserves, with 200,000 
and 40,000 tons, respectively, of relatively low-grade ores. 
value added by manufacture represented a substantial 
percentage over the raw material price. 
Since 1950, the conditions under which Argentina 
exported cattle began to be influenced by the need to 
strengthen the purchasing power of decreasing agri-
cultural and stock-breeding production. This had 
fallen as an immediate result of the severe drought 
which had affected its best grain and cattle lands since 
1950. In Chile, the copper export policy was changing, 
by a process which began in 1942. Until then, sales 
took place in New York by the North American com-
panies, known in Chile as the "greater mining com-
panies". These companies work Chile's three principal 
copper mines and ensure the Chilean economy, in 
dollars, of a return equivalent to the cost of produc-
tion, plus an amount equal to half the difference be-
tween this cost and the selling price abroad. Under this 
system, copper was not a subject of negotiation in 
Chile's trade agreements. During the Second World 
War, as a result of the installation of a copper-trans-
forming industry in Chile, it began to supply the 
Latin-American market with products in different 
stages of manufacture. Sales of copper slabs, however, 
continued to be based upon the New York market, 
with no Chilean intervention. In 1951, when the Inter-
national Materials Conference in Washington laid 
down an outline for distributing the copper available 
to the West, Chile's representatives announced their 
government's intention to handle the sales of 20 per 
cent of all slab output of the greater mining com-
panies, plus all that from the medium and small enter-
prises in Chile, using a plan which assured the domestic 
transforming industry of over 70,000 tons of blister 
copper a year. This reserve was along the same lines as 
the agreement which Chile had previously signed with 
the United States, by which 80 per cent of Chile's 
production of blister copper was to be purchased by 
the United States, at 27.5 cents per pound (24.5 cents 
to be paid by the consumer and 3 by the United States 
Treasury). Chile would sell the remaining 20 per cent 
at the world free-market price, which was 54.5 cents 
per pound at that time. Shortly after this agreement 
was signed, however, the free quotation fell rapidly. 
The factors leading to this price decline appear to have 
been the fixing of a quota, by the International Ma-
terials Conference, at amounts not exceeding those of 
world production; the controls aimed at preventing 
re-exports of copper to countries within the Soviet 
sphere of influence; and news releases indicating a new 
Chilean-United States agreement, which would lead to 
the sale of all Chilean copper at a single price. 
In May 1952, Chile abrogated the agreement with 
the United States and adopted measures bringing all 
copper mined in the country within the scope of trade 
agreements, so that it could be used for liquidating 
bilateral balances. The greater mining companies 
ceased to sell 80 per cent of their production in New 
York, all sales passing to the Banco Central de Chile, 
at a single price for all Chilean exports of copper slabs; 
this price in May 1952 was set at 35.5 cents per pound 
of electrolytic copper. The bases for the financial re-
lationship between the Chilean Government and the 
greater mining companies were modified. Thus, the 
Chilean Government would receive the difference 
between the selling price of copper on the international 
market and the same day's United States quotation 
for purchases of domestic copper, after deducting the 
value of freight between Chile and New York. The 
government would in future purchase the entire out-
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put of the greater mining companies, at the price indi-
cated earlier,6 for export purposes. The bill passed by 
the Chilean Congress laid down that exports of both 
slabs and finished copper goods should be authorized 
by the Central Bank only against payment in dollars. 
This regulation, unlike the Chilean-Argentine agree-
ment of 1952, does not contradict obligations arising 
out of international agreements, which are also valid 
in law, nor treaties in which transactions are made in 
currencies other than dollars, or based on barter 
agreements. 
Chilean approval of the agreement with Argentina 
implied, to a certain extent, official recognition of the 
importance or necessity of importing meat on the hoof, 
as required by the regulations of its foreign exchange 
budget for merchandise authorized for payment in 
dollar currency. Although, in practice, cattle importers 
had for a long time enjoyed this status, the uncertainty 
arising out of prevailing difficulties for reconciling such 
imports with the policy of fostering domestic stock-
breeding, had been one of the principal obstacles to 
Chilean-Argentine trade. This agreement, by previ-
ously determining a ceiling for foreign cattle imports 
and by recognizing that they would be paid for in 
values equivalent to dollar currency, is thus very im-
portant for the future expansion of trade between 
Argentina and Chile, which is naturally linked with 
the establishment of a definite stockbreeding policy 
in Chile. 
There are still further obstacles to be overcome 
before a steady flow of Chilean copper exports to 
Argentina can be arranged, despite Argentina's in-
creasing requirements, and the prevailing difficulty, at 
least at present, of importing copper from other world 
sources. Apart from the problems of price and payment 
described elsewhere in this report, the close resem-
blance between the respective transforming industries 
in the two countries obliges Argentina primarily to 
require raw materials, 50 per cent of it in the shape of 
electrolytic slabs and the rest fire-refined, for its 
smelters, rolling and wire-drawing mills, and those 
producing tubes and alloys. As Chile's installed capac-
ity, except for 12-mm. wire, is sufficient for the present 
domestic requirements, and is in course of expansion, 
through a new plant belonging to Fabricaciones Mili-
tares, prospects for the sale of Chilean copper manu-
factures to Argentina appear to be destined mainly to 
a gradual shift to blister copper on a scale to be deter-
mined by world raw-material supplies and the position 
of the Argentine balance of payments in the dollar area. 
•3= Copper in Brazil ian-Chilean trade 
In the Brazil-Chile trade sector, under the treaty of 
economic co-operation signed by the two countries in 
1947, which has only been in force since 1952, Chile 
agrees to export to Brazil 1,000 tons a year of copper 
slabs, while Brazil agrees to place no restrictions upon 
annual imports to its territory of 3,000 tons of raanu-
factured copper goods. This agreement, which makes 
6 24.5 US cents a pound. 
no stipulation as to the currency to be used in pay-
ment, is typical both of the parallel development of 
the transforming industries of both countries and of 
the kind of formula which it establishes for reconciling 
raw-material requirements with a defence of the manu-
facturing industry in the country of origin. 
Current—though restricted—copper requirements 
in Brazil, are estimated at 33,000 tons,7 and almost 
two-thirds of actual consumption come from the re-
quirements for electric cable. The shortage of copper 
in Brazil, however, linked to the low quotas obtained 
from the International Materials Conference and to 
balance-of-payments difficulties, particularly in the 
dollar area, causied serious consideration of the use of 
aluminium produced from local bauxite as a substitute 
for copper in electrical installations, including even 
high-tension cables, which will be made of aluminium 
with a steel core. This metal, in turn, is required for 
other uses, and industrialization of Brazilian bauxite, 
under the most favourable conditions according to 
existing information, would scarcely take less than five 
years to reach the present consumption level for 
aluminium, quite apart from requirements for replacing 
copper in electrical installations. The scale on which 
the replacement takes place will necessarily depend, 
for the next few years, upon the future possibilities of 
obtaining copper and upon its prices. 
During 1952, the bilateral conduct of Brazilian-
Chilean trade did not fulfil the terms of the agreement, 
which would have allowed Brazil to raise its copper 
supplies for that year by 4,000 tons. The causes miti-
gating against full compliance with the agreement 
indicate the utility of filling the gaps caused by the 
payments system for bilateral trade in the zone, as 
described in an earlier chapter. As a rule, Brazilian 
sales to Chile were hampered by the difference between 
Brazilian and world prices. For some commodities, 
which could have made a considerable contribution to 
stabilizing bilateral clearance, such as sugar and cot-
ton, Brazil's quotation during the first half of 1952 
was at times 82.6 and 31.2 per cent higher, respec-
tively, than the price paid by Chile for purchases in 
other areas, payable in dollar currency. Thus, the 
abundant unused credit which Chile had in this 
account would have been increased by the value of 
copper dispatched to Brazil. This in turn would have 
had to be invoiced at an overprice to offset the sur-
charge on Brazilian goods. But current Chilean ex-
ports, with the introduction of copper into the account, 
would have weakened its purchasing power. Under 
these conditions, the operation remained subject to the 
possibility of Brazil covering the price in dollars.8 
7 28 ,000 tons of electrolytic copper and 5,000 tons of fire refined 
copper, according to the report presented to the Banco do Brasil 
by the Sindicato de Industria de Condutores Eletricos e Trefilacao-
of the State of Sao Paulo. 
8 In another bilateral seqtor, that of trade between Chile and 
Uruguay, there have been suggestions, since the end of 1952, t o 
complete sales of Chilean copper on the basis of payment in 
sterling instead of dollars. 
Chapter XII 
CHILEAN N I T R A T E ON T H E BRAZILIAN M A R K E T 
1. Introduction 
An example of the size reached by the transfer to 
Latin America of a substantial proportion of nitrate 
exports is the growth of Chilean nitrate sales to Brazil, 
which have almost quadrupled in eight years. From an 
annual average of 18,598 tons in 1938-43, they in-
creased to 71,050 in 1951 and approximately 80,000 
in 1952, according to provisional data for this last year. 
Sugar plantations take almost half (48.7 per cent in 
1951 in round figures) of the agricultural consumption 
of nitrate in Brazil, followed, in order of importance, 
by coffee (16.2 per cent) and cotton (12 per cent). The 
nitrate consumed for the cultivation of other agricul-
tural products is insignificant. 
The amount of nitrate used, in itself a large tonnage, 
is however a minimum for the potential demand of 
agriculture in Brazil. This demand on the threshold of 
a complete reorganization of techniques, aims at re-
ducing the disequilibrium between agricultural devel-
opment and that of industry.1 The figures in table 116 
indicate the rate at which the potential demand for 
fertilizer is transformed into effective consumption. 
T A B L E 1 1 6 . B R A Z I L : APPARENT CONSUMPTION OF 
FERTILIZERS 
(Thousands of tons) 
1948 1949 1950 1951» 
Imports 99 127 237 383 
Production (excluding additions 
in the form of mixtures from 
imported fertilizers) 40 40 60 40 
Apparent consumption 139 167 297 423 
SOURCE: Banco de Brasil, Rio de Janeiro. 
• Provisional. 
In Brazil, basic crops, whose problems of declining 
yields have traditionally been solved by migration to 
new areas, are now beginning to arouse interest in soil 
rehabilitation due to the impulse from official circles 
for the protection of agriculture. In the new atmos-
phere which is prevailing, the prospects for the future 
consumption of fertilizers appear very stable. It has 
been estimated that 600,100 tons of nitrate would 
have been equivalent to a minimum application to 
only 16.4 per cent of the land that was at that time 
under cultivation in 1949, or nine times the total 1951 
consumption and little more than a third of the total 
annual Chilean nitrate production. 
1 According to data of the Conselho Nacional de Economia do 
Brasil, the rate of population growth for 1940-50 was 23 per cent, 
as compared to a 12 per cent increase in agricultural production, 
for the same period, resulting from an extension of the area 
cultivated. The area devoted to wheat cultivation increased 259 
per cent between 1941 and 1951, whereas wheat production 
increased only 213 per cent. Although the average cotton yield in 
1941 was 167 arrobas per alqueire, only 65 was registered for 1951. 
Real consumption in Brazil since 1938 increased at 
a cumulative rate of 14 per cent annually. A conserva-
tive estimate of Brazilian nitrate consumption for the 
cultivation of sugar reveals that, in 1961, 134,000 tons 
will be required as compared with the 69,700 tons in 
1951. This estimate took into consideration that sugar 
is the crop needing the greatest amount of nitrogen 
and that its producers are highly organized and in a 
good position to acquire nitrate. It was also based on 
the supposition not only of a 10 per cent annual 
increase in nitrate consumption by the sugar industry, 
but a 5 per cent increase for all other consumers, as 
well as no increases for industrial purposes. Therefore, 
the value of exports based on actual prices—approxi-
mately 5 million dollars at present—would be practi-
cally doubled within a decade. 
The increased imports, production and distribution 
of fertilizers experienced in recent years in Brazil are 
partly a result of an increased demand for nitrogen. 
Phosphorus fertilizers have shown the greatest increase 
as a result of new and extensive phosphate deposits, 
otherwise scarce in South America. This increase has 
also been due to the organization of local milling of 
African phosphorus, which may be used without 
further treatment. Another reason is that super-
phosphate plants increased productive capacity ten-
fold, from 19,100 tons in 1949 to 200,000 in 1952. 
It is not surprising that private enterprise has pre-
ferred to deal with such principal raw materials as 
apatite and phosphorus, since these have not only 
offered a larger profit but also fewer supply problems. 
The different fertilizers should be used together, 
thereby bringing about the closest approximation to 
the ideal ratio between nitrogen, phosphorus and 
potassium, three of the four basic elements. Contrary 
to this principle, in practice it has been found that 
during the last three years nitrogen has been used in 
insufficient quantities to maintain the ratio. However, 
the different price variations of phosphate and nitrogen 
fertilizers are the obvious cause of the more rapid 
increase in the supply of phosphate products for 
farmers. The price of sodium nitrate increased between 
1946 and 1950 by 63 per cent, whereas 20 per cent 
superphosphate rose only by 25 per cent; 45 per cent 
superphosphate increased 16.7 per cent between 1948 
and 1951, whereas potassium nitrate rose 23.9 per cent. 
Due to the acidic nature of Brazilian soil, maximum 
use should be made of lime—the fourth basic element 
—so that a rational use of the available fertilizers can 
be made. It is precisely this aspect of soil improvement 
that constitutes one of the principal problems facing 
Brazil. Relatively small quantities of lime are used, 
because the limestone from which it is derived is also 
in great demand as a raw material for the cement 
industry. Owing to the highly profitable character of 
the cement industry, the rise in the price of lime has 
been double that of those fertilizers showing the high-
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est price increase, 142.4 per cent between 1946 and 
1951. It appears difficult for this weakness of agricul-
ture in regard to lime supply to be solved other than 
through direct governmental measures; the scarcity of 
lime constitutes one of the principal problems in this 
field, requiring a greater effort than private enterprise 
is probably able to provide. 
In the case of nitrogen the situation is different, 
since supplies from Chile have temporarily been ade-
quate to satisfy the demand. However, to ensure 
additional tonnages to meet the heavy increases fore-
cast for the demand, a number of industrial groups are 
planning to produce synthetic nitrogen from domestic 
raw materials. 
A trade agreement between Brazil and Chile has 
until now prevented the construction of projected 
synthetic plants in Brazil. This has caused a position 
of status quo, which, if maintained and if the demand 
for nitrate continues to rise, will require a correlated 
increase in Brazilian exports to Chile. The only alter-
native to this would be the establishment of a means 
for liquidating balances multilaterally, to avoid in-
active balances.2 
Two formulas have been suggested for co-ordinating 
trade for the benefit of both countries, through in-
creasing sales of nitrates. 
The first proposes that the Sugar and Alcohol Insti-
tute of Rio de Janeiro should abandon its plans to 
produce anhydrous alcohol for synthetic rubber, using 
greater sugar-cane cultivation, and should devote this 
expansion to permanent sugar exports to Chile. In 
addition, the raw material for synthetic rubber, in-
stead of being obtained from anhydrous alcohol, could 
be derived from the natural gas of the petroleum 
refinery at Cubatao. Such gases would not be used for 
the projected programme of producing synthetic nitro-
gen. According to this first formula, Chilean sugar 
imports, amounting to 200,000 tons annually, would 
be distributed between Peru, Cuba and Brazil.3 The 
second formula suggests a change, through an ad hoc 
agreement, of the present treaty whereby Brazil re-
frains from establishing synthetic nitrate plants. The 
new agreement would guarantee to Chile a regular and 
fixed percentage of Brazilian nitrogenous imports. The 
success of these alternative formulas will necessarily 
exert a considerable influence upon the future of 
nitrate as a means of intra-Latin-American payments. 
' The trade disequilibrium between Brazil and Chile, in which 
Chile has accumulated a favourable but inactive balance during 
the last two years, retards financial operations received for 
nitrate exports. The cotton and sugar purchases which Chile 
might have imported from Brazil to utilize such credit balances 
were difficult due to the high prices of these commodities: 
whereas sugar from Cuba and Peru in August 1952 was valued at 
91.30 dollars per ton f.o.b., the price in Brazil was 166.70 dollars; 
for the same year, North American cotton classified as type 5 
was worth 904.50 dollars a ton f.o.b., when the official price in 
Brazil was 1,186.70 dollars. The difference from international 
prices on these two markets for sugar and cotton was thus 82.6 
and 31.2 per cent higher, respectively. At the same date, the price 
for nitrate imported by Brazil was 95 dollars c.i.f., amounting to 
an average of approximately 11 per cent higher than the prices 
quoted to other countries which normally liquidate payments 
upon delivery. In August 1952, this price was reduced to 85 
dollars for all orders not less than 1,000 tons. The price of nitrate 
exported to Brazil is actually theoretical, inasmuch as in 1951 
and 1952 the values from the total sales, amounting to substantial 
sums, remained frozen, frequently over the equivalent of 3 
million dollars. Chile utilized this amount to stimulate, through 
various subsidies, imports of certain Brazilian merchandise to 
neutralize the difference in prices and thus permit the release of 
a portion of the inactive balance. 
Another aspect of the problem, although still in the 
experimental stage, is the considerable importance 
which experts give to Chilean nitrate bioxide, whereby 
this product, derived from the raw material of nitrate, 
could be used for transforming Brazilian phosphates 
into solubles as a substitute for sulphur and which 
would also produce calcium nitro-phosphate as a by-
product. Although the financial, economic and trade 
possibilities have not as yet been established this 
subject was considered at a meeting held by F.A.O. 
in Rio de Janeiro in 1951. Nitrate bioxide, it should 
be noted, could also be used to replacc sulphuric acid 
in obtaining ammonia nitrate derived from distilled 
ammonia, thereby leading to a greater harmony of the 
traditionally opposing interests between natural and 
synthetic nitrates. 
The preceding remarks summarizing the prospects 
of Chilean nitrate on the Brazilian market, as well as 
the obstacles presented by the present disequilibrium 
of trade between the two countries, have been based 
on data which will be reviewed below. Because it is 
necessary to explain the nitrate situation in terms of 
the obstacles to its expansion, it has been deemed 
indispensable to include certain technical aspects. 
2. Brazilian nitrate imports and consumption 
Nitrate is the principal source of nitrogenous supply 
in Brazil, where to remedy deficiencies in rural econ-
omy, proportionately, more stimulants and fertilizers 
are required than in countries of the tropical zone in 
which highly acidic soils abound. 
The bulk of the nitrate demand comes from the 
States of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais, particularly in 
Sao Paulo where cultivation of sugar, coffee, cotton, 
vegetables arid to a smaller degree, certain other 
products absorb about 80 per cent of fertilizer imports. 
As may be seen in table 118, the percentage consump-
8 Cuba reserved for Chile an annual quota of 60,000 tons of 
sugar in the 1952 treaty. In the same year Chile began the estab-
lishment of a new sugar-beet industry, designed to absorb the 
estimated 3.3 per cent annual growth of domestic sugar con-
sumption. 
T A B L E 1 1 7 . B R A Z I L : I M P O R T S O F F E R T I L I Z E R S 






1944-50 1950 1951 
Total nitrogenous products... 18.6 41.6 72.7 96.5 
Chilean nitrate ' 16.5 40.9 62.0 71.0 
Other 2.1 0.7 10.7 25.5 
Phosphates 16.0 38.7 129.4 225.5 
Potassium products 3.8 9.9 34.6 46.7 
Mixtures and miscellaneous.. 2.6 3.7 0.2 14.7 
41.0 93.9 236.9 383.4 
Percentage of: 
Nitrogenous products 45.4 44.3 30.6 25.2 
Nitrate to total nitrogenous 
products. 88.9 98.3 85.3 73.5 
Nitrate to total imported fer-
40.4 43.5 26.1 18.5 
Phosphates 39.0 41.2 55.6 58.8 
Potassium products 9.3 10.5 14.6 12.1 
Mixtures and miscellaneous. . 6.2 3.9 0.2 3.7 
SOURCE: Serviço de Estatistica Economica e Financeira do 
Ministerio da Fazenda, Rio de Janeiro, 1951. 
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tion in Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais, rather than 
increasing as a result of increased Brazilian nitrate 
imports, actually decreases owing to additional con-
sumption by other regions where its use becomes 
generalized. Examples are the State of Rio Grande do 
Sul, where the use of nitrate consumption rose from 
1,000 tons in 1940 to 3,605 in 1951, and in the northern 
states where consumption jumped from 800 tons to 
21,126 in the same years. 
T A B L E 1 1 8 . B R A Z I L : A G R I C U L T U R A L AND I N D U S T R I A L 
U S E S F O R C H I L E A N N I T R A T E 
(Thousands of tons) 
Percentage consumption 
in the states of Sao 
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro 
Agriculture Industry Total and Minas Gérais 
1937-38. . 5.0 2.7 7.8 79.0 
1945-46. . . . 31.0 10.2 41.2 75.0 
1947-48. . 30.0 15.6 45.6 73.5 
1950-51. . . . 57.9 11.8 69.7 . 
SOURCE: Brazilian distributors. 
Table 118 also illustrates the ratio between nitrate 
consumption by agriculture and industry, demonstrat-
ing that within the last two years industrial consump-
tion declined. In 1950 a rayon mill using 4,000 tons of 
nitrate annually as a raw material for the nitric acid 
used in nitro-cellulose knitted wear, suspended its 
activities. Consumption was further decreased since 
nitrate was also used for transforming aluminium 
oxide (bauxite) into a sulphate aluminoid. The most 
important industrial use at present is to replace sodium 
carbonate as a raw material for sodium oxide used in 
glass manufacture. While both chemicals produce more 
or less equal amounts of sodium oxide and have similar 
* I t would appear that the efforts to produce soda ash and 
caustic soda in Brazil are to be fulfilled as a result of a 15-million-
dollar loan granted by the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development for the construction of an alkali plant in 
Cabo Frio. 
effects upon the refractory material used in the ovens, 
the employment of nitrate compensates for the supply 
interruptions of soda ash caused by periodic shortages 
of the foreign exchange necessary to make payments 
to exporting countries.4 
3. Nitrogen 
In 1948-49, an average of 0.59 kg. of nitrogen per 
hectare were used in Brazil, compared with an average 
of 1.18 used in Latin America as a whole and 4.58 in 
Canada and the United States.5 Brazilian consumption 
of nitrate for the same period—calculated on the basis 
of pure content—amounted to only 3.76 per cent of 
the total Chilean production of 277,000 tons. Inas-
much as the formula 1-3-1 represents the ratio be-
tween nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium as estab-
lished for Brazil by FAO in the document already 
quoted earlier, it is considered, from both a theoretical 
and practical point of view, that in view of the acidic 
soil, typical of the zone, and because a considerable 
area is devoted to the production of carbohydrates, 
the tendency should be towards an increase in the use 
of nitrogen and potassium. The ultimate formula 
would not necessarily imply such a disparity between 
these two elements and phosphorus, although it is 
naturally recognized that certain soils and crops have 
special requirements. In practice, during the last three 
years, the use of fertilizers has followed an opposite 
trend to the formula, particularly as regards the in-
sufficient use of nitrogen. An explanation of this 
phenomenon would be that the domestic production 
of phosphate fertilizers not only increased but was 
accompanied by a more favourable price for consumers 
than that of other fertilizers.6 
Only through a long-term programme|designed to 
solve the technical and financial aspects of the prob-
lem, will the wide gap between potential and actual 
consumption of nitrogen, depicted in table1119,|Sbe 
eliminated. 
6 FAO: Supply of Fertilizer for Latin America, 1951. 
6 Table 122 shows the price movement of fertilizers in'fBrazil 
from 1946 to 1951. 
T A B L E 1 1 9 . B R A Z I L : P O T E N T I A L MINIMUM R E Q U I R E M E N T S F O R N I T R A T E 




















Miscellaneous. . . . 709 
TOTAL 17,009 






























































































SOURCE: Serviço de Estatística da Produçâo do Ministerio de Agricultura, Rio de Janeiro, 
1949. 
» Figures from the Production Statistical Service of the Ministry of Agriculture, Rio de 
Janeiro, 1949. 
b Includes consumption for other fruit and garden vegetable produce. 
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As|illustrated in table 119, if 16.4 per cent of the 
arable area in 1949 had been given a minimum dose 
of nitrate, at the low estimated, level, consumption 
would have risen in that year to 600,100 tons. This 
would represent ten times the amount actually em-
ployed, and is equivalent to 38.6 per cent of total 
Chilean exports of sodium nitrate in 1949, which were 
almost 1.6 million tons.7 It is evident that such.a sub-
stantial increase in nitrogen consumption as would 
occur—supposing adequate applications of fertilizer— 
would adjust the rate between the increased amounts 
of lime, phosphorus and potassium employed, to a 
point more in accordance with basic soil deficiencies. 
This is particularly true in Brazil where it is well 
known that the plant capacity to absorb nitrogen from 
the organic matter of the soil itself is practically 
inexistent. 
Estimates of probable future increases in nitrate 
consumption cannot be considered entirely reliable, 
being subject to many conditions or factors regarding 
the Brazilian market as well as the price relationship 
between the various types of fertilizers. But such 
estimates, as shown in table 120, for possible sales 
increases between 1951 and 1961, can be useful. 
Although consumption increased, due to the 14 per 
cent annual cumulative increment since 1938, the 
table indicates that increased nitrate consumption for 
sugar—which has maximum nitrogen requirements— 
will be 10 per cent annually by 1951-61. Regarding 
other crops, only 5 per cent increases are registered, 
and there was none for industry. 
T A B L E 120. BRAZIL: ESTIMATED GROWTH OF NITRATE 
CONSUMPTION 







Cultivation of sugar. 30.0 77.0 47.0 
Other crops 27.9 45.2 17.3 
For industry 11.8 11.8 — 
TOTAL 69.7 134.0 64.3 
SOURCE: Brazilian distributors. 
4. Synthetic nitrogen production 
The project for producing synthetic nitrogen in 
Brazil presents a new and problematical aspect for 
future nitrate imports. Brazil has three small synthetic 
plants, but only one is devoted to agricultural require-
ments. Of the three, one, belonging to the Nitro-
quimica Brasileira, produces 100 tons annually for the 
production of chemical pulp. The second, belonging to 
Rhodia Brasileira, produces liquid ammonia for re-
frigeration based on 24 to 25 per cent ammonia. The 
third, at Volta Redonda, produces 3,000 tons annually 
of 25 per cent ammonium sulphate in liquid form for 
agricultural use, derived from coking by-products. 
Various efforts have been made within the last ten 
years to establish new sources of synthetic nitrogen. 
The most important has been that of the National 
7 World production of nitrogen in 1950—excluding the U S S R — 
according to the United, Nations Statistical Yearbook for 1951 was 
3 million tons, pure content, of which 75 per cent was synthetic, 
17 per cent derived from the by-products of coal and 7.4 per cent 
from Chilean nitrate. The latter figure refers to the gross produc-
tion of 1.6 million tons in 1950, equivalent to 277,000 tons of 
pure nitrogen. 
Petroleum Board, which in 1951 planned to build a 
plant to produce 375 short tons of ammonium nitrate 
and calcium carbonate daily—20.5 per cent pure nitro-
gen content—derived from the residual gases of the 
oil refinery to be constructed at Cubatao (Sao Paulo). 
Contracts had been drawn up for the purchase of the 
equipment in Germany, amounting to 8 million dol-
lars, of which the first quota was to be paid in sugar 
upon the signing of the contract in July 1952. But this 
plan was abandoned sine die as a result of the ratifica-
tion in 1952 of the economic co-operation agreement 
of 1947 between Chile and Brazil. In this agreement, 
Chile agreed to supply Brazil with the nitrate required 
in exchange for certain other reciprocal trade products. 
It was also agreed that Brazil—under a clause for 
three years, automatically renewable—would not estab-
lish plants for producing synthetic nitrogen, ammonia 
or nitric acid, except where the ammonia is a by-
product and not designed as material for synthetic 
nitrogen production. Similar to another pact between 
Chile and Argentina, the agreement is valid—within 
the specified time limits only—so long as no other 
countries in South America establish synthetic nitro-
gen plants.8 
The Sugar Institute has studied the possibilities of 
establishing mixing plants in Pernambuco and Santos 
to cause a price reduction for mixed fertilizers used by 
sugar-cane producers. In addition, it has considered a 
project for considerably increasing the present Brazil-
ian anhydrous alcohol production, by means of reduc-
tions in the human consumption of aguardiente, esti-
mated at 300 million litres annually. Half the surplus 
thus derived would be devoted to anhydrous alcohol 
production for mixing with gasoline—four parts gaso-
line to one of alcohol. Further, a second use for 
anhydrous alcohol, as the area of sugar cultivation 
increases, might be a substitute for butadiene and 
isoprene in the manufacture of Buna-S rubber, which, 
as the project gradually took shape, could probably 
be produced at a ratio of 24,000 tons of rubber for 
84 million litres of alcohol, or a ratio of 3.5 litres per 
kilogramme. Based on these projects, the officials of 
the Sugar Institute, in 1952, were interested in review-
ing the expansion programme for the sugar areas 
devoted to anhydrous alcohol production. They con-
sidered that this expansion, if devoted to the produc-
tion of raw materials for synthetic rubber, in addition 
to diverting the utilization of sugar to other channels, 
would help maintain fixed-quota sugar exports, which, 
through reciprocal trade, would enable the country to 
arrange regular nitrate imports so much in demand by 
sugar producers. If this were to occur, Cubatao, rather 
than being a source of synthetic nitrogen, would sup-
ply the raw materials required for synthetic rubber. 
It must also be noted that this plan would benefit 
Brazilian agriculture in that the sodium contained in 
Chilean nitrate assists the plants to assimilate the 
potash in the soil, otherwise lost when synthetic nitro-
gen is used. 
5. Phosphates 
In contrast to the rest of South America, where 
phosphate fertilizer industries must face a continued 
dependence upon imports, since high-grade reserves 
8 If gases from Cubatao are not utilized for producing nitrogen, 
experts consider it possible that the gases could be used for manu-
facturing isoprene, which, in addition to benzol, is the raw ma-
terial used in manufacturing synthetic rubber. Brazil has already 
planned such rubber factories owing to insufficient production of 
natural rubber. 
of domestic phosphorus are not available, Brazil has 
vast deposits of igneous and sedimentary origin. One 
of the igneous deposits in the States of Sao Paulo and 
Minas Gerais has estimated reserves of 100 million 
tons of apatite. The sedimentary phosphorite seams 
discovered in the north are sufficient to satisfy not 
only domestic needs, but also exports as well, although 
this would be a long-term project. The apparent 
reserves of just one of these deposits—in Pernambuco 
—is estimated at 42 million tons. Similar to that of 
Africa, Brazilian phosphorus can be employed directly 
on acid soils without any treatment other than pul-
verization. Brazil has requested the technical collabo-
ration of the United States Point Four programme in 
the complex problem of exploiting the Pernambuco 
seam without damage or alteration to a vast sub-
terranean lake, located directly beneath the phos-
phorus deposit, which has traditionally served the local 
population and agricultural needs. 
T A B L E 1 2 1 . B R A Z I L : ESTIMATED PHOSPHORUS 
ORE R E S E R V E S 
(Millions of tons) 
Trauira-Pirocaua and others ( M a r a n h à o ) . . . . 15 
Olinda (Pernambuco) 42 
Monteiro (Paraibo) 2 a 
Ipira (Bahia) • 
Araxà (Minas Gerais) 92 
Ipanema (Sao Paulo) 1 
Jucupiranga (Sao Paulo) 6 
Serrote-Juquià (Sào Paulo) 6 
Anitàpolis (Santa Catarina) • 
Fernando de Noronha 1 
TOTAL 165 
SOURCE: S. Fross Abreu, "O Problema do Fosfatos do Brasil," 
Digesto Economico de Sao Paulo, June 1952. 
• Details unavailable. 
According to 1951 data, Brazilian phosphates pro-
vide some 50 per cent of the raw materials used by 
domestic fertilizer plants. The remaining proportion 
consists of both domestic and imported bone meal and 
dried blood. The imported material is received, almost 
entirely, from the Comptoir des phosphates de Sfax, 
in Tunisia, and is pulverized by Brazilian plants in 
which the French company has capital.9 Output capac-
ity of super-phosphates rose from 87,000 tons in 1951 
to 200,000 in 1952. But deliveries were retarded due to 
shortages of sulphur used in transforming it to a 
soluble. Thus, the actual production was 19,000 tons 
in 1949, 56,000 in 1950 and 87,000 in 1951.10 
There are many different problems confronting a 
rational utilization of Brazilian phosphorus: the varied 
composition of the deposits, where in some cases 
aluminium, iron, barium are found, together with 
phosphorus ore or pure apatite. A further obstacle is 
the difficulty in transforming the ore into an element 
adequate for agricultural use; another is the shortage 
of sulphur; and finally, the problem of the cost of 
transporting phosphorus from the interior as a means 
of substituting domestic for imported material. It 
would appear that these problems can only be solved 
9 According to data of the Second World Conference on Fertil-
izers, held in Rome in 1951, world consumption of milled phos-
phorus for 1950-51 was 5.6 million tons, as compared to 3.5 in 
1939. Consumption of the principal South American countries 
individually, in thousands of tons, was: 
Argentina 6.5 Chile 17.1 
Brazil 30.0 Peru 24.0 
Colombia 6.0 
gradually and over the long term. As regardsjthe 
possibilities of exports to other countries of South 
America, in connexion with the recent discoveries, 
experts have declared that no real forecasts can be 
made until the Pernambuco deposits have been fully 
investigated. Such export prospects are o f*j general 
interest, especially in Chile and Uruguay. 
6. Replacement of sulphuric for n i t r ic acid 
obtained from original ore 
In the treatment of natural phosphates, sulphuric 
acid has until now been the most generally accepted 
agent for transforming phosphoric acid into a soluble, 
thus rendering it useful as a fertilizer. However, when 
it became clear that world availability for sulphur, 
estimated in mid-1952 at a little under 6 million tons 
annually, would be below the demand, the consistent 
rise in price has presented severe obstacles to the in-
dustry using sulphur for treating phosphorite or 
apatite in the preparation of super-phosphates. The 
same problem has confronted the plants treating by-
products of the distillation of petroleum or coal in the 
preparation of ammonia sulphate. 
Thus, there have been efforts made in Brazil to 
replace sulphur11 by using nitric acid as the principal 
agent. This would probably result in additional 
Brazilian-Chilean trade. 
In Chile, several experiments have been carried out 
by the Sociedad Chilena de Fertilizantes—a govern-
ment organization—to replace the sulphuric acid, used 
in producing super-phosphates, by nitric acid obtained 
from the mixing of the original ore with the iron 
sulphates found in the same area of the country. At 
the FAO meeting held in Rio in 1951, the results of 
these experiments were made known. It was demon-
strated that, through combining sodium nitrate with 
anhydrate of aluminium sulphate, nitric bi-oxide gas 
is liberated, which when mixed with water and oxygen 
is converted into the nitric acid required to replace 
sulphur for transforming phosphates into solubles. The 
problem of transporting nitric bi-oxide over the long 
distance between Brazil and Chile would be simplified 
by shipping it in liquid form in metal containers. 
Upon receipt, the liquid nitric bi-oxide—consisting 
of 30.4 per cent nitrogen—would be transformed into 
a superior acid than formerly employed for fixing 
synthetic ammonia, capable of producing 35 per cent 
ammonia nitrate as compared with the 21 per cent 
ammonia sulphate produced by sulphuric acid. In 
addition, nitric acid could also be used to treat phos-
phorous used for calcium nitro-phosphate fertilizer, 
which is similar t a super-phosphate but with a 27 per 
cent content of phosphoric anhydrite and 10 per cent 
nitrogen, both soluble in water. The Chilean experi-
ments demonstrated that the phosphorous and nitro-
gen salts could be avoided in the process simply by-
adding lime water thereby obtaining a phosphorous 
precipitate, bi-calcium phosphate—containing from 38 
to 40 per cent phosphorous anhydrite. In addition, 
calcium nitrate is obtained which, when crystallized 
and solidified, provides an excellent fertilizer. 
10 Certain Brazilian technical organizations have objected to 
the indiscriminate use of super-phosphates on acid soils. Servigo 
Nacional de Pesquizas Agronómicas, on page 18 of its bulletin 
No. 5 of 1949, summarized experiences in which hyper-phosphates 
gave better results. 
11 For the treatment of phosphoric rock, certain studies have 
been completed for utilizing the natural gases of Aratu for trans-
forming apatite ore of Bahía into solubles. 
Only through a study of the economic significance 
of these formulas for providing new uses for nitrate 
can an adequate appreciation be made of the part they 
may play in co-ordinating the Brazilian phosphorus 
industry. Nor is it possible, before such research takes 
place, that the traditional and opposing interests of 
natural and synthetic nitrates can be ultimately har-
monized.12 
7. The pre-eminent problem of lime 
Due to the limited use of lime by Brazilian agricul-
ture, the benefits accruing from fertilizers are sub-
stantially reduced. Because of the warm and humid 
climate of the country, particularly in the eastern 
food-producing areas, the intense rainfall—sometimes 
over 2 millimetres per minute—greatly exceeds the 
rate of evaporation. Therefore, as the land is culti-
vated and the soil subjected to leaching—the dissolv-
ing and draining-off by water—the mineral content 
of the soil is rapidly depleted. Once the top layer of 
organic material has been lost, the earth acquires a 
waterproof quality easily subject to erosion, giving 
rise to a migration of Brazilian farmers who, in the 
face of rapidly-declining yields, seek new and more 
fertile land. The rolling topography of the land is 
particularly subject to erosion and, in addition, the 
lack of cold winter months aggravates vegetable dis-
eases, to which plant life deficient in calcium are par-
ticularly susceptible. Thus, the inherent acidity of a 
sub-soil composed of acidic matter is a result of the 
serious deficiency of calcium caused by the heavy rain-
fall. It produces a lack of calcium, in some cases so 
severe that in the eastern rain belt the soil analyses of 
arable land sometimes reveal no calcium carbonate 
whatsoever.13 
1J InFsome Chilean fertilizer plants, the nitrate is used under a 
thermal process to transfer the phosphorus of apatite to a soluble 
state by means of a calcination with sodium nitrate or sodium 
sulphate. The Institute of Technological Research in Santiago is 
preparing to experiment with the Jourdain process whereby 
caustic soda can be obtained from nitrates, leaving nitric acid as 
a by-product. 
13 Bulletin No. 5, page 9, published by the National Agricultural 
Research Service in 1949. 
Throughout the Brazilian agricultural services, it is 
generally agreed that every effort must be made to 
prevent a further leaching of calcium and to restore 
the soil conditions necessary for the growth of micro-
organisms, as well as to normalize the original permea-
bility of the soil. An application of 100 to 300 kgs. a 
year of calcium carbonate (CaCOa) per hectare, 
according to the soil conditions, has been recom-
mended by experts in the field as the minimum dose 
required so that other fertilizers, in combination with 
the calcium, may raise the level of efficiency in terms 
of yields. An application of 100 kgs. of calcium per 
hectare to approximately 17 million hectares of cul-
tivated land would require 1.7 million tons of calcium 
carbonate. According to a study of 1952, no more than 
45,000 tons of calcium were sold in 1951, but it must 
also be noted, as shown in table 122, that, while the 
price of the fertilizers that varied the most only rose 
63 per cent between 1946 and 1951, the price of cal-
cium carbonate rose 142.4 per cent in the same period. 
This abnormal increase has been due in all probability 
to the demand for lime by the cement and construction 
industries which are at peak production and receive 
preferential treatment. Although all the States in 
Brazil have lime deposits, their working has not as yet 
attracted the private capital necessary to produce an 
agricultural calcium product. Indeed, the fertilizer 
factories have shown a marked preference for super-
phosphates although, according to experts, its use 
merely intensifies the acidic condition of the soil unless 
accompanied by calcium. Viewed in these terms, cal-
cium deficiency would seem to be the principal problem 
facing Brazilian agricultural policy. 
8. Fertilizer prices 
The purchasing power of Brazilian agricultural 
products, subject to internal price movements, has 
increased at a higher rate than the price of fertilizers, 
which have been imported since 1947 at 18.72 cruzeiros 
per dollar, and previously at 16.50 since 1939. Thus, 
it is shown, in tables 124 and 125, that in Sao Paulo 
the price of fertilizers in sixteen years has increased 
3.5 times, while agricultural prices rose from 5.4 to 
T A B L E 1 2 2 . B R A Z I L : S A L E S PRICES ON CREDIT OF NITRATE, OTHER FERTILIZERS 
AND CALCIUM CARBONATE 
(Cruzeiros) 




Sodium nitrate 1,323 1,626 1,626 1,687 2,156 63.0* 
Potassium nitrate 1,976 1,976 1,961 2,449 23.9 
Ammonium sulphate. . . 2,600 2,200 2,500 2,890 2,960 13.8 
Potassium chloride 2,000 2,400 2,800 2,800 2,800 40.0 
Potassium sulphate — 2,900 3,000 3,000 3,000 3 . 4 ' 
20 per cent super-
phosphate 1,400 1,400 1,300 1,550 1,750 25.0 
45 per cent super-
phosphate — 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,500 16.7-
Hyper-phosphate — — 1,200 1,250 1,662 38.5b 
Calcium carbonate 
(CaCOs) with 43 per cent 
calcium oxide content 165 180 180 250 400 142.4 
SOURCE: Sindicato das Industrias de Adubos e Colas, as well as private firms in Sao Paulo. 
» Ratio between 1948-51. 
b Ratio between "1949-51. 
NOTE: The price of nitrate for sales of 1,000 tons or more during the second half of 1952 was 
85 dollars per metric ton c.i.f. Brazil; the resulting price ex-dock in Sao Paulo was, therefore, 
2,325 cruzeiros per metric ton. 
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T A B L E 1 2 3 . B R A Z I L : P R I C E O F I M P O R T E D F E R T I L I Z E R S 
(Cruzeiros per ton) 
Expenses for Differential 
storage of importers' 
commissions, warehouse 
Cost price interest, Sale price charges over 
in importers' insurance, to agricultural cost Net profit 
warehouse advertising, etc. producer (percentage) (percentage) 
Normal super-phosphates.. 1,030 226 1,500 46 23.7 
Potassium chloride 1,838 387 2,730 52 27.5 
Chilean nitrate 1,492 318 1,843 30 2.2 s 
Hyper-phosphate" 1,055 231 1,355 28 6.5» 
Ammonium sulphate 1,933 406 2,890 50 28.5 
SOURCE: Sub-Divisao de Economia Rural, Secretaria de Agricultura, Sao Paulo. 
» The distributors commission apparently is included, with reference to these two fertilizers, 
in the warehouse charges. 
b Hyper-phosphate is subject to an additional unloading charge of 75 cruzeiros per ton. 
T A B L E 1 2 4 . B R A Z I L : R E L A T I O N S H I P B E T W E E N P R I C E S O F F E R T I L I Z E R S AND 
A G R I C U L T U R A L PRODUCTS A 
(1935 = 100) 
Fertilizersb Coffee Cotton Maize Rice Ground-nuts Potatoes 
1935 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1940 170 115 72 125 169 93 178 
1945 259 132 403 434 256 361 
1950 335 1,134 380 533 587 581 761 
1951 355 1,202 542 643 721 503 643 
SOURCE: Sub-Divisâo de Economia Rural, Secretaria de Agricultura, Sâo Paulo. 
a Annual average quotations compiled by the Sâo Paulo stock market. 
b Prices based on the annual average quotation of the following fertilizers in Santos: am-
monium sulphate, simple super-phosphates, potassium chloride and sodium nitrate. 
12 times. In addition, where one ton of foodstuffs cost 
9.8 arrobas of cotton in 1935 only 6.4 arrobas were 
required in 1951. 
It is apparent that the encouragement to be derived 
from proportional increases in the value of agricultural 
crops would be greater if the high prices for fertilizers 
on the Brazilian market were lower. In table 123 it 
may be seen that the farmer suffers from a difference 
on the price in the importers' warehouse of between 
28 to 52 per cent. Such a large difference for the 
farmer is explained by the inadequacy of credit facili-
ties, by the high rate of interest on instalment pur-
14 The railway tariff applied to a loaded boxcar, transported 500 
kilometres, after deducting the 50 per cent discount granted to 
fertilizers, is subject to a 4 to 7.5 per cent surcharge over average 
fertilizer prices. 
chases, which vary from 8 to 15 per cent, by the high 
costs of advertising and domestic freight rates and 
sometimes by the cost of uniting the fertilizers.14 
T A B L E 1 2 5 . B R A Z I L : C O M M O D I T I E S R E Q U I R E D TO B U Y 
A TON O F F E R T I L I Z E R 
Product Unit of measurement 1935 1951 
Cotton Arrobas 9.8 6.4 
Maize Sack 60 kgs. 46.4 25.4 
Rice Sack 60 kgs. 19.8 9.8 
Ground-nuts Sack 25 kgs. 44.5 31.3 
Potatoes Sack 60 kgs. 23.2 12.8 
SOURCE: Sub-Divisao de Economia Rural, Secretaria de Agri-





T A B L E 1. I N T E R - L A T I N - A M E R I C A N T R A D E IN T H E S O U T H E R N Z O N E : E X P O R T S 
(F.o.b. values; annual averages in thousands of dollars) 
To the zone Total 
1934-38 1946-48 1949-51 1934-38 1946—48 1949-51 
Argentina 45,516 156,086 163,596 542,000 1,466,600 1,111,943 
Bolivia 1,154 2,762 2,444 38,802 94,666 115,064 
Brazil 21,352 130,192 120,091 304,001 1,013,166 1,657,065 
Chile 4,356 34,212 38,731 139,000 280,230 326,317 
Paraguay 2,028 10,271 12,353 7,820 25,473 31,026 
Peru 11,113 50,134 47,322 79,400 156,000 200,206 
Uruguay 9,157 8,910 13,919 69,150 22,560 227,424 
ZONAL TOTAL 94,676 392,567 398,456 1,180,172 3,058,695 3,669,045 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
T A B L E 2 . I N T E R - L A T I N - A M E R I C A N T R A D E IN T H E S O U T H E R N Z O N E : I M P O R T S 
(C.i.f. values; annual averages in thousands of dollars) 
From the zone Total 
1934-38 1946^18 1949-51 1934-38 1946-48 1949-51 
Argentina 33,930 141,790 169,291 376,361 1,163,358 1,254,200 
Bolivia 6,285 24,672 18,892 24,191 59,948 56,952 
Brazil 39,201 88,553 147,510 260,690 1,013,193 1,408,180 
Chile 8,999 74,256 50,017 75,065 245,376 293,894 
Paraguay 4,341 12,006 8,872 7,960 22,621 26,355 
Peru 5,056 28,860 13,127 50,802 140,100 211,297 
Uruguay 10,012 51,115 33,933 52,326 187,652 251,693 
ZONAL TOTAL 107,824 421,252 441,642 847,395 2,832,248 3,502,571 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
T A B L E 3 . A R G E N T I N A : E X P O R T S 
(F.o.b. values in thousands of dollars) 





1934 1,064 18,119 1,911 3,575 1,714 2,595 28,978 475,000 
1935 1,770 24,138 2,878 3,594 3,383 3,071 38,834 501,000 
1936 2,626 33,736 3,273 3,535 4,068 2,663 49,901 537,000 
1937 3,167 42,384 4,259 3,383 4,304 3,763 62,160 758,000 
1938. 3,018 30,741 4,295 3,580 3,545 2,529 47,708 438,000 
Average 1934-38. . . 2,329 30,004 3,323 3,533 3,403 2,924 45,516 542,000 
1946 . . 10,912 43,746 26,419 11,052 14,726 14,360 121,215 1,159,200 
1947 . . 10,425 72,761 42,087 11,436 17,865 24,686 179,260 1,611,800 
1948 . . 10,939 76,405 23,736 12,544 28,856 15,303 167,783 1,628,800 
Average 1946-48 .. 10,758 64,304 30,747 11,677 20,482 18,116 156,086 1,466,600 
1949 . . 6,734 113,727 17,229 7,773 12,206 3,143 160,812 1,043,500 
1950 6,792 92,223 28,796 8,940 7,139 4,340 149,230 1,177,700 
1951 . 6,760 116,868 30,054 8,388 16,468 2,209 180,747 1,114,629 
Average 1949-51 6,762 107,942 25,360 8,370 11,938 3,230 163,596 1,111,943 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
T A B L E 4 . B O L I V I A : E X P O R T S 
(F.o.b. values in thousands of dollars) 





1934 375 96 68 — 23 14 576 56,211 
1935 806 124 57 11 21 15 1,034 36,600 
1936 963 221 123 — 31 111 1,449 37,300 
1937 817 277 129 — 64 44 1,331 36,400 
1938 646 548 89 — 85 13 1,381 27,500 
Average 1934-38 721 253 93 2 45 39 1,154 38,802 
1946 . . . 2,700 400 100 40 300 5 3,545 79,300 
1947 . . . 1,770 329 168 40 340 1 2,648 86,000 
1948 . . . 1,539 132 323 1 92 5 2,092 118,700 
Average 1 9 4 6 - 4 8 . . . . . . . 2,003 287 197 27 244 3 2,762 94,666 
1949 . . . 1,545 143 211 — 37 8 1,944 100,300 
1950 . . . 2,156 295 162 — 6 12 2,631 94,072 
1951 . . . 1,301 982 247 — 212 17 2,759 150,819 
Average 1949^51 . . . 1,667 473 207 — 85 12 2,444 115,064 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
T A B L E 5 . B R A Z I L : E X P O R T S 
(F.o.b. values in thousands of dollars) 





1934 13,450 44 794 90 6 8,596 22,980 284,000 
1935 . . . 13,223 4 842 64 56 6,951 21,140 272,000 
1936 13,065 14 810 36 22 6,328 20,275 320,000 
1937 16,609 52 1,021 49 36 6,361 24,128 348,000 
1938 13,388 51 515 52 29 4,206 18,241 296,000 
Average 1934-38 .. . 13,947 33 796 58 30 6,488 21,352 304,000 
1946 , . . 70,445 1,176 10,008 2,115 1,603 15,338 100,685 673,600 
1947 . . . 108,301 1,383 11,826 4,137 1,306 19,282 146,235 1,231,700 
1948 . :. 111,057 763 12,729 1,178 291 17,641 143,659 1,134,200 
Average 1946-48 .. . 96,601 1,107 11,521 2,577 1,067 17,420 130,192 1,013,166 
1949 83,774 240 9,340 1,806 382 15,668 111,210 2,115,900 
1950 . . . 75,789 151 9,225 516 59 16,967 102,707 1,097,900 
1951 . . . 116,907 1,648 6,198 264 4,678 16,662 146,357 1,757,396 
Average 1949-51 . 92,157 680 8,254 862 1,706 16,432 120,091 1,657,065 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
T A B L E 6 . C H I L E : E X P O R T S 
(F.o.b. values in thousands of dollars) 





1934 . . . 1,723 497 534 5 1,572 141 4,472 95,000 
1935 . . . 1,372 533 356 2 926 87 3,276 96,000 
1936 . . . 2,083 609 480 2 1,044 167 4,385 113,000 
1937 . . . 2,315 677 641 7 991 216 4,847 193,000 
1938 . . . 2,079 792 661 4 1,030 236 4,802 139,000 
Average 1934-38. . . ... 1,914 622 534 4 1,113 169 4,356 127,000 
1946 . . . 17,645 5,231 9,240 17 4,291 1,112 37,536 230,700 
1947 . . . 21,665 2,321 7,638 17 3,564 1,761 36,966 280,100 
1948 . . . 13,841 2,482 7,417 246 3,063 1,085 28,134 329,900 
Average 1946-48 ... 17,717 3,344 8,099 126 3,698 1,319 34,212 280,230 
1949 . . . 11,112 2,593 12,165 514 1,885 649 28,918 308,300 
1950 . . . 17,695 1,642 12,962 170 1,643 4,254 38,366 293,900 
1951 . . . 25,368 2,299 13,349 24 2,848 5,022 48,910 376,752 
Average 1949-51. . . . .. 18,053 2,178 12,825 236 2,125 3,308 38,731 326,317 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
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T A B L E 7 . P A R A G U A Y : E X P O R T S 
(F.o.b. values in thousands of dollars) 
Zonal Grand 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Peru Uruguay total total 
1934 2,732 5 29 — 184 2,950 8,400 
1935 2,029 — 6 2 — 178 2,215 8,500 
1936 1,061 — 2 13 — 133 1,209 6,300 
1937 1,779 — 5 .—. — 162 1,946 8,400 
1938 1,660 • — 3 — — 157 1,820 7,500 
Average 1934-38 1,852 1 9 3 — 163 2,028 7,820 
1946 7,085 7 31 4 4 2,083 9,224 26,754 
1947 8,606 3 3 .—. — 1,551 10,163 21,261 
1948 9,290 — 13 6 — 2,116 11,425 28,185 
Average 1946-48 8,327 3 19 3 1 1,917 10,271 25,473 
1949 . . 11,475 — 21 3 — 1,541 13,040 32,883 
1950 . . 10,405 — 244 16 — 3,148 13,013 29,124 
1951 9,742 1 7 6 — 1,450 10,206 31,070 
Average 1949-51 .. 10,541 — 124 7 — 2,046 12,353 31,026 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
T A B L E 8 . P E R U : E X P O R T S 
(F.o.b. values in thousands of dollars) 





1934 1,811 801 2,058 3,686 — 970 9,326 71,200 
1935 2,803 696 1,413 4,040 — 1,051 10,003 75,400 
1936 594 833 1,978 4,389 7 739 8,540 83,500 
1937 4,742 1,225 779 5,648 — 466 12,860 92,100 
1938 6,038 975 1,497 4,684 — 1,643 14,837 75,100 
Average 1934-38 3,198 906 1,545 4,489 1 974 11,113 79,400 
1946 4,535 6,265 1,321 29,189 — 8,995 50,305 151,300 
1947 3,620 4,878 655 30,254 — 9,900 49,307 154,300 
1948 6,688 6,on 386 30,785 — 6,861 50,792 162,400 
Average 1946-48 4,887 5,738 787 30,076 — 8,585 50,134 156,000 
1949 4,616 5,142 1,179 26,676 57 2,927 40,597 154,400 
1950 9,454 6,264 531 28,339 5 5,449 50,042 193,700 
1951 . 14,023 7,998 3,100 19,171 2 7,034 51,328 252,517 
Average 1949-51 9,364 6,468 1,603 24,729 21 5,137 47,322 200,206 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
T A B L E 9 . U R U G U A Y : E X P O R T S 
(F.o.b. values in thousands of dollars) 
Zonal Grand 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Peru total total 
1934 . . . 4,069 — 3,667 2 108 — 7,846 56,355 
1935 . . . 5,540 — 3,807 1 43 — 9,391 76,909 
1936 . . . 8,011 — 2,235 97 46 4 10,393 72,206 
1937 .. . 7,429 — 2,121 57 126 — 9,733 78,176 
1938 . . 5,933 — 2,237 35 182 43 8,430 62,103 
Average 1934-38 .. 6,196 — 2,813 38 101 9 9,157 69,150 
1946 . . . 1,921 79 3,136 370 477 344 6,327 152,766 
1947 . . 3,213 13 2,012 109 165 196 5,708 162,502 
1948 . . 4,077 389 10,005 8 198 18 14,695 178,953 
Average 1946-48 3,070 160 5,051 . 162 281 186 8,910 22,560 
1949 . . 7,623 303 13,741 18 252 147 22,084 191,660 
1950 . . 1,305 771 3,450 180 680 369 5,755 254,282 
1951 . . 2,360 — 7,017 — — • — 9,377 236,330 
Average 1949-51 3,763 537 7,736 99 466 258 13,919 227,424 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
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T A B L E 1 0 . A R G E N T I N A : I M P O R T S 
(C.i.f. values in thousands of dollars) 





1934 323 17,968 2,405 2,948 3,870 1,182 28,696 317,663 
1935 403 19,593 2,072 2,410 6,130 2,388 32,996 333,342 
1936 549 17,594 2,618 1,099 1,668 1,595 25,123 324,181 
1937 527 24,325 2,943 1,965 9,441 1,714 40,915 479,455 
1938 546 21,948 2,069 1,778 14,226 1,353 41,920 427,164 
Average 1934-38. . , 470 20,286 2,421 2,040 7,067 1,646 33,930 376,361 
1946 2,522 85,244 8,323 6,053 5,548 3,2 79 110,968 588,130 
1947 1,504 110,013 14,535 7,011 4,761 5,764 143,594 1,340,209 
1948 1,514 131,448 13,120 8,074 7,821 8,831 170,807 1,561,737 
Average 1946-48. . . 1,847 108,901 11,993 7,048 6,043 5,958 141,790 1,163,358 
1949 2,033 90,714 16,008 11,435 6,353 11,180 137,722 1,179,532 
1950 3,200 92,000 28,000 13,800 7,200 2,000 146,200 964,200 
1951 2,145 147,480 34,409 15,337 21,664 2,916 223,951 1,618,869 
Average 1949-51. . . 2,459 110,065 26,139 13,524 11,739 5,365 169,291 1,254,200 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
T A B L E 1 1 . B O L I V I A : I M P O R T S 
(C.i.f. values in thousands of dollars) 
Zonal Grand 
Argentina Brazil Chile Paraguay Peru Uruguay total total 
1934 1,398 306 1,288 •— 2,011 3 5,006 25,111 
1935 2,117 365 870 — 1,714 23 5,089 27,309 
1936 2,867 299 964 — 1,786 13 5,929 20,683 
1937 2,833 287 850 — 3,439 15 7,424 25,881 
1938 3,347 198 1,118 — 3,308 4 7,975 25,881 
Average 1934-38 . . . 2,512 291 1,018 — 2,452 12 6,285 24,191 
1946 . . . . 11,975 2,322 4,920 8 7,151 80 26,456 51,552 
1947 12,097 1,482 3,697 — 6,281 — 23,557 59,557 
1948 11,151 2,026 3,775 — 7,048 — 24,000 68,736 
Average 1946-48 . . . 11,741 1,943 4,131 3 6,827 27 24,672 59,948 
1949 12,403 1,116 3,580 4 6,353 299 23,755 78,330 
1950 9,864 1,155 2,947 9 6,042 697 20,714 55,843 
1951 5,383 793 1,957 2 3,797 276 12,208 36,683 
Average 1949-51 . . . 9,217 1,021 2,828 5 5,397 424 18,892 56,952 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
T A B L E 1 2 . B R A Z I L : I M P O R T S 
(C.i.f. values in thousands of dollars) 





1934 . 25,599 9 872 32 1,875 1,418 29,805 205,729 
1935 . 29,125 9 736 7 1,603 1,256 32,736 224,800 
1936 . 40,563 20 649 2 2,118 1,627 44,979 246,729 
1937 . 45,829 13 1,136 5 1,063 816 48,862 330,565 
1938 . 34,971 14 1,016 4 1,517 2,101 39,623 295,628 
Average 1934-38. . . 35,217 13 882 10 1,635 1,444 39,201 260,690 
1946 . 52,731 121 11,101 9 1,633 3,225 68,820 673,586 
1947 78,946 128 12,376 35 859 2,233 94,577 1,231,761 
1948 . 80,884 121 10,950 62 569 9,677 102,263 1,134,233 
Average 1946-48. . . 70,854 123 11,476 35 1,020 5,045 88,553 1,013,193 
1949 . 117,498 163 15,268 30 1,758 16,655 151,372 1,116,029 
1950 . 109,786 105 15,256 9 569 8,195 133,920 1,097,941 
1951 . 125,034 157 16,215 634 5,143 10,056 157,239 2,010,571 
Average 1949-51. . . 117,439 142 15,580 224 2,490 11,635 147,510 1,408,180 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
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T A B L E 1 3 . C H I L E : I M P O R T S 
(C.i.f. values in thousands of dollars) 





1934 . 1,228 39 702 — 4,333 4 6,306 49,431 
1935 . 1,930 18 780 2 4,509 5 7,244 62,699 
1936 . 2,004 11 953 14 5,019 67 8,068 71,600 
1937 . 3,805 29 898 — 7,176 38 11,946 88,561 
1938 . 4,491 10 638 — 5,995 301 11,435 103,035 
Average 1934-38. . . 2,692 21 794 3 5,406 83 8,999 75,065 
1946 . 28,724 178 11,338 16 31,759 384 72,399 196,929 
1947 . 28,563 124 13,141 1 35,697 122 77,648 269,965 
1948 . 25,857 254 10,997 24 35,563 25 72,720 269,233 
Average 1946-48. . . 27,715 185 11,825 14 34,340 177 74,256 245,376 
1949 . 13,364 197 12,994 14 32,667 23 59,259 304,583 
1950 . 13,437 160 11,274 170 17,976 124 43,141 247,958 
1951 . 26,044 231 6,156 — 14,221 1,002 47,654 329,140 
Average 1949-51. . . 17,615 196 10,141 61 21,621 383 50,017 293,894 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
T A B L E 1 4 . P A R A G U A Y : I M P O R T S 
(C.i.f. values in thousands of dollars) 





1934 4,318 99 6 — 119 4,542 7,700 
1935 3,934 — 70 1,018 — 47 5,069 8,700 
1936 3,886 — 40 2 8 50 3,986 6,500 
1937 3,705 — 53 8 — 139 3,905 8,700 
1938 3,935 — 58 4 — 200 4,197 8,200 
Average 1934-38. 3,956 — 64 208 2 111 4,341 7,960 
1946 10,169 3,143 — — 949 14,261 21,483 
1947 7,664 — 3,280 — — 556 11,500 22,033 
1948 8,248 — 1,395 256 2 357 10,258 24,347 
Average 1946-48. 8,694 — 2,606 85 — 621 12,006 22,621 
1949 6,273 6 2,028 187 31 468 8,993 28,433 
1950 6,346 2 814 188 7 413 7,770 17,610 
1951 8,541 6 508 8 6 782 9,851 33,023 
Average 1949-51. 7,053 5 1,117 128 15 554 8,872 26,355 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
T A B L E 1 5 . P E R U : I M P O R T S 
(C.i.f. values in thousands of dollars) 





1934 1,847 H 27 1,811 — 1 3,697 39,936 
1935 3,360 13 73 1,126 — — 4,572 44,144 
1936 4,323 9 102 1,236 — 4 5,674 50,386 
1937 4,874 8 103 1,243 — 42 6,270 60,048 
1938 3,636 7 61 1,195 — 169 ' 5,068 59,498 
Average 1934-38. 3,608 10 73 1,322 — 43 5,056 50,802 
1946 17,084 256 1,840 6,254 35 331 25,800 119,900 
1947 17,816 462 1,137 4,751 72 229 24,467 132,700 
1948 29,567 157 1,183 5,354 — 49 36,310 167,700 
Average 1946-48. 21,489 292 1,387 5,453 36 203 28,860 140,100 
1949 7,928 23 344 2,666 17 65 11,043 167,097 
1950 6,874 15 78 2,270 15 369 9,621 187,599 
1951 11,215 259 3,410 3,588 • — 247 18,719 279,196 
Average 1949-51. 8,672 99 1,277 2,841 11 227 13,127 211,297 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
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T A B L E 2 0 . Q U A N T U M OF L U M B E R E X P O R T S IN T H E S O U T H E R N ZONE 
(Annual averages in metric tons) 
Argentine Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Peru Uruguay Total 
A. Exports to the southern zone 
1 9 3 4 - 3 8 . . . 10 ,289 12 144 ,426 2 0 , 0 4 8 5 2 , 6 0 0 — — 2 2 7 , 3 7 5 
1 9 4 6 - 4 8 . . 6 , 0 0 6 4 , 8 9 9 4 8 9 , 7 5 9 4 1 , 2 2 0 194 ,070 — — 735 ,954 
1 9 4 9 - 5 1 . . 6,006® 5 ,844» 379 ,512 74 ,469 d 197 ,990 — — 663 ,821 
1 9 4 6 - 5 0 . . 6 , 0 0 6 ° 5 , 1 3 5 b 4 2 9 , 9 5 0 5 4 , 5 2 0 2 0 3 , 4 3 6 — — 699 ,047 
1 9 4 6 - 5 1 . . 6 , 0 0 6 " 5 , 1 3 5 b 4 3 4 , 6 3 5 5 4 , 5 2 0 " 196 ,030 — — 6 9 6 , 3 2 6 
B. Total exports 
1 9 3 4 - 3 8 . . . 103 ,261 2 8 210 ,602 26 ,437 5 2 , 6 0 0 4 , 5 6 8 — 3 9 7 , 4 9 6 
1 9 4 6 - 4 8 . . . 17 ,370 4 , 8 9 9 6 2 0 , 1 6 9 4 8 , 9 1 0 195 ,103 4 , 2 4 6 — 890 ,697 
1 9 4 9 - 5 1 . . . 1 7 , 3 7 0 " 5 , 8 4 4 » 6 1 9 , 4 9 8 9 6 , 2 1 3 d 1 9 8 , 9 9 0 5 ,789 — 9 4 3 , 7 0 4 
1 9 4 6 - 5 0 . . . 17 ,370» 5 , 1 3 5 b 584 ,449 67 ,831 2 0 4 , 4 5 6 4 , 3 4 9 — 8 8 3 , 5 9 0 
1 9 4 6 - 5 1 . . . 1 7 , 3 7 0 " 5 ,135» 619 ,834 6 7 , 8 3 1 " 197 ,047 5 ,017 — 9 1 2 , 2 3 4 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
» Y e a r 1949. b Average 1 9 4 6 - 4 9 . c Average 1 9 4 6 - 5 0 . d Average 1 9 4 9 - 5 0 . " Average 1 9 4 6 - 4 8 . 
T A B L E 2 1 . V A L U E O F L U M B E R I M P O R T S IN T H E S O U T H E R N ZONE 
(Annual averages, in thousands of dollars) 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Peru Uruguay Total 
A. Imports from the southern zone 
1 9 3 4 - 3 8 . . . . 3 ,392 95 — 1 — 150 772 4 , 4 1 0 
1 9 4 6 - 4 8 . . . . . . . 4 3 , 5 6 6 2 5 4 4 — — 570 5 ,101 4 9 , 4 9 5 
1 9 4 9 - 5 1 . . . . . . . 4 2 , 9 6 7 132 — — — 228» 5 , 9 7 2 d 4 9 , 2 9 9 
1 9 4 6 - 5 0 . . . . . . . 4 2 , 5 7 0 2 2 3 b 2 — — 4 8 5 » 5 ,449 4 8 , 7 2 9 
1 9 4 6 - 5 1 . . . . . . . 4 3 , 2 6 6 2 2 3 b 2 — — 4 8 5 » 5 , 4 4 9 " 4 9 , 4 2 5 
B. Total imports 
1 9 3 4 - 3 8 . . . . . . . 9 , 6 4 9 311 159 2 4 8 — 1 ,390 1 ,476 13 ,233 
1 9 4 6 - 4 8 . . . . . . . 50 ,965 9 2 6 103 242 — 2 , 4 9 9 5 , 9 6 8 6 0 , 7 0 3 
1 9 4 9 - 5 1 . . . . . . . 66 ,082 716« 229d 3 7 4 — 2 , 2 5 0 d 6 , 8 4 9 7 6 , 5 0 0 
1 9 4 6 - 5 0 . . . . . . . 54 ,722 873» 153 2 6 0 — 2 , 3 9 9 6 ,547 6 4 , 9 5 4 
1 9 4 6 - 5 1 5 8 , 5 2 4 8 7 3 b 1 5 3 " 3 7 0 — 2 , 3 9 9 " 6 , 4 0 9 6 8 , 7 2 8 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
» Y e a r 1949. b Average 1 9 4 6 - 4 9 . 0 Average 1 9 4 6 - 5 0 . d Average 1 9 4 9 - 5 0 . 
T A B L E 2 2 . Q U A N T U M OF L U M B E R I M P O R T S IN T H E S O U T H E R N ZONE 
(Annual averages, in metr ic tons) 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Peru Uruguay Total 
A. Imports from the southern zone 
1 9 3 4 - 3 8 . . 2 0 8 , 3 9 0 3 , 7 5 9 — 8 — 12 ,554 4 6 , 6 9 1 271 ,402 
1 9 4 6 - 4 8 . . 6 2 7 , 3 8 2 4 , 0 1 8 602 1 — 14,554 91 ,891 7 3 8 , 4 4 8 
1 9 4 9 - 5 1 . . 6 3 0 , 0 0 9 2 ,768» 4 5 2 1 — 6 , 0 7 2 » 9 5 , 2 8 0 734 ,582 
1 9 4 6 - 5 0 . . 6 1 8 , 8 2 4 3 ,705» 4 5 2 1 — 12 ,434» 93 ,227 728 ,643 
1 9 4 6 - 5 1 . . 6 2 8 , 6 9 5 3 , 7 0 5 h 452 1 — 12 ,434» 9 3 , 2 2 7 " 738 ,514 
B. Total imports 
1 9 3 4 - 3 8 . : 4 3 3 , 6 6 7 15,357 933 7 ,342 — 9 4 , 6 8 5 74 ,941 6 2 6 , 9 2 5 
1 9 4 6 - 4 8 . . 7 0 1 , 4 7 9 16,741 1 ,515 2 , 5 9 4 — 5 5 , 8 2 8 102 ,521 8 8 0 , 6 7 8 
1 9 4 9 - 5 1 . . 8 3 2 , 0 1 2 15 ,246» 3 6 7 2 ,821 — 4 5 , 7 0 5 109 ,106 1 ,005 ,257 
1 9 4 6 - 5 0 . . 7 3 2 , 9 5 0 16 ,368» 1 ,228" 2 ,417 — 5 0 , 7 2 0 105 ,156 9 0 8 , 8 3 9 
1 9 4 6 - 5 1 . . 7 6 6 , 7 4 6 16 ,368» 1 ,228" 2 ,707 — 50 ,767 1 0 5 , 1 5 6 " 9 4 2 , 9 7 2 
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Yearbooks. 
* Y e a r 1949. b Average 1 9 4 6 - 4 9 . « Average 1 9 4 6 - 5 0 . d Average 1 9 4 9 - 5 0 . 
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